PALESTINE IN THE LATE OTTOMAN PERIOD

Political, Social and Economic Transformation

PALESTINE IN THE LATE OTTOMAN PERIOD

Political, Social and Economic Transformation

Edited by DAVID KUSHNER

YAD IZHAK BEN-ZVI, JERUSALEM • E.J. BRILL, LEIDEN

Published with the assistance of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn

Copyright © 1986 by Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Press, Jerusalem, Israel

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without written permission from the publisher.

Published by the Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute for the Study of Eretz Israel, P.O.Box 7660, Jerusalem, 91076 Israel

Distributed outside Israel by E.J. Brill, Postbus 9000, 2300 PA Leiden, the Netherlands

ISBN 965-217-027-5 (Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi)
ISBN 90 04 07792 8 (Brill)

Printed in Israel

Contents

Foreword IX
Note on Transliteration XII

Government and Administration

CARTER V. FINDLEY — The Evolution of the System of Provincial Administration as Viewed from the Center 3
HAIM GERBER — A New Look at the *Tanẓīmāt*: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem 30
RUTH KARK — The Contribution of the Ottoman Regime to the Development of Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1840-1917 46
ROBERT EISENMAN — The Young Turk Legislation, 1913-1917, and Its Application in Palestine/Israel 59
ENGIN D. AKARLI — 'Abdülḥamīd II's Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System 74

Society and Economy

BUTRUS ABU-MANNEH — The Ḥusaynīs: The Rise of a Notable Family in 18th Century Palestine 93
GABRIEL BAER — Jerusalem's Families of Notables and the Waḳf in the Early 19th Century 109
URI M. KUPFERSCHMIDT — A Note on the Muslim Religious Hierarchy Towards the End of the Ottoman Period ... 123
ALEXANDER SCHÖLCH — Was There a Feudal System in Ottoman Lebanon and Palestine? 130
RUTH RODED — Social Patterns Among the Urban Elite of Syria During the Late Ottoman Period, 1876-1918 146
C. ERNEST DAWN — Ottoman Affinities of 20th Century Regimes in Syria 172
GAD G. GILBAR — The Growing Economic Involvement of Palestine with the West, 1865-1914 188

Fred M. Gottheil	Money and Product Flows in Mid-19th Century Palestine: The Physiocratic Model Applied	211
Shmuel Avitsur	Wind Power in the Technological Development of Palestine	231

Foreign Involvement

Daniel Crecelius	Egypt's Reawakening Interest in Palestine During the Regimes of 'Alī Bey al-Kabīr and Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, 1760-1775	247
Yair Hirschfeld	Some Findings on Prussian and Ottoman Politics in Palestine During the 1840s Based on the Writings of Dr. Gustav E. Schultz, the First Prussian Vice-Consul to Jerusalem, 1842-1851	263
Isaiah Friedman	The System of Capitulations and Its Effects on Turco-Jewish Relations in Palestine, 1856-1897	280
Moshe Rinott	Capitulations: The case of the German-Jewish Hilfsverein Schools in Palestine, 1901-1914	294
Alex Carmel	A Note on the Christian Contribution to Palestine's Development in the 19th Century	302
David Kushner	The "Foreign Relations" of the Governors of Jerusalem Toward the End of the Ottoman Period	309
Caesar E. Farah	Protestantism and Politics: The 19th Century Dimension in Syria	320
J.C. Hurewitz	The Entente's Secret Agreements in World War I: Loyalty to an Obsolescing Ethos	341

Sources for the History of Ottoman Palestine

'Ādel Mannā'	The *Sijill* as Source for the Study of Palestine During the Ottoman Period, with Special Reference to the French Invasion	351
U.O. Schmelz	Demographic Research of the Jerusalem and Hebron Regions Towards the End of the Ottoman Period	363

MORDECHAI ELIAV	The German and Austrian Consular Archives in Jerusalem as a Source for the History of Palestine and Its Population in the Late Ottoman Period	372
NATHAN SCHUR	Itineraries by Pilgrims and Travelers as Source Material for the History of Palestine in the Ottoman Period.....	382
GEOFFREY LEWIS	An Ottoman Officer in Palestine, 1914-1918	402
Contributors		417
Index		419

Foreword

The Ottoman period in the history of Palestine lasted four hundred years, and while its beginning goes back almost to the Middle Ages, its closing years bring us well into the 20th century. It began in 1517, when Sultan Selīm I conquered Palestine in the course of his successful campaign against the Mamluks, and ended in 1917/18, when the British permanently ousted the Ottomans from their possessions in the Fertile Crescent. During this long and almost uninterrupted Ottoman rule, the period between the late 18th and the early 20th centuries stand out as a time of particularly dramatic changes. It was a time of foreign penetration and foreign involvement in the affairs of the country, making Palestine the scene of acute rivalry between the European powers; it was a time of economic development and of increasing links between the country and the world market; it was a time of a growing population, new settlements and expanding towns; it was a time of significant changes in the role of government and in the administrative structure; it was a time of emergence of new social forces; and it was a time of "opening up" toward Western cultural influences. These and other contemporary developments have left their mark on the country to this very day.

The articles presented in this volume touch upon a variety of topics all related, in one form or another, to these general developments. The important goal of writing a comprehensive history of Palestine during the late Ottoman period, and the Ottoman period as a whole, still stands unfulfilled, and given the enormous source material which awaits discovery and investigation, is perhaps beyond the capability of any individual scholar in the near future. Rather, this volume attempts to add some building stones to the edifice which hopefully one day will be built. It constitutes the fruits of the research of many scholars interested in various aspects of the area's history, and belonging to a number of academic disciplines. Indeed, it is through the collaboration of historians, economists, sociologists, geographers and many others that the goal of writing the history of Ottoman Palestine stands its best chance.

The volume includes several articles which rather than focus on the area of Palestine, as such, go beyond into the neighboring regions and deal with the subject matter in the larger Syrian context. Ottoman Palestine was never an entity unto itself and was always closely linked, administratively, economically and otherwise to its neighboring areas. Developments in Palestine had their parallels in Syria, and while in some cases research work on Palestine proper

has progressed beyond what we have concerning Syria as a whole, in other cases the opposite is true. Accordingly, there is much to learn from studies of Ottoman Syria. They may give us some reasonable hypotheses with regards to similar historical problems faced in research on Palestine, or they can, simply, point to what is still lacking, encouraging us to fill the gaps in our knowledge in due course.

Whether they occurred in Palestine, or adjacent areas, developments in the late Ottoman period naturally reflected changes within the Ottoman Empire as a whole. To mention just two examples: The involvement of foreign powers in the affairs of the country was a corollary to the general European encroachment upon the Ottoman Empire which gave rise to the Eastern Question. Similarly, the new principles of government and administration introduced into the country were in no small part the fruit of the reforms, known as the *Tanẓīmāt*, initiated by the 19th-century Ottoman statesmen, for the purpose of strengthening and modernizing the state. Certain aspects of the history of Palestine and its neighboring areas can therefore serve as suitable case studies which may teach us something about Ottoman history as a whole. As Albert Hourani aptly says while discussing the goals of Middle Eastern research: "A special importance attaches to small scale studies of limited regions and communities within a broader framework as it is only through them that we can understand what really happened in history".* It is indeed to be hoped that the studies presented here may constitute some contribution, if a modest one, toward this important goal.

One final word may be in place. In the minds of many of the area's inhabitants, both Jews and Arabs, the Ottoman period has not fared too well. There are widespread misconceptions regarding the nature of the Ottoman government and administration, which is often seen as the source of many of the ills which have afflicted the region. This negative outlook stems, perhaps, from two main factors. First, it is the long period of Ottoman decline which is mostly remembered by the population of the successor states, not the period of the Empire's heyday with its orderly system and its better economic and social conditions. Second, it happened to be the Ottoman Empire which ruled over Jews and Arabs at just that particular moment in their history when they began aspiring toward national liberation and it was only natural that much of their protest and grievances be directed against their Ottoman masters. In the interest of true scholarship, it is therefore the duty of all students of the history of Palestine to rethink much of what has been said or written of the Ottoman period, and try to reach as objective and true an appraisal as possible of the realities of that time. Once again, it is to be hoped that this volume can serve as a vehicle toward this end.

* * *

* "History", in Leonard Binder (ed.), *The Study of the Middle East* (New York, 1976), p. 121.

The articles included in this volume were originally presented as papers at an international conference on the Legacy of Ottoman Palestine, held in Haifa in December of 1979. The conference was organized by the Institute of Middle East Studies affiliated with the Jewish-Arab Center at the University of Haifa. Sadly, two of the scholars who participated in the conference and whose studies were included did not live to see the book in print: Gabriel Baer and Moshe Rinott.

An effort has been made to achieve, as far as possible, uniformity in the style and form of the articles, although some usages of a minor technical nature follow the preferences of the individual authors. Attention was given, in particular, to uniformity of spelling and transliteration, which resulted at times in deviations from the original practices of the authors. The editor assumes, of course, all responsibility for any errors or inconsistencies which may have occurred in this process.

The conference on the Legacy of Ottoman Palestine was sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn, which also contributed generously toward the publication of this book. Their interest and assistance is acknowledged with deep gratitude. It is also my wish to heartily thank Prof. Alex Carmel who was instrumental in the realization of the conference, and to Mr. David Bukay and Mrs. Ilana Sorek who assisted in its organization.

In the publication of the volume special thanks are due to Mrs. Helen Silman, who served as language editor and Mrs. Ayala Kazimirsky, who prepared the index. The staff of Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi has been of great assistance throughout all phases of publication: Prof. Amnon Cohen, Mr. Yehuda Ben-Porat and Mr. Zvi Zameret were a source of good advice and much encouragement, while Mrs. Shlomit Meshulam, Miss Orit Wertheim and Mr. Channanel Goldberg untiringly carried it through all the printing stages. Their help is acknowledged with deep gratitude.

From the outset it was impossible not to feel the guiding spirit of the late Prof. Uriel Heyd, a pioneer in the study of Ottoman Palestine, who was the teacher of a great many of the scholars whose studies are presented here. It is to his memory that this volume is dedicated.

Haifa 1985 *DAVID KUSHNER*

Note on Transliteration

The rules followed in the transliteration of foreign terms and names are, with the minor deviations necessary in specific cases, as follows:

1. Arabic terms and names have been transliterated according to the system used by the *Encyclopedia of Islam* (new edition), with some modifications:

   a. 'j' has been used in place of 'dj'
   b. The lines under 'th', 'kh', 'dh', 'sh', 'gh' have been omitted.

2. Ottoman terms and names of Arabic or Persian origin have been transliterated according to the system for Ottoman Turkish used by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (in this category certain terms common to Turkish and Arabic, and particularly those of religious significance, have been transliterated into Arabic). Terms and names of pure Turkish origin, or of an origin other than Arabic or Persian — as well as ones which relate to the period after the language reform in Turkey (1928) — appear in the modern Turkish orthography. (Note that in Turkish 'c' is pronounced 'j', 'ç' is pronounced 'ch', and 'ş' is pronounced 'sh'.)

3. Hebrew terms and names have been transliterated according to a system similar to that used by the Hebrew Language Academy. There are no indications of the lengthening of vowels or doubling of consonants.

4. Those names which are familiar to the English reader in their anglicized form are rendered in their customary, accepted spelling.

Government and Administration

The Evolution of the System of Provincial Administration as Viewed from the Center

CARTER V. FINDLEY

The hoary truisms about Ottoman history of the later periods include the propositions that new laws and reforms remained mostly "on paper" and that an examination of how measures were officially prescribed tells little about how they were actually implemented. Ideas such as these surely date back to observations by contemporaries and must have behind them a depth of experience that the present-day historian cannot match. Yet experience, especially when interpreted in the light of limited information or preconceived opinions, is not an infallible guide to knowledge. If the practical achievements of the reformers and legislators did not match their professed intentions, it is appropriate to ask why that was so and whether there is not still more information to uncover. It is worthwhile to bear in mind that formulation of reformist concepts is less difficult than their full elaboration in regulatory acts, that regulation is less difficult than uniform implementation of the regulations over vast territories with diverse populations, and that ongoing monitoring of the implementation of regulatory ideals is perhaps most difficult of all. It is well to bear in mind, too, that some of the problems the reformers sought to solve were really insoluble. Sooner or later, in any case, thorough study of reform programs requires close examination of the relevant regulatory acts. And what a task this can be. In the volumes of the officially published series of laws, the *Düstūr*[1], alone there are perhaps twenty thousand pages of material of this kind for the years 1839-1922 — not much by twentieth-century standards, yet a great deal for the place and time. Do these acts not reveal at least what the reformers thought "ought" to have been? And do they not also tell us something through the problems cited in their successive revisions, or through the abuses they attempted to prevent — about what actually "was"? Granted, the question of the extent to which the laws and regulations governed the course of events also needs to be examined in an empirical way. Yet in addressing a question such as the situation in any single part of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth-century reform era, it is important to be aware of what the regulatory texts have to say.

This essay is intended to help develop such an awareness. This discussion is mainly a comparison of the laws on provincial administration of 1864 and 1871, with the successor law of 1913. The essay is the more "academic" in that the law of 1913 was evidently not fully applied before the collapse of the Empire. Some efforts were made, and this discussion concludes with a

consideration of the response they elicited. The most serious effort at implementation probably came in Turkey itself, after the rise of the republic.[2] In any case, the law of 1913 shows the conclusions drawn by the reformers in the Young Turk period after almost fifty years of experience with the earlier legislation and thus provides a measure of the final state of Ottoman ideas on local administration.

Before looking at the laws of 1864 and 1871, some comment on the evolution of the system of provincial administration during the earlier decades of the reform era is appropriate. The dates of those laws make it clear that the promulgation of the first general laws on provincial administration was quite late in the Ottoman era. Yet, certainly by the end of the eighteenth century, Ottoman officials in Istanbul were keenly aware of the need for the central government to reassert its authority in the countryside. They had begun to recognize, too, that this would require an improvement in the quality and regularity of the services that the central government was able to provide. Maḥmūd II (1808-39) accordingly began attempting to eliminate local powers resistant to central control. He also resumed an effort that Selīm III had already begun, that of forming modern-style military and civil-bureaucratic elites. In addition, he reasserted the legislative function of the central government and made that into the principal means for the projection throughout the Empire of reformist concepts — thence the myriad laws and regulations in the *Dūstūr*.

It must be recognized, of course, that Maḥmūd's success in these endeavors was limited. Syria and Palestine, for example, remained under the control of a miscellany of more or less autonomous local notables and Bedouin tribes until the Egyptian occupation in 1831. It was during the period of Egyptian rule, lasting until 1840, that the first attempt was made to institute a regular system of civil administration, together with military conscription, partial secularization of the law courts and the concession of equal political status to Christian and Jewish subjects. The efforts of the Ottomans to reassert their control after the end of the Egyptian occupation occurred in the face of an outburst of resentment at the Egyptian measures, something more or less suppressed until then by the sternness of Ibrāhīm Paşa's rule.[3]

For the Empire in general, the fact that a quarter century was still to pass before the promulgation of the first general law on provincial administration is perhaps best interpreted as an indication of the difficulty of creating and staffing new kinds of administrative systems and infrastructure throughout the Empire. After the death of Maḥmūd II in 1839, the new civil-bureaucratic elite which he had formed gradually came to dominate the affairs of the central government. It tried to create a system of local administration that was intended to be essentially an extension of the civil bureaucracy at the center. Simultaneously, it continued the process of innovative legislation with the Gülḫāne Decree of 1839. This decree pointed the way for subsequent reforms. For together with its guarantees of life, honor, and property, its promise of due

process of law, and its proclamation of legal equality between Muslim and non-Muslim, it also spoke of replacing tax farming with a regularized system for assessing and collecting revenue; and it provided for the creation in Istanbul of a special council to draft further legislation required for implementation of these promises.[4] In fact, the government had already attempted in 1838 to replace tax farming with direct collection and centralized control of revenues, as well as to introduce a system of regular salaries for the emolument of central and provincial officials alike. The uncertain hold on power by the new reformist elite, resistance by those with vested interests in the old ways, and the diplomatic problems of the contemporary crisis in Ottoman-Egyptian relations kept these measures from bearing fruit as intended.[5] Together with the virtual adoption of free trade in the Anglo-Ottoman commercial convention of Balta Liman (1838), the unsuccessful attempt at fiscal centralization created new economic problems that the Ottomans never really overcame.

The cause of local administrative reform suffered a setback. Yet it had not been thwarted totally. For most of the *Tanẓīmāt* period, the provincial administrative system developed in a way that reflected custom, happenstance, and some efforts at reform. This system had a number of basic elements. The Empire was divided into provinces known as *eyālets*; these were redefined and decreased in size in 1836. Each *eyālet* was subdivided into *sancaks* or *livās* (two synonymous terms). Each *sancak* or *livā* was divided into *ḳażās*, which were divided in turn into *nāḥiyes*. Administrative districts at these four levels were headed by officials known as *vālī*, which I translate as governor general, and then in descending order — and in contrast to later practice — as *ḳā'imaḳām*, *mūdīr*, and *muḥtār*. At least at the higher levels, these officials were appointed from Istanbul. In keeping with the reformist desire to replace autonomous local powers with control from the center, the powers of the local governor general were initially limited. But they were revised on a number of occasions, and were increased in the 1850s when it became more realistic to regard the *vālī* in the role envisaged for him by the reformers, namely, the provincial representative of the central executive power.[6] The governors general and other chief administrative officers were supported by small staffs of appointed officials. At least at the provincial level, the most important — such as the treasurer (*defterdār*) and the military commander (*ser'asker*) — were initially appointed by the center and were intended to serve as checks on the governor general's power. When his powers were enlarged in 1852, he received the right to appoint subordinate officials, including the chief administrative officers in the next two echelons below him.

In addition, there were local councils, known by various names such as *memleket meclisleri*, which were initially intended to assist the tax collectors (*muḥaṣṣıls*) appointed to implement the program of fiscal centralization announced in 1838. These councils, found at the provincial and — at least where the *Tanẓīmāt* reforms were applied — also at lower levels, included the appointed officials, the local Muslim and non-Muslim religious leaders, and

other members elected by an indirect system to represent the local populace. The councils were innovative in the sense of giving non-Muslims an enlarged role in government; yet, in general, they tended to be dominated more or less by the same notables who had dominated local affairs before the beginning of reform. Gradually acquiring a broad range of functions in both administrative and judicial matters, the councils became one of the most important checks on the governor general's power. They can be regarded both as a new step toward political participation by the local populace and as a case of reliance on collegial institutions to enhance the capabilities of a thinly developed administrative infrastructure.

Relations between the local authorities and those in Istanbul were assured, finally, by means such as the occasional dispatch of inspection missions from the center, the referral of certain types of matters from the provincial councils to the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (*Meclis-i Vālā-yı Aḥkām-ı 'Adliye*) in Istanbul, and the maintenance by the *vālīs* of a functionary known as the "agent of the gate" (*kapı kāhyası*) to represent them at the Sublime Porte. Presumably a remnant of the decentralization of the pre-reform era, the "agents of the gate" continued to exist until 1909, appointment to these posts being taken over by the central government in 1863.[7]

Through the mid-1860s, efforts to improve local administration proceeded by fragmentary or localized measures. Aside from the various redefinitions of the responsibilities of the governors general and other officials or institutions just mentioned, municipal institutions began to be developed for Istanbul,[8] and special regimes were organized for certain places, such as Lebanon, that had a special status for one reason or another. Midḥat Paşa also conducted a highly influential experiment in administrative improvement, beginning in 1861, in the province of Nish.

Out of Midḥat Paşa's efforts, however, there emerged something significantly new: the first general law on provincial administration, initially promulgated in 1864 for application in the single, specially created Danube province, with Midḥat Paşa as governor. In 1867, this law, with a few modifications, was published for more general application and in fact applied in a number of provinces, the Ottoman designation for which was changed under the new law from *eyālet* to *vilāyet*. Also published at the same time or shortly after were a variety of instructions and other documents, some of which go beyond the provisions of the law of 1864 in ways anticipating the next general act on local administration.[9] This was the provincial administration law of 1871, under which virtually all parts of the Empire were finally brought under the *vilāyet* system.

While various features of the local administrative system were modified by subsequent acts, no other law of comparable generality was published until 1913. The laws of 1864 and 1871 were thus milestones in the development of the local administration system and deserve to be studied not only in their own right but also in comparison with the later law. In any such discussion, it is also

appropriate to treat the two earlier laws together. Not only were they promulgated within a few years of each other, but they were clearly viewed as coupled together. A prefatory article in the law of 1871 says that since the basic organization (*teşkīlāt-ı esāsiye*) of the *vilāyets* had been "proclaimed" in the earlier law, and since the provincial courts — which the earlier law had dealt with — were now the subject of separate regulations, the new law dealt only with the responsibilities of the executive officials, the administrative and municipal councils, and the administration of the *nāḥiye* or lowest echelon of administrative subdivisions, about which the 1864 law had little to say. In other words, the new law went beyond the earlier definition of basic organization to define more fully administrative responsibilities and to add some new organizational elements, the municipal councils and the *nāḥiyes*. A "special article" at the end of the law of 1871 then abrogated the provisions of the earlier law, and of certain other acts, that contradicted the new text. For the next forty years, then, the officially prescribed system of local administration was that of 1864 as modified and amplified by the law of 1871, and at certain points by miscellaneous other acts; and it is on this basis that we shall discuss the system.[10]

First, the adoption of the *vilāyet* laws represented something of a redrawing of jurisdictional lines. With twenty-seven *vilāyets* organized down to 1876 in place of thirty-two to forty *eyālets*,[11] the new provincial units were on balance larger than the old. Under the law of 1864, the *vilāyets* were to be subdivided into *sancaks* or *livās*; these into *ḳażās*; and the *ḳażās* directly into villages or *ḳaryes*. What had formerly been the lowest administrative subdivision, the *nāḥiye*, was to disappear, except in cases where there were small groups of villages not worth forming into a separate *ḳażā* (art. 4). The cities and towns were to be treated as consisting of quarters (*maḥalle*) including at least fifty houses, and the *maḥalles* were to be assimilated in administrative status to the villages. The capital of each province, and the chief town of each *sancak*, was also to be the center of an administrative district of the next lower echelon, known as the "*sancak*" or "*ḳażā* of the center" (*merkez sancağı, merkez ḳażāsı*, art. 24 and 35), and each such "central" district was to have its own administrative chief. By 1871, "central" jurisdictions of these types, while continuing to exist in the territorial sense, had lost their distinct administrative apparatus. Then and subsequently, the governor general of the province of Beirut, for example, was also responsible for administering both the *sancak* and the *ḳażā* headquartered at the same town.[12] The law of 1871 also again generalized the *nāḥiye* as the fourth administrative echelon down from the top, between *ḳażā* and village (art. 1, 50-58). Finally, the same law initiated a more integrated approach to the administration of the provincial towns and cities by calling for the creation in them of municipal councils (*belediye meclisleri*, art. 111-29), although these articles were reportedly seldom implemented, and the history of provincial municipal administration only began in general with a later law of 1877. In partial contrast to the nomenclature in use before 1864,

the chief administrative officers at the various administrative echelons were known as the *vālī* of the province, the *mutaṣarrıf* of the *sancak* or *livā*, the *ḳā'imaḳām* of the *ḳażā*, the *mūdīr* of the *nāḥiye*, and the *muḫtār* of the village.

In Palestine, it may be noted, the situation that prevailed under this legislation was that the present-day territories of the State of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza area were divided between the *sancaks* of Acre, Balḳā' (centered at Nablus), Jerusalem, and Ma'ān which included part of the Negev desert. As of the 1890s, when Vital Cuinet published, the *sancaks* of Acre and Balḳā' were part of the *vilāyet* of Beirut, the *sancak* (or *livā*) of Jerusalem was one of the "independent" *sancaks (elviye-i müstaḳille)*, and the *sancak* of Ma'ān was part of the *vilāyet* of Syria. The "independent" *sancaks* were ones attached directly to the Ministry of the Interior in Istanbul, rather than to any *vālī*. The usual reason for this appears to have been either proximity to Istanbul, or the sensitivity or importance of the locale in question.[13] For a *sancak* to be made "independent" in this sense brought it more closely, rather than less so, under the control of the central Ottoman government; it is important to understand the difference between these *sancaks* and the "privileged" or "autonomous provinces" (*eyālāt-ı mümtāze* or *muḫtāre*) — such, at various dates as Egypt or Eastern Rumelia — that were only nominally under Ottoman sovereignty. "*Ḳażās* of the center" were still noted in Palestine as of the turn of the century, while municipal governmental institutions are said to go back as far as 1873 in Jaffa and the 1860s in Jerusalem. Other institutions prescribed for the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy — the *nāḥiyes*, and the *muḫtārs* of the villages — were also present in Palestine, although, there as elsewhere, the *nāḥiyes* were not as widely developed as the regulatory texts indicate they should have been.[14]

The administrative system created by the laws of 1864 and 1871 is usually described as highly centralized and as patterned after the French prefectoral system. Both points, and the connection between them, need to be examined with care. For example, the system of four levels of administrative jurisdictions, often cited as an example of French influence, has precedents as far back as the "classical" Ottoman *tīmār* system.[15] Not only that, but allowing for both the *nāḥiye* and the village, the law of 1871 provided for five levels, not four; and the *nāḥiye* was certainly not a commune in the French sense, but rather an agglomeration of villages.[16] Similarly, while the administrative system created by the Ottoman laws of 1864 and 1871 was repeatedly criticized for over-centralization, there is an element of paradox in attributing this problem to French example, unless in some very general sense. The French actually revised their system of local administration under the Second Empire, at a time when their influence on Ottoman policy makers was indeed strong, along lines of what was announced as decentralization.[17] To the extent that Ottoman reformers borrowed from the French and obtained an opposite result, the reason probably lies partly in the intentions of the Ottoman statesmen, partly also in differences in the Ottoman environment. The idea of a

local administrative infrastructure staffed by personnel from the central civil bureaucracy was still a novelty to Ottomans, as it no longer was to the French. Ottoman provincial legislation did gradually enhance the powers of local administrators; but what was almost more significant was that they, or at least their leaders, were now supposed to be bureaucrats owing allegiance to the central government, and no longer to local interests. The added fact that the *Tanẓīmāt* statesmen tended to concentrate decision making at the Sublime Porte, and that 'Abdülḥamīd later concentrated it even more tightly at the Palace, proves that there were real grounds for complaint about centralization. In time there were attempts, including the provincial administration law of 1913, to respond to these complaints. Centralization was thus a real issue, but the connection between it and French influence is not so clear as has sometimes been suggested.

However the Ottoman system of 1871 should be viewed, in a comparative perspective, the fact remains that it made the *vālī* responsible for the conduct of business in the fields of civil administration, finance, education, public works, police, and civil and criminal affairs. Following this list came a series of articles with further details on functions of the governor general ranging from law enforcement, to appointment of provincial officials, supervision of tax collection, development of schools, promotion of trade and agriculture, foundation of credit funds, public works, hygiene, and the use of the police forces or, in certain circumstances, even the regular military (art. 4-14).[18] These provisions cover all the things that an exemplary governor like Midḥat Paşa actually would attempt and thus show, at least in an ideal form, the scope that Ottoman expectations about the role of government were beginning to acquire.[19]

To assist him in these functions, the *vālī* had an official staff that consisted, according to the law of 1864, of the provincial treasurer (*defterdār*) and his Accounts Office; the corresponding secretary (*mektūbcu*) heading both the provincial Correspondence Office (*Taḥrīrāt Ḳalemi*) and Printing Plant (*Maṭba'a*); a foreign affairs officer mainly responsible for handling relations between the provincial authorities and the consuls, merchants, or protégés of foreign powers; a public works officer with engineers on his staff; and an agricultural and commercial officer (art. 7-12). Also performing functions which came under supervision of the *vālī* in some respects were the *alay beyi* in charge of the local police force (*ẓabṭiye*) and an inspector of judges of the religious courts (*müfettiş-i ḥükkām-ı şer'iye*, art. 16-17). Not all these officials were present in every case.[20] The text of the law of 1871 makes clear, however, that the overall effect of changes in the *vālī's* staff was to increase, not decrease, its size. In that law, in addition to the functionaries just mentioned, we find an assistant (*mu'āvin*) to the *vālī*, a director of education, superintendents of road construction (*ṭarīḳ emīnleri*), a cadastral officer (*defter-i ḥāḳānī müdīri*), what are described as officials of the Administrations of Real Property and Population (*Emlāk ve Nüfūs Idāreleri*, their functions pertaining to keeping

records on population, real property, and taxes due on both), and directors of pious foundations (*evḳāf müdīrleri*, art. 17-34).[21] Counterparts of most of these functionaries also appeared at the next two administrative echelons: at *sancak*, as staff of the *mutaṣarrıf*, and at *ḳażā*, as staff of the *ḳā'imaḳām* (law of 1871, art. 3, 35-49).[22]

In addition to the chief administrative officer and his official staff, the administrative pattern prescribed for the province (*vilāyet*), the *sancak*, and the *ḳażā* also included certain types of conciliar bodies. Under the law of 1864, these included the secular (*niẓāmiye*) courts, responsible for hearing both civil and criminal cases under the new laws. The same law also effectively integrated the existence of provincial commercial courts into the *niẓāmiye* court system. The law provided for a series of courts of first instance and appeal at the top three levels of the local administrative hierarchy. These courts were to be presided over by the same judges (*ḥākim* in the text) who presided over the religious courts, and of whom all but the highest-ranking were officially referred to in this period as *nā'ibs*. The courts were also to include six elected members, three Muslims and three non-Muslims (art. 16-23, 37-42, 50-53). Reliance on the religious judges to adjudicate in types of law other than the *Şerī'at*, aside from being the historically normal practice of the Ottomans, presumably reflects the incipient state of development of the new secular courts, while the inclusion of the religiously mixed elected members (*a'żā, mümeyyiz*) represented an attempt to head off European complaints about the quality of Ottoman justice. In any event, following the attempted separation of judicial and executive functions in 1868,[23] the *niẓāmiye* courts were no longer included in the same way in the provincial administration law of 1871. Rather, about the same time, they began to be the subject of separate laws, a development that culminated in 1879 with a series of acts intended to organize the Ministry of Justice, the secular (*niẓāmiye*) courts, and other related functions.[24]

In the provincial administration law of 1871, the conciliar bodies mentioned as playing a role in local administration are the general assembly (*meclis-i 'umūmī*) of the province and the administrative councils (*mecālis-i idāre*). The administrative councils were the successors of the local councils (*memleket meclisleri*) founded at the beginning of the *Tanẓīmāt*, and were now to be found in province, *sancak*, and *ḳażā*.[25] The provincial administration law of 1864 defined the membership of these councils in terms that also recalled the earlier local councils.

The administrative council of the province was to include the appointed officials of the province, as well as four elected members, two of them Muslims and two of them non-Muslims (art. 13). The administrative council of the *sancak* was to include members of these same types, as well as the local religious leaders (art. 33). The administrative council of the *ḳażā* was to be composed like that of the *sancak*, except that the law is not quite clear on the number of elected members. The article on the *ḳażā* council speaks simply of

three elected members (*üç nefer a'żā*); the preceding article describing the entourage (*ma'iyet*) of the *ḳā'imaḳām* implies that this means three Muslims and three non-Muslims (art. 46-47).[26]

The administrative councils were to perform essentially consultative functions pertaining to a wide range of administrative and even judicial business detailed in the law of 1871. At the province level, for example, the responsibilities of the administrative council included purchasing and the concluding of contracts on behalf of the government, farming out certain revenues, various matters pertaining to mines and forests, supervision of the construction and maintenance of government buildings and of roads connecting the various *sancaks* of the province, general supervision of revenue and expenditure, review of decisions of the administrative councils of the *sancaks* and of the municipal councils, changes in the jurisdictional links of *ḳażās* and villages, certain matters of general public utility, the distribution within the province of any tax burden levied either by the state or by the general council of the province with approval of the Sublime Porte, as well as any other matters referred to the council by the *vālī* (art. 77). The judicial functions of the provincial administrative council had mainly to do with administrative justice: investigating and trying charges brought against officials concerning their performance of duty, settling conflicts of official jurisdiction, investigating complaints of the populace either about officials or about distribution of tax obligations, and hearing cases pertaining to tax farms or other contracts concluded between the government and individuals (art. 78).[27] The deliberations of the provincial administrative council were conducted according to general rules (*aḥkām ve ḳavā'id-i 'umūmiye*) laid down in the law of 1871 (art. 79-89). Its decisions about administrative matters were to be submitted to the governor general (art. 77), and those for which an imperial decree was required under existing regulations were to be submitted by him in turn to the Sublime Porte and thence to the Palace (art. 81). The administrative councils of the *sancaks* and *ḳażās* had analogous responsibilities and were expected to follow the same procedural rules. Haim Gerber has recently found and studied records of the proceedings of the administrative council of the *sancak* of Jerusalem for several years at the beginning of the twentieth century.[28] It is to be hoped that other scholars will find and study more such documentation in the near future.

As the name of the councils at the provincial, *sancak*, and *ḳażā* levels implies, their administrative — and judicial — functions were really more important than the representative character that has been associated with them. If an exception is to be made on this point, it would be in favor of the non-Muslims, for whom membership in the councils continued to provide an important means of participation in public life. Even for the non-Muslims, though, there were problems in that the prescribed mode of representation had nothing to do with local demographic realities and took no account of the number of non-Muslim denominations in any given place, except through the

ex officio membership of the religious leaders, whose capacity to contribute to the deliberations of the councils was sometimes questionable.[29] In general, the representative character of the councils has to be measured against the prominence of *ex officio* members and the evidence that old-style local notables, despite the intentions of the reformers in Istanbul, often succeeded in working through the councils to retain much of their prominence.[30] Finally, the system used to choose the elected members of the councils was extremely oblique.

As originally set forth in the law of 1864, this was much more a system of nomination than of election, in fact it was a system where even the initiative in the choice of nominees rested with higher-level administrative officials (art. 63-77).[31] This system was supposedly revised by a set of instructions issued in 1875. It remained a system of nomination, but one in which the choice of nominees rested with representatives of the populace.[32] The main question about the modifications of 1875 concerns whether they ever became operative or not. Heidborn's assessment is that the modifications made little difference: the system was still one of nomination, and the actors in it often did not know the difference.[33] Later measures lend credence to this view. One dating from 1889 and intended to prohibit election to the same council of individuals related to each other within certain degrees of kinship, was enacted as an addendum to the original *vilāyet* law, which dealt with the provincial elections in its concluding sections, and without reference to the instructions of 1875.[34] In the passage of the provincial administrative law of 1913 dealing with the system of election to the local councils, the same thing happened again: the reference was to the law of 1864 and not to the instructions of 1875.

The extent to which the administrative councils figured as representative bodies was thus limited; but each province was supposed to have one other body of more clearly representative character: the provincial general assembly (*meclis-i 'umūmī*). The law of 1864 provided that this was to consist of two Muslims and two non-Muslims elected from each *sancak* of the province. The assembly was to meet once a year in the province capital for not more than forty days (art. 25-27). The law of 1871 then provided fuller details on the matters that the assembly was to discuss and on its mode of procedure. Subjects for discussion, not always clearly differentiated from those assigned to the administrative councils, included a broad range of "development" projects — plans for roads to be built during the coming year; discussion of means for the promotion of trade, industry, education; purchase, sale, or exchange of squares, pastures, or open spaces (*meydān ve çayır ve mesīre*) held for common use; requests from the *livās* and *ḳażās* for redistribution of the tax load of the province; proposals for new taxes; and anything else referred to the assembly by the *vālī* or the Sublime Porte. The general assembly was authorized to meet in committee. The basis for its deliberations on specific subjects included both requests from lower echelons and summary reports (*feẕleke*) that the 1871 law required most officials on the staff of the *vālī* to submit annually. Indeed, the

official was required to be present to answer questions from the assembly when his report was discussed (art. 61-75). As the law of 1864 made explicit, the role of the assembly was only to express opinions (*beyān-i rey*), and no request or wish of the assembly would become policy until it had been forwarded to Istanbul by the *vālī*, who was supposed to preside over the assembly, to receive the commands of the sultan (art. 28). The assembly did at any rate provide a means for the upward flow of information. Indeed, the procedure for election of members to the assembly underscored this aspect of its function. For the members of the administrative councils of the various *ḳażās* who came to the headquarters of their respective *sancak* each year to elect those who would represent the *sancak* in the general assembly were also expected to turn over to the representatives petitions concerning matters that the *ḳażā* councils wished to have discussed in the general assembly (1871 law, art. 78). Under 'Abdülḥamīd, the general assemblies ceased to meet. For at least part of the 1870s, the contrary was the case, and accounts of the meetings were published in the press.[35]

With its appointed administrative chiefs, their staffs, the administrative councils, and the provincial general assembly, such was the system prescribed for the top three levels in the administrative hierarchy — the *vilāyet*, the *sancak*, and the *ḳażā*. Below the *ḳażā* level, the administration began to display a character that was much less bureaucratic and more participatory.

Institutions at the *nāḥiye* or "commune" level, for example, were discussed in the provincial administration law of 1871 (art. 56-58, 94-106) and then modified by a special set of regulations issued in 1876. According to a recent study, these *nāḥiye* institutions were never widely developed; for the regulations of 1876 were adopted only at European insistence, and the villages were too dispersed in most parts of the Empire to make the "communal" institutions very workable.[36] In Palestine — meaning essentially the *sancaks* of Acre and Balḳā' and the "independent" *sancak* of Jerusalem — *nāḥiye* institutions were found in some places, but certainly not everywhere; and those that existed were only organized slowly.[37] In principle, however, the regulations of 1876 provided that each *nāḥiye* should have an elected director (*mūdīr*). If the population of the locality belonged to more than one religion, he was to come from the most numerous community, and his assistant (*mu'āvin*) was to come from the second most numerous. The election of the director was subject to confirmation by the chief administrative officials at *ḳażā*, *sancak*, and province levels. There was also to be an elected communal council (*nāḥiye meclisi*), one of whose members was to fill the role of assistant to the *mūdīr*. In *nāḥiyes* with a religiously mixed population, half the members of the council were to be Muslims and half non-Muslims. The duties of the director were to include publications of laws, regulations, and other communications received from the *ḳā'imaḳām*, the reporting of certain types of information to the *ḳā'imaḳām*, preliminary investigation of crimes, the assembling of persons obligated to compulsory labor on the roads, and supervision of tax collection.

Those of the council pertained to the distribution of the tax burden and the timely collection of taxes, projects of public utility to be realized with financial aid or labor contributed by the local populace, construction of roads between villages, solution of problems relating to common pastures and woodlands, arbitration of disputes, and encouragement of agriculture. These functions correspond essentially to those of the higher-echelon administrative councils. Bureaucratic control over administrative action at this level was assured by the requirement not only of higher approval by the election of the *müdīr*, but also of ratification by the *ḳā'imaḳām* of decisions taken by the *nāḥiye* council.[38]

Finally in the villages and in the various quarters (*maḥalle*) of towns and cities, the laws on provincial administration provided for locally elected headmen (*muḫtārs*) and councils of elders (*iḫtiyār meclisī*). In every village, each religious community (*ṣınıf-ı ahālī*) was to have two headmen, unless a given community numbered fewer than twenty households, in which case it was to have only one. There was also to be a separate council of elders for each community, consisting of three to twelve elected members and including the religious leaders of the community *ex officio*. Under the 1864 law headmen and council members were to be elected by members of their communities who met certain stated criteria pertaining to age, good repute, and the payment of at least fifty *ḳurūş* per year in direct taxes — not to mention the unstated criterion of being of the male sex (art. 63). The headmen and councils of elders performed functions essentially like those of the directors and councils of the *nāḥiyes* and thus provided yet another means, in districts of even smaller scale, for the provision of locally needed services and the extension of central-bureaucratic controls. Gabriel Baer has recently studied the history of the office of *muḫtār*, tracing it into the twentieth century.[39]

The problem of a system of administration for provincial municipalities, which the law of 1864 (art. 5) recognized only as consisting of so many quarters, was taken up in measures published in 1867 on municipal councils[40] and again in provisions in the 1871 law (art. 111-29). Municipal institutions were then treated more fully in additional acts, culminating in a new municipal code in 1876 for Istanbul and a law in 1877 on provincial municipalities. The latter provided for an elected municipal council (*belediye meclisī*), with six to twelve members depending on the size of the town, one of its members to be appointed by the government to the presidency of the council. The engineer, doctor, and veterinary of the municipality were to serve *ex officio* as advisory members, and there was also to be a secretary of the council, a cashier (*ṣandıḳ emīnī*) and a staff of municipal constables (*çavuş*). The municipality was to have its own budget — something that the provincial administrations had yet to be permitted. This was to be approved by a body known as the municipal assembly (*cem'iyet-i belediye*), consisting of the municipal council and the local administrative council (art. 50).[41] An amendment in 1886 authorized the organization of municipal institutions also in the central towns of *nāḥiyes* and in large villages that were "capable of development (*ḳābil-i i'mār*)."[42] With

these measures, administrative systems for the towns and cities of the Empire began to evolve on a path of their own, separate from the general legislation on provincial administration. As already noted, the development of municipal governmental institutions seems to have begun promptly in Jerusalem and Jaffa, a process studied by Ruth Kark in particular.

To sum up, the administrative system created by the laws of 1864 and 1871 recognized five levels of administrative jurisdiction. At the top three — the *vilâyet*, the *sancak*, and the *każâ* — administrative responsibilities were supposed to be mainly in the hands of bureaucrats appointed in Istanbul. At the lower two levels — the *nâḥiye*, and the village or municipality — the chief administrative roles were in the hands of locally elected figures, although bureaucratic controls were exerted there too through the workings of the electoral system, the downward flow of orders and communications, or the higher-echelon review of local initiatives. At all levels, the system was to include — in the municipalities it was based on — conciliar bodies performing a variety of functions and possessing something of a representative character. This was not the foremost characteristic of the conciliar bodies, particularly at the top three levels of the administrative hierarchy, yet a degree of participation by the local populace, at least by its more influential members, was one of the realities of the system.

Given contemporary conditions, it goes without saying that this system did not function smoothly or uniformly in all the territories of the vast Empire. This fact becomes evident from comparative study of local conditions, but there are also general signs. It was not long, for example, before there were demands for a closer scrutiny of prescribed procedures or even a general revision of them. A set of instructions on provincial administration, issued in February 1876, outlined a baleful and lengthy catalogue of abuses that needed to be prohibited.[43] The constitution promulgated in December of the same year called explicitly for further legislation on the provincial general assembly and the administrative councils, and promised a new regulation of local administration on bases of decentralization (literally, "broadening of discretion," *tevsî'-i me'ẕûniyet*) and separation of powers (art. 108-10). The constitution also asserted the responsibility of every official in the performance of duty and demanded that all official functions be brought under regulation (art. 40).[44] During the brief life of the first Ottoman parliament, a new provincial administration law was passed by the lower house but not by the Senate. Thereafter, as foreign intervention and separatist nationalism inflamed one part of the Empire after another, and as the Hamidian system became established, the cause of local administrative reform — even on paper — more or less ceased to receive attention in more than piecemeal fashion.[45] The next several decades saw the promulgation of various acts relating to the functions assigned to the *nâḥiye* councils in the settlement of disputes (*veẓâ'if-i ṣulḥiye ve 'adliye*),[46] the supposed organization and duties of the provincial land registry services,[47] the establishment of requirements for appointment and promotion

in local administration,[48] and the many problems in such troubled localities as Crete, Eastern Rumelia, or the Armenian-inhabited provinces of the East.[49] As in most other fields, however, there would be no further review of overall policy until the Young Turk Revolution and the attempt then launched to regularize comprehensively the administrative systems.

One phase of this regularization was the adoption of a "temporary law" in March 1913 on the general administration of the provinces.[50] There were many signs of the revolutionary era in this law. It showed throughout a new degree of care and precision in specifying details and clarifying points that had been vague in the earlier laws. In detailing the duties of the governor general, the 1913 law emphasized the overtly ideological point that the *vālī* should assure the realization of liberty, equality, and justice (*ḥürriyet, müsāvāt ve 'adālet*, art. 22). The preamble to the law mentioned the responsibility of officials in language very close to that of article 40 of the constitution. Most importantly, referring specifically to article 108 of the constitution, the preamble proclaimed that provincial administration was to be based on the separation of powers and decentralization (again, *tevsī'-i mezūniyet*).

The law was divided into two parts (*kısım*), the first pertaining to the general administration of the province (*idāre-i 'umūmiye-i vilāyet*) and the second to its "special" or "particular" administration (*idāre-i ḫuṣūṣiye*). This distinction of "general" and "particular," and the Ottoman terms associated with it, had appeared in some respects in the law of 1871, the title of which designated it — like the law of 1913 — as a law on general provincial administration. Yet the meaning of the terminological opposition was not really clear in the earlier text. In that of 1913, the discussion of the province, first as an element of the "general" administrative system, and then in terms of its own "particular" administration, reflected both the new emphasis on decentralization and an important legal innovation. The nature and significance of this change will become clear in the discussion of the second part of the law.

To begin with Part I on general provincial administration, this first discussed the various administrative subdivisions. Here the hierarchy of province (*vilāyet*), *sancak* or *livā*, *ḳażā*, *nāḥiye*, and village (*ḳarye*) reappeared in familiar form, with the chief administrative officers at each level designated as before (art. 1). But there were differences in detail. The concept that the administrative apparatus of a "central" *sancak* should exist in the province capital, and that of a "central" *ḳażā* in the headquarters of every *sancak*, was now simplified in the sense that there was to be only one such jurisdiction — a "central" *ḳażā*, with its own *ḳā'imaḳām*, at the province capital (art. 1). Any general revision of the local administrative organization was henceforth to require a special law. Yet, in keeping with the spirit of decentralization, the provincial general assembly was empowered to alter the boundaries of administrative subdivisions in the province, the location of their headquarters, or their links to higher administrative echelons, subject to approval by either the Ministry of the Interior or — depending on the matter in question — by the

sultan (art. 3). Two other administrative realities not mentioned in 1871 also received recognition in the 1913 law. These were the "independent *livās*" (*elviye-i ġayr-i mulḥaḳa*) — *sancaks* that were to be treated "like provinces" (*vilāyet ḥükmünde*, art. 2) so that they could be dealt with directly from Istanbul — and the nomadic tribes, for which the law promised special regulations to govern modes of settlement and administration (art. 4).

The text then went on to the officials of the province, the mode of their selection and appointment, and their duties. These matters were detailed for the most part only as far down as the *ḳażā* level. As in the past, office-holders at *nāḥiye* and lower levels were basically not professional officials; indeed, the law speaks at points of "civil-bureaucratic and *nāḥiye* officials" (*mülkiye ve nāḥiye me'mūrları*, art. 24). The difference between this law and earlier ones was that the new text had scarcely anything to say about the lowest administrative echelons, implicitly leaving them for separate treatment. As for the official staffs found at the administrative headquarters of the higher echelons, these were only slightly expanded beyond the provisions of 1871. The *vālī*, for example, was now to have under him separate directors of agriculture and public health (art. 5), as well as the officials mentioned in the earlier law. At the bottom of the hierarchy, the director of the *nāḥiye*, who was mentioned in this respect, was now also to have a rudimentary official staff, including a clerk and possibly also fiscal and land registry officials (*māl ve tapu me'mūrları*, art. 6).

Where the duties of the various officials were concerned, the new law again differed mainly in going into greater detail. It did, however, make the authority of the *vālī* much clearer, particularly in relation to his own official suite, by describing him as the senior executive official in the province and the deputy (*vekīl*) and representative of every ministry (art. 20). All laws and regulations published by the state, and all instructions and decisions published by the ministries, were to reach the provincial administration through the *vālī*. In doubtful cases, the officials of those branches were to refer in the first instance to the *vālī* and were required to execute the orders he issued, whether on his own initiative or after communication with competent higher authority (art. 21). Applying the concept of decentralization again, the law thus attempted to resolve the duality which the earlier laws had scarcely recognized, in the responsibility of local officials to the governor general, on one hand and to the ministry to which their functions pertained on the other. The duties of the *mutaṣarrıf* at *sancak* level and the *ḳā'imaḳām* at *ḳażā* level were expressed in generally parallel terms. In fact, the articles on the *ḳā'imaḳām* followed those on the *mutaṣarrıf* almost word for word, the main differences appearing in specifically local-oriented responsibilities of the former, such as listening to complaints of the villagers, reminding *nāḥiye* and village authorities of how properly to discharge their duties (art. 54), or "facilitating" application of the law on military recruitment (art. 58). On balance, these provisions express the "development-oriented" character of Ottoman administrative ideas even more

clearly than had the law of 1871. They also show a heightened concern for practical application and assessment of results, for example, by requiring periodic inspection tours, not just of the *vālī* as in 1871, but of the *mutaṣarrıf* and *ḳā'imaḳām* as well (art. 30, 42, 54).[51]

The most important innovation in the section of the law on provincial administrative officials is without question that which pertains to the mode of their selection and appointment. This was a point on which the laws of both 1864 and 1871 had been vague, and with good reason; for no serious attempt to create an overall system for appointment-making or a general regularization of civil-bureaucratic personnel policy occurred before the 1880s. As long as 'Abdülḥamīd remained in power, the workings of this system were slanted in the direction of extreme centralization and palace dominance.[52] The Young Turk revolution made possible a reversal of this trend and a redistribution of the appointment-making power under conditions of considerable regulatory specificity.

The law of 1913 detailed the mode of nomination and appointment for many more officials than had either of the earlier laws. A *vālī's* appointment necessitated a request by the Ministry of the Interior and a decision by the Council of Ministers, as well as a decree (*irāde*) by the sultan. Appointments of some of the *vālī's* more important staff members, as well as the *mutaṣarrıfs* and *ḳā'imaḳāms*, were to originate in the Ministry of the Interior and then proceed directly to the Palace (art. 8). Numerous members of the official staff at province and *sancak* levels were to be nominated and appointed according to prescribed procedures by the ministries to which their functions pertained. In the case of a specific list of posts, including some of those to which appointment required an imperial decree, the *vālī* was to be called on to express his views through the Ministry of the Interior before the appointment was made (art. 9). Finally, a lengthy list of other officials, starting with a residual category of subordinate officials (*me'mūrīn-i tāliye*) at the province level and extending all the way down to the *nāḥiye* clerks, were to be nominated by the bureau chiefs under whom they were to serve, then appointed by either the *vālī*, *mutaṣarrıf*, or *ḳā'imaḳām*, the appointments made by the last two being subject to the *vālī's* confirmation (art. 10). Succeeding articles went on to detail procedures — which again varied according to how the official had been appointed — for dismissal from office, to assign extensive powers of official discipline to the *vālī*, to assert the right of any person to bring complaints against officials, and — in the event of malicious or ill-founded complaints — to provide for these to be turned over to the public prosecutors (*müdde'i-i 'umūmī*, art. 11-19). Where appointments were concerned, moreover, the work of the Young Turk legislators did not stop with the provincial administration law of 1913, for there was also a set of regulations issued in December 1915 for officials in the Ministry of the Interior. This attempted to classify all positions under the ministry in terms of salary. It further refined appointment procedures, still recognizing the role of the provincial authorities in some

appointments, but providing for a new appointment board, known as the Council of Directors (*Encümen-i Müdīrān*), to take charge of those handled by the ministry in Istanbul. Finally, the regulations of 1915 laid down criteria to govern appointment and promotion in the ministry and called for a system of competitive examination.[53]

Aside from defining the province and its administrative subdivisions, and a discussion of the duties and conditions of service for the various officials, the one other topic treated in the "general" part of the 1913 law was the administrative councils (*meclis-i idāre*). As before, these were to exist in every province, *sancak*, and *ḳażā*, and were to include as members specified local officials, the local religious leaders (now included in the provincial administrative council as well as those at lower echelons), and elected representatives (art. 62-65). The duties of the councils remained partially as before. These included such administrative functions as farming out taxes and conducting other kinds of auctions, analyzing certain public works proposals, and maintaining government property. In addition, the councils had functions in administrative justice, such as trials of officials (art. 66). They also reviewed the decisions by councils at the next lower level (art. 69). On the other hand, some functions assigned to the administrative councils in 1871 were now missing from the list. These functions, mostly of purely local significance, had been reassigned, and the general direction of reassignment is implied from another article of the 1913 law forbidding the administrative council in the province to interfere in functions prescribed for the general assembly of the province or for a new body known as the province council (*encümen-i vilāyet*, art. 67). The duties of the administrative councils of *sancak* and *ḳażā* were defined chiefly by cross reference to the article listing those of the provincial administrative council (art. 69, 71). A special "temporary article" at the end of the law asserted that until new rules could be issued, elections to the administrative councils were to be conducted according to the provisions of chapter five of the provincial administration law of 1864. This seems perplexing at first, since those provisions were ostensibly superseded by instructions issued in 1875. As will be recalled, however, this article of the 1913 law is one of several indications that the instructions of 1875 never went into effect.

Where the provincial administration law of 1913 proved most innovative was in Part II, on the "special" or "particular" administration of the province. Here, in fulfillment of the constitutional demand for decentralization, the law began with an innovation barely anticipated in any of the earlier acts on local administration, a point at variance, moreover, with the whole prior history of Ottoman and Islamic law.[54] For this part of the law began by recognizing the province as a legal person (*şaḫṣ-ı ma'nevī*), empowered to dispose of movable and immovable property and charged with specific responsibilities under this law (art. 75). The means for administering and preserving the affairs and interests of the province, and for representing and personifying it (*teşḫīṣ*),

consisted of the *vālī* together with the general assembly and the new province council (*encümen-i vilāyet*, art. 76). In the "particular" as in the "general" administration of the province, executive competence was to be vested solely in the *vālī* (art. 77), and this authority was to be used to perform a lengthy list of local services incumbent on the province (*vilāyete 'āʾid ḫidemāt-ı maḥalliye*, art. 78). These included public works projects such as building roads within the province, draining swamps, or digging canals; issuing concessions for the provision in cities and towns of services such as tramways or buses, gas or electric illumination, or the piping in of potable water; the development by a variety of means of agriculture, commerce, and industry; the opening of schools and other institutions of public beneficence, such as hospitals; and the administration of these institutions and all other property and goods of the province (art. 78).[55] To provide it with means to pursue these goals, the province was to have a budget, with two parts designated as ordinary and extraordinary, and numerous revenue and expenditure items were henceforth to be provincial responsibilities (art. 79-83).[56] The budget was to be approved by the general assembly of the province, then forwarded by the *vālī* to the Ministry of the Interior, and was to become executory upon receipt of the sultan's decree (art. 86).

The law then went on to define the special responsibilities incumbent on the *vālī* in his capacity as the embodiment of the province's legal personality and to assign certain "special officials" (*me'mūrīn-i ḫuṣūṣiye*) to assist in these functions. The *vālī* was responsible, together with the provincial general assembly, for performing all the local functions that the law assigned to the province; and he might use his "general" administrative staff where appropriate in so doing (art. 87). In particular, the *vālī* was responsible for drawing up the final accounts for the past fiscal year, as well as the budget for the next, and submitting these to both the province council and the general assembly (art. 88, 91). He was the person empowered to authorize payment (*āmir-i ʾīṣā*) of sums provided for in the budget (art. 90). It was he who disposed of power to buy, sell, or exchange real property and to litigate on behalf of the province (art. 92, 94). To assist him in his fiscal obligations, the *vālī* was to have under him a "Special" Accounts Office (*Vilāyet Muḥāsebe-i Ḫuṣūṣiye Ḳalemī*), which would do the work of preparing the retrospective accounts and the budgets, take charge of collecting the "special" revenues of the province, and prepare the orders required for expenditures. Province funds were to be placed in the custody of the local branch of the Agricultural Bank.[57] The appointment and dismissal of the "special" provincial officials was a function of the *vālī*, and their salaries and office expenses were to come out of the provincial budget (art. 98-102).

The principal adjuncts of the *vālī* in performing his distinctly local functions were obviously to be the provincial general assembly (*meclis-i 'umūmī*) and the province council (*encümen-i vilāyet*). The former was to meet once annually, normally for no more than forty days (art. 111-15). The latter was to be a kind

of permanent standing committee elected out of the former to perform certain functions on an ongoing basis.

One of the most striking innovations of the 1913 law was the provision that the members of the general assembly should be elected simply on a basis of proportional representation, at a rate of one to every 12,500 males in the population, the system of communal representation being tacitly dropped (art. 103-104). But this change which could only have caused trouble, was abandoned in a later amendment that called for a sharing out of the memberships between Muslims and non-Muslims on a basis corresponding to their proportions in the population of the various *ḳażās*, the administrative entity which the assembly members were to represent. Under this system, the elections would be conducted by what amounted to list voting, with separate Muslim and non-Muslim lists, from which those who received the most votes would be awarded assembly seats until these had been distributed in the required proportion.[58] The vote in these elections would be exercised by all those who had served as secondary electors (*müntehib-i ṣānī*) in the last election to the Chamber of Deputies (art. 103-104). Subsequent articles went on to give details about the eligibility qualifications for assembly membership and — though a separate procedural regulation was promised (art. 119) — about procedural matters.[59]

The terms of the 1913 law make clear that the provincial general assembly was to be responsible for some very important functions, although its powers were subject to various checks. Examples of the powers appear in the numerous articles on the "special" local functions of the *vālī* when a favorable decision of the assembly is required for disposition of the matters in question. In addition, the assembly was to review and decide on various public works projects.[60] It had the power to raise additional fractional taxes (*küsūrāt*, art. 80, 130) within legally defined limits[61] and could appeal for redress of certain types of problems in the distribution of the tax burden. Within certain bounds, the assembly could contract loans in support of projects to be undertaken in the province. The assembly had the power to review the draft provincial budget item by item and make modifications prior to approving it. It also had to examine and vote on a report (*īżāḥnāme*) which the *vālī* had to present at the opening of each assembly session. The report was supposed to tell what had been done during the preceding year to implement the decisions reached at the last meeting of the assembly; and if a two-thirds majority of its members found the account inadequate, the assembly was to forward its views, together with the report, to the Ministry of the Interior (art. 128-34).

At the same time, the *vālī* was hardly powerless in dealing with the general assembly of his province. He was to preside at assembly meetings and determine the agenda, though items submitted by members, if approved by a majority, would have to be added to it. In general, the decisions of the assembly became final only with his approval. He also had twenty days from the date of any decision to criticise it; and if he did so, the matter was to be

referred to the Council of State in Istanbul. Other safeguards show how clearly the drafters of the law foresaw the possibility of trouble in containing the political aspirations of assembly members. The assembly was forbidden to discuss "political matters (*siyāsiyāt*)" or express wishes (*temenniyāt*) about them; the *vālī* could adjourn or dissolve it; it was forbidden to hold unauthorized sessions; and decisions reached at such sessions were to be null and void (*ka'anna lam yakun*, art. 118-27, 135).

That the legislators of 1913 did intend to shift a significant amount of real power to the provinces is nonetheless clear from the creation of the province council. This was to consist normally of four members elected out of the general assembly at the close of its annual session. The council members were to be from different *ḳażās*, were to receive an expense allowance amounting to a salary, and were to serve for one-year terms but be eligible for re-election. Their functions were extensive: giving opinions on plans that related to matters of local interest and were to be presented to the general assembly, preparing a report on the year's achievements, to present together with the parallel report by the *vālī* at the general assembly meeting. In emergencies, the province council could also make any decision that the general assembly was empowered to make, on condition that the decision be referred to the assembly at its next meeting. Clearly most important among the functions of the province council, however, were budgetary powers that effectively projected the role of the general assembly in this sphere into a year-round system of controls. For the province council was not only to examine the draft budget annually; it also examined monthly expenditure tables for conformity to the budget, advised on the conditions of auctions and sales that the budget required to be conducted, determined how sums designated to cover unforeseen expenses were to be spent, and — within certain limits — carried out transfers of sums from one item in the budget to another (art. 136-44). Such powers of budgetary control — essential for a coherent politico-administrative system and to ensure that the local populace had some control over its own affairs — are among the most significant of the decentralizing concessions in the 1913 law.

The law concluded, however, with one more item of some importance to decentralization. This was the definition of a procedure to handle matters of common interest to adjacent provinces. If these were of the type entrusted to the general assemblies of the provinces, it was to be possible, with approval from the Ministry of the Interior and with necessary practical arrangements made by correspondence among the *vālīs* of the provinces concerned, for representatives chosen from the general assemblies to meet together as a mixed council (*encümen-i muḫteliṭ*). The decision of the mixed council would be referred to the general assemblies of the provinces concerned at the next meeting — a provision that could obviously cause considerable delays. If the general assemblies concurred in the decision, the *vālīs* could implement it forthwith. Otherwise, the matter would have to be referred to the Council of

State in Istanbul (art. 145-46). Obviously, matters of local interest which nevertheless crossed jurisdictional lines had in all cases first to be submitted to higher echelons. The mixed councils would provide one means of reducing the massive flow of paper work to the center.

Overall, then, the law of 1913 provides a notable measure of the evolution of Ottoman ideas and expectations about local administration. As compared with the administrative system prescribed in 1864 and 1871, the differences do not appear so much in the formal apparatus of the administrative system. The various echelons of administration remained the same. The hierarchy of officials and councils, if merely listed, would also appear to have changed only slightly. We note a few additions to the administrative staffs at the various echelons, and also the province council (*encümen-i vilâyet*) and the *ad hoc* mixed councils to handle business affecting more than one province. In 1913, however, the purposes that these officials and institutions were to serve were envisaged in ways significantly different from those of forty or fifty years before. The differences emerge from the distinction of "general" and "special" or "local" administration, from the adaptation of different local institutions to serve in one or the other — sometimes both — of these spheres, and from the real increase in decentralization. In "general" administrative roles, we find the *vâlî* and other chief administrative officers of *sancak* and *kazâ*, their appointed staffs, and the hierarchy of administrative councils. To assure the "special" administration of the province we find the *vâlî* again, but with a somewhat different function and staff, as well as the provincial general assembly and province council, all of these intended to operate in ways stemming from the concept of the province as a legal entity, possessing its own budget and programs.

This adaptation and enhancement gained in significance from other contemporary trends that only become fully perceivable in a discussion of much broader scope than can be undertaken here. For as the constitutional references in the preamble of the law of 1913 imply, among the sometimes contradictory traits of the Young Turk period were a dramatic re-emphasis on law and regularity and an attempt by those means to establish a new orientation toward service, control, and accountability in administration. In a real sense, it was this orientation — manifested in the regularization of personnel policy and in countless requirements concerning inspection tours, periodic reports, budget debates, rights of complaint and review, and so forth — that made decentralization an acceptable concept from the viewpoint of the central government. As developed in the provincial administration law of 1913, the decentralizing reforms provide an intriguing insight into the brave new world of the Young Turk reformers' dreams.[62]

In fact, however, the contrast between the dream of a rational new order and the realities of the time was one of the saddest and most conspicuous features of the Young Turk period. Not only did continual warfare and defeat thwart the realization of the dream, there was also the question of whether the

political aspirations of the peoples remaining under Ottoman sovereignty in 1913 could have been satisfied by any program of administrative decentralization. In Turkey proper, the 1913 law remained the basic text on local administration even under the republic. In the Arab provinces, on the other hand, the law was greeted with immediate protests, aimed particularly at the provisions for a provincial general assembly and the powers of the *vālī* over it. Attempts to apply the law, even coupled with concessions concerning the use of Arabic in schools and administration, were met with growing demands to autonomy. In the Hijaz, previously an honored satellite more than a province of the Empire, the attempt to apply the law implied anything but decentralization; there, the law provoked rebellion among the Bedouin and surely helped bring on the Arab Revolt of 1916.[63] Troubles such as these helped to intensify yet another problem that stood in the way of the realization of reformist goals. This was the spirit of dictatorial militarism that triumphed among the Young Turk leadership itself during World War I, making a mockery of the apparent desires for reason that are so profoundly imprinted on the legislation of this period. Where Syria and Palestine are concerned, this problem is well enough symbolized by the name of Cemāl Paşa and has been described in trenchant detail, as Geoffrey Lewis points out, in Falih Rıfkı Atay's account of his experiences in Jerusalem.[64]

Thus, the law of 1913 did not become widely operative; and its concessions, which amounted to responding to the political or even nationalist aspirations of the Empire's subjects by readjusting Ottoman administrative structures and procedures, would have failed to satisfy much of the population even had the scope of application been wider. Yet comparing the 1913 law with those of the 1860s and '70s, and of the latter with the conditions that preceded them, shows a significant development in Ottoman administrative thought and practice. The proof of this observation lies in the fact that many of the points of contrast between successive formal definitions of the administrative system occur precisely where the contributions to this volume show that there were tangible gains in the countryside. The record was certainly uneven, as the failure to establish an effective system of land survey and registration makes clear: the Ottoman reformers were often unable to solve problems that posed such vast requirements, Empire-wide, in resources and technical skills. Similarly, the direction of change was not always for the better, as the record of Cemāl Paşa shows. Yet, in the improvement of public security, in the regularization and enhanced effectiveness of administration, in public works and education, and in the creation of organizational structures permitting a level of local participation, there were concrete gains. In general, these correspond to internationally current nineteenth-century ideas about progress. In certain times and places, the Ottoman administrators did not so much pioneer these reforms as adapt to an environment where there was increasing demand for them. Yet there was certainly an Ottoman stamp on these reforms; and this can often be detected — at times it is conspicuous — in the institutional and

physical evidence that still survives from many of these innovations. Surrounding the tangible gains and ideas of progress in a more general way, there was also beginning to be a new climate of ideals among Ottoman administrators as much as among the subject peoples. Now, if an Ottoman official violated the spirit of the new measures as egregiously as Cemāl Paşa did during World War I, members of his staff were apt to react with the astonished disapproval that emerges from the account of Falih Rıfkı Atay. Atay's reaction was not unique.[65]

To view the evolution of the system of local administration in terms of the patterns prescribed from the center can be highly misleading if one does not also set the centrist view against the factual record from a variety of localities. The information now available about Palestine suggests that, just as there are important conclusions to be gained from a study of the regulatory texts themselves, their practical impact was greater than has at times been recognized.

Notes

1 *Düstūr*, First Series (*Birinci Tertīb*), 4 vols. plus 4 appendices (*zeyl*) and a "Completion" (*Mütemmim*) volume (Istanbul, 1289-1335/1872-1917), as well as 4 additional vols. published as vols. 5-8 (Ankara, 1937-43); Second Series (*İkinci Tertīb*), 12 vols. (Istanbul, 1329-1927 [*sic*: i.e., 1911-1927]). The Turkish Republic has continued to publish the *Düstūr* as the official compilation of laws; the title is now in its fifth series. The first series (identified in these notes as *Düstūr*[1]) contains acts dating from 1839 through the reign of 'Abdülḥamīd; the second (*Düstūr*[2]) contains acts of 1908-22.

2 C.H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), p. 18.

3 Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 4-20. See also the papers by M. Ma'oz ("Changes in the Position of the Jewish Communities of Palestine and Syria in the mid-Nineteenth Century"), Mordechai Abir ("Local Leadership and Early Reform in Palestine, 1800-1834"), and Yitzhak Hofman ("The Administration of Syria and Palestine under Egyptian Rule [1831-1840]"), in M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 142-63, 284-310, 311-33. On earlier conditions, see Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns of Government and Administration* (Jerusalem, 1973). On conditions during the *Tanzīmāt* and the reign of 'Abdülḥamīd, see the papers by M. Ma'oz ("The Impact of Modernization on Syrian Politics and Society during the Early *Tanzimat* Period") and Shimon Shamir ("The Modernization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Period of Abdülhamid") in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 333-81; also Najib E. Saliba, "The Achievements of Midḥat Pasha as Governor of the Province of Syria, 1878-1880," *IJMES*, 9 (1978), pp. 307-23.

4 J.C. Hurewitz (ed.), *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record* (2nd. ed., New Haven, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 269-71.

5 H. Inalcık, "Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 5 (1973), pp. 97-127.

6 Cf. Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, 1963), p. 165 (citing views of Fu'ād Paşa, 1867); Ilber Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli İdareler, 1840-1878* (Ankara, 1974), p. 55.

7 Hans-Jürgen Kornrumpf, *Die Territorialverwaltung im östlichen Teil der europäischen Türkei vom Erlass der Vilayetsordnung (1864) bis zum Berliner Kongress (1878) nach amtlichen osmanischen Veröffentlichungen* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1976), pp. 20-21, 39-74; Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 30-43, 69-101; Ortaylı, *Mahalli Idareler*, pp. 13-31; Inalcık, "Application of the Tanzimat," pp. 97-127; Davison, *Reform*, pp. 136-42; Davison, "The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire," in Polk and Chambers, pp. 93ff.; A. Heidborn, *Manuel de droit public et administratif de l'Empire ottoman* (Vienna and Leipzig, 1908), vol. 1, p. 164; C. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (Princeton, 1980), pp. 179-83, 195, 313-14.

8 Steven T. Rosenthal, *The Politics of Dependency: Urban Reform in Istanbul* (Westport, CT, 1980).

9 Kornrumpf discovered and emphasized this point: *Territorialverwaltung*, pp. 24, 74-89.

10 Texts of the provincial administration laws of 1864 and 1871 appear in Ottoman in *Düstūr*[1], I, pp. 608-51, and in French translations officially communicated by the Ottoman authorities to the European missions in Istanbul in George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman* (Oxford, 1905-1906), vol. 1, pp. 36-45, 47-69. Article numbers cited below refer to whichever of these laws is under discussion at the time. As printed by Young, the French translations are marred by ellipses, translation errors, and arbitrary substitutions of terms (e.g., *Defterḫâne* for *Defter-i Ḫâkânî*). Consequently, our discussion follows the Ottoman texts, even though they are not without confusing points or outright errors, E.g., *Düstūr*[1], vol. 1, p. 635, art. 41 of the 1871 law states that general responsibility for the police force of the *livā* or *sancak* is entrusted to the senior (literally, biggest) female police officer in the district (*en büyük żabṭiye żābiṭesine muḥavveldir*). In this case, the error is an obvious one, and the text should simply say "entrusted to the senior police officer" (*en büyuk żabṭiye żābiṭine...*). Young's version of these texts does have the virtue of giving fuller and more precise information about modifications resulting from later legislation and should be preferred for information of that kind. Even so, what Young says on these points needs to be checked against *Düstūr*[1], vols. 5-8, not published when he wrote.

11 Davison, *Reform*, p. 159.

12 *Düstūr*[1], vol. 1, pp. 608 n. to art. 1 of the 1864 law, 612 n. to art. 24, 614 n. to arts. 29-30, 615 n. to art. 35; Heidborn, *Manuel*, vol. 1, p. 160; Ortayh, *Mahalli Idareler*, p. 49; Vital Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine: Géographie administrative, statistique, descriptive et raisonnée* (Paris, 1896), p. 52.

13 Heidborn, *Manuel*, vol. 1, pp. 7-8.

14 On municipalities in Palestine, see the contributions by Haim Gerber and Ruth Kark in this volume. On the general administrative geography of Ottoman Palestine, see Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine*, pp. 3-5, 92, 100-101, 105-106, 110, 113-14, 116-17, 178, 183, 192-93, 195, 197, 513-15, 626, 658, 663, 667, 676-77, and foldout map headed "La Syrie;" cf. Şemseddîn Sâmî Frasherî, *Ḳamūs ül-A'lâm* (Istanbul, 1306-1316/c. 1889-1898), vol. 2, p. 1348; vol. 4, pp. 3164-65; vol. 5, pp. 3421-23, 3606-07; vol. 6, p. 4318 (not always reliable on boundaries).

15 Halil Inalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London, 1973), p. 82 right-hand columm of the chart; Kornrumpf, *Territorialverwaltung*, pp. 14-15, 23.

16 Heidborn (*Manuel*, vol. 1, p. 157) adjusts his use of the French terms accordingly, translating *vilâyet* as *province*, *livâ* and *sancak* as *département*, *ḳażâ* as *arrondissement*, and *nâḥiye* as *canton*. His term for the lowest level of urban or rural organization is *commune urbaine* or *rurale*.

17 Bernard Le Clère and Vincent Wright, *Les préfets du Second Empire* (Paris, 1973), pp. 36ff.; Davison (*Reform*, pp. 42-51) discusses a variety of influences and describes the Ottoman system as a "mixture of centralization and decentralization."

18 Cf. *Düstūr*[1], vol. 5, p. 947 amendment of 22 Safer 1305/1887 to art. 14 on the *vālī's* use of military forces.

19 Davison, *Reform*, p. 159, Note, however, that Midḥat experienced frustration as *vālī* of Syria in 1878-80: Shamir, "Modernization of Syria," pp. 351-81; Saliba, "Achievements of Midhat Pasha," pp. 307-23. Midḥat suffered by then from the enmity of the sultan,

and from the fact that his gubernatorial style — that of a kind of viceroy disposing of all powers locally — did not fit in well under the very laws that his earlier successes had helped to shape.

20 Young, *Corps de droit*, vol. 1, p. 51, n. 5; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, p. 189.

21 Some of the added officials were already mentioned in 1867 in instructions added to the 1864 law at the time of its publication for general use; Kornrumpf, *Territorialverwaltung*, pp. 86-87.

22 Cf. table comparing administrative staffs of *vālī*, *mutaṣarrif*, and *ḳā'imaḳām* in Heidborn, *Manuel*, vol. 1, p. 164.

23 Davison, *Reform*, pp. 240ff.; Stanford J. Shaw, "The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement before 1876," *IJMES*, 1 (1970), pp. 73ff.

24 Young, *Corps de droit*, vol. 1, pp. 159ff.; Heidborn, *Manuel*, vol. 1, pp. 223ff.; C. Findley, art. "Maḥkeme — in the Ottoman Empire (excluding Egypt)," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd. ed. (forthcoming). Young (vol. 1, p. 166) indicates that the regulations of 1897 supersede others going back to a set dated January 1872 (*Dūstūr*[1], vol. 1, pp. 352-56). As a result, the statement in the preamble of the provincial administration law of 1871 to the effect that the *niẓāmiye* courts had already been brought under separate regulations (*Dūstūr*[1], vol. 1, p. 625) is not strictly accurate. Both the provincial law and the court regulations may, however, have been under consideration at the same time.

25 Ortaylı (*Mahalli Idareler*, pp. 54, 73-76) also mentions education, public works, and agriculture commissions, which he says were found in some provinces. While they may have existed, they were not mentioned in the provincial administration laws of 1864 and 1871. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, p. 182, needs to be corrected in this regard.

26 This account follows the Ottoman text: *Dūstūr*[1], vol. 1, pp. 616-17; Young's official translation differs in saying that the staff of the *ḳā'imaḳām* included three Muslim members of the administrative council and two non-Muslims members (*Corps de droit*, vol. 1, p. 42, art. 46). Cf. Ortaylı, *Mahalli Idareler*, p. 68. Davison, *Reform*, p. 148, follows the wording of art. 47 ("three members, religion unspecified"), evidently without comparing this with art. 46. The number of elected council members was also later raised to six in the councils of some *vilāyets*: Young, *Corps de droit*, vol. 1, p. 10 38n. Some accounts of the councils refer to the *ex officio* membership of the local religious leaders as if this applied at all three levels (e.g., Heidborn, *Manuel*, vol. 1, p. 165).

27 Heidborn, *Manuel*, vol. 1, p. 106; Ortaylı, *Mahalli Idareler*, p. 56.

28 Haim Gerber, "The Administration of the *Sanjaq* of Jerusalem," *Asian and African Studies*, 12 (1978), pp. 87-101.

29 C. Findley, "The Acid Test of Ottomanism: The Acceptance of Non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Bureaucracy," in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 1 (forthcoming); Ortaylı, *Mahalli Idareler*, pp. 58-62, on problems of non-Muslim representation.

30 Ortaylı, *Mahalli Idareler*, pp. 62-64, 67, 71.

31 For details, see Davison, *Reform*, p. 148; cf. Ortaylı, *Mahalli Idareler*, pp. 19-20, 69-71.

32 Young, *Corps de droit*, vol. 1, pp. 45-47, instructions of 1875; Ottoman text in *Dūstūr*[1], vol. 3, pp. 174-75.

33 Heidborn, *Manuel*, vol. 1, p. 166.

34 *Dūstūr*[1], vol. 6, p. 397. The heading of this text refers to the original *vilāyet* law as dating from 23 Rebiülevvel 1284/1867, not 1864. 1867 was, however, the date when the scope of application of the 1864 law first began to be broadened; cf. n. 9 above.

35 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd. ed. (Oxford, 1968), p. 388. Ortaylı, *Mahalli Idareler*, p. 79. Young, *Corps de droit*, vol. 1, p. 60 n. 8; Heidborn, *Manuel*, vol. 1, 164 n., p. 68.

36 Heidborn, *Manuel*, vol. 1, pp. 158, 170-71. Ortaylı, *Mahalli Idareler*, pp. 87-95.

37 Cf. the contribution by Haim Gerber in this volume; also Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine*, pp. 92, 100, 105, 110, 114, 117, 178, 183, 193, 195, 197, 514-15, 626, 658, 663, 667, 677.

38 Young, *Corps de droit*, pp. 84-88, *nāḥiye* regulations of 1876; Ottoman text in *Dūstūr*[1],

vol. 3, pp. 33-37; Young converts the Hijrī date of the regulations incorrectly and gives the wrong page numbers for the *Düstūr* reference — two errors frequently encountered in his work. In the law of 1871, the provisions on the duties of the *nāḥiye* director and council are in arts. 56 and 100. Butrus Abu Manneh relates that he has found cases of appointed *nāḥiye* directors in Palestine — another example of bureaucratic control from higher echelons (personal communication, December 1979).

39 Gabriel Baer, "The Economic and Social Position of the Village-Mukhtar in Palestine," in Gabriel Ben-Dor (ed.), *The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict* (Ramat Gan, 1978), pp. 101-17; cf. comments on the office of *muḫtār* in the contribution of Haim Gerber in this volume.

40 Kornrumpf, *Territorialverwaltung*, pp. 90-92.

41 Young, *Corps de droit*, vol. 1, pp. 69-84, law of 1877 on provincial municipalities; Ottoman text in *Düstūr*[1], vol. 4, pp. 538-53 (cf. page numbers cited by Young); Lewis, *Emergence*, pp. 393ff.

42 *Düstūr*[1], vol. 5, p. 695.

43 Young, *Corps de droit*, vol. 1, pp. 88-95; *Düstūr*[1], vol. 3, pp. 24-33.

44 *Düstūr*[1], vol. 4, pp. 8, 18.

45 Cf. Edouard Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat, ou histoire des réformes dans l'Empire ottoman depuis 1826 jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1884), vol. 2, pp. 249-55; Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 391.

46 *Düstūr*[1], vol. 7, pp. 72-28, regulations of 1325/1907.

47 *Ibid.*, vol. 8, pp. 729-37, regulations of 1325/1907.

48 *Ibid.*, vol. 6, pp. 224-30, 350-51, 570-71, 1275-80; vol. 1, pp. 212-13, 658-59; vol. 8, pp. 4-15, 200-205.

49 Young, *Corps de droit*, vol. 1, pp. 96-112; many such measures in *Düstūr*[1] (see rubrics in tables of contents); the timing of some ostensibly general measures was also governed by the need to respond to problems of specific places; see *Düstūr*[1], vol. 7, pp. 116-18, official communiqué of October 1896 on provincial "reforms" (mostly orders application of existing laws).

50 *Düstūr*[2], vol. 5, pp. 186-216 temporary laws of 17 Rebiülahir 1331/March 1913. There was also a temporary law of 1912 that superseded the law of 1871 in part: *Düstūr*[2], vol. 4, pp. 421-38. We shall confine our discussion to the law of 1913, and article numbers cited below in the text refer to it. A contemporary British analysis of this law is in the Public Record Office (London), FO 424/250, "Annual Report, 1913," pp. 24-25; see also Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 134-38. As for the term "temporary law," article 36 of the constitution as amended in 1909 (*Düstūr*[2], vol. 1, pp. 641-42) allowed the enactment of "temporary laws" under certain conditions when the parliament was not in session. The laws originated as decisions of the Council of Ministers, were promulgated by decree of the sultan, and were supposed to be submitted to parliament at its next session.

51 Relevant provisions of the 1871 law are in art. 7 only: *Düstūr*[1], vol. 1, p. 627; Young, *Corps de droit*, vol. 1, p. 49.

52 Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, pp. 266-79.

53 *Ibid.*, pp. 328-29, text in *Düstūr*[2], vol. 8, pp. 178-81.

54 Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 385; Ortaylı, *Mahalli Idareler*, pp. 87-88, finds this point anticipated in the law of 1877 on provincial municipalities, provisions on control of property by the municipality and on legal actions against it; cf. Heidborn, *Manuel*, vol. 1, p. 158.

55 Further amendments on some of these points appear in *Düstūr*[2], vol. 6, pp. 504-505, temporary law of 20 Cemazielevvel 1332/April 1914.

56 Other measures on the provincial budget include *ibid.*, vol. 5, p. 144, vol. 6, pp. 505-508. Provincial budgets of a sort were known before: Klaus Kreiser, "Der Haushalt der Provinz Jemen zwischen 1887/8 und 1910/1," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, vol. 1, pp. 207-17; the innovation was local control over the budget.

57 *Düstūr*[2], vol. 5, p. 793; temporary law of 29 Şevval 1331/Sept. 1913, amending art. 101 to allow the Agricultural Bank to collect a one percent commission of sums received and paid out.

58 *Ibid.*, vol. 6, pp. 508-509, previously cited temporary law of 1332/1914.

59 Cf. *ibid.*, vol. 8, pp. 1170-74, internal regulations of 27 Receb 1334/May 1916 for the provincial general assemblies.

60 Amendments on this subject, also, in previously cited temporary law of 1332/1914: *ibid.*, vol. 6, p. 509.

61 *Ibid.*, vol. 5, pp. 232-33, temporary law of 28 Rebiülahir 1331/April 1913 on the rates of the additional fractional taxes.

62 Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, ch. vii. Cf. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2: *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975* (New York, 1977), p. 300, on the programs of the Committee of Union and Progress. On the reformist impulse in general and the positive side of the spirit of the period, see Bernard Lewis, *Emergence*, pp. 227ff., and Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), pp. 325ff.

63 Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 134-38; C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism* (Urbana, Illinois, 1973), pp. 16-19, 24; William L. Ochsenwald, "Opposition to Political Centralization in South Jordan and the Hijaz, 1900-1914," *Muslim World*, 63 (1973), p. 305. For the Armenian inhabited provinces of eastern Anatolia, a program of reforms was prepared on the eve of World War I on a basis of international agreement: see Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 38-39.

64 See the contribution by Geoffrey Lewis in this volume; also Falih Rıfkı Atay's account of Cemâl Paşa's attitude toward law in *Zeytindağı*, expanded 2nd ed. (Istanbul, 1938), pp. 97-100. My thanks to Professor Lewis for this reference.

65 Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, pp. 163-65, 231-33, 235-39, 251, 263, 283, 296-97.

A New Look at the *Tanẓīmāt*: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem

HAIM GERBER

The view held by most scholars on the 19th century Ottoman reform seems to be a negative one. Many have reached the conclusion that the reforms failed to bring about any substantial change for the good. Such lofty sentiments as are expressed in the edicts of 1839, 1856, and the constitution of 1876, are supposed to have remained a dead letter. The good intentions of the men of the *Tanẓīmāt* were nullified by the resistance coming from an often reluctant sultan, corrupt officialdom, and hard-headed local elites. At the same time, some observers lamented those measures of reform that did have some effect. They deplored, for example, the fact that the old political institutions were totally wiped out, while nothing viable replaced them. A characteristically anti-Ottoman interpretation asserts that some of the reforms brought about corrupt and laughable consequences, that were the opposite of the intentions of the *Tanẓīmāt* leaders. Thus, instead of the old Ottoman bureaucrat there appeared a kind of semi-Westernized semi-Oriental type of bureaucrat, who was imbued with neither of these two cultures, whose dress and behavior were a mishmash of the two and who was, on top of everything, poorly paid, and therefore greedy and prone to take bribes.[1]

It is the intention of this article, to show that this picture, although not totally false, nevertheless misses some subtle, but important changes which did take place in the structure of the Ottoman bureaucratic system. It must be emphasized that only the Ottoman bureaucray itself is dealt with. Had other aspects of the life of the country in the 19th century also been considered, it would probably be still easier to demonstrate that a tangible change was occurring. But then there would have been the methodological problem of having to attribute various changes to different causes, such as the influence of foreign powers and the like. Provided only the Ottoman bureaucracy itself is examined it can be safely assumed that outside factors possibly contributed to the initial push. But most of the changes to be reviewed below were in all probability self-generated by the *Tanẓīmāt* movement itself.

This study is in a way an outgrowth of a former study, which sought to describe minutely the Ottoman administration in Jerusalem at the beginning of the 20th century,[2] that is, more or less at the end of the reform movement. The main source for that first study was a rare (though small) Ottoman archive situated in the Israel State Archives.[3] The main part of that archive comprises the protocols of the administrative council of Jerusalem, extending over three

years at the beginning of the 20th century. This body was probably one of the most typical reforms of the *Tanẓīmāt* era.[4] It convened several times a week and discussed everything brought before it by the province's authorities. The idea arose that it would be quite revealing to compare the pattern which emerged from the first study to the traditional, pre-*Tanẓīmāt* Ottoman bureaucracy of Palestine, that is, roughly in the first half of the 19th century.[5]

The most important achievement of the Ottoman government in 19th century Palestine was a substantial improvement in public security. It is clear that its absence was the foremost reason for the country's previous decline. Geographically the country is mainly divided into the coastal plain and the mountain area. While the coastal region as a potential area for settlement exceeds the mountain area several times over, the situation in Ottoman Palestine was that the former region was almost totally deserted, while the mountains were quite densely populated.[6] This obviously suggests a situation where lack of public security was an inherent characteristic. On the other hand, it is also evident from this basic fact, that the Ottoman government was strong enough to prevent any local force from consolidating itself as a central authority within the country, an authority which would be able to reduce lawlessness. The instrument for the deterioration in the country was of course the nomads. In a country situated on the border of the desert, whenever the government weakened militarily or politically, the encroachmment by nomads advanced.[7] Beginning in the 17th and 18th centuries, intrusions by nomads resulted in large areas of land becoming desolate. Although the nomads could not penetrate into the mountainous region, other factors were operating there which made the Ottoman government's authority a mere sham. The main factor was a powerful local elite, composed of opposing village or district shaykhs, among whom strife, often violent, was almost incessant.[8] It is evident that as long as this state of near anarchy prevailed, any potential development (whether economic or political) was virtually ruled out.

This period ended around the middle of the 19th century, when the Ottoman government began to implement in Palestine the first reforms of the *Tanẓīmāt*. It is well known that initially the Ottoman government's main efforts were intended to consolidate its hold over its dominions. In the 1850s and 1860s, in a series of clashes with the Ottoman army, most of these local rebellious forces were wiped out, or at least reduced to insignificance.[9] The supremacy of Ottoman authority in Palestine was never again thrown into question. The very term village shaykhs seems to have disappeared, its place being taken by the *muḫtār*, that is, a tame official in the Ottoman administration, completely subservient to the *mūdīr*, or governor of the *nāḥiye*.[10]

One of the most effective measures by which the Ottoman administration established itself unequivocally over the country was the gendarmerie. This is one of the many loan words which entered the Ottoman bureaucratic vocabulary in the latter half of the 19th century. The extremely important place the gendarmerie occupied in the life of the province at the beginning of the 20th

century is widely reflected in the protocols of the council. It was the gendarmerie which checked on people who applied for residence permits in Jerusalem,[11] and it was the gendarmerie which supervised the election procedure for the office of *muḫtār* in the villages.[12]

The protocols of the administrative council may sometimes be one-sided. It is therefore important that other sources corroborate this view about the resurgence of Ottoman authority at the expense of the village elite. In a letter written towards the end of the 19th century about land disputes between Jews and Arabs in the southern coastal plain there is a clear account of the relationship between the village headmen *(muḫtārs)* and the governor of Gaza.[13] These village headmen were completely subservient to the governor. Other contemporary sources are even more outspoken about these power relations. One such account states:

> The Turkish soldiers are like leprosy to the Arab villagers. Two of them were enough to dismay a whole village. They used to come mounted on horses, sit in the village, holding in their hands an old "fetching order" for someone in the village. The shaykh was forced to bring that man, and as long as he did not bring him, the soldiers would sit and eat the village fowl, slaughter sheep and drink sweetened coffee, and their horses would eat barley clean of straw, which each of the villagers would bring daily to the shaykh's house.[14]

This view about the change in the power relations between the Ottoman government in Palestine and the local village elite somewhat contradicts the conclusion reached by G. Baer, in his study of village headmen in Palestine in the 19th and 20th centuries.[15] Baer reached the conclusion that while the Ottomans did try to curb the power of the village shaykhs, they were not successful in this. He admits that the *muḫtār* became a mere governmental official, but suggests that there was no transformation from the shaykh to the *muḫtār*.[16] This point is probably at least partially true. The question certainly awaits further research. One of the sources cited above mentions the shaykh as the official whose power was reduced by the Ottoman administration.[17] The most likely explanation seems to be that a limited number of shaykhs remained powerful and prestigious, but their authority was invoked only rarely. At the same time, the day to day business of administering the village (taxes, land registration and disputes, reporting on various events and the like), was carried out by the *muḫtārs*.

The power of the nomads in western Palestine was demolished no less than the power of the village shaykhs. One of the clearest contemporary descriptions showing this comes from the pen of Laurence Oliphant. In 1883 Oliphant observed about the northern part of the country:

> ...The Bedouins are being pushed gradually east of the Jordan, and it is now becoming more and more rare for an Arab encampment to be seen

> in the neighborhood of the more settled and prosperous part of the country...[18]

Especially pertinent was the case of the plain of Esdraelon, always occupied by Bedouin. On the situation here Oliphant had the following to say:

> Readers will be surprised to learn that almost every acre of the plain of Esdraelon is at this moment in the highest state of cultivation; that it is perfectly safe to ride across it unarmed in any direction, as I can testify; that, so far from plundering and despoiling villages, the few Bedouins, whose "black tabernacles" are not confined to the southern margin of the plain, have, in their turn, become the plundered and despoiled, for they are all reduced to the position of being subject to inexorable landlords, who charge them exorbitantly for the land which they occupy and for which they pay in hard cash, under penalty of instant ejection, which is ruthlessly enforced so that the inhabitants of the villages, with which the plain is now dotted live in perfect security.[19]

This observation about the drastic reduction in the power of the Bedouins is fully corroborated by one Bedouin chief in the Beisan plain, in an interview which he gave to two Arab scholars in 1913. In the past, he said, they could do anything they wished, but in 1913, "that despised chief, who is heading a tribe of some three or four thousand people, is depressed and oppressed. He is subject to the contempt of the simplest official".[20]

Nor was Oliphant the only European observer to voice the aforementioned view. It was also expressed by several Zionist observers, none of whom is to be suspected of any special fondness for the Ottoman government. Thus, Y. Yelin observed, as early as 1872, that the Bedouin threat on the road between Jerusalem and the Jordan river was practically nil, although he may have been exaggerating a little.[21] In 1890 Ḥissin observed that "the Turkish rule now becomes stronger and stronger. Slowly it restrains the wild shaykhs, and it now already levies taxes from the most rebellious tribes and forces them to submit to the government".[22] And Usishkin observed in 1891:

> There are still on the road the remains of the booths in which ten years ago guards were stationed to protect the road to Jerusalem. But now these guards are no more. For now even in dark night there is no danger on the road.[23]

All this is not intended to claim that security on roads in western Palestine was by then perfect. But it seems that the chronic lack of security was definitely improved, and that this was achieved by the Ottoman government.

Some important phases in the fight against nomads find wide expression in the protocols of the Jerusalem council. Relatively large number of documents relate to the region of Beersheba. Only in 1900 was there a settlement in this area, by a deliberate action of the Ottoman government.[24] Notwithstanding the

fact that the population here was very small, more documents deal with this region than with any other area in the province apart from Jerusalem itself. The reason for this was undoubtedly the preoccupation of Jerusalem's administration with the problem of the Bedouins. An additional reason was the fact that the council of Jerusalem constituted, in some matters, an appeal tribunal for the reformed court in Beersheba.

It has been shown above that by the beginning of the 20th century the Bedouin threat was gone. The establishment of Beersheba meant more than just that: it was a deep intrusion into the nomads' way of life. One of the first ways in which this was done was mediating in land conflicts. One such major conflict mentioned in our sources is that between the tribes of 'Azāzmeh and the Tiyāhā. At the beginning of the 20th century this conflict was already forty or fifty years old, and the council of Jerusalem had dealt with it several times. More than once it aroused violent struggles between the tribes. A committee composed of high officials in the province went to Beersheba at the close of the 19th century and mediated between the two sides. This, however, was not the end of the matter, since the land had to be registered. For the Bedouin chiefs it looked natural that the land would be registered in their names, but the government viewed the situation differently.[25] What was at issue here was of course the conflict between the traditional Bedouin concept of land tenure, of which the basis was the *dīra*, or wandering area of the tribe, and the new concept of land tenure, registration in the name of the individual. That the new concept was beginning to penetrate the Bedouins' traditional world-view is made clear in several documents. One such group of documents records a conflict over a piece of land held by the tribe of the 'Azāzmeh. A discussion arose between them and the Ottoman government, as it was not entirely clear how the land was possessed. One document relates that the Bedouins cultivated the land very intensively so that every now and again they would abandon it for a number of years, so that legally their right of possession would expire. But the document goes on to say that since the establishment of the town of Beersheba the Bedouin owners had begun to till the land regularly and permanently. Consequently the establishment of the township had a visible effect on the sedenterization of the neighboring nomads.[26]

The Beersheba region was not the only one where there were Bedouins who were not connected in any way to the Ottoman government. Another such area was the Judean desert. From its protocols we know that the Jerusalem council was involved in land mediations also in this region.[27] Concerning the extinction of the power of the Judean desert Bedouins, there is also an excellent on the spot corroborating account supplied by Baldensperger. His account relates to the 1920s, but is very relevant to our case:

> These tribes, though they call themselves Arab, are agricultural nomads, and are best known in the markets of Jerusalem and Bethlehem for the early cucumbers which they grow in the warm regions in the spring and

> sell at cheap prices. Though now very harmless, some fifty years ago they were the terror of all villages bordering on the Judean desert. There were always feuds with small detachments of troops, and they were so audacious as to kill the officials in the plain of Rephaim, the baka, before Jerusalem. The fatal blow was given them only by the capture of the much-feared Sheikh Safi-ej-jer in 1865, when the Pasha of Jerusalem at the head of a battalion of soldiers got the better of him in Bethlehem. Since then the Ta'amry have been greatly reduced, their only privilege being that they escape conscription, as do all who live in tents.[28]

The assertion contained in the last sentence does not seem to be generally true. The protocols of the Jerusalem council indicate that Bedouins all over the country had begun to pay taxes. Thus, one document records that the Rashayda tribe paid taxes.[29] The Ta'āmira tribe at the beginning of the 20th century paid tithes on its agricultural produce. In 1906/7 that tax was estimated at about 1600 Turkish pounds.[30] There are even indications that the Bedouins of the northern Negev paid taxes at this period.[31]

The Ottoman government's consolidation of control over the country in the latter half of the 19th century was undoubtedly the most important change in this period. But at the same time other changes were taking place. One such change which comes readily to mind when comparing the beginning of the 20th century with the beginning of the 19th century was a substantial difference in the very presence of the Ottoman administration.

One of the expressions of the *Tanẓīmāt* in the provinces was the gradual appearance of new administrative bodies, governing new administrative areas, and especially the commune, or *nāḥiye*. Elsewhere I have shown that the pace of establishment of these administrative bodies was a far cry from what was laid down in the *vilāyet* laws.[32] At the beginning of the 20th century there were in Palestine only a handful of such *nāḥiyes*, but the period was brisk in the formation of new ones. I maintain that even this outwardly simple fact of establishment of new administrative centers suggests a more modernized working of the administration. This is so because it seems that the pre-*Tanẓīmāt* administration was characterized, among other things, by very few contacts with the ordinary citizens. Thus, from A. Cohen's book on 18th century Palestine it can be understood that administrative areas below the level of *sancak* were scarcely meaningful except in relation to taxation.[33] In Palestine *sancak* offices would be located in three towns at the most. Consequently, it is possible that most ordinary citizens rarely saw an Ottoman official. This undoubtedly carried with it some advantages in the 18th century. But probably no more so at the beginning of the 20th century.

Another field where one can observe a clear process of modernization in the working of the Ottoman administration is the attitude taken by officials and their political and bureaucratic behavior. The discussion of this point can be divided into two. One is the position of the governor vis-à-vis the central

government, and the other is the position of the governor *vis-à-vis* the officials working under him. On both scores substantial change was visible between the beginning of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th.

At the beginning of the 19th century the power of coercion enjoyed by the central government over the provincial governor seems to have been very slight. Moreover, while in theory the provinces were graded so that each smaller area constituted a part of a larger province, in practice this was of little consequence. By the same token, each ruler viewed his post not as something entrusted to him in order to achieve a specific task, but as a personal asset.[34] This viewpoint may be termed "atomization" of the Ottoman provincial administration. Each province constituted a world unto itself. And it is exactly 18th century Palestine which constitutes one of the best examples for this bureaucratic pattern, and one has only to think about Ḍāhir al-'Umar and Aḥmed Jezzār.

The second point concerns the political and even legal relations between the provincial governor and his staff. The classical Ottoman Empire was characterized by what, following Max Weber, may be called household government.[35] This means that the ruler's officials were at the same time his personal defendants or in other words, members of his household. The staff of Aḥmed Jezzār was totally subservient to him as full-fledged slaves, even though that was not their legal status. They were "his men" during working hours as much as afterwards. In fact, probably no such separation existed in practice.

A careful investigation of the behavior of the Ottoman administration of Jerusalem at the beginning of the 20th century, leads to the surprising realization that this dual model of provincial bureaucracy was totally swept away during the *Tanẓīmāt* era. From the available information it is abundantly clear that the ruler of Jerusalem was a tame bureaucrat, in a carefully graded hierarchy.[36] Such a ruler could not even dream of building for himself a semi-autonomous principality, from which no one would be able to dislodge him. In the first place it was a question of expectation: the expectation of a Jezzār at the start of the 19th century would be to augment his power and autonomy, rather than to seek promotion by way of receiving a more important position in another province. Such an expectation would be unthinkable for an Ekrem Bey at the beginning of the 20th century. But going beyond expectations, it is also a question of bureaucratic structure. While Jezzār had an army at his disposal, Ekrem Bey did not have a single soldier under his full command.[37] Concomitantly, while Jezzār's officials were members of his household and were subject to his dictatorial will, Ekrem Bey at the beginning of the 20th century could give no orders to his employees, and in any case could not ensure compliance with such orders. He could hardly go as far as to dismiss officials. The separation between his own household and the staff of officials could not be more perfect than it was, and Weber's model, at this point at least, was admirably realized. In this case, although no *Tanẓīmāt* law related to the matter

directly, in a very subtle way the structure of the Ottoman bureaucracy was completely transformed.

Another administrative sphere which was substantially modernized in the province of Jerusalem was taxation. It is well known that this was one of the most thorny problems that plagued the Ottoman Empire before the *Tanẓīmāt* era. It was not taxation as such, but rather the way taxes were levied which was the problem, and it concerned the system of farming out agricultural tithes — *iltizām*. It is widely accepted that the *iltizām* was one of the gravest shortcomings of the Ottoman administrative system. Its abrogation in the edicts of 1839 was considered to be a fundamental reform.[38] But these Ottoman edicts were completely ineffective.[39] Nevertheless, the description of the institution of tax farming at the beginning of the 20th century makes it quite clear that the institution was in fact dramatically altered.[40] While in the first half of the 19th century tax farmers would levy practically any proportion of the produce they chose, this was far from being the case at the beginning of the 20th century. The protocols of the council makes it clear that the *iltizām* was reduced to a mere shadow of its former self. This is shown for example by the fact that in large areas of the province the *iltizām* was not used, but rather, more regular forms, less onerous to the peasants and probably more profitable to the government. And even in those areas where the *iltizām* was still in vogue, sometimes no candidate appeared who would farm out the tithes. This, of course, is an unlikely occurrence in a situation where the tax farmer has effective control over the countryside.

It can be asked how this transformation from the old-style tax farming to the new type took place. After all, the Ottoman government intended to abolish the *iltizām* altogether, not to transform it into a more moderate form. It seems that the answer to this had to do with the changing level of administrative effectiveness and orderliness characterizing the early 20th century government of Palestine. This is reflected, for example, in the way the conferring of tax farms took place.

It is not at all clear how the process of auctioning the tax farms was done in the pre-*Tanẓīmāt* period, but it can be imagined that under-the-table arrangements used to play a substantial role. Undoubtedly they did so also at the beginning of the 20th century, but probably to a much lesser degree. The auction was done by regular procedure and had a fixed opening date and a deadline. Offers were often placed with the authorities through the telegraph, sometimes from other provinces. At one time somebody suggested an "offer" which arrived one day late, and so was disregarded and the leasing contract was duly signed. The man appealed to the ministry and claimed that the last day of the leasing period was the day of the sultan's accesion and therefore an official holiday. His request was granted, while pointing out the article in the tithe law which allowed this interpretation.[41] This is only a small example of what seems to be a relatively more exact and orderly procedure, in all likelihood far superior to anything that had gone before in Ottoman history.

Another area where modernization was apparent was the legal system. Without entering into a full-fledged sociological analysis of the traditional legal system of the Ottoman Empire, one important characteristic is noteworthy, and pertinent to the present study.[42] This is connected to Weber's analysis of Islamic law. Weber suggested a fourfold analysis of the legal systems of the world.[43] One type was designated by him as "kadi-justice", but obviously, he only used the Islamic case as a prototype of a more general phenomenon. Nevertheless his characterization seems quite relevant to the Ottoman case, if not to the Islamic system in general. What Weber meant by "kadi-justice" was a legal system where there are few strict rational rules on the basis of which the judge operates, but rather, he acts according to intuition. As can be appreciated only through reading *ḳāḍī*-protocols of the Ottoman Empire, this description is surprisingly precise. The Ottoman *ḳaḍī* had no written code of laws to guide him. He had of course the orthodox manuals, some of which are considered superb. But there was also state law (*ḳānūn*) to be taken into consideration, as well as local custom. What he would decide in any specific case was entirely up to him. He had to explain his decision to no one, and most legal decisions in the Ottoman court protocols are not justified. A would-be robber in the Ottoman Empire might equally anticipate amputation of a limb, or being sent for any number of years to serve in the galleys. Precisely for this reason one does not find in the Ottoman legal system professional lawyers.[44] If nobody could analyse the process leading to a decision, then evidently, no defence could be predictably prepared. An appeal system in the real sense of the term was also lacking. It is true that sometimes a case might be reviewed by some sort of higher legal authority. But this can hardly qualify as an appeal, since it was in effect a *new* trial. The first trial could not be re-examined since there was no real debate and no arguments based on the various niceties of the law.

There are clear signs that this traditional legal system was undergoing substantial changes in various respects. There are only hints of these changes because of methodological problems. The problem is that so far no information whatsoever has come to light on the working of the new-style *niẓāmī* (reformed) courts, which constituted the backbone of the new Ottoman legal system. But alternatively, some insights are available in the protocols of the Jerusalem council which, while strictly speaking not a court,[45] was nevertheless a semi-judicial body, and in some respects even a full-fledged court. From the mode of working of this body it can readily be seen that there existed a great difference between it and the old-style courts. To begin with, the protocols of the council are sometimes difficult to comprehend because of the large number of references to earlier relevant material, and especially to various articles of law. Moreover, the type of legal reasoning is much closer to modern legal thinking. The concept of "special circumstances", specific to a particular case, is apparent in many documents. This was an inconceivable concept in the old legal thinking of the *ḳāḍī* courts. The concept of appeal from

one instance to another can also be seen to exist. Also, a document in the writer's own possession is in effect an appeal document presented to a certain *niẓāmī* court somewhere in the Empire (and this seems to be the only such document that so far has come to light). Thus, it is also positively proven that the process of appeal really existed in the practice of the new-style courts established by the *Tanẓīmāt*.

Municipalities were one type of new institution introduced by the *Tanẓīmāt* movement in the last third of the 19th century. Several issues are involved with the question of municipalities, and they serve to illustrate the modernization of the Ottoman administration of Palestine in more than one way. To begin with, the very establishment of the municipality as a corporate legal body, at least partially independent of the government, is a revolution in the context of the all-embracing traditional Ottoman administration. And at least according to Eisenstadt's model of political modernization, this is a more sophisticated form than earlier ones.[46]

Secondly, the main task of the municipalities in Ottoman Palestine was the provision of services, and here also was hidden an important aspect of modernization. Thirdly, in the process of nominating municipal officials in Jerusalem at the beginning of the 20th century one can detect some interesting flirtations with democratic elections which, although a far cry from modern democratic elections, cannot be dismissed as a sham.

It should be emphasized that within the context of the Islamic legal tradition, the establishment of municipalities is to be considered a substantial revolution. Orthodox Muslim law does not recognize any legal entity other than the individual.[47] For this reason some scholars have even gone so far as to deny the very distinction in Islam between village and town. It must not be forgotten, however, that one part of the functions of the municipality in a Western European town were fulfilled in the Ottoman Empire (and probably in other Islamic countries), by institutional substitutes, chief among which was the *ḳāḍī*. It is evident that the *ḳāḍī* was much more than a mere judge, since he fulfilled many administrative tasks. He was the most important link connecting the Ottoman government to the local population, and most of the sultanic orders issued in connection with city administration were not only addressed to the *ḳāḍī*, but, moreover, most of them enjoined him to carry them out in person, or to see to it that they were carried out by others.

Nevertheless, the *ḳāḍī* was not, of course, a real substitute for municipal authorities, and the lack of such authorities in Islam serves to underline the fact that the idea of the state as the provider of public services is totally lacking. This traditional concept began to change only during the *Tanẓīmāt* era.

In Palestine municipalities first emerged in the 1860s. There are some hints indicating that the municipality of Jerusalem was possibly established in 1863,[48] and that of Jaffa in 1872.[49] One of the signs and criteria for the existence of municipalities as administrative bodies independent of the government was separate budgets. For this reason, the basis for the existence of

municipalities was their ability to impose their own taxes on their citizens. It is interesting to note that in 19th century Egypt municipalities were not established until nearly the end of the century owing to the refusal by the Europeans to pay taxes. This problem was not extant in Palestine, where there were no substantial foreign colonies as in Egypt.[50]

At the beginning of the 20th century, the budget of any municipality had to be approved by the council of Jerusalem, and some of the debates about this are preserved in that body's protocols. Most of these budgets were approved without much ado, and it is evident that the sums involved were extremely low. But in some cases the budget was not endorsed, and the documents make it clear that the council tried to prevent a situation arising when the administration of the province would have to pay debts incurred by municipalities. In other words, the council would approve only those budgets that were balanced. It sought to motivate the municipalities to find independent sources of income. Thus, the budget of the Beersheba municipality for the year 1907/8 was 28,000 piastres, and the main source of income was supposed to be selling land in the area to would-be settlers. In that case the budget was approved only after the expectation was fulfilled to a large extent.[51] This procedure proves that these budgets were real, and not merely notions.

Members of the municipality were nominated through a sort of popular election. This was of course a principle introduced by the *Tanẓīmāt* movement. Election took place, formally, both to the administrative council and to the municipal councils. And of course, the tendency of the modern researcher is to throw serious doubts on these "elections". But in fact, Jerusalem is fortunate in that some vivid descriptions of its daily life have survived, and among other things one can find here descriptions of elections. The main source for this election is David Yelin, a Jewish observer, whose picturesque account well deserves a closer examination than it has had hitherto.

According to Yelin, every citizen aged 25 or more, who paid a property tax (*vergi*) of 50 Turkish pounds or more could vote. Eligible for election was every citizen aged 30 or over, who paid a tax of at least 150 Turkish pounds annually.[52] The municipal council was composed of ten members, of whom one half was replaced every two years. Only Ottomans could participate, and the name list of all voters would be announced by the municipality some time before the election took place. Yelin described the election of 1898 in which 1200 people participated. The nature of the political struggle was peculiar, and Yelin's words here merit quoting in full.

> The success of those wishing to be elected (be they of whichever religion), is much dependent on a general agreement between the various groups, and this general agreement, by the help of God, is now extant in our city for tens of years. One group elects so and so from the other group, so that [in the next election] the other group would vote for its candidate. And

> each time, two years after we have observed the ups stepping down, we observe the losers come up...[53]

Undoubtedly, what Yelin describes here is a subtle balance of powers between the important families of the Jerusalemite elite, a balance known to have existed also from other sources,[54] but which was never thought to be so formal and deep-rooted. The game is an old one, now being played with new institutional tools. This amalgam of old and new is still more distinct in Yelin's account of the unexpected aftermath of these elections:

> The elections for the council of our city are at last at an end, and the new members have finally, this week, commenced convening. But this time, the matter was not terminated as simply as it used to be. For, ten days after the ballot boxes were opened, the citizens of our city were still eagerly looking forward to see to which side the balance would tip. And this is the matter: among our Muslim citizens there are two aristocratic families, whose genealogy goes back to the days of the establishment of Islam in the country: The families of Ḥusaynī and Khālidī. And from olden times the competition among them is great; while the power of one of them is supreme, most important offices go to its sons, and it rules, while the other becomes weaker, until the balance is redressed in the opposite direction. And in our days now for many years the first family has the upper hand and the headship of the city council has been in the hands of its members almost from the day the municipality was established... But this time, when the time has come for the head of the council to leave his office, the second family collected all its strength and placed for election one of its most distinguished elders and the other family nominated as candidate the son of the outgoing mayor and one of its distinguished men. After a severe campaign, which lasted for a month and a half, all the three were elected, and along with them also one Muslim and one of our nation [Jewish], who is the son of the permanent Jewish member of the council... and so remained only the question of the nomination of the head of the council which by law is at the hand of the city governor... and so the list was sent to his highness the Pasha, for his decision all the great men of our city were looking forward. And after much contemplation he at last decided in favour of the Khālidī family and as head of the council he appointed Yāsīn Efendi al-Khālidī...[55]

Although, as was said, the game remained as it had been, that is no justification to dismiss the new rules. Often in public affairs the "how" is more important than the "what", and this is undoubtedly the main difference between democracy and dictatorship.

If this account of the developments concerning the municipalities may look to some readers too optimistic, it is because we are looking for *beginnings* of new developments. In fairness it must be noted that some contemporaries were

much harsher in their judgment than we are. Thus, two young Palestinians who wrote a book about the province of Beirut on the eve of the Great War were harsh when talking about the municipality of Nablus:

> We, the people of the East, are far away from the true meaning of the word municipality. According to our perception, the headship of the municipality is an office destined to reinforce the position and power of the *a'yān*... the head of the municipality, along with the members of the council which he heads fulfill with no objection and precisely the command of the governor of the *nāḥiye*, the *ḳażā* or *sancak*.[56]

It is well known that the classical Islamic states, including the Ottoman Empire, cared very little for public services.[57] Religious, educational and medical services, inasmuch as they were at all provided, were provided by the waḳf institution, a nongovernmental body, although often subjected to several types of intervention. But with the establishment of the municipalities, this basic attitude of all traditional Islamic countries began to give way to the modern commitment of the state to the provision of public services. Thus, education was gradually usurped from the hands of the waḳf, as were health services, water installation and the like. It is not by chance that the *Tanẓīmāt* people were so hostile to the waḳf institution. Of all the traditional institutions this was probably one of the most hard hit. This was due at least in part to the fact that the service function of the waḳf was so inherently contradictory to the concept of the modern state. The end product of this reform process was not a welfare state, nor anything like it. But what seems to be important is to emphasize the changed attitude of the Ottoman bureaucracy. But this, in fact, is too modest an appreciation, for in some fields the change went far beyond a mere change in attitude. It is known, for example, that the change in education was really revolutionary,[58] and this certainly was an outgrowth of development in public services.

This account of changes in the Ottoman government of Palestine by the beginning of the 20th century seems to stand in flagrant contradiction to Shamir's findings about Syria in the early 1880s.[59] It is doubtful that the differences between the two provinces may be explained away by indicating inherent differences between Syria and Palestine (on this, see further below). It seems that the difference is to be accounted for by the difference in time. It seems to us that the Ottoman reforms came gradually and slowly to fruition at the very end of the period, by a bureaucratic process, not yet wholly clear, but cumulative in nature, that may be called "incubation". On most scores it seems difficult to explain this process of "incubation" in clear and unequivocal words. But there is one area where this seems possible, and this is education. Education was certainly a self-propelling process. Once modern education was introduced, it was an independent force, quite disconnected from edicts and policies.

One more question which remains to be discussed is whether the province of

Jerusalem had a special sort of administration, untypical of other Ottoman provinces. Such a claim has been made several times,[60] and it is possible that there is at least a grain of truth in it. But even if this is the case, it is not enough to invalidate this thesis; in all probability Jerusalem was not so exceptional as to render it uncharacteristic. For this study does not deal with the policies of governors and high officials, nor even with their actions. What we have tried to analyse is the bureaucracy from the "micro"-angle, the small bureaucrats in their daily behavior, the unintentional behavior, which is often unconscious and automatic, and is usually disregarded by the historian. It is extremely unlikely that on this lowest bureaucratic level there could be a substantial difference between Jerusalem and other provinces. Moreover, some of the changes reviewed above were only very indirectly caused by the Ottoman government. This is especially true with regard to the municipalities, which added to the *Tanẓīmāt* the extremely important facet of public services, and yet this function was carried out by the locals alone.

Notes

1 Some of these views are quoted in B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), pp. 122ff.
2 H. Gerber, "The Ottoman Administration of the Sanjaq of Jerusalem, 1890-1908", *Asian and African Studies*, 12 (1978), pp. 33-76.
3 Part of this archive is composed of the governor's correspondence, while the other is composed of the minutes of the administrative council (*meclis-i idāre*). Documents from this part are henceforth presented with the initials M.I.
4 See, for example, M. Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 87-101.
5 In describing the pre-*Tanẓīmāt* pattern of bureaucracy I have assumed that there was no great difference between the 17th century and the first half of the 19th century. In describing this old pattern I have mainly relied on the following: A. Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century* (Jerusalem, 1973); Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*; M. Hoexter, "The Role of Qays and Yaman Factions in Local Political Division", *Asian and African Studies*, 9 (1973), pp. 249-311; I. al-Nimr, *Tarīkh Jabal Nāblus wa'l-Balqā'* (Nablus, 1961).
6 See W. Hütteroth, "The Pattern of Settlement in palestine in the Sixteenth Century", in M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 3-10.
7 The political role of the Bedouins in the Ottoman period is described by M. Sharon, "The Political Role of the Bedouins in Palestine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in Ma'oz, *Studies*, pp. 11-30.
8 See Hoexter, "The Role of Qays and Yaman Factions".
9 See Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 113-122.
10 See Gerber, pp. 48ff.
11 M.I. 1322 (*Mālī* year), decision no. 159.
12 See Gerber, p. 48.
13 Cited in Druyanov, *Ktavim le-toldot Ḥibat Tziyon*, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv, 1924), p. 660.

14 B. Dinur (ed.), *Sefer toldot ha-Hagana*, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv, 1954), p. 61.
15 G. Baer, *The Village Mukhtar in Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1978), pp. 12ff., in Hebrew.
16 *Ibid.*
17 See note 14 above.
18 L. Oliphant, *Haifa or Life in Modern Palestine* (Edinburgh and London, 1886), p. 61.
19 *Ibid.*, p. 59.
20 Meḥmed Refīḳ and Meḥmed Behcet, *Beirut Vilāyeti* (Beirut, 1335), vol. 1, p. 417.
21 Cited in Dinur, p. 62.
22 *Ibid.*
23 *Ibid.*
24 On the establishment of Beersheba see for example 'Ārif al-'Ārif, *Tarīkh Bir al-Sab' wa-ḳabā'ilihā* (Jerusalem, 1934), *passim.*
25 M.I. 1322, no. 824; no. 971.
26 M.I. 1322, no. 907.
27 See, for example, M.I. 1322, no. 760.
28 Baldensperger, "The Immovable East", in *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement* (1922), pp. 65-66.
29 M.I. 1323, no. 453.
30 M.I. 1322, no. 340
31 M.I. 1323, no. 927.
32 See Gerber, pp. 35-37.
33 Cohen, p. 121, where it is specifically stated that the main administrative area was the *muḳāṭa'a*, a fiscal term.
34 See, for example, Volney's description: C.F. Volney, *Travels Through Egypt and Syria in the Years 1783, 1784, 1785*, vol. 2 (New York, 1798), pp. 223, 224.
35 For a summary statement of Max Weber's views on the status of the officialdom as one characteristic differentiating Ottoman type bureaucracy and modern democratic bureaucracy, see R. Bendix, *Max Weber* (New York, 1960), pp. 423-431.
36 See Gerber, pp. 37-41.
37 He would have to have the consent of the chief of the gendarmerie even for the simplest operation, and there was no way he could force him to consent. See Gerber, p. 41.
38 See Lewis, p. 105.
39 See G. Baer, "The Evolution of Private Landownership in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent", in Ch. Issawi (ed.), *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914* (Chicago, 1966), p. 82.
40 Gerber, pp. 64ff.
41 M.I. 1322, no. 827.
42 Sociological analysis of the Ottoman legal system based on the protocols of the *ḳāḍī* court is not yet available, and is badly needed. For the time being, the summary presented here is mainly based on the author's reading in the *ḳāḍī* records of the 17th century Anatolian city of Bursa. Also pertinent for the formation of these views were the books of H. Ongan, *Ankaranın Bir Numaralı Şeriye Sicili* (Ankara, 1958), and *Ankaranın Iki Numaralı Şeriye Sicili* (Ankara, 1974). My main theoretical guidance was Lon Fuller's *The Anatomy of Law* (Pelican Books, 1971).
43 Max Weber, *On Law in Economy and Society* (Oxford, 1969), p. 213 and n. 48, where further references are given.
44 Although one can find plenipotentiaries on an *ad hoc* basis. On these see R. Jennings, "The Office of Vekil (Wakil) in 17th Century Ottoman Sharia Courts", *Studia Islamica*, 42 (1975), pp. 147-149.
45 Formally the council was an administrative body, but as is well known, in the past it had been a judicial body. Also, in some cases the Jerusalem council constituted a full-fledged court even at the beginning of the 20th century. This was mainly the case regarding

Beersheba. In some matters the Jerusalem council constituted an appeal instance to the *niẓāmī* court of Beersheba. See Gerber, p. 58.

46 See S.N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization, Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), pp. 2-3.

47 J. Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford, 1964), p. 155.

48 'Ārif al-'Ārif, *al-Mufaṣṣal fī tarīkh al-Ḳuds* (Cairo, n.d.), p. 218.

49 *Ha-Ḥavatzelet*, vol. 2, p. 18.

50 G. Baer, *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt* (Chicago, 1969), pp. 196-198.

51 M.I. 1323, no. 897.

52 D. Yelin, *Yerushalayim shel tmol* (Jerusalem, 1972), p. 202.

53 *Ibid.*, p. 194.

54 See Gerber, pp. 61ff.

55 See Yelin, pp. 222-223.

56 Refīḳ and Behcet, vol. 1, p. 121.

57 This is expressed, for example, in the fact that *all* the public buildings in the city, even when established by the rulers, were immediately transferred to the waḳf especially founded to maintain these buildings. For an excellent example of this see example H. Inalcık, "Istanbul", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed.

58 See, for example, J.S. Szyliowicz, "Changes in the Recruitment Patterns and Career-Lines of Ottoman Provincial Administrators during the Nineteenth Century", in M. Ma'oz, *Studies*, pp. 268ff.

59 See Sh. Shamir, "The Modernization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Period of Abdülhamid", in W. Polk and R. Chambers (eds.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 351-382.

60 See, for example, B. Abu-Manneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem in the Late 19th Century", in G. Ben-Dor (ed.), *The Palestinians and the Middle East Question* (Ramat Gan, 1978), p. 25.

The Contribution of the Ottoman Regime to the Development of Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1840-1917

RUTH KARK

During the final decades of Ottoman rule over Palestine, both Jerusalem and Jaffa underwent marked growth and development. Within a short time, these two small, backward towns typical of 19th century Palestine became the country's main urban centers.[1] What was the nature of this growth and how can it be evaluated? What were its causes and what factors influenced it? What role did the Ottoman government, at its various administrative levels, play in the development process? This paper will examine three aspects raised by the above questions: 1) physical development, built-up area and infrastructures; 2) population; 3) economic growth.

Physical Development (Construction and Infrastructure)

On reliable maps from the 1840s and onwards, as well as on early aerial photographs of Jerusalem and Jaffa, the built-up areas, both within and outside the city walls can be measured by planimeter.[2] Accordingly, the built-up area of Jaffa increased from 108 *dunams* in 1842 — most of which was within the walled town — to 1,550 *dunams*, mostly outside, in 1917, representing a 15-fold growth. Jerusalem grew from 699 *dunams* in 1841 — again mainly within the walls — to 4,130 *dunams* in 1917, of which over three-quarters were outside the Old City (see Figure 1).

Table 1. *Built-up Area in Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1841-1918*

		Jerusalem area in *dunams*	% of total area	Jaffa area in *dunams*	% of total area
1841/42	within the walls	681	97.4	94	87.0
	outside walls	18	2.6	14	13.0
	total	699	100.0	108	100.0
1917/18	within the walls	749	18.1	103	6.6
	outside walls	3,381	81.9	1,447	93.4
	total	4,130	100.0	1,550	100.0

There was thus not only an absolute, but also a relative, increase in the built-up areas outside the walls of both Jerusalem and Jaffa, and "new towns" arose beside the old ones. The new construction reflected changes in cultural norms and aspirations to modernization and improvement in living standard, and also in housing and sanitation conditions. Nevertheless, some traditional traits, such as the separation of ethnic and religious groups in residential areas was carried over into the new quarters.[3]

Alongside the construction of private dwellings there was also remarkable expansion of various economic enterprises: khans, cafés and restaurants, hotels and hospices, tourist and commercial agencies, banks, insurance offices, industrial buildings and workshops, and steam-powered flour mills proliferated.[4] The number of shops and businesses increased, both in and outside the old marketplaces, and new, well-planned, modern markets were constructed. In Jaffa, for example, abut 400 new shops were opened between 1882 and 1907.[5]

Many public buildings of a religious character were constructed, as well as government institutions, educational, charitable and medical establishments. The more modern types of service buildings tended to be located in the new parts of the cities, outside the walls, but maintained some physical continuity with the old centers.[6]

International and interurban communications, and the transport infra-structure in both Jerusalem and Jaffa were improved considerably. Some of the streets in the old towns were widened and paved, and new roads were built outside these towns. The roads from Jerusalem to Jaffa, Hebron, Nablus and Jericho were improved; the railway between Jaffa and Jerusalem was completed and stations were built in both towns.[7] Both cities benefited especially from the improvement in the foreign and Ottoman postal and telegraphic services.[8] Drainage, sewage, water supply, sanitation and cleanliness, street lighting, urban maintenance, town planning and supervision and registration of ownership and building permits also improved somewhat.[9]

Population Increase

The population of Jerusalem and Jaffa increased considerably in the period under review. Jerusalem's population inereased from about 9,000 at the beginning of the 19th century to about 70,000-80,000 on the eve of World War I. In the same period, Jaffa's population grew from about 2,500 to around 50,000.[10] Despite similarities in the growth graphs for the two cities, there was a considerable difference in the composition and character of their populations. Jerusalem attracted people mainly for religious reasons, while the motivation for settling in Jaffa was largely economic.



Fig. 1. *Development of Built-up Area 1841-1918*

Table 2. *Inhabitants of Jerusalem and Jaffa percent according to religion*

	Muslims	Christians	Jews	Total
Jaffa				
1835	84	15	1	100.0
1915	61	19	20	100.0
Jerusalem				
1835	42	27	31	100.0
1915	14	22	64	100.0

Sources: Titus Tobler, *Lustreise in Morgenland*, vol. 2 (Zurich, 1939), pp. 121-123 and Arthur Ruppin, *Syria: An Economic Survey* (New York, 1918), pp. 7-8.

Economic Growth

Population increase alone would not have led to physical expansion had it not been linked to economic growth. Economic growth in the two cities differed in character mainly in the types of crafts, internal and external trade, building and services (mainly catering to tourists and pilgrims).[11]

Various sources indicate that the rate of economic growth in Jaffa exceeded that in Jerusalem, where population growth outstripped economic development,[12] the gap being made up by the import of capital.[13] Towards the end of Ottoman rule,[14] Jaffa began to benefit also from agricultural development (particularly citrus) and industry. Jaffa's foreign trade showed an increase in turnover from £79,000 in 1862, for all branches of exports and imports (imports constituted only 6%),[15] to a trade balance of over £2,000,000 — of which 64% were imports — in 1913.[16]

One of the best indicators of economic growth was the rise in demand for land and in the cost of real estate in the two cities. The figures are not always consistent or absolutely reliable, but nonetheless show a tremendous rise in the cost of land during this relatively short period.

In Jaffa, the cost of urban land, which in the 1870s ranged around 100 francs per *dunam*, rose to over 3,000 francs per *dunam* on the outskirts of the city (a 30-fold increase) and up to 50,000 francs per *dunam* in the center of the city (500-fold increase) in the second decade of the 20th century.[17] Prices in Jerusalem increased from 650 francs to about 3,000 francs per *dunam* on the outskirts of the city, and, in the center, from about 4,000 francs to 50,000 francs per *dunam* (77 times) between the mid-19th century to the first and second decades of the 20th century. The increase in demand of agricultural land throughout the country during this period led to price rises, from about 7 francs per *dunam* in 1881 to a maximum of 300 francs per *dunam* just before the war — a 42-fold increase.[18]

Even allowing for the fluctuations in the currency rates and for inflation, it is evident that both demand and land costs increased markedly.

Causes and Influences

We can only guess at some of the causes and the complex factors behind the urban development at this particular time. The tremendous expansion in the volume of building no doubt reflected population pressures as well as religious motivation, and attests to the availability of appropriate economic resources. The physical development described above was a result rather than a factor of processes operating during this period. It may be taken as an indicator of change which itself eventually influenced further growth.

Apart from natural increase and the inclusion of peripheral villages within the municipal areas, population growth in Jerusalem and Jaffa was due to the influx of three categories of newcomers: 1) Christian and Jewish immigrants from Europe and some from America,[19] 2) Arab (Christian and Muslim) and Jewish immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, 3) Arabs and Jews from towns and villages in Palestine.[20] Each of these groups was impelled by entirely different considerations.

Immigration from Europe and America was induced by events there as well as by the Holy Land religious attraction. Migration from Middle Eastern countries was mainly in pursuit of economic opportunities, whereas internal migration represented dissatisfaction with village life and reflected the economic stagnation in the smaller towns (such as Hebron, for example) and the attractions of developing centers. Natural population increase was mainly a result of the reduction in mortality rates.[21]

The influx of newcomers to Jaffa and Jerusalem led to cultural, social (although not necessarily modernizing), as well as economic and physical changes. Because of the prevailing *millet* system of community self-government, the influence of non-Muslims was less marked in the political sphere. Many Jews and Christians maintained their foreign nationality, and their participation in Ottoman political frameworks was limited. Nevertheless, this situation also began to change towards the end of the period.

Developments in the economic sphere resulted from improvements in technology in shipping and transport, from the opening of the Suez Canal and the general prosperity in the world economy, as well as from local developments, the amassing of wealth by the population and the importation of capital from abroad.

The Jews alone invested in the country capital from external sources which, in the period 1881-1917, amounted to £6,000,000 (150 million francs). Two-thirds of this sum came from Zionist and other public funds, and the remaining one-third from private capitalists and immigrants.[22] This amount does not include income from the *ḥaluḳa* (charitable distribution monies) which, according to A. Rivlin, in 1913/14 amounted to £140,000.[23]

The Christian churches brought about £400,000 per year into Syria and Palestine in the years preceding World War I, some of the money finding its way to Jerusalem and Jaffa.[24] To this must be added income accruing from economic activities by foreigners in the country, as well as from tourists and pilgrims who came in ever-increasing numbers after the middle of the 19th century, benefiting these two towns in particular.[25]

Contributions of the Ottoman Regime

Were the physical developments and the demographic and economic processes, as described above, solely the result of external factors, or did the Ottoman government also play an active role in the growth of Jerusalem and Jaffa? It is difficult to detect direct links between the political processes in the Ottoman Empire[26] and the local changes in Jerusalem and Jaffa. That these may have been interrelated can perhaps be inferred from parallel developments and timing in the political, demographic, economic and physical spheres. This may well indicate that despite the difficult economic situation in the Empire and the bureaucratic weaknesses and corruption, these reforms were beginning to be felt at local levels in different provincial centers.

The Ottoman regime probably aided development in these cities indirectly by assuring security of life and property, stability, religious tolerance and by improving the status of foreign residents. The extension of privileges to foreigners under the Capitulations, yielding to pressure by the European powers, and the enhanced status of the foreign consuls, eased the granting of concessions and trading rights to European companies in communications, industry and finance. Philanthropic, missionary and other bodies freely engaged in religious, educational and medical activities. The permission for foreigners to acquire land, and to build upon it, also contributed to development. The regime contributed indirectly to the growth of urban populations by noninterference in the process of spontaneous settlement by immigrants (except for limitations on the immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe in certain years).[27]

The Ottoman government directly facilitated the urban growth of Jerusalem and Jaffa by improvements in public administration and by the construction of infrastructures, particularly through the local municipal councils (*meclis-i belediye*). A municipality was established in Jerusalem as far back as the 1860s,[28] and in Jaffa in 1871.[29]

Initially the municipalities in Jerusalem and Jaffa operated on limited budgets and the scope of their activities was restricted. In 1877, however, they were granted considerable authority within the framework of the Municipality Law, and they extended their activities. If, at first, the municipalities were mainly concerned with sanitation and hygiene out of health considerations, as time went by, they added such functions as the preservation of security, law and order in and around the city, the maintenance and improvement of roads,



Fig. 2. *Ottoman Development of Communications Between Jerusalem and Jaffa (End of 19th Century)*

the draining of swamps, the construction of public and business premises, the granting of building permits, the numbering of houses and shops, and the fixing of prices for basic commodities and travel fares.[30] At the end of the period under review, the municipalities of Jerusalem and Jaffa functioned in a fairly well-ordered fashion and published detailed tenders for urban development projects and modernization of transport services (the introduction of a tramway),[31] electric lighting, the water supply and the installation of a telephone system.[32] These, however, were not implemented before the outbreak of the World War I.

The provincial administration also became increasingly active. It initiated the improvement or construction of new public buildings such as *sarays* (government house), mosques, public parks, water fountains and ostentatious clocktowers (which were meant to symbolize progress and the spirit of the time). The administration opened gates in the city walls which previously had either been closed during the night, and constructed new gates (Jaffa — 1869;[33] Jerusalem — 1886[34]) and also made some improvements in the Jaffa port (the construction of a customs house, a quay, a coal storage station and a new lighthouse[35]). The district administration improved and paved urban and inter-urban roads making coach traffic possible, and built guard posts along the way.[36] It also installed a telegraph line (1865) and Ottoman postal branches in Jerusalem and Jaffa. In the fields of health, education and culture, elementary and high schools, government hospitals, and in Jerusalem even a museum of antiquities, were opened at the initiative of the head of the Council for Education (1901); and a theater was built near Jaffa Gate (1904).[37] (See Figures 2, 3 & 4)



Fig. 3. *Ottoman Institutions in Jerusalem at the End of the Ottoman Period*



Fig. 4. *Ottoman Institutions in Jaffa at the End of the Ottoman Period*

Compared with this spate of activities, the role played by the Ottoman regime in the economic field was limited. It hampered local production and industrial development by its policy of high taxation (5%-8%) imposed on local artisans and on exports, while giving preferential treatment to foreign merchants and importers. Nor were there any protective tariffs.[38] Only at the end of the period under review was a customs tariff of 8%, and subsequently of 11%, imposed on imported goods as against 1% on exports.[39] This policy change was not intended to stimulate or encourage local production, but rather to increase revenues from the growing volume of imports. The result however benefited local production, especially the budding industry in Jaffa. The chambers of commerce established in Jerusalem and Jaffa at the beginning of the 20th century lacked all influence and hardly functioned at all.[40] As to the development of Jaffa port, the Ottoman authorities were ineffectual and even hampered its development and improvement, refusing, for example, to extend the railway line to the port.[41]

Summary and Conclusions

It is difficult to isolate and measure the role of any given body in the general process of urban development, influenced as it is by a multiplicity of factors. Such development often stems from the combined initiatives — or from chance activities — of many bodies and individuals. It is particularly difficult to make

intelligent assessments when there is a lack of quantitative data concerning some of the fields of activity and when contemporary written sources are rarely impartial (most of these were local and European rather than Ottoman). In both cities, however, there remain relics by which the intensity of the development process can be evaluated. Perhaps an indication of the Ottoman regime's contribution to the development of these two cities may be derived from the rising expectations of the local populations. In the mid-19th century, very little was expected of the regime in the way of municipal services and development.

When the British consul, James Finn, spoke in 1856 to an Arab effendi in Jaffa about the necessity of building jetties along the Mediterranean coast and the need to open an additional gate in the city wall, the improvement of roads and the introduction of coach transportation, he received the following answer: "But", said the Effendi (not a Turk, but one of the Arab city notables), "we do this on principle. When I have money to spare I lay it out on a house, a slave, a diamond, a fine mare or a wife; but I do not make a road up to that object in order to invite strangers to come that way..."[42]

As the conversation continued, Finn gained the impression that "even the resident natives deprecated the very idea of governments spending money on roads and harbours."[43]

In the second decade of the 20th century, the government, and especially the municipality, were the bodies to which the inhabitants addressed their requests for various measures to be taken to develop their city. For example, when the water shortage became acute in Jerusalem, the residents expressed their desire that "the public institutions, headed by the municipality... take steps to meet the shortage and bring water to the city from nearby spring".[44] In Jaffa. the local Arabic newspaper, *Falasṭīn*, complained, in a number of articles appearing in 1911 and 1912, that there were no fire-fighting services in the municipality, and pointed to serious problems in the urban infrastructure (parks, streets, port, telephone, electricity) and deplored the lack of cultural activity provided by the municipality.[45]

Despite the generally accepted view that the Ottoman government contributed little to the development of Jerusalem and Jaffa between 1840 and 1917, the various echelons of the regime assisted both directly and indirectly in accelerating the urban development of these cities. There was direct involvement, especially in the building and development of the urban and interurban infrastructure, and in the introduction of orderly administration — even though bribery and corruption were still commonplace.[46] The activities of the administration did not always stem from its own initiative or from a desire to act in the people's interests. Sometimes motivation was of an exhibitionist nature, such as the numerous improvements undertaken in Jerusalem on the occasion of Kaiser Wilhelm II's visit to Palestine, or the building of clocktowers and water fountains with local funds to mark the sultan's birthday. At the same time, the administration showed greater awareness of the

need for development and the improvement of living conditions in the cities.[47] This awareness may have been spurred by the beginnings of democratization at the municipal level and by a greater measure of participation by the local population in the administration of the cities and of the district.

Notes

1 For detailed discussion of this development and change in the demographic, political, social, economic and physical spheres see Ruth Kark, "Hitpaṯut he'arim Yerushalayim ve-Yafo ba-shanim 1840 ve-'ad miḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1976).

2 Some of the maps that were used for measurement in Jerusalem are: *Plan of the Town and Environs of Jerusalem* (London, 1841), drawn by Aldrich and Symonds; *Ordinance Survey of Jerusalem*, 1:10,000 (Southampton, 1864), drawn by C.W. Wilson; 'Nähere Umgebung von Jerusalem', drawn by C. Schick in *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palaestina-Vereins*, 17 (1894), p. 1; *Environs of Jerusalem*, 1:10,000 (1917?), drawn by the Survey of Egypt. Some of the maps used for measurement in Jaffa are: *Jaffa and Vicinity*, 1:4,850 (1842) drawn by R.E. Skyring in R.C. Alderson, *Notes on Acre and Some of the Coast Defences of Syria* (London, 1843); Karte der Umgebung von Jafa 1878/9, 1:31,800 drawn by T. Sandel in *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palaestina-Vereins*, 3 (1880), op. p. 44; *Plan of Jaffa*, 1:6,000 (1918), drawn by the Survey of Egypt. An excellent source for the years 1917-1918 were German air photographs of Jerusalem and Jaffa: (Verzeichnis der) Palästina = Flieger = Aufnahmen (des Bayerischen Kriegarchives).

3 Ruth Kark and Shimon Landman, "The Establishment of Muslim Neighbourhoods in Jerusalem Outside the Old City During the Late Ottoman Period", *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*, 112 (July-December, 1980), in press; Ruth Kark, *Shkhunot bi-Yerushalayim* (Jerusalem, 1978).

4 This is evident from a comparison of the many city plans of Jerusalem and Jaffa between the years 1840-1918. It is also confirmed by a comparison of several editions of different guidebooks. For example see Karl Baedeker (ed.), *Palestine and Syria, Handbook for Travellers* (Leipzig, 1876; 1894; 1900; 1912).

5 Ze'ev Smilansky, "ha-Yishuv ha-'ivri be-Yafo 'al-pi reshimot statistiyot shena'asu bi-shnat 5667", *ha-'Omer*, 1:1 (1907), pp. 11-12; the Greek Orthodox Church was especially active in building modern markets in Jerusalem, Jaffa and other towns in Palestine. Avraham M. Luncz, *Luaḥ Eretz Yisrȧel li-shnat 5666*, vol. 9 (1904), p. 7.

6 According to a series of detailed functional maps of the two cities in Kark, "Hitpaṯut".

7 *Ha-Levanon*, 5:7, Feb. 13, 1868; *ha-Asif*, 4 (1888), p. 53; Avraham M. Luncz, *Yerushalyim* (1892), pp. 219-220; *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement* (1895), 3; The American Consulate in Jerusalem (Lorenzo M. Johnson) to William H. Seward, Washington, Sept. 30, 1865, The National Archives of the U.S., T 471. The Jerusalem-Jaffa railway was built as part of a plan to construct a railway from Palestine to Egypt. Public Record Office, F.O. 98/4432, Nov. 4, 1892.

8 *Ha-Magid*, 8:41, Aug. 26, 1864, 324, and Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, *Syria and Palestine, Peace Handbook*, 10:4 (London, 1920), pp. 78-79.

9 These improvements were made partly by the municipalities. For further details see Ruth Kark "The Jerusalem Municipality at the End of Ottoman Rule", *Asian and African Studies*, 14 (1981), pp. 117-141 and Kark, "Hitpaṯut", pp. 62-63.

10 Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, "The Population of the Large Towns in Palestine During the First Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century according to Western Sources", in M. Ma'oz

(ed.), *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 49-69. Detailed tables of the growth and composition of the population in the two cities are presented in Kark, "Hitpatḥut", pp. 104-113. For the end of the period we have data on Ottoman subjects in the *Nüfūs* registers (1884-1915), Israel State Archives (I.S.A.).

11 Baedeker, *Palestine and Syria* (1876), pp. 127-129, 145 and (1912), p. 7. At the end of the 19th century according to Vital Cuinet there were 28 hotels and hostels in Jerusalem (*Syrie, Liban et Palestine géographique, administrative, statistique, descriptive et raisonnée* [Paris, 1896], p. 542).

12 In 1904 Goodrich-Freer wrote in her book: "Jerusalem has no commerce, no manufacture, no agriculture" (*Inner Jerusalem* [London, 1904], p. 77). Ruppin tends to agree with her while comparing Jerusalem to Damascus in 1907: "Jerusalem is, by contrast the city of the dead; its inhabitants have no occupation..." (*Three Decades in Palestine* [Jerusalem, 1936], p. 11). He recommended the introduction of small scale industry to the city.

13 David Yelin, *Mi-Dan ve-'ad Be'er Sheva'* (Jerusalem, 1973), p. 250 and Ruppin, *Syria*, p. 12.

14 Smilansky, "ha-Yishuv", pp. 35-108; Ruppin, *Three Decades*, p. 5 and Alex Carmel, *Hityashvut ha-Germanim be-Eretz Yisra'el be-shalhey ho-tekufa ha-'Othmanit* (Jerusalem, 1973), p. 59. On the founding of Stein's metal factory in Jaffa see Central Zionist Archives (C.Z.A.), A268/13/2.

15 According to data given by A.Y. Hayat, the British vice-consul at Jaffa (F.O. 78/389 and F.O. 78/1768).

16 Shmuel Tolkowsky, *The Gateway of Palestine — a History of Jaffa* (London, 1924), pp. 182-184.

17 Smilansky, "ha-Yishuv", pp. 12-13, 40. Ruppin, *Syria*, pp. 40, 82. Smilansky quoted for 1907 a price of 500-600 francs per *dunam*, but based on the available evidence, my impression is that he was mistaken ("Letters from Eretz Israel" sent to *Gullus Zizny*, Jan. 4, 1907, The Archives of Tel Aviv-Jaffa). The price of agricultural land around Jaffa in 1907 was 1,000 francs per *dunam* for an orange grove (Smilansky, "ha-Yishuv", pp. 12-13). In 1914-15, the price per *dunam* of agricultural land that could not be planted with oranges was 150-400 francs and sand dunes in the periphery were priced at 8-80 francs per *dunam* (Ruppin, *Syria*, pp. 40, 82 and C.Z.A. L51/54).

18 Ruppin, *Syria*, pp. 40, 82 and C.Z.A. L18/55/7 and data on prices of land that was bought for the new Jewish neighborhoods extracted from the *Takanot* (By-Laws); see table in Kark, "Hitpatḥut", pp. 301-302.

19 Ruppin estimated that around 40,000 Jews entered Palestine from 1826 to 1916 (in Charles Issawi [ed.], *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914* [Chicago, 1966], pp. 270-273). There is no general estimate for the non-Jewish population.

20 These three categories are evident from data given in the Montefiore censuses (1839, 1849, 1855, 1866 and 1875 — in the Montefiore Archives, London), and the Smilansky census (1905), for the Jewish population. For the Ottoman population from the *Nüfūs* (I.S.A.).

21 Luncz, *Yerushalayim*, vol. 1 (1882), 144 and Uziel O. Schmelz, "Some Demographic Peculiarities of the Jews of Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century", in Ma'oz, *Studies*, pp. 130-141.

22 E. Ulitzur, "Jewish National Finances 1881-1946", *The Palestine Yearbook*, vol. 3 (1947/8), pp. 355-356 and Ruppin, *Syria*, pp. 9-12. Ruppin states in *Der Aufbau Landes Israel* (n.p. 1919, p. 53), that a sum of £800,000 was spent from 1881 to 1917 by Jewish private investors on urban construction, trade and industry.

23 Avraham Rivlin, "Hakhnasot ha-ḥaluka bi-Yerushalayim", App. 21, 1914, C.Z.A. L51/114.

24 Issawi, *Economic History*, pp. 272-273 and Ruppin, *Syria*, pp. 9-12.

25 Johnson, The American Corsulate, and Conrad Schick, "Progress in Palestine", *PEFQS*, vol. 12 (July 1880), pp. 187-188.

26 Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, 1963); Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State 1789-1908", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 3 (1972), pp. 243-281; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of*

Modern Turkey (London, 1968); Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861* (London, 1968) and Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1976/7).

27 "Parshandata", Peḳidut Turkiya ve-mishṭarah", *ha-'Omer*, 1:3/4 (1907), pp. 1-18.

28 Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality", pp. 117-122.

29 *Ha-Ḥavatzelet*, 2:2 (1871), p. 18 and the German Consulate in Jerusalem (M. Kiamik), Gouvernement de la Palestine, Jerusalem to Dr. C. Kersten, Jerusalem, Sept. 18, 1873, I.S.A. 67/192.

30 Further details on the activities of the municipalities see in Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality", pp. 125-139, and idem, "Hitpaṭḥut", pp. 62-63.

31 J.H. Kann, "Water supply for Jerusalem (confidential)", The Hague (November, 1910), C.Z.A. Z2/642.

32 D. Smilansky, *Letters*, May 2, 1910, and an unsigned letter to A. Ruppin, Jaffa, Jan. 2., 1908, C.Z.A. L1/121.

33 Baedeker, *Palestine and Syria* (1876), p. 130 and James Finn, *Stirring Times*, vol. 2 (London, 1878), pp. 342-343.

34 Avraham, M. Luncz, *Netivot Tziyon vi-Yerushalayim*, I (Jerusalem, 1876), pp. 5-7 and Luncz, *Luaḥ*, vol. 3 (1898), p. 62

35 Shmuel Avitsur, *Nemal Yafo be-ge'uto uve-shki'ato* (Tel Aviv, 1972), pp. 16-18, 107-108.

36 Johnson, The American Consulate.

37 Schick, "Progress"; Luncz, *Luaḥ*, vol. 7 (1902), pp. 171-172, vol. 10 (1905), pp. 166 and Luncz, *Yerushalayim*, vol. 5 (1901), p. 283.

38 Ruppin, *Syria*, pp. 46-54; Avitsur, *Nemal Yafo*, p. 25 and Y. Shirion, *Zikhronot* (Jerusalem, 1943), p. 117.

39 Avitsur, *Nemal Yafo*, p. 123.

40 Great Britain, F.O., *Syria and Palestine*, p. 125.

41 *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80; Ruppin, *Syria*, p. 73; and Avitsur, *Nemal Yafo*, pp. 93-111.

42 Finn, *Stirring Times*, vol. 1, p. 191.

43 *Ibid.*

44 *Moriya*, 5:493, Apr. 21, 1914, p. 2.

45 *Falasṭin*, Dec. 17, 1911; May 22, 1912; and Nov. 30, 1912.

46 This is evident from many sources, for example from the minutes of the Jewish community in Jaffa written in 1890-1897 or from many correspondents in the archives of 'Ali Ekrem Bey the *mutaṣarif* of Jerusalem from 1906-1908, I.S.A., Record Group 83.

47 For example, see tender issued in 1917 by the municipal council of Jaffa for the undertaking of several development activities such as building a tramway, an electric network and an irrigation project, C.Z.A. L51/6 (Appendix I).

The Young Turk Legislation, 1913-17 and Its Application in Palestine/Israel

ROBERT EISENMAN

A burst of legislative activity important for British Palestine and later for the State of Israel occurred between 1913-17 under the Young Turk regime in the Ottoman Empire. Some observers have speculated that among the reasons for this far-reaching legislative reform were Turkish needs during the Great War and that a liberalization of certain aspects of religious law was required in the war effort.[1] It is hard to see that this was the case for all three areas of legislation. The protocol issued with the *irādes* of 1916 alluded to the problem of "foreign Muslims" abandoning their wives in the Ottoman Empire, though who these foreign Muslims might have been in such circumstances is an enigma.[2] It is possible, however, that this, together with the problem of the reputed death of a spouse, do reflect a wartime milieu. Rather than speculate too much though on the reasons for the far-reaching innovations we are going to describe, it would perhaps be best to say that the Ottoman authorities took advantage of this critical juncture in the history of the Empire to make changes that had long been thought desirable.

The innovations we are speaking about were carried out in the three main areas of law still dominated after the *Tanẓīmāt* by religious and traditional norms: land law, civil law (or transactions), and personal status — the chronological order in which the Young Turk regime addressed them. At least as far as the first two are concerned, the reforms preceded the outbreak of the war, and therefore must be seen as part of the attempt to upgrade and modernize the Empire, in particular Turkey itself, that reached its apogee after the war under the Atatürk regime. Interesting for the purposes of this study is that they were absorbed into the nascent legal structure of Palestine, despite the fact that they had hardly had a chance to penetrate the legal framework of Turkey itself. The Ottoman Law of Family Rights, for instance, continued in effect in Palestine and is still in effect in Israel today, even though immediately after the war it was abrogated in Turkey in favor of a more modern European approach.

The Provisional Land Laws of 1913-14

The six laws that were promulgated between 1913 and 1914, which bore the title "Provisional" because The Committee of Union and Progress had stormed the Porte two months before and no parliament was yet sitting,

completely altered the nature of land tenure in Palestine and throughout the Ottoman Empire.[3] Their total effect was to widen the rights of freehold tenure over *mīrī*, so as to approach *mülk* in character, thereby creating for the first time in the Ottoman Empire a concept of "immovables".[4] A distinction was made between these two categories only in the sensitive area of succession and in several other aspects of transfer and mortgage.

The first law in this series concerned a subject unrecognized in Islamic law, "juridical persons".[5] It recognized the right of Ottoman corporate bodies, government, commercial, and charitable, to own and deal with land according to the laws of the Empire. Interestingly enough, when it came to charitable institutions and the government's ongoing concern to limit the illegal conversion of *mīrī* into waḳf these were limited to possessing building property in towns and villages only, i.e., *mülk*, out of which waḳf could freely be dedicated.

The second of these laws was the most controversial, and for Palestine, the most interesting. This was the Provisional Law of Inheritance of 27 Rabī' al-awwal, 1331/March 6th, 1913. This law is considered throughout Palestine and Israel to have appeared on 3 Rabī' al-awwal, which probably stems from a mistake made by the Palestine legislator when he appended it to the Succession Ordinance of 1923 in the Second Schedule. This date probably really is an attempt to represent the date as it appeared in *Düstūr*, the promulgation date (laws in the Ottoman Empire took effect upon their publication in *Düstūr*) and not the adoption date, i.e., 3 Rabī' al-thānī, 1331 (Ottoman fiscal dating February 27, 1328 or March 12, 1913).[6] Some scholars have confused Ottoman *Mālī* (fiscal) dating with Hijra dating. Bernard Lewis, for example, mistakenly gives a date of February, 1910 for these "temporary" laws, which if accepted without challenge would confuse the historical impetus for their original adoption.[7] The Provisional Law of Inheritance was the only one in the series to drop the subject "immovable property" from its title; and side stepping the subject of succession to *mülk*, which was administered by the *'ulemā* according to *Shari'a*, it confined itself to *mīrī* and its derivatives. Based on the *B.G.B.*, the German Civil Code of 1896, it treated women systematically with men and representation for the predeceased at all degrees of the inheritance schedule was provided for, both serious deficiencies in Islamic law when viewed in terms of modern Western practice. However, the *B.G.B.* was intended for succession in urban areas, whereas the Young Turks applied it primarily to agricultural land, an outstanding example of the pitfalls involved in the pell-mell adoption of Western legal norms. The result was the further impractical fragmentation of land so characteristic in the Middle East.[8]

The last four laws in this series dealt systematically, i.e., all Ottoman categories of land were included, with mortgage, disposal (or transfer), partition, and leasing. Since Islamic law knew nothing comparable to the Western concept of mortgage,[9] the Provisional Law for the Mortgage of Immovable Property of March 10th, 1913 finalized the introduction of a

completely Western concept of mortgage which had been gradually developing during the *Tanẓīmāt*.[10] The Provisional Law of Disposal of Immovable Property of April 12th, 1913 further extended the developing freehold status of *mīrī*, lifting all restrictions on the owner's right to freely dispose of his property of any kind with the notable exceptions of dedicating *mīrī* for waḳf or bequeathing it by legacy.[12] Whereas before *mülk* accretions on *mīrī* land, such as houses, orchards, vineyards, etc., were always treated under the separate Islamic law applying to them; they were now viewed as following the land. Trees and vines growing wild on the land, soil, sand, and stones could now be disposed of freely by the owner, but, significantly, not minerals found under it, which were still to be covered by Art. 107 of the Land Code.[13] Since an Islamic law of partition already existed for freehold property in the *Mecelle*,[14] the Provisional Law for the Partition of Joint Immovable Property of December 14th, 1913[15] was the only really "Islamic" legislation of the series and generally narrowed the prerogatives opened in the Land Code of 1858 to the party desiring partition.[16] The last of this series, the Provisional Law for the Leasing of Immovable Property, was actually adopted in the early part of 1914 and was mainly a recapitulation of an earlier *irāde* of 1882.[17] Here, too, provisions of the *Mecelle* were extended and rationalized; however, in anticipation of the extension of the concept of freedom of contracts now to be undertaken in an amendment to the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure, parties were permitted to introduce by agreement conditions "not repugnant to law or public morality", which echoed the original language of Art. 64.

The 1914 Amendment to Art. 64 of the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure

Though the first steps had already been taken in 1879, via the fiction of procedural change, to admit a Western concept of contract alongside the Islamic law of *mu'āmalāt*, the original language was ambiguous and restrictive.[18] On May 4th, 1914, several months after the last law in the series discussed above, an amendment was adopted to Art. 64 of the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure, itself the last major piece of legislation to come out of the *Tanẓīmāt*.[19] The hesitant steps taken some thirty years before in both the *Mecelle* and the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure to use the fiction of procedural change to alleviate some of the more pernicious effects of Islamic and customary practice (pernicious from the point of view of the modern European legislator) were pressed forward with telling effect. Though in a preamble to the amendment, the pro forma acknowledgement that the *Mecelle* and Islamic law probably contained all that was "necessary" to solve the difficulties was included, still "freedom and certainty" of contractual undertaking were considered to be of critical importance to the economic development and social well-being of the nation and the parties to a contract themselves were considered "best able to express their own wishes".[20] What the Young Turks did was to alter the previous ambiguous language in Art. 64

permitting freedom of contract "not forbidden by law or contrary to morality and public order". The words, "not forbidden by *special laws and regulations*", were inserted for "not forbidden by law", and the former were now interpreted to include only those regulating matters of minor detail as distinct from laws of more general application, such as the *Mecelle*, the Penal Code, and the Commercial Code,[21] the exact opposite of the sense of the earlier language.

Two further paragraphs were added: the first generally extending the subject matter of contracts to interests, rights, and even things not yet in existence (i.e., contracts relating to things to be produced in the future), all more or less at odds with the approach of Islamic law as expressed in Arts. 197-213 of the *Mecelle*. Another potential trouble spot in Islamic law for the new doctrine of freedom of contracts being enunciated by this amendment to Art. 64 was also removed by the second paragraph, which stipulated that once a contract on fundamentals was concluded subsidiary matters passed over in silence would not then affect its validity. What in effect had been achieved by the Young Turks in this seemingly relatively inoffensive amendment was the revamping of the whole law of contracts or "transactions" as it had been operating until then in the Ottoman Empire. Though there was very little time to work out the implications of what had been done in the courts of the Ottoman Empire before its dissolution, if Palestine and later Israel are any yardstick, it became clear that the rules of the *Mecelle* regarding the incidence of contract were only in effect subject to the agreement of the parties concerned. Aside from being explicit, i.e., written or spoken, such agreements could also be inferred from the conduct of the parties or from related stipulations. Contractual stipulations generally, including those for damages, notions either frowned on or unprovided for in Islamic law, were now recognized and large portions of the *Mecelle*, while not actually repealed, were either rendered inoperative or in time lapsed.[22]

The Ottoman Law of Family Rights and the Ottoman Law of Procedure for Sharī'a Courts of 1917

Undoubtedly the most well known and certainly the most troublesome, as far as application in Palestine was concerned, were the several laws in personal status adopted between 1916-17 after the unilateral abrogation of the Capitulations by the Young Turk regime at the outbreak of the war in August 1914.[23] The first two were simply *irādes* which were later incorporated and expanded in the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917.[24] The first of these, following Ḥanbalī *fiḳh*, provided for judicial dissolution of marriage on the wife's initiative in cases where she was deserted and left without support. It was at this point that the protocol issued with the two decrees by the Office of the *Şeyḫ ül-Islām* put the blame on the number of foreign Muslims marrying and then abandoning Ottoman wives, but this seems rather incredible on the face of it. As with the second *irāde*, which relied on a variant Ḥanafī view to permit a

wife to seek judicial dissolution of marriage if the husband became afflicted with certain diseases that made cohabitation dangerous and in connection with which, the Explanatory Memorandum of the Ottoman Law of Family Rights the next year spoke of "elephantiasis, leprosy, and madness" (though the Lebanese version of the same law with considerable more frankness included "syphilis");[25] it does not take very much imagination to envisage the utility of both of these innovations in the conditions engendered by war.

The Ottoman Law of Family Rights (OLFR) and the Ottoman Law of Procedure for *Sharī'a* Courts (OLPSC), which accompanied it, came into effect by imperial *ḳarār* (a decision of the Council of Ministers) on November 7th, 1917.[26] There certainly must be a question as to whether the laws ever came into effect in the *Sharī'a* courts of Palestine before the area fell to the British. In the south, anyhow, they probably did not, since the country fell in stages, with Allenby's triumphal entry into Jerusalem on December 9th ending the first stage which began somewhere between November 5th and November 8th just a few day after the very well-timed publication of the Balfour Declaration on November 2nd — all in all a very significant week in the Middle East.[27] This made little difference to the British, who had the dates of the laws wrong in any case and who, though at first seemingly puzzled by the two laws, ended up by applying them in Palestine as two very useful pieces of legislation. For their part, why the Young Turks would have chosen such a disastrous moment in the history of the Ottoman Empire for the promulgation of two such significant pieces of legislation is a question that will probably. always puzzle commentators. The laws, however, very definitely represent a giant step forward on the road to Turkish nationalism, though they were very soon afterwards withdrawn in Turkey itself and only remained operative in countries like Palestine, where they had hardly had a chance to come into effect before they were detached from the Ottoman Empire.[28] Finally, to compound the anomaly, the *Sharī'a* courts in Palestine and Israel went about their affairs in a "business as usual" fashion only referring to these laws where required or when it suited them, generally preferring compilations like Ḳadrī Paşa's.[29]

The Ottoman Law of Family Rights was a complete and highly systematic codification of the two central areas of personal status, marriage and divorce. The law not only made extensive use of the device of *talfīḳ*, i.e., combining the doctrines of more than one school in one and the same legal topic, considered "reprehensible" by most Islamic jurists, but employed what Schacht characterized as an "unrestrained eclecticism", going back into the past to adopt any opinion from any time whatsoever that might suit the purposes of the modern legislator.[30] Reforms in Islamic law came mainly in the adoption of more stringent regulations with regard to child marriage, recognition of stipulations inserted in marriage contracts, limitations on the effectiveness of certain expressions of unilateral repudiation, and extensions of women's rights to seek judicial dissolution of marriage even beyond those already initiated and incorporated in this law from the year before.

The problem in Palestine with the OLFR is that it was originally intended to be territorial in application, i.e., it was to apply across the board to all Ottoman citizens and probably with the abolition of the Capitulations, all foreigners as well. The *millet* system was in effect to be scrapped and the *Sharī'a* courts were envisioned as the new National Courts of Personal Status. It is for this reason I have referred to it as nationalistic and the OLPSC was adopted to accompany it, which applied the procedure of the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure, based as it was on the French Civil Code, to *Sharī'a* courts.[31] So disturbing were the original articles applying to Jews and Christians, i.e., Arts. 3, 12, 20-32, 39-41, 51, 58-59, 78-79, 91, 132-38, 148-49, and 155-56, that they are rarely found in any extant version of the law, though the Young Turks must have expended quite some effort in their preparation.[32] It would seem the British authorities were also disturbed by them, as they were by the references to appeal to the Court of Cassation in Istanbul (an innovation in itself in the sphere of Islamic jurisprudence).

The Application of the OLFR and OLPSC in Palestine

When the system of judicial administration was reestablished in Proclamation no. 42 on June 24th, 1918 by the O.E.T.A. (South), the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration with headquarters at Jerusalem, recourse to the Court of Cassation and the *şeyḫ ül-Islām* in Istanbul were abolished and a *Sharī'a* appeals court was promised for Jerusalem.[33] However, the authorities do not seem to have been aware of the existence of the two Ottoman laws of November, 1917, since the all-important take-over provision for law in force in the courts of Palestine specified the date of the occupation as the cut-off with such modification as might be proper in the light of private international law and good administration without additional reservation.[34] Proclamation no. 42 also contained an introductory note explaining that all disabilities imposed by the Ottoman authorities on British or Allied subjects were to be removed, and it is in this light that the offending sections of the OLFR might be viewed. When the offensive was resumed in the north the following November and the administration extended into the new areas of conquest by Proclamation no. 81 of November 18th, 1918,[35] the British authorities show for the first time they have become aware of these two laws by changing their system of reception of Ottoman law and making special reference to them. Confirmation, too, is provided of the fact that the laws already had had time to enter the practice of the courts in the north by a proviso stipulating that cases already entered under them were to continue to be judged according to them. Proclamation no. 81 now specifically provided that the law and procedure of *Sharī'a* courts were not to include the "Ottoman laws of the 25th of October, 1333, 1917". Here the misunderstanding of Ottoman fiscal dating has already crept in, just as a similar confusion in the dating of the Provisional Law of Inheritance of 1913 was to creep into the Second Schedule of the Succession Ordinance of 1923.[36]

Whereas Proclamation no. 42 specified the cut-off date for the reception of Ottoman law was to be "before the occupation", Proclamation no. 81 now altered this scheme for all courts, secular and religious, to the more precise "before October 25th, 1917", the presumed date of the OLFR and OLPSC. When the final judicial structure in Palestine was established some two and a half weeks after the League of Nations officially confirmed the Mandate in Article 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council in August, 1922, the take-over of Ottoman law was put further back to the commencement of hostilities, November lst, 1914. As we shall see, however, the OLFR and the OLPSC continued to be a focus of interest and were provided for by the additional proviso "and such later Ottoman Laws as have been or may be declared in force by Public Notice..."[37]

The OLPSC had already been put back into effect in the *Sharī'a* courts by an order in the *Official Gazette* of August lst, 1919 without Arts. 14, 47-48, 50-52, and 62 which dealt with institutions of a specifically Ottoman nature. It still constitutes part of the corpus to be applied in theory in the *Sharī'a* courts in Israel today, even though Arts. 17-20, 26-27, 39-41, 45-46, 53, 56, and 58 make specific reference to the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure of 1879, which was canceled in Palestine in 1936-38 in favor of more British rules of court.[38] All references to the Court of Cassation in Istanbul (implied in Arts. 53-55) were now understood in Palestine to be to the *Sharī'a* Appeals Court, which had been established the year before on September 13th, 1918 in Jerusalem as promised in Proclamation no. 42. Reference to it was theoretically to take the place of reference to the *şeyḫ ül-Islām*, though its competence did not extend to the review of any decisions made in the *Sharī'a* courts before the British occupation.[39]

Pursuant also to the promulgation of the OLFR and OLPSC, Administrative Regulations were adopted by the Ottoman authorities to regulate matters of registration of marriages and divorces as called for in Arts. 37-38 and Art. 110 of the OLFR.[40] Accompanying these, an amendment was adopted to the Ottoman Penal Code providing for six months' imprisonment for husbands, participating judges, and judges' deputies who arranged or performed marriages in contravention of the regulations set forth in the OLFR. This was the first effective coupling of criminal sanctions with relevant procedural regulations in the Middle East and was soon to become a fixture of legal innovation in personal status in the region. These carried over into the Palestine Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936 with slight refurbishment according to more British tastes and even some extension into non-Muslim affairs.[41] In contrast to the OLFR and OLPSC, these Administrative Regulations were never officially put into effect in Palestine. However, testifying to the stubborn independence of the *Sharī'a* court judges, the *ḳāḍīs* applied them as if they were operative whenever they thought that they were relevant.[42] Rather, on September 23rd, 1919 two days before the OLFR was

itself reapplied, a Marriage and Divorce (registration) Ordinance was adopted, again showing what the concern was holding up the readoption of the OLFR.[43] This was wider in scope than the Ottoman and effective across the board for all communities. Being, therefore, more general in tone, it dealt only with the procedures of registration itself, leaving out such subjects pursuant to the OLFR and contained in the Ottoman Administrative Regulations, as publishing of marriage bans, the examination for impediments, the exact recording of stipulations inserted in the marriage contract, and the problem of objections by marriage guardians. On the other hand, it tightened up the procedures for registration of divorce in pursuance of Art. 110 of the OLFR. But even more than this, by providing that any person failing to observe such procedures be liable to criminal prosecution according to Art. 99 of the Ottoman Penal Code, it specifically imported this law also and made its penalty of six months' imprisonment for all procedural infractions in marriage and divorce applicable in Palestine. At a very early stage, therefore, in its administration the typical Islamic modernist legal device of coupling penal sanctions with procedural reform to limit undesirable social practices in sensitive areas of law was imported into Palestine.

The Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917 was actually once again applied in Palestine by special ordinance on September 25th, 1919.[44] The title of this law, the Muslim Family Law (Application) Ordinance, tells in microcosm the story we have been unraveling. When the OLFR was put back into effect in this manner, it was not put into effect as the "Ottoman" Family Law, i.e., theoretically applicable to all citizens on a territorial basis, but rather as the "Muslim" Family Law, shorn of its controversial articles applying to Christians and Jews and restricted to the Muslim religious *millet* only. This was an extremely conservative position, especially in view of the fact that the Turkish Government was simultaneously retracting it in favor of more modern European legislation in the field, and characteristic of British colonial policy towards the customs of "native" peoples. In a famous case towards the end of the Mandate, where a Muslim woman attempted to have a case of maintenance transferred to the civil courts (the system of separate judicial competences had also in effect been imported by the adoption of the OLFR in this manner) because it was not one of the subjects treated in the OLFR, this conservatism was graphically illustrated even in the courts. The High Court of Justice, which had jurisdiction in conflicts of jurisdiction between the separate judicial competences, held that the Muslim Family Law (Application) Ordinance did not "deprive the *Shari'a* courts of jurisdiction in matters not referred to in the Ottoman Family Law 1333".[45] Since both the OLFR and the OLPSC had been specifically applied by special ordinance, they continued in effect under the scheme produced by Art. 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922 mentioned above.

The Application of the Amendment to Art. 64 of the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure

The 1914 Amendment to Art. 64 of the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure had far-reaching effects for the whole range of civil law in Palestine and Israel. Under the guise of a procedural amendment, it introduced the concept of freedom of contracts into Palestine. This amendment was directly absorbed into Palestine under all the jurisprudential schemes, whether that of Proclamation no. 42, Proclamation no. 81, or the final one of Art. 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922. What occurred, and this is clear when one reviews the court practice in Palestine and the early Israeli state, was that the *Mecelle*, the pioneering attempt at codifying almost pure Islamic *fiḳh* in the area of transactions, while not invalidated per se, was reduced in a widely recognized manner and transformed into a table of contractual norms in all cases subject to the will and agreement of the parties concerned. Together with Art. 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council, which as it came to be interpreted more or less stripped the Islamic law embodied in the *Mecelle* of its essence and acted to superimpose the norms and practice of English law upon it, it was developed in the practice of the civil courts (the Palestinian successors to the *niẓāmiye*) as a means of limiting the actual extent to which the *Mecelle* was put in effect.[46] Even when the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure was repealed by the British in legislation governing procedure from 1936-38, so basic was Art. 64 seen to court practice and the legal structure as it was functioning in Palestine, that it was retained. Here the Mandate authorities very strikingly pointed up that the Amendment to Art. 64 of 1914 was not the procedural matter the Young Turks passed it off as, but a cornerstone of substantive civil law in the country.

It was carried over into Israel via Sec. 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance of May 19th, 1948 (the counterpart to Art. 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council in Israel) and played something of the same role in Israeli court practice as it had during the Mandate. It was not repealed until 1973, when the Law of Contracts (General Part) Law, which was meant to stand as the first and theoretical part of the developing new Israeli Civil Code, was passed. Since the Israeli authorities were by now systematically developing their own statutory law in a consistent manner, it is not surprising that this Amendment to Art. 64 of the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure should finally be repealed at a time when the *Mecelle* itself was finally being removed from the Palestine/Israel scene.[47]

The Application of the Provisional Land Laws of 1913-14

The series of provisional laws regarding land discussed at the start of this study were also absorbed into Palestine and from there into Israel via the same mechanism as the Amendment to Art. 64. Because of the implications of the

Balfour Declaration and the confused situation regarding land generally, a moratorium on transactions in land was imposed from the very first days of Allenby's campaigns.[48] Not only had the administration of land in the Ottoman Empire generally been reduced to chaos since the attempts to have all transactions registered following the 1858 Land Code, but the Ottoman authorities had made matters worse in Palestine by running off with all the Land Registers at the approach of the British forces. Transactions were allowed to resume in 1920 with the promulgation of the Land Transfer Ordinance and the accompanying Correction of Land Registers Ordinance in anticipation of the establishment of special land courts the next year and a whole mechanism known as Land Settlement, which it was hoped would clarify the situation, but which did not get going until 1929-48.[49] The Land Transfer Ordinance of 1920 very consciously operated within the framework of the Provisional Laws of 1913-14; for instance, as in the Provisional Laws of Disposal and Mortgage, *mülk* appendages affixed permanently to *mīrī* land, were conceived of as being part of that "land".[50] The *Maḥlūl* Land Ordinance of the same year, adopted mainly to curb the unregulated process of what the British saw as "squatting", i.e., the occupation of land falling vacant either through a three-year failure of cultivation or a failure of heirs (considered legitimate in Islamic legal theory as it developed), actually referred to the Provisional Law of Inheritance of 1913 for the first time in any Palestine piece of legislation. It specifically applied it to such situations and thereby emphasized the basic *mīrī* character of such land and the British willingness to operate within the Ottoman and Islamic system of land tenure as they inherited it.[51] Here, too, for the first time the mistake in dating of this law is already evident.

Aside from settling certain problems regarding the permissibility of mortgaging *mīrī* in the Land Law Amendment of 1933 (first raised in the Provisional Law for the Mortgage of Immovable Property of 1913 and referred to in Sec. 10 of the Transfer of Land Ordinance of 1920),[52] most attention in Palestine, and thereafter in Israel, focused on the Provisional Law of Inheritance of 1913. This is already evident in the *Maḥlūl* Land Ordinance above before the promulgation of the Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922. What the Ottomans had created were two different systems of inheritance: one, a secular one, having to do with *mīrī* was to be carried on according to a law based on the German *B.G.B.* whether in the secular courts or the *Sharī'a*; the other, applying to freehold and all other *mülk*, was carried on as always, at least where Muslims were concerned, according to *Sharī'a*. This system the British absorbed via the *Maḥlūl* Land Ordinance and the Palestine Order-in-Council two years later. The Land Courts Ordinance of 1921 had specifically empowered the new courts it set up to deal with rights in and over every kind of land, including *mülk*, *mīrī*, and derivatives of the second, direct the Land Office to register valid rights, and consider applications for corrections of the Land Registers. However, such regulations could only apply to Muslims in "mixed"

suits, since the *Sharī'a* courts still exercised exclusive jurisdiction over Muslims in matters of succession.

In 1923 the British formally approached the problem of succession in a territorial manner. The solution they reached was conservative, in line with their usual colonial policy (Palestine had been transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office in 1921 after the civil disturbances of that year and in anticipation of the confirmation of the Mandate by the League of Nations). The main lines of the system they adopted were Ottoman and these have passed on into Israel with little intrinsic change despite the passage of a new Succession Law in 1965. Though the Succession Ordinance of 1923 purported to be of territorial applicability, Muslims were excluded from its provisions and from the list of religious communities appended in the First Schedule. Still, the British did specifically apply the Provisional Law of Inheritance of 1913 to all matters of succession relating to *mīrī* lands in both civil and religious courts, a far-reaching directive for any secular government in the Middle East. Though the *Sharī'a* courts had been in the habit of applying the Provisional Law of 1913 to *mīrī* anyhow, now they were specifically directed to do so by the secular authorities (as were the other religious and secular courts), and to punctuate this, the 1913 Ottoman law was actually appended to the Succession Ordinance in the Second Schedule.

The Israelis went even further. Inheriting the system depicted above, through the vehicles we have described, the Israelis were interested in immediately turning their attention to certain problems relating to the equality of women, always a sore point in the Middle East and not something likely to have unduly troubled a British colonial administration. They did this in a law entitled the Women's Equal Rights Law of 1951. The law handled a compendium of subjects all relating to the treatment of women, and succession was dealt with in Sec. 4. Having already forbidden in a territorial manner laws detrimental to women *qua* women (as Islamic law most certainly was, at least through Western eyes) in Sec. 1, the legislator stated: "Notwithstanding anything laid down in any other law, rights in an inheritance of *mülk* land and movables shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Second Schedule of the Succession Ordinance",[53] which meant the Provisional Law of Inheritance of 1913. Therefore, not only had the Israelis absorbed the Provisional Law of 1913, they now extended it to cover an area it was never meant to cover, i.e., intestate succession to *mülk* lands. This is not the place to go into whether the Muslims carried out the provisions of this law or not; suffice it to say they ignored it, since the Israeli authorities did not set up any supervisory apparatus to ensure its observance. The Israelis seemed more interested in citing a general principle than in ensuring it was carried out in actual practice. In any event, in Sec. 7 of the same law they immediately qualified what they had done, obviously in deference to the religious parties with the words in Sec. 4, unless all parties to a given suit agreed "to be judged according to the law of their community". The Muslim community, anyhow, took this as a blanket

permission to apply *Shari'a* law to *mülk* in succession matters as they always had done. Still, what had been contemplated here was a potential interference into the law of personal status of the various communities of far-reaching extent and the vehicle of this interference even in 1951 was to have been the Provisional Ottoman Law of 1913.[54]

The following year work began on an Israeli Succession Bill. The scheme originally was to withdraw the area from religious court jurisdiction altogether.[55] This ran into immediate difficulties from the religious parties, with the Muslims content to let them "run interference" for them. Therefore, after much wrangling, when the bill was finally submitted six years later in 1958 to the Knesset, concurrent jurisdiction in the Palestine/Ottoman manner was provided for at the written request of the parties concerned. The law that finally emerged from the Knesset seven years later in 1965 conserved this scheme. However, unlike that enunciated in the Women's Equal Rights Law of 1951, which actually directed the religious courts to apply the Ottoman law of 1913 to *mīrī*, the religious courts were given leave to apply any law of personal status they chose, just so long as all interested parties consented to their jurisdiction and with the proviso that maintenance out of the estate be not less than under secular law.[56] One might have thought that such a system would give the *Shari'a* courts greater power than they had before to effect succession orders concerning either *mīrī* or *mülk* in accordance with *Shari'a*. In fact it did, but the *Shari'a* courts, consistent to a fault and seemingly completely indifferent to Israeli reforms, did nothing of the sort. They have gone on behaving as they always have, settling *mülk* according to *Shari'a* and *mīrī* according to the Ottoman law of 1913.[57]

The 1965 Israel Succession Law aspired to be comprehensive and therefore repealed all articles of the *Mecelle* dealing with such matters, Sec. 4 of the Women's Equal Rights Law, and the Succession Ordinance of 1923, including as it did the Provisional Ottoman Law of Inheritance of 1913. However, perhaps even more anomalous than anything so far described, the scheme of succession it chose to adopt for all intestate succession in the civil courts was that of the 1913 Ottoman law. That the new Israel Succession Law of 1965, aspiring to be modern, should have finally settled on the scheme of the old 1913 Ottoman law is surprising to say the least. This, of course, comprised a widening of its provisions beyond anything contemplated in Ottoman times. The reason given by those responsible in the Israeli Justice Ministry was simple: The Ottoman law was working well and had the advantage of being widely known among the people.[58] Nothing perhaps could be a better testament to the durability and lasting influence of these Young Turk initiatives in land law, contract law, and personal status in Palestine/Israel than this.

Notes

1 See J.N.D. Anderson, "Recent Developments in Shari'a Law", vi, *Muslim World*, 43, pp. 276-80; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford, 1961), pp. 22f. and 238; N. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), p. 416; and R. Eisenman, *Islamic Law in Palestine and Israel* (Leiden, 1978), pp. 35f.

2 Eisenman, pp. 35f.

3 Hitherto land under the category of *mülk* had been regulated by Islamic law through the *Mecelle* of 1869, *mīrī* and its derivatives through the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 incorporating principles going back to the early days of the Ottoman Empire and Islam. See my discussion of these two laws, pp. 19-26 and 53-62.

4 *Mīrī* land was land righly appertaining to the state, going back to the early days of the Muslim conquests; *mülk* lands were lands held in freehold tenure. Outside the Arabian Peninsula itself, the latter mainly were in towns and villages.

5 "The Provisional Law Concerning the Right of Certain Corporate Bodies to Own Immovable Property", *Düstūr*, 2nd series, vol. 5, p. 114; R.C. Tute, *The Ottoman Land Laws* (Jerusalem, 1927), p. 165.

6 *Düstūr*, vol. 5, p. 145; Tute, p. 165.

7 Lewis, p. 458; see also E. Mardin, "Development of the Shari'a under the Ottoman Empire", in M. Khadduri and H.J. Liebesny (eds.), *Law in the Middle East* (Washington, 1955), pp. 279-91.

8 See Lewis, pp. 458-59; E. Mardin, p. 287; M. Silberg, *Personal Status in Israel* (Jerusalem, 1965), pp. 182-211, in Hebrew.

9 The primitive concepts of *farāgh bi'l-wafā'* (pledge with the right of redemption) and *bay' bi'l-wafā'* (sale with the right of redemption) were often used as a kind of mortgage in the Ottoman Empire, but these were forbidden in Palestine. See Eisenman, pp. 12, 52, 60, 65, etc.

10 *Düstūr*, vol. 5, p. 185; Tute, p. 166; Eisenman, pp. 65f.; 1 Rabī' al-thānī, 1331.

11 Fiscal dating March 30, 1329; *Düstūr*, vol. 5, p. 158; Tute, p. 169; Eisenman, pp. 166f.

12 The actual words in Art. 5 run: "Whosoever owns by virtue of a formal title-deed *mīrī* or *mevḳūfe* may transfer it absolutely or subject to redemption and may lease it and lend it and mortgage it as security for debt, and he alone has the right to all increase and to the full use of it and to all the crops which grow naturally upon it... The rights for disposal and transfer... or... fixtures and additions constructed on *mīrī* or *mevḳūfe* will be the same as for the land itself".

13 Arts. 5, 9, and 11.

14 Arts. 1114-91 of the *Mecelle*.

15 Fiscal dating Dec. 1, 1329; *Düstūr*, vol. 6, p. 100; Tute, p. 172.

16 See my discussion of this, pp. 67f.

17 Feb. 14th, 1914 or 18 Rabī' al-awwal, 1332; *Düstūr*, vol. 6, p. 193; Tute, p. 175; Eisenman, pp. 68f.

18 See my discussion, pp. 26f.; see also C.A. Hooper, *The Civil Law of Palestine and Trans-Jordan*, vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1936), pp. 141-71.

19 Fiscal dating April 24, 1330; *Düstūr*, vol. 6, p. 574; Hooper, vol. 2, pp. 75, 114-16, 123f.

20 See Report in Hooper, vol. 1, pp. 4f.

21 Hooper, vol. 2, pp. 116-17.

22 See my detailed discussions of these matters, pp. 106-35 and 162-67.

23 The Ottoman abolition of the Capitulations was never repealed in Palestine as elsewhere in the Middle East, and therefore these were never reapplied. They were suspended by Art. 8 of the Mandate confirmed by the Big Powers in the San Remo Treaty in July, 1921 and abolished altogether by the Treaty of Lausanne officially ending World War I on July 27, 1923. See E. Malchi, *The History of the Law of Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1942), p. 40, in Hebrew and E. Vitta, *The Conflict of Laws in Matters of Personal Status in Palestine* (Tel Aviv), pp. 5ff.

24 *Düstūr*, vol. 8, pp. 853-7; Anderson, "Recent Developments...", iii, p. 38 and vi, pp. 272, 277-79, and *Islamic Law in the Modern World* (New York and London, 1959), pp.

26f.; S.D. Goitein and A. Ben-Shemesh, *Muslim Law in Israel* (Jerusalem, 1957), pp. 229-30, in Hebrew. Y. Meron has supplied the correct date of March 25, 1916 (fiscal dating March 12, 1322).

25 See Anderson, "Recent Developments...", vi, pp. 276-80.

26 Fiscal dating Oct. 25, 1333, which of course is not Oct. 25, 1917. See Eisenman, pp. 32-35.

27 See T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (London and New York, 1935), p. 387 for dating of the start of this campaign.

28 *Dūstūr*, vol. 9, pp. 762-83; Goitein and Ben-Shemesh, pp. 213-33 and 273-87; L. Bouvat, "Le code familial ottoman de 1917," *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 43 (1921), pp. 5-26. See also Eisenman, pp. 37 and 50.

29 A. Layish, "*Qāḍīs* and *Sharī'a* in Israel," *Asian and African Studies*, 7 (1971), p. 249.

30 Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford, 1964), p. 106.

31 See Anderson, "Recent Developments...," iv, p. 118; N.J. Coulson, *History of Islamic Law* (Edinburgh, 1964), p. 163; and Lewis, p. 229. See also my detailed discussion of the OLPSC, pp. 45-49.

32 One place they can be found is in Rushdī as-Sarrāj's Arabic translation, *Kitāb Majmū'at al-Ḳawānīn al-Shar'iyya* (Jaffa, 1944), pp. 185-97. See also Goitein and Ben-Shemesh, p. 290

33 See *Proclamations, Ordinances, and Notices Issued by O.E.T.A. (South) to August, 1919 (PONOETA)*, no publication date, available at Hebrew University Law Library, p. 9, Secs. 8-9.

34 *Ibid.*, Secs. 1-2. See Eisenman, pp. 17-19.

35 *PONOETA*, p. 12; N. Bentwich, *Legislation of Palestine*, 1918-25 (Alexandria, 1926), vol. 1, p. 612, Sec. 4.

36 The date should be Nov. 7, 1917, since there are thirteen days difference between Ottoman fiscal dating, which follows Byzantine practice and Julian dating followed in the West.

37 Eisenman, pp. 79-80 and 106 and Hooper, vol. 1, pp. 28-81.

38 See my discussion, p. 34. An amendment was adopted to the new Civil Procedure Ordinance in 1944 which stated, inter alia, that regardless of references to the OCCP in the OLPSC, these articles were not to be considered in effect in the *Sharī'a* courts. Still in HC 110/46, the Supreme Muslim Council, later defunct in Israel, was adjudged the sole custodian of tradition and procedure before the courts of the Muslim religious community.

39 Public Notice, no. 66, Sept. 9, 1918, *PONOETA*, p. 18 in fulfillment of a promise made in Sec. 9 of Proclamation no. 42.

40 See Anderson, "Recent Developments...," iv, pp. 118ff. and Goitein and Ben-Shemesh, p. 218. The latter dated these incorrectly as December, 1917. Again the mistake seems to relate to fiscal dating, which is Dec. 31, 1333 or Jan. 13, 1918.

41 See my discussion, pp. 37ff. and 102-105.

42 Goitein and Ben-Shemesh, p. 218.

43 R.H. Drayton, *The Laws of Palestine* (London, 1934), vol. 1, Cap. 88; Goitein and Ben-Shemesh, pp. 218 and 232f.; Bentwich, vol. 1, p. 57; Eisenman, pp. 38 and 51.

44 Drayton, vol. 2, Cap. 96; Goitein and Ben-Shemesh, p. 213; Bentwich, vol. 1, p. 58.

45 H.C. 49/45, 12 PLR 426; 1945 ALR 659. See also Vitta, pp. 145-48 and Silberg, pp. 21, 27-28.

46 See my discussion, pp. 131ff.

47 *Israel Law Review*, 9, no. 2 (April, 1974), pp. 274-91; Eisenman, pp. 258ff.

48 Proclamations 18/11/18 and 30/4/19 temporarily forbade transactions in land and invalidated promissory notes in connection with such, as for example the practice of *farāgh bi'l-wafā'*. See also Secs. 16-23 of Proclamation no. 42.

49 Bentwich, vol. 1, p. 26; Drayton, vol. 2, Cap. 81, p. 881. For Land Courts Ordinance, see Bentwich, vol. 1, p. 150; Drayton, vol. 2, Cap. 75, p. 828. For Land Settlement, see the Land (Settlement of Title) Ordinance, 1928, Drayton, vol. 1, Cap. 80, p. 875 and my discussion, pp. 146-51. Though transactions began, litigation did not until the establishment of the Land Courts.

50 Sec. 2.
51 Sec. 2. The Mandate Authorities actually arrogated to themselves the traditional role of the Ottoman sultan in leasing out land appertaining to the state.
52 See Eisenman, pp. 65 and 150.
53 *S.H.*, 5711, no. 82, p. 248; 6 *LSI* 171. See also Silberg, pp. 398–435.
54 See Layish, *Women and Islamic Law in a Non-Muslim State* (Jerusalem, 1976), pp. 307ff. and "Qāḍīs and Shari'a", pp. 77f.
55 See U. Yadin, "The Law of Succession and other Steps Towards a Civil Code", in Yadin and Tedeschi (eds.), *Studies in Israel Legislative Problems* (Jerusalem, 1966), p. 105.
56 *S.H.*, 5725, no. 446, p. 63; 19 *LSI* 58, Sec. 155.
57 A personal communication to me by A. Layish; see also Layish, *Women*, p. 309; Eisenman, pp. 204ff.
58 Yadin, p. 115.

'Abdülḥamīd II's Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System*

ENGIN D. AKARLI

Sultan 'Abdülḥamīd II (r. 1876-1909) attributed a greater importance to the provinces of the Ottoman Empire than his predecessors. The sultan's interest in his Arab subjects was an integral aspect of his attempts to restrengthen the Islamic foundations of the Empire and thus generate a viable basis of social support which was essential for the survival of the Empire.

Background

'Abdülḥamīd II ascended to the throne amidst great confusion. War with Russia was imminent and the provinces were in turmoil. While society had been gravely ruptured by armed clashes between Muslim and Christian subjects, the gulf between state and society had become wider than ever. Within the state sector itself, the lower echelons had become embittered by the government's domination by an oligarchic group of *paşas* which, in turn, was chaotically fragmented by personal and factional enmities and rivalries. Reliance on the support of foreign diplomats in internal power struggles among the *paşas* had become customary. The conduct of even routine government business had become arduous. Last, but not least, the Ottoman treasury was virtually bankrupt beneath the burden of servicing the public debt, while Ottoman territories had been turned into open markets for Western exploitation. In a nutshell, vulnerability to Western pressure in all spheres of governmental activity, a political milieu of incompatible interests and values, and chronic budgetary deficits had become endemic features of Ottoman politics.[1]

'Abdülḥamīd barely found the time to contemplate these problems before he saw the state at war with Russia. The result was defeat, complete bankruptcy of the treasury, intensified grievances against the central government in all provinces, and a series of onerous and intimidating international peace negotiations at the end of which the Ottoman government placed a significant portion of its revenues under foreign control in order to restore its financial credibility. It also ceded 232,000 square kilometers of land containing a population of over six million people either to other states or to newly formed tributary principalities. Of its former tributaries Tunisia and Egypt were occupied by the French and British respectively, while Romania and Serbia became independent states.[2] So the outcome of the war with Russia, or rather

of the protracted crisis underlying the war, induced certain developments that help to explain the growing interest in the Arab provinces.

First, in order to compensate for the depleted resources resulting from the recent territorial losses, the Ottoman government deliberately turned its attention to provinces which until then had escaped effective control. Most of the Arab provinces were in this category.[3] This point is openly stated in a letter by Aḥmed Cevdet Paşa, one of the most influential statesmen of the period under consideration and a mentor of the sultan:

> Because of the devastation of Rumelia, the revenues of the government have become reduced by nearly a half. In order to make up for this loss, the most important issue for us now is to render prosperous and increase the wealth of the Anatolian and Arab provinces... The development of Syria [i.e. Damascus and its environs], Aleppo and Adana would turn this area into an Egypt... This can be accomplished with ease under the aegis of our sovereign.[4]

Cevdet Paşa's proposal did not remain on paper. There can be little doubt that the net government revenues from the Arab provinces steadily increased during 'Abdülḥamīd's reign.[5] One must not hastily conclude, however, that the Ottoman government's ultimate goal in the area was to exploit local resources.[6] An assessment of the true nature of this development requires a detailed analysis of the flow and destination of the accruing funds in terms of the operation of Ottoman finances as well as the economy both at the provincial level and Empire-wide.[7] Such an analysis is not attempted in the present article. Instead, another aspect of 'Abdülḥamīd's provincial policy is concentrated on — an aspect which suggests that economic exploitation was by no means the primary consideration of the Ottoman Arab policy — namely, the endeavor to create a viable basis of social solidarity for the state's survival.

This strongly felt need also took shape during the protracted crisis that marked the opening years of 'Abdülḥamīd's reign. The crisis obliged the "Ottomans"[8] to reappraise and revise the "reorganization" (*Tanẓīmāt*) policies of the Westernizing ministers who had dominated the government during the period 1839-1871/6. When judged by the impotency of the Ottoman government in face of the problems that induced the crisis, it is understandable that the Ottomans should in general adopt a revisionist stance concerning the reorganization, that is, the reinvigoration of the state. The vulnerability of the government to economic and political pressures by Western powers, as well as the acculturation of Ottoman leadership in Western values *à la Tanẓīmāt* (along with other but less important reasons) prohibited any radical deviation from the path of the *Tanẓīmāt*. Still, in the 1870s, an increasing number of Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals disputed or defied at least one basic tenet of the *Tanẓīmāt* model, namely, the integration of the various ethnic and religious communities in Ottoman lands into one people through their equitable treatment. Instead of such integration, which was deemed

impractical and even detrimental, the rectification of the Islamic foundations of the Ottoman state was advocated as a sound and practical basis for social solidarity.[9] This renewed concern for Islam converged with the desire to make up for the recent losses turning the government's attention to the Arab provinces.

'Abdülḥamīd himself was highly sensitive to the trend of the times. He believed that

> The priority of the subjects who constitute a majority over the rest is an unavoidable necessity in any state. The Catholics, for example, are preponderant over the Protestants in countries where the former are in majority... Likewise, the religion of the Sublime State of the Ottomans is the religion of Islam, and the Muslims are in majority among its subjects. Nevertheless, all subjects are treated most equally by the Sultanate. While this is a matter of fact,... the Christian subjects are distinguished by the protection of foreign powers... For example, if a Christian attacks a Muslim and wounds and even attempts to kill him, the foreign consuls interfere and want to prevent the trial of the Christian even if the oppression of the Muslim and the aggression and cruelty of the Christian are well-known facts... The consuls pressure the central government for the immediate removal of the governors and other administrators who oppose their action.[10]

According to the sultan, had it not been for foreign intervention and Ottoman indiscretion that facilitated it,[11] "the hearts of all subjects might have been filled with love and loyalty towards their sublime sovereign through the diligent implementation of the laws and regulations that... [were] enacted after the promulgation of the Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber".[12] Yet, as things stood, "not only [did] the existing regulations concerning all branches of the government fall short of sustaining the interests and territorial integrity of the state, but they also fail[ed] to assure the true interests of the loyal subjects, and, above all, of the distinguished religion of Islam which is the reason of the strength and endurance of the state".[13] No matter how adversely affected were the Muslims, they would "always be moved with the [feeling of] loyalty and reverence towards the office of the Sultanate and Caliphate under the influence of their upbringing at home".[14] They would "intrinsically desire the continuation of Ottoman rule, and faithfully serve for the sake of it, while the other subjects obviously nourish[ed] totally different views and desires"[15] with the instigation of Western powers.[16] Consequently, the continued support of the Muslims was indispensable for the existence of the Ottoman state.[17]

Given the importance that 'Abdülḥamīd attributed to Islam as a basis of loyalty to the state, it was only natural that he would pay due attention to winning the hearts of the Arabs, who were the "noble people" (*ḳavm-i necīb*) in Islamic tradition and had come to constitute, since the last war, the second largest element of the population after the Turks.[18]

Cevdet Paşa formulates the principle that seems to have guided 'Abdülḥamīd's approach to the Arabs in a report drafted upon the request of the sultan to sum up a conversation between the two.

> The Sublime State is a large body composed of various peoples (*aḳvām*) and classes (*ṣunūf*) which cohere by the sacred power of the Caliphate. Islam provides the Arab, Kurd, Albanian and Bosnian with a sense of direction. It is true that the Turks are the real force behind the Sublime State. It is ethnically and religiously incumbent upon them to give their lives for the Ottoman dynasty until they are all destroyed. Consequently, it is natural for the Sublime State to value the Turks more than other peoples. But it is necessary to hold in high esteem the Arabs as well. Their language is the language of our religion. Also the other peoples must be treated as equals of the Turks and Arabs. This was the basic arrangement of Yavuz Sultan Selīm [the conqueror of Arab lands]. It was kept up for a long time. Eventually, with the multiplication of the ignorant and unmindful officials, these subtle points began to be overlooked. Still, some of the officials in the Arab lands insult the Arabs, calling them *fellāḥ*. Naturally, the Arabs hate the Turks in turn. Present circumstances oblige the government officials to be cognizant of such subtle points concerning the state. As long as this is observed the Arabs, who are accustomed to being ruled by the Ottomans for so many years, will not go on a different road by themselves. Even if a few of them will do so, they will bear no influence because of the paucity of their numbers.[19]

Cevdet Paşa's argument clearly shows that Islam was to serve to rebuild the solidarity of the Muslims in order to restrengthen the state. Subtle attention had to be paid to the Muslim provinces and the Muslims treated respectfully and equally.

'Abdülḥamīd and the Arabs

Indeed, during the reign of 'Abdülḥamīd II, most of the Arab provinces began to be considered first rank provinces. This meant that their governors and other senior officials were paid higher salaries and were more experienced and better qualified than most of their colleagues serving elsewhere.[20] The sultan attributed a special importance to the Hijaz (that is, the two holy cities and their environs) and "Syria" (Damascus and its environs).[21]

Another indication of the importance attributed to the Arabs during 'Abdülḥamīd's reign is the fact that some of his most influential advisors and quite a few of the leading statesmen in his service were either Arabs or people who were well informed in Arab affairs. Ḫayreddīn Paşa, a Circassian from Tunisia who spoke Arabic better than Turkish, served as grand vezir in 1879. He was appointed to the Council of Notables (*Meclis-i A'yān*) and remained among the sultan's most valuable advisors until his death in 1890.[22] Aḥmed

Cevdet Paşa was also an expert on Arab affairs thanks to his *'ilmiye* career and services in the Arab regions. 'Abdülḥamīd says that he "benefitted greatly from the extensive knowledge of Cevdet Paşa."[23] Of the Arabs who played prominent roles in the service of the sultan, 'Izzat ('Izzet) Paşa al-'Ābid (second secretary of the sultan, court chamberlain and chairman of many special committees including the Hijaz railroad project) was probably the most powerful statesman in the final decade of 'Abdülḥamīd's reign.[24] Rifā'i shaykh Abū'l-Hudā al-Ṣayyādī held the highest *'ilmiye* rank (*Rumeli ḳāḍī' askeri*) and served as the head of Ṣūfī şhaykhs (*şeyḫ ül-meşā'iḫ*) in Istanbul as well as the sultan's chief propagandist and envoy in the Arab provinces.[25] 'Abd al-Ḳādir al-Ḳudsī (another second secretary), the Salīm and Najīb Melhame brothers (the minister of mines and the head of the secret police, respectively), and Shafīḳ al-Ḳūrānī (the minister of the police) were also influential statesmen.[26]

Along with the Arabs who played key roles in government or court, there were many others who occupied lesser positions. By all accounts, the number of Arabs serving within the Ottoman governmental system steadily increased during the reign of 'Abdülḥamīd. They seem to have preferred to serve in their hometowns or nearby, but there were no particular obstacles to their promotion so long as they could get an appropriate education in Turkish, establish good connections, and were willing to move around in the Empire just like the rest of their colleagues who aspired to better positions.[27] They could even become commanders-in-chief of armies as did Maḥmūd Shawkat (Şevket) Paşa from Iraq or rise in the civil bureaucracy as did Sāṭi'Bey el-Ḥuṣrī, the renowned ideologue of Arab nationalism.[28]

Without educational opportunities, however, the Arab could not have risen within the Ottoman bureaucracy. The table on page 79 indicates that in the field of public education Arab provinces were much better served than in the pervious years of reform.

Matched against population estimates, these figures may not appear impressive, but the improvement over the years is unmistakable. Besides, if it were possible to exclude the nomadic population, who could not be provided with schools, the number of schools and population figures would compare better. Furthermore, the school figures in the table exclude (a) the old-style elementary schools (*uṣūl-ı 'atīḳa ṣıbyān mektebleri*) which, although run by the Ministry of Education, yet needed to be modernized, (b) the Muslim religious schools which continued to function in accordance with local traditions but with some backing from the government, (c) the native private schools the establishment of which was encouraged by the government, (d) the eight craft schools run by the government, (e) the military junior high schools which were set up in all but the remote Arab provincial centers and the military high schools that were established in Damascus and Baghdad, and, finally, (f) the *Medrese-i Sulṭāniye* in Beirut which was apparently organized after the model of the Galatasaray *Mekteb-i Sulṭānīsi*.[29]

*Official Public Schools in Ottoman Arab Provinces 1876-1906**

	Modernized Elementary Schools (*Ibtidā'ī-i Uṣūl-i Cedīd*)			Junior High Schools (*Rüşdiye*)		High Schools (*Ī'dādiye*)		Population estimate (in 1000)	(in %)
	1877	1892-3	1905-6	1876	1906-7	1876	1905-6	1901	
Basra		26	17	1	6	—	—	689	2.4
Baghdad		11	10	8	9	—	—	897	3.1
Mosul		?	41	—	6	—	1	515	1.8
Zor		—	49	3	1	—	—	151	0.5
Aleppo		29	116	10	20	—	3	956	3.2
Syria		59	79	— 14	7	—	2	738	2.5
Beirut		181	182		13	—	5	652	2.2
Jerusalem		?	352	2	4	—	1	345	1.2
Hijaz		—	4	1	3	—	1	1500(?)	5.1
Yemen and Asir		—	52	—	7	—	2	3800(?)	13.1
Benghazi		—	11	—	3	—	—	300(?)	1.0
Tripolitania		—	21	3	3	—	1	700(?)	2.4
Total for Arab Provinces**	insig-nificant	306	934	42	82	—	17	11243(?)	38.4
Total for all Provinces***	200	31.1	6958	390	523	1	93	29294(?)	100.0
Arab/all (%)		9.8	13.4	10.8	15.7	—	18.3	38.4	

* See text for types of schools excluded.
** Excludes Cebel-i Lübnān.
*** That is, the Empire total minus Istanbul.

Sources: B. Kodaman, *Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi* (Istanbul, 1980), pp. 128-203, and V. Eldem, *Osmanlı Imparatorluğu'nun Iktisadi Şartları* (Ankara, 1970), pp. 52-58.

As for higher-level schools, a two-year teachers' college was set up in each one of the Arab provinces except the Hijaz, Tripolitania and Basra. In addition, schools of medicine, law, arts and sciences were established in Damascus in the final years of 'Abdülḥamīd's reign.[30] Yet, it was the state schools in Istanbul that kept attracting the more talented students. The number and capacity of the higher educational institutions in Istanbul steadily increased, and their quality was significantly improved during the period under consideration. These schools were essentially designed to train bureaucrats in such fields as medicine, law, economics, administration, teaching and military sciences. Usually, the students were on scholarship and upon their graduation

they joined the military or civil bureaucratic corps.[31] The Arab students were no exception.

Providing the Arabs with such educational opportunities and their inclusion in the bureaucracy must be interpreted as conspicuous elements in 'Abdülḥamīd's strategy to create a viable basis for the unification of the Ottoman population. Unprejudiced employment of Arabs in government jobs marked a genuine effort to incorporate them as equal partners in the Ottoman system. The extension of a standardized educational system into the Arab provinces, on the other hand, represented a significant attempt at cultural homogenization. An examination of the curricula pursued in schools of various levels all around the Empire reveals that although Turkish remained the language of instruction, the courses on Arabic carried an almost equal weight with those on the Turkish language itself. Furthermore, the courses on religion deliberately aimed at emphasizing the common bond between Muslims.[32]

The *'Aşīret Mektebi* embodied well these aspects of the sultan's educational policy. It was a five-year secondary boarding school established in Istanbul in 1892 specifically for the sons of Arab tribal notables. 'Abdülḥamīd was its honorary director. According to the school's regulations, its students would be "selected from among the physically and mentally gifted twelve to sixteen years old youth who belonged to respectful (*mu'teber ve muḥterem*) families of the various Arab tribes". A quota was specified for each Arab province except Beirut and the Cebel-i Lübnan. The students would be on full government scholarship including a monthly stipend. The school was established

> in order to enable the tribal people to partake of the prosperity that emanates from knowledge and civilization, and to further augment their well-known natural inclination towards and love for the Great Islamic Caliphate, and the Sublime Ottoman Sultanate, as well as to strengthen and confirm the earnest loyalty [to the state] and religious duties obliged on them by the canon and civil laws. The principal's and the teachers' attention and perseverance must be concentrated above all on these points.

The graduates were expected to rejoin their tribes and to serve as teachers or officials in the area.[33]

'Abdülḥamīd and Notables

In addition to his efforts to integrate Arab youth into the Ottoman system through education and bureaucratization, 'Abdülḥamīd deliberately sought to establish and maintain good relations with local leaders, particularly with Muslims.

'Abdülḥamīd believed that the attempts to eliminate the influence of the leading Muslim notables in Anatolia and Rumelia in the past had only served the interests of the Europeans, and had been detrimental to the Ottomans. The government needed the services of the notables to legitimize and strengthen the attachment of the common folk to the state and to keep them from unbecoming behavior.[34] The sultan applied this conviction in his Arab policy as well.

Some of the powerful Bedouin chieftains could communicate directly with the Palace through private telegraph codes.[35] Delegations from the Arab provinces frequented Istanbul. 'Abdülḥamīd did his best to meet them in person and to please them with other favors and presents according to the importance of the mission.[36] He hosted his more influential visitors in the Palace, sometimes for prolonged periods. They

> resided in the imperial guesthouse... Their meals were sent from the palace kitchen, and they were paid stipends out of the Privy Purse while their children went to school for free. Special mansions were given over to the higher celebrities from among them... 'Abdülḥamīd believed that in this way he won the hearts of the people of the areas that these [notables] were from.[37]

'Abdülḥamīd also retained in his retinue a number of influential Arab *'ulemā*, Ṣūfī shaykhs and other religious figures who exhorted Muslims to rally behind the sultan-caliph and to be submissive to him. They also helped to build up the pious image of the sultan in the eyes of the common Arab folk.[38]

Abu-Manneh shows that the Ottoman attempts to undermine the powers and prerogatives of the *sharīfs* of Mecca were abandoned in view of the reaction of notables. There was a large force commanded by the military governor of the Hijaz, who intended to use it to impress his authority upon the local populace. He was, however, ordered to settle conflicts by peaceful means. Eventually, he was recalled. The *sharīf's* authority was restored and the notables were appeased on the understanding that they acknowledged the sultan's supremacy and would never detract from his image as caliph.[39] Clearly, the sultan subordinated the need to consolidate governmental authority to another even more important need, namely Islamic solidarity.

A similar case is the conflict that emerged between Ḥamdī Paşa, the governor of "Syria" (1880-1885) and 'Abd al-Ḳādir al-Jazā'irlī, the revered hero of the Algerian resistance to the French occupation who had settled in Syria together with his close adherents. The Algerians had retained their clannish solidarity and had grown accustomed to defying governmental authority, taking advantage of the high esteem in which their leader was held in the Islamic world. At the time of Ḥamdī Paşa's governorship, the clandestine attempts by the French to bring the Algerian immigrants under official French protection triggered a protracted conflict between the governor and 'Abd al-Ḳādir. Ḥamdī Paşa began to impress the government's authority on the

Algerians. 'Abd al-Ḳādir reacted by filing complaints to Istanbul as well as to the French vice-consulate in Damascus, and by ordering his men to be on alert for combat. The grand vezir sent a soothing letter to 'Abd al-Ḳādir, but he also let Ḥamdī Paşa know that the central government had complete confidence in him and trusted that the issue would be settled judiciously. It was. Ḥamdī Paşa took advantage of the disputes among 'Abd al-Ḳādir's sons to curtail the Algerians' attraction to acquire French citizenship and to weaken their clannish bonds. He also duly created an opportunity for reconciliation with 'Abd al-Ḳādir and restored the old man's pride.[40]

There can be little doubt that the *paşa* had complied with the sultan's wishes. 'Abdülḥamīd would have disapproved the alienation of a revered Muslim leader. Besides, he would on principle prefer the peaceful settlement of problems[41] through cooperation with local leaders. These aspects of 'Abdülḥamīd's political style are best illustrated in his handling of the issues related to Ḥawrān which preoccupied the governors of "Syria" throughout his reign.

Cevdet Paşa, during his term as the governor of "Syria" in 1878, found the province in such turmoil that he believed only an adequate display of force could help restore tranquillity.[42] While the local security forces were being reorganized arbitration was virtually the only means available to him. Thus, when the *mutaṣarrıf* of Ḥawrān complained that the village shaykhs unlawfully claimed exemption from taxes, Cevdet advised him to reach a compromise with them. To resort to coercion without adequate military means might result in the loss of authority.[43]

Midḥat Paşa, who succeeded Cevdet in the governorship of "Syria", also complained about the inadequacy of the security forces under his command. Unlike Cevdet, however, he used whatever power was available to him, and did not always heed the military expertise of the *müşīr* (the commander-in-chief) of the Fifth Army Corps stationed in Syria. While Midḥat continued to reorganize the security forces under his direct command, he also persistently urged Istanbul to subordinate the *müşīr* to him. His request fell on deaf ears. Midḥat's determination to impose his authority on the unruly local elements, if necessary by force, continued to be frustrated by the *müşīr*.[44] Obviously, the *müşīr* acted with 'Abdülḥamīd's knowledge. The sultan thought of Midḥat as an assiduous and honest but undiscerning statesman, whose earlier work had benefited the separatist elements rather than the state itself.[45]

He could not let Midḥat have a free hand in "Syria". 'Abdülḥamīd agreed with the *paşa* about the need for reform in "Syria", in order to consolidate the government's authority, better its finances, and improve the dispensation of justice, but he also thought that impetuosity would only obstruct reforms. 'Abdülḥamīd bided his time until the current diplomatic problems which preoccupied the central government were settled, and then he launched his own program of reform, not only in "Syria" but in all provinces.[46] The sultan was worried lest Midḥat's tough policy in a politically sensitive area would

precipitate foreign intervention and this further complicated the diplomatic problems in hand. He did not miscalculate. Midḥat's drive against the Druzes of Ḥawrān in October 1879 got the British involved in the affair in support of the Druzes. Midḥat was ordered to cease hostilities and to settle the affair peacefully.[47]

What ultimately precipitated Midḥat's removal, however, was the Palace's quite valid conviction that keeping Midḥat in his post would irreparably damage the already much weakened prestige of the Sultanate in the area. The growing fury of the "Syrians" against the governor as well as the government was unmistakable. Midḥat had failed to establish a working cooperation with the local population. Admittedly, this was no easy task to accomplish given the enormous differences among the various local communities, and between the government and notables, particularly in matters of taxation. British diplomats in Beirut and Damascus appreciated the difficulties encountered by Midḥat in this regard, but they also criticized the governor for his impatience and uncompromising attitude. When Midḥat was finally dismissed, the event was viewed with satisfaction by the local population, particularly by the Muslims, masses and notables alike.[48] Quite clearly, 'Abdülḥamīd could not tolerate the further alienation of the populace of a crucial province.

Aḥmed Ḥamdī Paşa, who succeeded Midḥat as governor of "Syria", was very conscientious about assuring the sultan that he understood his prerogatives.[49] Once more, however, a conflict developed between the governor and the *müşīr* over the utilization of regular troops to keep order in the province. Ḥamdī had done his best to further improve the security and military forces and the defenses in the area. The Fifth Army Corps had been supplied with new troops and better weapons. The two large barracks and several blockhouses had been built in Ḥawrān, and the construction of a highway running from Damascus into Ḥawrān had begun.[50] Ḥamdī argued in his cables and letters to the Palace and the Porte that the investment in these improvements was negated by the *müşīr's* perverse refusal to cooperate with the provincial government. The *müşīr's* attitude abetted aggression by unruly tribes and Druzes against their neighbors. The Druzes even dared to rob soldiers on duty and steal weapons from arsenals. Yet, the *müşīr* was intransigent to the detriment of the government's prestige and influence, and of order and security in the province.

Ḥamdī's complaint was similar to Midḥat's but not identical. Ḥamdī repeatedly emphasized that he needed the assistance of regular troops to display a sufficiently large force to guarantee the effectiveness of his counsel to the shaykhs and notables, and the settlement of disputes "without the shooting of a gun". In other words, Ḥamdī Paşa heeded the sultan's disapproval of direct military involvement in local issues. Furthermore, the *müşīr* who opposed Ḥamdī was a tactless man. He offended notables and officials by his impudence, meddled in affairs which had diplomatic overtones, and, last but not least, allowed army mules to graze on cultivated fields. When Ḥamdī asked

the Palace to remove either him or the *müşîr* from the province, 'Abdülḥamīd approved the expulsion of the *müşîr* not only from "Syria" but from the army as well.[51]

'Abdülḥamīd trusted Ḥamdī Paşa's wisdom, and he must have realized the adverse effects of an open conflict between the *müşîr* and the governor. Nevertheless, Ḥamdī was not allowed to resort to regular troops in settling local disputes. Neither was his successor Rāşid Nāşid Paşa granted the permission he sought in December 1887 to order a large force into the Cebel-i Drūz in Ḥawrān "in order to quell and correct its leading shaykhs who ... [kept] the common folk in serfdom and use[d] them as tools of avaricious and mischievous intentions".[52] Instead, Rāşid Nāşid was replaced. His successor, Nāfiẓ Paşa was reminded of the diplomatic sensitivity of the area and the necessity to adhere to conciliatory measures. Nāfiẓ Paşa acknowledged that

> recourse to military might must be avoided, because it should be the endmost remedy in internal affairs, and because the alteration of the lawful or unlawful ways of self-rule that took root among uncivilized people through centuries cannot be altered all at once before the appearance of a natural disposition among them in that direction.[53]

In the fall of 1889, however, 'Abdülḥamīd allowed the use of a sizable military unit in the coordinated action by Governor Nāfiẓ Paşa and the *müşîr* to consolidate authority in the Cebel-i Drūz. The conditions had changed. The common Druze folk (*'avām*) and the shaykhs were involved in a self-destructive struggle against one another over the control and ownership of land that had been developed for cultivation during the previous twenty-five years. Both parties filed petitions asking for intervention by the authorities, militarily if necessary. The *'avām* asked for the government's support to shake off the yoke of the shaykhs. The shaykhs and notables desired to have their possessions lawfully registered and put under government protection. After several meetings with the notables and the representatives of the *'avām*, a careful inquiry into the integrity of the parties, and having checked that there was no foreign intrigue, the governor and the *müşîr* decided that it was timely to implement some reforms in the Cebel-i Drūz. The Council of Ministers agreed and advised the Palace to approve the joint request by the *müşîr* and the governor for two infantry battalions, one cavalry regiment, and a battery of cannon to be ordered to Ḥawrān to supplement the troops already garrisoned there. 'Abdülḥamīd ratified the scheme.[54]

All the incidents mentioned above make clear the critical importance that 'Abdülḥamīd attributed to the consent of local leaders in the settlement of problems. Reconciliation, not coercion dominated 'Abdülḥamīd's style of administration in the Arab provinces. The foremost priorities of the sultan's Arab policy were to reinforce the Islamic foundations of the state and to keep the area free from foreign intervention. Only then would it be possible to consolidate the government's authority. Cooperation with local leaders or at

least their neutralization intersected these three objectives, for it was deemed essential for the success of all.[55]

Conclusion

At the time of 'Abdülḥamīd's ascent to the throne, the attempts by the *Tanẓīmāt* statesmen to fuse the various ethnic and religious communities in Ottoman lands into one people had come to be deemed impractical and detrimental by a large number of people in the Ottoman ruling elite. Instead, a reemphasis of the Islamic foundations was advocated as a viable basis for social and political solidarity. The renewed concern for Islam converged with the desire to compensate for territorial losses and directed the sultan's attention to the Arab provinces and his Arab subjects.

His reign witnessed the extension of the public school system into Arab provinces. While Islam and loyalty to the Sultanate were emphasized in these schools as common bonds between Arabs and Turks, the availability of educational opportunities facilitated the employment of Arabs in large numbers at all levels and branches of administration. Furthermore, a systematic propaganda was conducted to win the support of the Arabs through Ṣūfī shaykhs and other religious leaders,[56] and a deliberate attempt was made to establish and maintain good relations with local leaders in Arab lands. Although not discussed in detail in the present article, it must also be taken into consideration that all these efforts to incorporate the Arabs more effectively into the Ottoman system were supplemented by commendable efforts to improve the administration, security services and the dispensation of justice,[57] as well as communications.

Of the railroads built during 'Abdülḥamīd's reign, 47.3 percent (2,350 kilometers) were in Syria and the Hijaz.[58] Similar statistics about highway construction are unavailable, but it is instructive to note that virtually all the highways that existed in "Syria" before the French Mandate were constructed during 'Abdülḥamīd II's reign.[59] The same period also witnessed the building of a modern port in Beirut, and the electrirification and development of waterworks and city transportation in the major Arab cities, as well as the construction of the Hindiyya barrage in Iraq. In addition, the postal services were greatly improved and telegraph lines were extended to the remotest corners of the Empire.[60] Given the meager resources available to the government,[61] these developments were no mean achievement even if they left much to be desired and were essentially concentrated in the region of Syria.

There can be little doubt of the genuineness of 'Abdülḥamīd's efforts to incorporate his Arab subjects into the Ottoman system by enlisting their loyalty and active support. As such, his problem was to create a united and therefore a strong state.[62] His approach to the problem, however, suffered from a number of shortcomings. The overwhelming majority of the Arabs as well as of the Ottoman population were Muslims. Yet, a common belief in Islam was

insufficient to compensate for the disparities in language, social organization, economic interests, political tradition and even religious outlook that existed between the various socioeconomic and ethnic groups.[63] Moreover, the cultural and political influences emanating from the well educated and economically powerful Christian communities who enjoyed European protection[64] further complicated the problem of unification. Add to these the disastrous state of Ottoman finances and the frustrating vulnerability of the government to Western pressure, or rather, the ultimate failure of the Ottomans to overcome the problems that marked the opening years of 'Abdülḥamīd's reign,[65] then it can be argued that the sultan had set himself an unattainable goal.

'Abdülḥamīd's concern to maintain good relations with local leaders was in fact an acknowledgment of and a pragmatic approach to the problems encountered by the central government in consolidating a diverse population. Yet, to the end, 'Abdülḥamīd's relationship with local leaders resembled that between a patron and his clients, and lacked any real institutional basis. This inability to establish institutional mechanisms for the reconciliation of conflicting material and ideological interests of the diverse elements in Ottoman polity and society wiped out whatever hopes remained of unifying the Ottoman state, with Arabs as an integral element in it.

'Abdülḥamīd himself was dethroned in 1909. His Unionist (*İttiḥādcı*) successors pursued an increasingly coercive and nationalistic (Turkish) provincial policy. The Arab reaction to this policy together with European rivalries molded the future of the Arab provinces.

Notes

• I would like to express my gratitude to the Boğaziçi University Research Center for the partial financing of the research.

1 For a general survey of the problems of 'Abdülḥamīd II's reign and their origins see my unpublished Ph.D. thesis "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics", Princeton University (1976).

2 E.D. Akarlı, "Ottoman Population in Europe in the 19th Century", unpublished M.A. thesis, The University of Wisconsin, Madison (1972).

3 P.M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent* (Ithaca, 1966), pp. 231-254.

4 Başbakanlık Arşivi Yıldız Esas Evrakı (YEE, hereonwards): 18/1867/93/39 (March 1878), from Damascus to the Palace. Cf. 'Abdülḥamīd's more general but similar remarks: YEE: 9/2010/72/4. Also see 'Oṣmān Nūrī, *'Abdülḥamīd-i Ṣānī ve Devr-i Salṭanatı* (Istanbul, 1327/1909), vol. 3, p. 948.

5 See, e.g., the case of "Syria" (i.e. Damascus and its environs) in 'Abd al-'Azīz Muḥammad 'Awaḍ, *al-Idāra al-'uthmaniyya fī wilāyat Sūriyya, 1864-1914* (Cairo, 1969), pp. 214-221. See also *Iḥṣā'iyāt-ı Māliye, 1325-1327* (istanbul: Māliye Naẓāreti, 1326-27/1910-11), 3 vols.

6 See, e.g., Shimon Shamir, who bases his argument on a single budget of "Syria", "Modernization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Period of Abdülḥamīd", in W.R. Polk and R.C. Chambers (eds.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, the 19th Century* (Chicago, 1968), p. 351.

7 The operation of Ottoman finances and economy should be approached in an analytical

frame of mind as suggested by C. Keyder, "Ottoman Economy and Finances, 1881-1918", in O. Okyar and H. Inalcık (eds.), *Social and Economic History of Turkey, 1071-1920* (Ankara, 1980), pp. 323-328.

8 Throughout this article, the term "Ottomans" is used in a technical sense, denoting the Ottoman political elite. See, E.D. Akarlı, "Friction and Discord within the Ottoman Government under Abdulhamid II", *Boğaziçi University Journal*, Humanities, 7 (1979), p. 22, n2.

9 See B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1968), pp. 123-124, 323ff., 340-343, and Stephan Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia", *Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 2 (May 1973), pp. 139-155.

10 YEE: 11/1325/120/5 (Oct. 1896). For a case in point see the sultan's refusal to punish the governor of Aleppo: IRADE, Meclis-i Mahsûs, 2875/1 (March 1879).

11 For 'Abdülḥamīd's views on the causes of foreign intervention see, particularly, YEE: 9/2638/72/4 (c. 1880); YEE: I/156-XXV/156/3 (April 1895), and YEE: 9/2006/72/4 (c. April 1894). These as well as some other major memoranda of 'Abdülḥamīd that are preserved among Yıldız documents are available in A. Çetin and R. Yıldız (eds.), *Abdulhamid: Devlet ve Memleket Görüşmerim* (Istanbul, 1976).

12 YEE: 9/2006/72/4 (April 1894).

13 YEE: I/156-XXVI/156/3 (no date).

14 YEE: 9/2006/72/4 (c. April 1894).

15 YEE: I/165/XXXVIII/156/3 (Nov. 1903).

16 YEE: 9/2008/72/4 (Feb. 1888).

17 In addition to the documents mentioned in footnotes 11-16, see YEE: 9/2610/72/4 (c. 1904), and YEE: 8/1842/77/3 (June, 1895).

18 E.D. Akarlı, "Abdulhamid's Islamic Policy in the Arab Provinces", *Türk-Arap İlişkileri: Geçmişte, Bugün ve Gelecekte* (Ankara, 1979), p. 59. The Arabs constituted about 16 percent of the population, excluding the Arabian Peninsula, Tripolitania and Crete, and the Turks about 45 percent. With the inclusion of these places, on the basis of the rough estimates provided by Vedat Elden (*Osmanlı Imparatorluğu'nun Iktisadî Şartları Hakkında bir Tetkik* [Ankara, 1970], pp. 52-58), the Arabs' share in the total population would be around 30 percent, and that of the Turks around 35 percent.

19 YEE: 18/1858/93/39, c. 1878-1881, but most probably in 1881 when some anti-Turkish handbills appeared in Syria. For copies of this handbill and its translation presented to the sultan see YEE: 18/94-26/94/44. For the English translation and Arabic original see J.M. Landau, "An Arab Anti-Turkish Handbill, 1881", *Turcica*, no. 1 (1977), pp. 215-222.

20 See the Ottoman Yearbooks (*Sālnāme-i Devlet-i 'Aliye-i 'Oṣmāniye*); Enver Z. Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 8 (Ankara, 1962), pp. 331, 335; 'Oṣmān Nūrı, vol. 2, pp. 521-522; A.L. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria* (Edinburgh, 1969), p. 179, and IRADE, Dahiliye, 60447.

21 YEE: 9/2006/72 (c. April 1894); YEE: 18/417/3/40 (Dec. 1880). Throughout this article, "Syria" will denote the *Vilâyet-i Şûriye*.

22 M.K. Inal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrıazamlar* (Istanbul, 1940-53), pp. 946-951; Akarlı, "Friction and Discord", BÜD (1979), pp. 5-11.

23 Memoirs of 'Āṭıf Ḥüseyin, 'Abdülḥamīd's doctor. Manuscript preserved in Türk Tarih Kurumu Library, no. Y-255, defter 11, p. 179. Also note that Cevdet Paşa wrote his "*Ma'rūżāt*" (*Türk Tārīḫ Encümeni Mecmū'ası*, 1926) upon the sultan's request. For Cevdet's influence on 'Abdülḥamīd's Arab policy also see, e.g., YEE: 35/439/122/105, defter 2, pp. 27-29, 41-43; YEE: 31/27-8/27/79, and Butrus Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)" *Asian and African Studies*, 9 (1979), p. 5.

24 Karal, vol. 8, p. 544; Tahsin Paşa, *Abdulhamid: Yıldız Hâtıraları* (Istanbul, 1931), pp. 23, 136-138; and S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, 1977), vol. 2, p. 214. Shaw's statement about 'Izzet's grand vezirate is incorrect.

25 Butrus Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi", *Middle East Studies*, 15, no. 2 (May, 1975), pp. 131-153.

26 On these and other important Arab personages see Kural, vol. 8. pp. 544-545; 'Oşmān Nūrī, vol. 2, pp. 501-506, and Dawn and Roded in the present volume.

27 Dawn in this volume and also his *From Ottomanism to Arabism* (Urbana, 1973), pp. 170-171.

28 M.K. Inal, pp. 1869-92, and W.L. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist; Sati al-Husri* (Princeton, 1971).

29 B. Kodaman, *Abdulhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi* (Istanbul, 1980), pp. 117, 141-142, 202, 223-224; idem, "Tanzimattan II. Meşrutiyete Kadar Sanayi Mektepleri", in Okyar and Inalcik, pp. 287-295; Shaw and Shaw, pp. 182, 249; Tibawi, 195; S. Shamir, p. 376; *1301 Sūriye Vilāyeti Sālnāmesi*, p. 123; and YEE: 18/417/3/40, vol. 18, deste 11. evrak (21 Ra 300), p. 2. There were over 1500 *uşūl-ı 'atīka şıbyān* schools in the regions of Iraq and Syria (Kodaman, pp. 141-142).

30 Kodaman, p. 237; Tibawi, p. 195.

31 Tibawi, p. 195; Shaw and Shaw, pp. 249-251, 112-113, and F.W. Frey, "Education: Turkey", in R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow (eds.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, 1964), pp. 215-216.

32 Kodaman, pp. 143-145, 177, 186, 206-209, 227.

33 IRADE, Meclis-i Mahsûs, 5641; Regulations: Annex 3. Also see Maḥmūd Cevād, *Ma'ārif-i 'Umūmiye Nazēreti: Tarihçe-i Teşkīlāt ve Icrā'āti* (Istanbul, 1338), pp. 338-341. Shaw and Shaw assert that the *'Aşīret Mektebi* was organized to train native Turcoman and Kurdish officers (p. 246). That this is an erroneous statement and for further information on this school see YEE: 31/114, 115, 116, 117/76/139; YEE: 36/140-80/140/XXIII and YEE: 31/76-11/76/81. The school was discontinued in 1907 supposedly due to an uprising of the students because they did not like the meals, but probably because it failed to achieve its purpose. O.N. Ergin, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi*, vol. 3 (Istanbul, 1940), p. 980.
In addition to the tribal youth trained in the *'Aşīret Mektebi*, the sons of the chieftains of some Yemenite tribes were offered in the War Academy in Istanbul a condensed program to be trained as officers (YEE: 31/115/76/139, document 4), while the sons of the Amirs of Mecca attended the Palace School for the Imperial Family (*Şehzādegān Mektebi*) (TTK Lib, Y-255, defter 11, p. 218, 'A. Ḥüseyin's notes).

34 YEE: 1/165-XXXVIII/156/3 (Nov. 1902); YEE: 9/2610/72/4 (c. 1904).

35 Tahsin Paşa, pp. 150-151.

36 Tahsin Paşa, pp. 106-107, 150-151; Sa'īd Paşa, *Sa'id Paşa'nın Ḥāṭırātı* (Istanbul, 1328), vol. 2, pp. 314-316; Tibawi, p. 183; and YEE: 31/1936 mük./45/82 (July 1908).

37 Tahsin Paşa, p. 31.

38 Abu-Manneh, "Abulhuda", pp. 138-140.

39 Abu-Manneh, "Sharifs of Mecca", pp. 1-21.

40 YEE:18/417/3/40, deste 6, documents dating 8-13 Temmuz and 3-5 Eylūl 1298 (June 20-25, Sept. 15-17, 1882). For 'Abd al-Ḳādir's life before his emigration to "Syria" see Raphael Danziger, *Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation* (New York, 1977).

41 See below and Tahsin Paşa, pp. 158-159. For 'Abdülḥamīd's general dislike of the use of brute force see Akarlı, "Problems", pp. 71-73. First-hand data on 'Abdülḥamīd nullifies the legacy which casts him as a reactionary autocrat with genocidal tendencies.

42 YEE: 18/1867/93/33 (March 1878); YEE: 18/533-61 and 76/93/39 (March 1878). Also see 18/553-210/93/35 (c. 1878).

43 YEE: 18/553-328/93/36 (May 1878). Also see YEE: 18/553-249/93/35 (Aug. 1878).

44 Shamir, pp. 354-355, and 367-370. In addition to the documents mentioned by Shamir also see YEE: 31/1056/62/79. That the *müşīr* had a point in denying Midḥat the support he demanded see the conditions in Ḥawrān described by British Vice-Consul Jago: PRO, FO 78/2985 x/j 5056, Sept. 1979.

45 'Abdulhamid, *Hâtıra defteri*, Bozdağ edition (Istanbul; Selek 1960), pp. 111-124, esp. 114, and YEE: 9/1820/72/4 (c. 1893), pp. 4-5.

46 See YEE: 24/150/162/VIII defter 12, pp. 84-86; defter 8, pp. 73, 100-104; YEE: 31/1001/62/79. For the diplomatic problems involved see Akarlı, "Problems", pp. 30-40. That 'Abdülḥamīd had a program of reform see S.J. Shaw, "A Promise of Reform",

IJMES, 4 (1973), pp. 359-365, and Shaw and Shaw, pp. 221ff.

47 Shamir, p. 372.

48 See the reports by Jago and Dickson, PRO, FO 78/3130. For the final months of Midḥat's governorship see Shamir, "Midhat Pasha and the Anti-Turkish Agitation in Syria", *Middle Eastern Studies* 10/2 (May 1974), pp. 115-141, esp. p. 117. In addition to the documents mentioned by Shamir see YEE: 18/1604/3/40 (Sept. 1880).

49 YEE: 18/1604/3/40 (Sept. 1880).

50 IRADE, Dahiliye, 67679 (Dec. 1881); YEE: 18/417/3/40, deste 4, 23 ka. sa. 300 (Feb. 1885); IRADE, Meclis-i Mahsûs, 3936, 22 M 305 (Oct. 1887). The road was completed in 1880, 'Awaḍ, 274.

51 YEE: 18/417/3/40, deste 4, documents dating 2 ka. ev. 1299, 26 Tes. sa, 23-27 da. sa. and 19 Şubat, 1300, and 18 Mart, 3-28 Mayıs 1301 (Dec. 1883, Nov. 1884, Feb.-June 1885).

52 Communications summarized in IRADE, Meclis-i Mahsûs, 4607, annex 2.

53 *Ibid.*

54 *Ibid.*, annexes 1-9. In Ḥawrān the Druzes worried the Ottomans most. Still, the Ottomans were concerned over enlisting the support of the Druzes for some complicated reasons that will be discussed in a forthcoming study on the Cebel-i Lübnân. The Ottomans made use of Druze auxiliary troops in keeping order in Ḥawrān. 'Abdülḥamîd even considered creating Druze cavalry regiments similar to the Ḥamîdiye Kurdish regiments. See YILDIZ, Parâkende, no. 1306, 3 L 310 (1893).

55 For similar findings in the case of Eastern Anatolian provinces see Duguid, pp. 139-155. Also see W.M. Ramsay, "The Intermixture of Races in Asia Minor: Some of its Causes and Effects", *Proceedings of the British Academy* (1915-1916), p. 409.

56 Abu-Manneh, "Abulhuda", p. 139.

57 For a general assessment see Shaw and Shaw, pp. 238-254. Archival documents indicating the importance attributed to improving the juridical, security and administrative services are numerous. In addition to the documents already mentioned above, see, e.g., IRADE, Meclis-i Mahsûs, 3936 (Oct. 1887); IRADE, Meclis-i Mahsûs, 2988 (Aug. 1879); YEE: 24/150/162/VIII-9 (Aug. 1979); IRADE, Meclis-i Mahsûs, 3295, (June 1882).

58 Eldem, pp. 156-161; and Charles Issawi (ed.), *The Economic History of the Middle East* (Chicago, 1966), pp. 91-93.

59 'Awaḍ, pp. 273-275.

60 Issawi, pp. 182, 191, 207, 210, 288, 299-300; Eldem, pp. 170-175; and Shaw and Shaw, pp. 228-230. Also see IRADE, Şûrâ-yı Devlet, 1552 (Sept. 1876), and IRADE, Meclis-i Mahsûs, 3838 (March 1887).

61 Akarlı, "Problems", ch. 3.

62 See Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, 1975), esp. his introductory chapter, pp. 43-44, and 77-80, showing that it is theoretically possible to homogenize a diversified population provided that the necessary conditions exist. Also see J.R. Strayer, *Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History* (Princeton, 1971), pp. 341-348.

63 For some differences in political tradition see E. Akarlı and G. Ben-Dor (eds.), *Political Participation in Turkey* (Istanbul, 1975), editors' conclusion, pp. 157-162. 'Abdülḥamîd's religious propaganda was partially directed to eliminate different interpretations of Islam, see Abu-Manneh, "Abulhuda", pp. 140-146; also see 'Āṭıf Ḥuseyin's notes, TTK Lib. Y-255, 9, pp. 55-56. For a discussion of some of the factors of disunity see Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, pp. 185ff. The Ottomans were fully aware of these discrepancies and of the necessity to develop alternative administrative plans and policies. See, e.g., Midḥat Paşa, YEE: 31/966/62/79, and 24/150/162/VIII, 8 (1879); Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, IV (Ankara, 1967), pp. 99-100, and *passim*; 'Abdülḥamîd, YEE: 9/2006/72/4, YEE: 9/1122/72/4, and *Hâtıra Defteri*, (Selek), pp. 141-142.

64 The Maronite community in Beirut and the Cebel-i Lübnân was particularly important in this respect.

65 Akarlı, "Problems", conclusion.

Society and Economy

The Ḥusaynīs: The Rise of a Notable Family in 18th Century Palestine*

BUTRUS ABU-MANNEH

It was in the 18th century, perhaps in a more definite way than before, that notable families from among the local Muslim population started to rise in the towns of Ottoman Palestine and to enjoy locally various degrees of power. This was due, among other things, to the weakness of the central government and also to the spread of the custom that official positions passed by inheritance from father to son or to the nearest kin. In some letters of nomination that go back to the late 18th century the following phrase is mentioned: "especially that it is the function of your father and grandfather (*siyyamā wa-hiya waẓīfat abīka wa-jaddika*)".[1] In a letter by the *ḳāḍī* to the *mutawallī* (trustee) of the waḳf of the Dome of the Rock mosque, upon the death of a certain functionary of this mosque, called 'Abdallāh al-Mallāḥ, it is said that "his functions have become free... [consequently] they pass to his uncle, and that is according to the exalted order (*al-amr al-'ālī*), that if a functionary from among the inhabitants of Jerusalem dies leaving no son, his functions should pass to his nearest kin because he deserves that more than the stranger and this [emphasises the *ḳāḍī*] is in accordance with the sultanic order and the special *'urf*".[2]

Following the implementation of this rule important functions and offices remained in the same family for a number of generations and consequently those families acquired influence, wealth and power and thus rose to the status of notable families.[3] One of the families which illustrates this process is the Ḥusaynī family of Jerusalem.

My interest in this family was aroused when one of its members living presently in Jerusalem showed me a box of old papers. To my astonishment the papers included many documents and private letters many of which date back to the late 18th century. They shed light on the first and as yet unknown phase of family's rise, which, as is well known, was the leading notable family in Palestine in the last quarter of the 19th century and the first half of the present century. This study is based on those documents and supplemented substantially by the Jerusalem *Sharī'a* court records.

Our ignorance of the early history of this family is due first of all to the fact that the Damascene historian 'Abd al-Razzāḳ al-Bīṭār, the author of the collection of biographies of the *a'yān* of the Muslim world in the 13th Muslim century (corresponding to the 19th century) failed to mention any of them for no apparent reason.[4] In fact Bīṭār included no biography of anyone from

Jerusalem except a half page on Shaykh Muḥammad Budayr, a locally famous *'ālim* who died in 1220/1805.[5] But he did write several biographies of the Dajānī family from the Jaffa branch[6] in spite of the fact that they did not enjoy equal status with a number of *a'yān* families in Jerusalem.

It is a common tradition among the members of the Ḥusaynī family that they regard Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf b. 'Abdallāh b. 'Abd al-Laṭīf (d. 1775) as the founding father of their house. Indeed all those who carried the name Ḥusaynī and who performed the functions of *muftī, naḳīb al-ashrāf* or *shaykh al-ḥaram* from about the last quarter of the 18th century until the 20th, or those who held administrative functions in the later phase, such as mayor of Jerusalem, were his descendants.[7]

There exists a biography of Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf in the collection of biographies of notables in Jerusalem in the 12th Muslim century (approximately 18th century) which was collected by his son Shaykh Ḥasan.[8] A second biography is found in *Silk al-Durar*, the collection of biographies of the 12th/18th century notables of the Muslim world written by Khalīl al-Murādī, the *muftī* of Damascus (d. 1791).[9] Murādī, who knew Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf personally based his biography of him on the one included in Shaykh Ḥasan's collection, and on his personal knowledge. The biography in *Silk al-Durar* is the better of the two. It is not only more detailed but was also written with perspective by a knowledgeable person at the center of the province.

It is interesting that Murādī used his first name, "Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf". He gave him no family name. Neither is the family name of Ḥusaynī mentioned in the text. Murādī also produced a biography of 'Abd al-Laṭīf's father, giving him the family name of "al-Ḳudsī."[10] Moreover, even his son Ḥasan, in his collection written in 1781,[11] did not give him the family name of Ḥusaynī. Even Ḥasan referred to himself simply as Ḥasan b. 'Abd al-Laṭīf. Thus, the surname Ḥusaynī was not in common use at that phase and seems only to have been emphasized later on. However, Murādī preceded the name 'Abd al-Laṭīf by the title "Sayyid." This title usually precedes the names of those who belong to the descendants of the Prophet.

Indeed Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf belonged to a well-established family in Jerusalem. His father, 'Abdallāh was *shaykh al-ḥaram*, the superintendent of the affairs of the two holy sanctuaries in Jerusalem, the Dome of the Rock and the Aḳṣā mosques. His grandfather was *naḳīb al-ashrāf*, a post whose importance and functions will be discussed later.[12] He himself inherited his father's function and succeeded to his grandfather's post and served in both of them simultaneously. Among the papers mentioned above, there is a letter of nomination to the post of *naḳīb* issued by the chief *naḳīb al-ashrāf* in Istanbul. It is dated Muḥarram 1158/Feb. 1745.[13]

Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf did not simply fill two leading posts in the city. It is apparent from the accounts by Murādī and Shaykh Ḥasan, that he was a very remarkable man, with a powerful personality. Such qualities in a man filling those posts gave him a power unrivalled by any other local notable in the city.

Thus in spite of the bias of Murādī favor of Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf he perhaps was not exaggerating in describing him as "the head of Jerusalem and its most prominent notable (*ra'īsuhā wa-'ayn a'yānihā*)".[14] He enjoyed such powers that Murādī believed nothing was done in Jerusalem without his approval.[15]

Indeed, it appears that this man, who had good connections both in Damascus the capital of the province,[16] and in Istanbul,[17] and who apparently was aware of what was taking place in the Ottoman Empire during his time, was determined not to let slip the opportunity to establish a power base in Jerusalem for himself and for his sons after him.[18] Both oral and written material bear witness to his success in achieving that. At the end of his life he quarreled with 'Oṣmān Paṣa, the governor of Damascus, who ordered him to confine himself to his own mansion[19] which he did as long as 'Oṣmān Paṣa was in office. However, he remained in his positions which were administered in effect by his elder son 'Abdallāh.

Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf died in 1188/1775[20] leaving four sons, 'Abdallāh in whose family the *niḳāba* stayed for a long time, Ḥasan, who became *muftī* (jurisconsult), 'Abd al-Ṣamad into whose line the *iftā* passed, as will be seen, and Muṣṭafā. 'Abdallāh inherited his father's two posts, that of *naḳīb al-ashrāf* (hereafter *naḳīb*) and of *shaykh al-ḥaram*, and when some years later Ḥasan became the Ḥanafī *muftī* of Jerusalem, the family held three most important offices in the city. Another equally important post — that of the *baṣkātib* — the chief clerk of the *Sharī'a* court — was held by a member of the Khālidī family, an office which also passed from generation to generation from about mid-18th century onwards.[21]

Indeed, the post of *muftī* of Jerusalem was held throughout the 18th century by a number of *'ulemā* of various Jerusalem families[22] including two who were born outside the city or even outside Palestine.[23] But when it reached Shaykh Ḥasan, it stayed in the Ḥusaynī family for six successive generations and even when this post declined in importance following the *Tanẓīmāt* reforms and the modernization of government institutions, its occupant kept his social and political prominence in the city through additional means.

Little is known about 'Abdallāh b. 'Abd al-Laṭīf. No papers that belong to him are found in the collection mentioned above. His brother Ḥasan had very little to say about him in his *Tarājim*.[24] It appears that he held his two offices for about two decades. After his death in the mid-1790s, his elder son 'Abd al-Laṭīf succeeded him as *naḳīb*,[25] while Shaykh Ḥasan had himself appointed to the post of *shaykh al-ḥaram* in addition to that of *muftī*. After four months 'Abd al-Laṭīf died and was followed in the *niḳāba* by his brother 'Abd al-Salām.[26] But two and a half months later, he also died.[27] Consequently Shaykh Ḥasan added to his two offices the third one until 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Salām, a mere boy at that time, became old enough (about four years later) to be given the *niḳāba*. It should be added that 'Umar was a grandson of Shaykh Ḥasan through his daughter.

At no other time in the 18th century were those three offices held by one and

the same person in spite of many contenders from rival families as will be seen. It is no doubt a sign of the predominance that this family enjoyed in Jerusalem at the time, and of the proper connections which it established both in Damascus and in Istanbul. Indeed the process for the nomination of somebody to a public function at this time was in itself a sign of this predominance.

We have seen that public functions passed in Jerusalem at this time from father to son, but this was not done without certain official procedures or the granting of final confirmation from Istanbul, at least in regard to the higher offices. As we learn from the *Shari'a* court records pertaining to the cases just mentioned, when the need arose to appoint a candidate to the office of *naḳīb*, it was the *ḳāḍī* at the place who appointed him, upon local application. This was done without much delay so as not to leave the post vacant. But the *ḳāḍī's* appointment was temporary and subject to confirmation by the *vālī* and the final confirmation of the appropriate authority in Istanbul (in our case the chief *naḳīb al-ashrāf*). It is interesting to note here the phrase written in the *ḳāḍī's* letter concerning the appointment of both 'Abd al-Salām and Shaykh Ḥasan to the *niḳāba*: "The notables of the people of Jerusalem among whom were *'ulemā*, *sharīfs*, and dignitaries appeared before us and chose you (*ikhtārūka*) to be the ... *naḳīb al-ashrāf* in Jerusalem".[28]

In other words, though it was accepted that the post should remain in the same family, still a certain procedure was observed perhaps to show that the new incumbent enjoyed public support. Moreover, the *naḳīb* was "chosen" not by the descendants of the prophet, the doyen of whom he was and whom he was supposed to represent, but by the notables and dignitaries of the city. We learn moreover that the decision to appoint the *naḳīb* was the prerogative of the *ḳāḍī* and not of the governor (*mütesellim*), even though he was, it seems, one of the applicants. It is interesting to note as well that a similar practice had taken place for the appointment of a *muftī* to succeed Shaykh Ḥasan, on his death in 1809.[29]

It appears that for the city notables there was an immediate personal interest as to who would occupy the post of *naḳīb* (or other public function as that of *muftī*) apparently because of the prerogatives and duties that this office furnished to the occupant. From the letters of appointment that were sent by the head *naḳīb* in Istanbul to the occupants of the post in Jerusalem or Jaffa or Lydda, we learn that the *naḳīb* was entrusted with responsibility for the *sharīfs*. He had to protect them from actions harmful to their honor or property (*'irż ve-māl*). He was enjoined, moreover, to work to safeguard their legal rights and to guard against any interference in their affairs by the *ḳāḍīs*.[30] (This is a reference to the rule that *sharīfs* "could be tried and punished... only by other members of their clan...").[31]

Above all he was warned to be on watch for those who might establish a claim to be of *sharīf*ian descent upon a title deed (*sanad*) and who might wear the green turban of *ḳāḍīs* and local *naḳībs*. Apparently this was regarded as a malpractice and the local *naḳīb* was ordered to prevent it and to avoid doing it

himself. He had to refer such claims to the chief *naḳīb* in Istanbul,[32] an indication that the latter wanted to keep them under his control.

However, *sharīfs* were not a closed caste. They were allowed to marry non-*sharīfs* and vice-versa. It was apparently possible to achieve such honorable status from either father's or mother's side. The result was that the number of people claiming to be of *sharīfian* descent greatly increased and they were dispersed among all social classes.[33] In other words the *naḳīb al-ashrāf* stood at the head of one group of the city's population and protected its prerogatives and interests. But like other public functionaries the *naḳīb* was at the same time part of the city's governing system. Being one of the leading notables his name was mentioned in third place in official edicts directed to the *sancak*, after the names of the *ḳāḍī* and the *muftī* but before the name of the *mütesellim*[34] (the governor).

On many occasions the authorities sought his advice and help in matters beyond the scope of his normal duties. A number of letters in the above-mentioned collection illustrate this. For instance the *ketḫudā* (lieutenant) of the *vālī* of Damascus sent a letter in 1776, enclosing the lists of the *jizya* (poll-tax) levied on non-Muslims in Jerusalem, to 'Abdallāh, the *naḳīb*, requesting his help to collect it. A letter giving information about the nomination of the *vālī* (1790) asked him to have the letter read in public. In another letter (1798), the *naḳīb* was asked to assist in the collection of taxes from the Banū Ḥasan tribe in the vicinity of Jerusalem, after it had broken its promise to pay. Evidently, the *naḳīb* was one of the pillars of the government in Jerusalem at that period and enjoyed much influence both among the people of the city and in government circles. But it is difficult to decide whether or not this influence was limited to Jerusalem itself or extended to other towns, especially as the appointment to the post according to the edicts found among the collection of papers or registered in the *Sharī'a* records, extended beyond Jerusalem or even its *sancak*. Thus the appointment of Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf to the *niḳāba* (1745) included not only the city of Jerusalem but also the towns of Nablus, Gaza, Ramle and Jenin.[35] In the appointment of his grandson and namesake 'Abd al-Laṭīf b. 'Abdallāh the same towns were cited.[36] In the letter of nomination of 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Salām (1800) sent by the *vālī* of Damascus[37] the same towns were mentioned excluding Jenin but adding Jaffa and Lydda: "Jerusalem and its dependencies Gaza, Ramle, Jaffa, Lydda and Nablus according to the old custom and the correct rules".

It is not known whether the *naḳīb* of Jerusalem had any authority practical or moral over the *ashrāf* of those towns. It seems unlikely because those towns had their own *naḳībs*. It is possible that the *naḳīb* of Jerusalem's appointment was coextensive with the Ottoman *ḳāḍī* of Jerusalem's region of jurisdiction; but unlike the *ḳāḍī*, the *naḳīb* had no practical authority in those towns. However, towards the end of the century younger members of the Ḥusaynī family were appointed *naḳībs* of Jaffa and Lydda and thus fell under the direct influence of the elder *naḳīb* of Jerusalem.[38]

The growing power and influence of the Ḥusaynīs in Jerusalem throughout the second half of the 18th century, predictably aroused resentment in other families which resulted in a fierce competition between them. This was perhaps not uncommon among a small number of families living off the limited resources which a town like Jerusalem in the 18th century could have provided. This rivalry was pursued in Damascus and especially in Istanbul. In the collection of papers mentioned above there are several letters from the family's agent in Istanbul, in which he related the activities of Jerusalemites who had gone to the capital to further their own interests and he described the steps taken to counter their intrigues.

In order to confront their enemies, the Ḥusaynīs worked to broaden their power base. First they established "alliance" through marriage, not only with local families like the Jammā'īs[39] in Jerusalem, but according to the *Sharī'a* records a Ḥusaynī bride was married to Mūsā Ṭūqān of Nablus — a powerful figure who served for a while as governor of that town — and a woman in his family became a Ḥusaynī's bride.[40]

Another means was to create friendly relations with notable families in Damascus as they did with the Murādīs[41] or to establish closer contacts with the *vālīs*. One or two papers in the collection indicate that the Ḥusaynīs probably had good relations with Jezzār Paşa, the *vālī* of Acre. It is more certain however that they enjoyed a close relationship with Yūsuf Kanj Paşa, the *vālī* of Damascus (1807-1810), as is apparent from his very friendly edict confirming the nomination (1809) of Ṭāhir b. 'Abd al-Ṣamad, a nephew of Shaykh Ḥasan to the post of *muftī*.[42]

However, the Ḥusaynīs resorted to other means as well. It is known that the nomination to the post of *naḳīb*, like other public functions, was annual. It also involved sending a present annually to the head *naḳīb al-ashrāf* in Istanbul.[43] One of the available documents contains the phrase "your customary present has arrived (*ber mu'tād hediyeniz vāṣıl olup*)".[44] But the Ḥusaynīs also used to send presents to many other prominent and influential people in Istanbul, apparently to gain friends in ruling circles. In the collection of papers, there is a document signed by Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf and addressed to his agent in Istanbul. It contains a list of 18 persons in the capital to whom boxes of soap (presumably the product of a soap factory which he owned in Jerusalem),[45] jars of rose water and cotton undercaps were presented.[46] It is undated but from some of the biographies of the recipients it is assumed that it goes back to the 7th decade of the 18th century. The list is headed by *şeyḫ ül-Islām* who received a box of soap, a jar of rose water and five undercaps. After him comes the *naḳīb al-ashrāf* to whom two boxes of soap, one jar of rose water and ten undercaps were given. The names of these two personalities are not cited, however. Most other recipients are named which suggests personal acquaintance. Some of them were former *ḳāḍīs* of Jerusalem or Damascus. Others were people attached to the palace like Meḥmed Ağa, the chief eunuch of the sultan's harem, or Mes'ūd Bey, a chamberlain in the palace.

Presumably the sending of such presents continued even if not every year. Among the papers is a letter sent by the agent in Istanbul dated 1205/1791 which sheds light on the motive for those presents. He wrote that he had distributed gifts according to the list, but that one present whose recipient had died meanwhile, he had given instead to 'Āshir Efendi "because he became acceptable in powerful circles". (It is known that Muṣṭafā 'Āshir Efendi, a prominent *'ālim*, was appointed at this time *ḳāḍī'asker* of Rumeli and later (1213/1798) became *şeyḫ ül-Islām*. This was during the reign of Sultan Selīm III.)[47] The same agent also wrote that he had presented another *'ālim* with half a box of soap because he was becoming close to the *şeyḫ ül-Islām*, Mekkī Efendi.

The recipients used to provide the agent with a letter confirming their receipt of the present. A number of those letters are found in the collection of papers. The earliest one comes from the chief eunuch of the palace, Ḫalīl Aġa, and is addressed to Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf and dated 1173/1759. The latest letter is dated 1211/1796 and was sent from the office of Yūsuf Aġa,[48] the influential *kethudā* (lieutenant) of Sultan Selīm's mother.

Those presents to the dignitaries of Istanbul perhaps secured more than a little support for the Ḥusaynīs in their efforts to entrench themselves in Jerusalem and to confront their local rivals. But such means were not enough, especially since this local rivalry developed into bitter strife in the last decade of the century. It was waged on the other side by no less a powerful figure than Shaykh Mūsā al-Khālidī,[49] a well-educated *'ālim* who, like the Ḥusaynīs, enjoyed strong connections in Istanbul. Less well-known figures who opposed the Ḥusaynīs came from such prominent families in 18th century Jerusalem as the Jā'ūnīs, the Ghāzzīs and others.[50] Indeed, it appears that at no previous time had relations between the families of Jerusalem been so tense.

In this struggle, the Ḥusaynīs seem to have worked to strengthen their ties with circles close to the Palace and to the sultan. The distribution of presents noted above demonstrates this. An additional means was perhaps the increased emphasis given from that time to the surname "Ḥusaynī". Being recognized as descendants of the prophet, they were entitled to such a family name as were a great many other families throughout the Muslim world. Until about the end of the 1780s it did not seem necessary to put it into common use. But thereafter it is used often and even emphasized. Indeed a family name as such became an asset and seems to have served the Ḥusaynīs well in their attempt to gain the support of Palace circles in their strife with their rivals. On the other hand, at a time when the Ottoman sultans were putting forward a claim to the supreme Caliphate of Islam, it was certainly useful for them to secure the allegiance of provincial families of recognized descent such as the Ḥusaynīs.

That the Ḥusaynīs were identified as supporters of Palace circles during Sultan Selīm III's reign (1789-1807) is suggested by an apparent connection between the events in Istanbul in the summer of 1806 and the subsequent temporary dismissal of Shaykh Ḥasan from the post of *muftī* and 'Umar from

the post of *naḳīb*.[51] It is known that after the Edirne event in mid-1806, Sultan Selīm retreated from his reforming policies in the face of his opponents among the Janissaries and a strong faction among the *'ulemā* led by Şerīfzāde 'Aṭāullāh Efendi came to dominate the Porte. 'Aṭāullāh Efendi became *şeyḫ ül-Islām* early in November 1806. A few weeks after that Ḥasan and 'Umar were dismissed. They were reinstated about a year later only after Yūsuf Kanj Paşa the *vālī* of Damascus (1807-1810) had intervened.[52]

If Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf can be regarded as the founding father of his family, Ḥasan succeeded in consolidating its power and improving its fortunes. He did that to such an extent that thereafter only outside forces were able to shake its position in Jerusalem.

As mentioned above, Ḥasan was already the Ḥanafī *muftī* of Jerusalem in 1781 and though he was later dismissed he was well established in the post from 1791. An autobiography of Shaykh Ḥasan exists in his book *Tarājim ahl al-Ḳuds*,[53] according to which he was born in Jerusalem in 1156/1743. He was educated by local *'ulemā*, a list of whom he gives in his autobiography. Among his teachers he also mentions Sayyid Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī (when the latter visited Jerusalem in 1169/1755-6). Jabartī says that Zabīdī composed a poem dedicated to Ḥasan.[54] Another teacher of his seems to have been Ṭaylasānīzāde 'Abdullāh Efendi of Istanbul who presumably taught him while he was serving in Jerusalem.[55] However, it is not clear from this biography whether Shaykh Ḥasan had studied elsewhere outside Jerusalem. Hence he seems to have been educated exclusively in Jerusalem.

As mentioned above Shaykh Ḥasan is the author of a collection of biographies of the notables of Jerusalem in the 18th century. He collected those biographies and edited them upon the application of Khalīl al-Murādī.[56] They served Murādī as a main source on Jerusalem for his well-known book *Silk al-Durar*.

Shaykh Ḥasan died in 1809. As his sons were still young,[57] his nephew Ṭāhir b. 'Abd al-Ṣamad succeeded to the post of *muftī*. To his other post of *shaykh al-ḥaram* was nominated his grandson 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Salām who from 1800 held the post of *naḳīb al-ashrāf*. Shaykh Ṭāhir appears to have been a man of learning.[58] He was appointed in 1227/1812 reader of al-Bukhārī's *al-Ṣaḥīḥ* and the supervisor of learning in the mosque of the Dome of the Rock.[59]

Shaykh Ṭāhir and Sayyid 'Umar represented the third generation of the family. They apparently followed the same policy as Shaykh Ḥasan and maintained their links with Palace circles during Sultan Maḥmūd II's period. In this way they preserved the power of the family in Jerusalem. But their fortunes were disrupted by the invasion of Ibrāhīm Paşa. In 1834, after the revolt in central Palestine against the *paşa* of Egypt, 'Umar and Ṭāhir along with two other notables of Jerusalem were invited to meet Muḥammad 'Alī in Jaffa, who sent them into exile in Egypt.[60] However, they were allowed to return two years later.[61] During the *Tanẓīmāt* period the family lost much influence in favor of the Khālidīs who supported the *Tanẓīmāt* reforms. But

with the rise of Sultan 'Abdülḥamīd II, the Ḥusaynīs restored their power and influence in Jerusalem and its *sancak*. Their position remained unchallenged by rivals until almost the end of that sultan's reign.

Document 1

The mainstay of the honorable *Sayyids*, Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf Efendi...

After... greetings, it is communicated that you are appointed by us *kā'imaḳām*[62] over the respected [and] honorable *sayyids* found in the districts of Jerusalem, Nablus, Gaza, Ramle and Jenin.

It is necessary that you [should] treat with respect and reverence those of correct genealogy. Beware to molest their honor or property undul... [torn in the text]. [You should] obtain [their] *Sharī'a* and permanent rights when the need arises. Do not allow other *ḳāḍīs* to interfere with or disturb the honorable *sayyids*. Do not take payments under the name of *'arūsiye*[63] or under any other pretext... [torn in the text]. You should be fully careful to restrain and prevent those who seek admission [to the ranks of the *sharīfs*] by a writ (*ḥujja*) of *ḳāḍīs* or title deeds of *ḳā'imaḳāms*. You [yourself] do not give permission to wear the green sign.[64] You should spare no effort to care for and protect as it is [your] duty this biggest deposit and greatest trust.

Written at the beginning of Muḥarram al-Ḥarām of the year 1158.

The humble al-Sayyid M. Zayn al-'Ābidīn,
al-naḳīb 'alā ashrāf al-Mamālik al-'Uthmāniyya.



Document 1

Document 2

The model of the illustrious *sayyids*, al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf Efendi...*

After... greetings, it is communicated [to you] that as from the beginning of Dhū'l-ḳa'da... of this year 1208, the office of *ḳā'imaḳām* over the honorable *sayyids* found in the district of Lydda continues with you as before... It is necessary that you show respect for the illustrious *sayyids*. Take care to prevent those who establish a claim for a *sharīf*ian descent and show the green sign, upon title deeds (*sanad*) of *ḳāḍīs* and *ḳā'imaḳāms*. You [should] also avoid [giving permission] to anybody to wear the green sign. You [should] refer to us those who claim *sharīf*ian genealogy [and apply for recognition]. [You should behave towards] this biggest trust with complete honesty. Do not take and do not let to be taken payments under the name of *tevcīhiye*[65] and *'arūsiye* and other disapproved innovations. Along with [your] using every effort for the protection of their honor and property, [you should] procure the beneficial prayers of the honorable *sayyids* for the duration of the life and reign of the... *pādiṣāh* of Islam. You should follow in every matter the exalted *Shar'*...

The humble al-Sayyid M. Darwīsh
al-Ḥusaynī, *al-naḳīb 'alā al-ashrāf*

* He is the grandson of the one mentioned in the first document.

Document 3

Sayyid 'Abd al-Salām Efendi... who is presently the *ḳā'imaḳām* in Jaffa...

After greetings. As it became known to us that you treat with honor and reverence, and you protect and shield the honorable *sayyids* in the district of Jaffa, it is communicated [to you] that the aforementioned and honored function remains as before with you on our behalf [starting] from the beginning of Dhū'l-Ḥijja ... of this year, 1208.

It is necessary that you show honor and respect as in the past for the illustrious *sayyids*. Take care to prevent and prohibit those who [establish a] claim for a *sharīf*ian descent and wear a green sign [turban] upon a *sanad* [title deed] of *ḳāḍīs* or a *ḳā'imaḳām*. Do not take and do not let to be taken payments under the name of *tevcīhiye* and *'arīsiye* and other disapproved innovations. Together with [your] exerting abundant effort for the protection of their honor and property, [you should] procure the beneficial prayers of the honorable *sayyids* for the duration of the life and reign of the... *pādiṣāh* of Islam. You should follow in every matter the exalted *Sharī'a*...

The humble al-Sayyid M. 'Aṭāllāh
al-Ḥusaynī, *al-naḳīb 'alā al-ashrāf*

Document 4

To the presence of the honorable... [no addressee is mentioned]

[We] send to you [our] proper blessings. Following that it is communicated [to you] that in this blessed year your letter which was sent by you, and your customary present had arrived.

As it was written to us the *niḳāba* of Lydda has already been conferred upon Sayyid Aḥmad Efendi. The *niḳāba* of Jaffa was conferred upon Sayyid 'Umar son of Sayyid 'Abd al-Salām. [It] was sent to you together with the correspondence [of] your continuation [in your function].

With its arrival, it is necessary that you should [keep] adhering to [the path of] uprightness in the illustrious service you are conferred with by us. You should care for the protection and upkeep of the honorable *sayyids*. [No date is given; presumably about the end of the 18th century.]

The humble al-Sayyid M. 'Aṭāllāh
al-Ḥusaynī, *al-naḳīb 'alā al-ashrāf*

Document 5

This is the register of presents to our lords and benefactors and to our respected friends. We ask our protected son Meḥmed Aġa to do his best in distributing them as follows, may God lengthen his life.

Our benefactor, the *şeyḫ ül-Islām* a box of soap, a jar or rose water and five undercaps.

Our benefactor, the *naḳīb al-ashrāf*, two boxes of soap, a jar of rose water and ten undercaps.

Our master Ibrāhīm Efendi Munlā Bey, son of 'Aważ Paşa a box of soap, a jar of rose water and five undercaps.

Our master al-Sayyid Ibrāhīm Efendi, formerly the *ḳāḍī* of Istanbul by rank, and a son in-law of Zayn al-'Ābidīn Efendi, a box of soap, a jar of rose water and five undercaps.

To the *seğmen başı*, the deputy of the *aġa* of the Janissaries, a box of soap and a jar of rose water

'Abd ül-Raḥīm Efendi, the chief secretary of Dürrī-Zāde, and the *ḳāḍī* of Salonica, a box of soap and three undercaps.

Veliüddīn Efendi, presently the deputy of the *tevḳī'ī*, a box of soap and two undercaps.

Al-Sayyid 'Ömer Efendi, formerly the *ḳāḍī* of Damascus and [presently!] the chief secretary, a box of soap.

Al-Sayyid Aḥmed Hāşim Efendi, formerly the *ḳāḍī* of Jerusalem, a box of soap.

Mes'ūd Bey, the head porter of the sultan's court, a box of soap

Meḥmed Ağa, the chief eunuch of the sultan's palace, a box of soap.

your respected father a box of soap, and a jar of rose water.

al-Sayyid Ḥākim Efendi, the *rūznāmce-i ru'ūs*, a box of soap.

Ṣāliḥ Ağa, formerly the *ağa* of the Janissaries in Jerusalem and presently the *ağa* of the Kalk [!] in Üsküdar, a box of soap.

al-Sayyid Ḥusayn 'Ārif al-'Usaylī al-Ḳudsī a box of soap.

The *ḳethüdā* of *naḳīb al-ashrāf* a box of soap.

The chief secretary of *naḳīb al-ashrāf* a box of soap.

al-Sayyid Meḥmed Ağa, *baş shāwīsh ashrāf*, two boxes of soap and the [unreadable] inside a bundle.

The other heralds of the *sharīfs*, a box of soap.

Our son Meḥmed Ağa may God protect you and preserve you and may He bring me to see you, Amen.

I would let you know that the mentioned boxes are twenty-one boxes of soap, and two boxes each of which contains three jars altogether six jars of rose water. [As to] the undercaps, each one has his name written on his gift both on the boxes and the undercaps.

Concerning the rose water, distribute the six jars as explained in the addenda. I ask of your faithful intention great care and full attention in directing one of the followers to distribute them to the recipients and to get receipts from all and to send them to us quickly. There is no need to add more because your understanding is enough. This is our greatest interest requested from you and if God wills this will not be forgotten by us.

May God lengthen your life by the honor of the Prophet and peace be upon you.

Moreover, send to each one of the addresses his letter with his gift.

Your friend,
Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf, the *ḳā'imaḳām* of the *naḳīb* of al-Ḳuds.

هذا وقد الهدايا الافندينا او لبا النعم واحبابنا
المحترمين نرجو امنكما لهمت ولدنا المحروس
تحذرعانوذ بهم على هذا المنوال وعمركم بطول

ولدنا السيد محمد اغا حرسكم الله وايفاكم بجميع
بمراكم امنيه نعرف جنابكم ان الصناديق المذكوره
واحد وعشرين صناديق صابون وهنا وقد
داخل كل واحد ثلاث احرار جمله ستة اجرار
ماء ورد والطوافي كل احد مكتوب اسمه
على هديته في الصناديق والطوافي واما
ماء الورد بقزعوم الستة احرار كما هو
مشروط بذيله نرجو امنكم الوفيه الهمه
الزايد والاعتنا التام بامر احد الاتباع
ان يوزعهم لاصحابهم واخذ الوصولات
منهم بجميع وارسالهم لنا سرعه ولا يلزم زياده
لان فيهم فيه الكفايه وهذا آخر ما عندنا
جنابكم وانشا الله لا يضيع عندنا ذلك
وعمركم بطول بجاه الرسول والسلام

وكذلك نرسلو لكل احد مكاتبته
مع عدينه والدعا

ولي النعم شيخ الاسلام
صندوق صابون
وكلم ماء ورد
وخمس طوافي

ولي النعم نقيب الاشراف
صندوقين صابون
وكلم ماء ورد
وعشر طوافي

افندينا مولانا بك عرض
باشازاده ابراهيم
افندي صندوق
صابون وكلم ماء
ورد وخمس
طوافي

افندينا السيد اصعم افندي
اسلامبول افندي سابقا
بالرتبه زين العابدين افندي
داماتي صندوق صابون
وكلم ماء ورد وخمس
طوافي

جناب سكاكاشي كيل
اغا بشكيريان صندوق
صابون وكلم
ماء ورد

عبد الرحيم افندي كاتبي
وزيرزاده وقاضي
سالانيك صندوق
صابون وثلاث
طوافي

ولي الدين افندي
وكيل التوقيع
صندوق صابون
واطاقتين

قاضي الشام سابقا وكاتبي
السيد عمر افندي
صندوق
صابون

قاضي القدس سابقا
السيد حمد هاشم افندي
صندوق
صابون

مسعود بك سر
بوابين وكاتب
صندوق
صابون

اغاء باباه دار السعاده
محمد اغا صندوق
صابون

والدكم المحترم
صندوق صابون
وكلم ماء ورد

السيد حاكم افندي
دوزغانه جي الروس
صندوق
صابون

صالح اغا آغا بشكيريان
القدس سابقا واغات
البقلق في اسكدار حالا
صندوق صابون

السيد حسين عارف
العسيلي القدسي
صندوق
صابون

كتخدا نقيب الاشراف
صندوق
صابون

نقيب الاشراف
صابون

السيد محمد اغا باشا
شاويش اشراف
صندوقين والاسبق
صابون

سايس كتخدا شيخ
الاشراف
صندوق
صابون

Document 5

Notes

* I would like to express my thanks to advocate Sa'īd al-Ḥusaynī of Jerusalem and to Mr. Ibrāhīm Ṣabrī, the former chief secretary of the *Sharī'a* court of Jerusalem and to the staff of the court for their kind help in consulting the records. My thanks are due also to the Alexander von-Humboldt-Stiftung of West Germany for their fellowship which allowed me free time to write this paper.

1 See the letter of nomination of 'Abd al-Salām b. 'Abdallāh al-Ḥusaynī to the post of *naḳīb al-ashrāf* in the *Sharī'a* court of Jerusalem, record no. 278, of the year 1211/1796-7, p. 41.

2 Record no. 273, of the year 1206/1791-1792, p. 27.

3 *Ibid.* However it should be noted that important offices such as *naḳīb al-ashrāf* and *muftī* were renewed annually and that they were subject to the whims of the central government. In spite of that this rule was upheld.

4 'Abd al-Razzāḳ al-Bīṭār, *Ḥilyat al-bashar fī a'yān al-ḳarn al-thālith 'ashar*, 3 vols. (Damascus, 1961-1963).

5 *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 1351.

6 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 69, 71, 521, 537; The Dajānīs of Jaffa belonges to the Dajānī family of Jerusalem.

7 There were other families in Jerusalem that carried the family name "Ḥusaynī" and who might have been distant relatives of this family but the descendants of Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf were those who filled those important posts in the city. The records of the *Sharī'a* court confirm this fact.

8 Ḥasan b. 'Abd al-Laṭīf, *Tarājim ahl al-Ḳuds fī al-ḳarn al-thānī 'ashar* (undated), pp. 121-127 (hereafter: *Tarājim*). For this paper I have used a photocopy of the original which could not be traced. This photocopy is found in the Rockefeller Museum Library in East Jerusalem. There was a copy of this work in the Khālidiyya Library in Old Jerusalem but it could not be found and seems to have been lost. In 1942 the late Aḥmad Samīḥ al-Khālidī wrote two articles on "Notables of Jerusalem in the 12th Hijra Century" which were published in the Cairo weekly *al-Thaḳāfa*. The first on "Shaykh Muḥammad al-Khalīlī" appeared in vol. 4, no. 194 (Sept. 15, 1942), pp. 9ff. The second on "Shaykh Muḥammad al-Tāfilātī" appeared in vol. 5, no. 212 (Jan. 19, 1943), pp. 15ff. Mr. Khālidī used as his main source the manuscript of "Ḥasan b. 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Ḥusaynī, al-Muftī bi'l-Ḳuds", as he called the author. He did not mention which copy he used, perhaps the lost one of the Khālidiyya!
However, there is another copy in the British Library (Ms. Or. 3047). This Ms. consists of 41 folios and is dated Rabī' al-thānī 1195/ March-April 1781. On Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf see fols. 29b-31b. See also K. Barbir, "Scholarship and Opportunity in Eighteenth Century Jerusalem: Hasan al-Qudsi's Notables", a paper presented in the 3rd International Conference on the History of Bilād al-Shām. Amman, April 1980.

9 Khalīl al-Murādī, *Silk al-Durar fī a'yān al-ḳarn al-thānī 'ashar*, 4 vols. (Būlāḳ, 1291-1301); on Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf, see vol. 3, pp. 124ff.

10 *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 89.

11 See Ms. no. Or. 3047 in the British Library, fol. 41b. See also Barbir, n. 4.

12 See below p. 97.

13 See Doc. no. 1 in the appendix. On the chief *naḳīb al-ashrāf* in Istanbul and his functions see I.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletenin Ilmiye Teşkilatı* (Ankara, 1965), pp. 156ff.

14 Murādī, vol. 3, p. 124.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 126.

16 Murādī states specifically that there existed between his father 'Alī Afandī al-Murādī, the *muftī* of Damascus, and 'Abd al-Laṭīf good and friendly relations.

17 See below p. 98; and Doc. no. 5.

18 Describing his increased power in Jerusalem Murādī (p. 124) stated rather elegantly *wa-istabadda mushayyidan arkānahu.*

19 Murādī, vol. 3, p. 126.

20 *Ibid.* See also Jabartī, *'Ajā'ib al-Āthār* (Būlāḳ, 1297), vol. I, p. 412.

21 Murādī, vol. 2, pp. 217-218. See also Aḥmad Taymūr, *'Ālam al-fikr al-Islāmī fī al-'aṣr al-ḥadīth* (Cairo, 1387/1967), pp. 214ff. and pp. 224f.
22 See Murādī, vol. 1, p. 49 and p. 175; vol. 2, pp. 2f.; vol. 3, pp. 2ff.; vol. 4, p. 52 and p. 58.
23 *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 101-102; vol. 4, pp. 102-108.
24 *Tarājim*, p. 130.
25 *Sharī'a* record no. 278, p. 32 dated Muḥarram 1211/July 1796.
26 *Ibid.*, p. 41 dated Rabī' II, 1211/Oct. 1796.
27 *Ibid.*, p. 70 dated Rajab, 1211/January 1797.
28 Record no. 278, p. 41 dated Rabī' II, 1211, and also p. 70.
29 Record no. 293, p. 37 dated Sha'bān 1224/Sep. 1809 and also p. 67.
30 See Docs. 1, 2 and 3.
31 H.A.R. Gibb & H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. 2 (London, 1957), p. 93.
32 See Docs. 1, 2 and 3.
33 Gibb and Bowen, vol. 2, p. 93.
34 See copies of such edicts in *Sharī'a* records of Jerusalem. When an edict or a proclamation reached Jerusalem the *'ulemā, sharīfs* and *a'yān* used to assemble in al-Ḥanābila mosque. "The edict was then read in the presence of the *ḳādī*, the emissary that carried the edict, public functionaries and other dignitaries and notables". According to Shaykh Ḥasan in *Tarājim*, pp. 115f.
35 See Doc. no. 1.
36 See record no. 278, p. 32 and p. 97; See also record no. 279, p. 48.
37 The letter is found among the collection of papers. I have a photocopy of it and of all the other documents cited in this study.
38 See Docs. no. 2 and 3 and record no. 279, p. 49 and record 280, p. 77.
39 See record no. 273, p. 71 dated 10 Shawwāl 1206/June 1792 and record no. 280, p. 35 dated 1213/1798-9.
40 Record 295, p. 203 dated Muḥarram 1228/1813. Mūsā Tūḳān, the *mütesellim* of Nablus, married the daughter of 'Umar and gave his daughter in marriage to 'Abd al-Salām, son of 'Umar. Both marriages took place at the same time.
41 See above p. 94.
42 See record no. 293, p. 37. Kanj wrote: "It is a duty upon us to have zeal for their house and if God wills we shall not allow, during our term [of rule] anything to happen to their house except prosperity and prolonged comfort and exceeding honor and veneration".
43 Gibb & Bowen, vol. 2, p. 100.
44 See Doc. no. 4.
45 Record no. 297, pp. 161-162.
46 A photocopy of the document and a translation are brought in Doc. no. 5.
47 On him see *'Ilmiye Sālnāmesi* (Istanbul, A.H. 1334), p. 565.
48 On Yūsuf Aġa see S. Shaw, *Between Old and New* (Harvard, 1971), pp. 88-9, 369-74.
49 See *Sharī'a* record 273, p. 12, and a letter from the family's agent in Istanbul dated 1205. On Mūsā al-Khālidī see Taymūr, pp. 224f.
50 From a letter sent by the agent in Istanbul in 1205.
51 Record 291, p. 7 dated Ramaḍān 1221/end of Nov. 1806. On the political change that took place in Istanbul after the event of Edirne see S. Shaw, pp. 345ff. and pp. 374f.
52 For the restoration of Ḥasan see record 291, p. 64 dated Shawwāl 1222/December 1807 and p. 152 Ṣafar 1223/April 1808; for that of 'Umar to the *niḳāba* see record 292, p. 6 dated Rabī' II 1223/May 1808.
53 See pp. 132-144.
54 See Jabartī, vol. 2, p. 204.
55 From a letter sent by the family agent in Istanbul dated 1205/1791. All efforts to identify the man were fruitless.
56 A page of a letter presumably sent by Murādī to Shaykh Ḥasan is still found in the collection of papers. See also A. Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus 1723-1783* (Beirut, 1966), p. 333; and Barbir, p. 3.
57 At first Shaykh Ḥasan had only girls, but he was blessed with boys from a late marriage. On his death, his grandson 'Umar was appointed by the *ḳāḍī* as guardian of his underage children (8 boys and 3 girls). See record no. 293, p. 106.

58 He may have studied at al-Azhar in Cairo. See A.S. al-Khālidī, *Ahl al-'Ilm bayn Miṣr wa-Falasṭīn* (Jerusalem, 1946), p. 38.
59 Record no. 295, p. 186.
60 A. Rustum, *al-Maḥfūẓāt al malikiyya al-Miṣriyya*, vol. 1 (Cairo, 1940), pp. 171, 188-9. See also 'Ārif al-'Ārif, *al-Mufaṣṣal fī tarīkh al-Ḳuds* (Jerusalem, 1961), pp. 281, 284; S.N. Spyridon (ed.) *Annals of Palestine, 1821-1841* (Jerusalem, 1938), p. 93.
61 Rustum, vol. 3, pp. 106-7, no. 4516 dated 27 Dhū'l-ḥijja, 1251 (April 16, 1836).
62 This word means substitute and in this context it denotes the local *naḳīb al-ashrāf* who formally substitutes for the head *naḳīb* in Istanbul.
63 *'Arūs* means a bride. Presumably the term *'arūsiye* means a gift of money or a fee paid for the *naḳīb* in return for his approval of the marriage of a certain member of the *sharīfs* under his supervision. This term is not found in the standard dictionaries.
64 The "green sign" is a green turban which the recognized descendants of the prophet used, to be distinguished from other people.
65 *Tevcīh* means conferring an office (Redhouse, p. 606), but *tevcīhiye* is not found. Presumably, it means in this context a gift or a fee paid by the *sharīfs* of a certain locality to their *naḳīb* on the occasion of the office (of *niḳāba*) being conferred upon him or renewed.

This is a revised English version of an article which originally appeared in A. Cohen (ed.), *Jerusalem in the Early Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1979), pp. 323-342.

Jerusalem's Families of Notables and the Waḳf in the Early 19th Century

GABRIEL BAER

INTRODUCTION

The vague notion that there was some connection between the waḳf as an institution and the elite in Islamic cities has been generally agreed upon by all those who have touched upon the subject. It is the aim of this study to investigate in detail the different forms this connection assumed in one of these cities in a pre-modern period. Jerusalem was particularly suitable as a case study for such an investigation for various reasons. It was a small town with a manageable number of rather well-known notable families; because of its religious position, the waḳf occupied an important place in its social and economic life; in contrast with other Islamic cities, the relation of Jerusalem's elite (or at least part of it) and the waḳf in a later period, the 1920s and 1930s, has been the subject of a scholarly study;[1] and last, but not least, the *sijill* of Jerusalem's *ḳāḍī's* court is one of the richest of its kind and has been made accessible in recent years. This paper is based primarily on documents concerning waḳf from the Jerusalem *sijill* for ten *Hijrī* years, from Ramaḍān 1220 to Sha'bān 1229, corresponding to November 1850 and July 1814.[2]

The notables (*a'yān*) in an Islamic city were an informal elite consisting of the richest, most influential and most prestigious families of merchants, *'ulemā* and civilian and military officers. They were by no means a well-defined class, and in some cases it is not easy to decide whether this or that family should be included in this category. The list of the group of notable families studied here (the group) is given in the Appendix where it is explained who was included in it. We shall try to establish the common characteristics of these families, some differences among them, and their quantitative importance with regard to the activities concerning the waḳf to be discussed hereafter.

As we have asserted elsewhere, members of notable families generally acquired property, income, or control of existing waḳfs, i.e. waḳfs not founded by their own family, in consequence of their economic, social and political power.[3] The detailed analysis of this aspect of the relation between Jerusalem's notables and the waḳf will consitute the second and main part of this study. However, for the sake of completeness we cannot here disregard the fact that, like other ordinary people (probably even to a larger extent), their social and economic position was strongly related to family or other waḳfs of their own. We shall begin with a discussion of this relationship between Jerusalem's notables and the waḳf in the early 19th century.

THE WAḲFS FOUNDED BY JERUSALEM'S NOTABLE FAMILIES

In the course of the years 1805-1814, 23 *waḳfiyyas* were registered at the *ḳāḍī's* court of Jerusalem. Seven of these waḳfs were founded by the Ottoman governor of the Gaza *sancak* for the benefit of the great mosque in Jaffa and consisted of property in Jaffa and its vicinity, and one other by the Ottoman *mütesellim* of Jerusalem. Less than one-third, i.e. seven waḳfs, were founded by members of the families included for the purpose of this study among the group identified as "notables"; three Ḥusaynīs, two Ḳuṭaynas, one Dajānī, and one Nimrī.[4]

However, waḳfs of Jerusalem's notables were mentioned in the *sijill* in other contexts as well. A relatively large number of these notables appeared before the court as *mutawallīs* (administrators) of waḳfs founded by their fathers or forefathers. Thus, in 1222/1807 'Abd al-Ṣamad al-'Alamī was appointed *mutawallī* of the waḳf of his grandfather Abū'l-Faḍl, instead of the deceased daughter of the founder; two months later Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Khālidī, the secretary of the Jerusalem *ḳāḍī's* court, was appointed *mutawallī* of the waḳf of Aḥmad Bey Turjemān, one of his ancestors on his grandmother's side (and another Khālidī replaced him in 1813); three members of the al-Nimrī family served as *mutawallīs* of the waḳfs of three of their grandfathers, also Nimrīs (one of the grandfathers and one of the *mutawallīs* served as chief architect, *mi'mārbaşı*, of Jerusalem); in 1810 Ibrāhīm Bey Turjemān, the *mutawallī* of his grandfather's waḳf, asked the *ḳāḍī* to allocate to him a manager's fee, which had not been fixed in the *waḳfiyya*; in 1811 Ḥasan al-Jā'ūnī, Jerusalem's *cebeci başı* (chief armorer?), was appointed *mutawallī* of two waḳfs founded by his grandfather Ḥasan al-Jā'ūnī, and early in 1814 Bashīr al-Jā'ūnī was appointed to the same post for another Jā'ūnī family waḳf; Khadīja, the daughter of Muḥammad al-Daḳḳāḳ, served as *mutawalliya* and *nāẓira* of the waḳf of her grandfather on her mother's side; in 1227/1812 Ṣāliḥ al-Danaf was appointed *mutawallī* and *nāẓir* of his father's waḳf; and in 1813 Muḥammad Ṭāhir al-Ḥusaynī, the *muftī* of Jerusalem, appeared before the court as *mutawallī* of the waḳf of his grandfather 'Abd al-Laṭīf Ḥusaynī, formerly *naḳīb al-ashrāf* of Jerusalem;[5] and in 1813 'Abdallāh Dajānī was appointed *mutawallī* of a Dajānī family waḳf. Among the newly appointed *mutawallīs* of family waḳfs during this period, our group of "notables" constituted about one-half, eight out of fifteen.

Evidently, in all these cases members of these families not only administered the waḳfs but the families also were the main beneficiaries. Some of the quoted documents were accounts of these family waḳfs (Nimrī, Turjemān). Additional family waḳfs of Jerusalem's notables are mentioned in the *sijill* in connection with repairs, restorations and long-term leases of property belonging to these waḳfs (e.g., Jārallāh and Daḳḳāḳ waḳf. Ṣafar 1228/February 1813).[6]

For the time being, it is impossible to evaluate fully the quantitative significance of these data. In order to arrive at such a definite evaluation, it will be

necessary to study a longer period, particularly because only then will enough of the most important documents for a quantitative comparison between the waḳfs of notables and other people be available, namely accounts (which show the property, income and expenditure of the waḳfs). Nevertheless, two quantitative statements can be made. First, the proportion of our group of notables among the founders of new waḳfs and the newly appointed *mutawallīs* of family waḳfs (one-third and one-half respectively) was by far greater than their share of the privately owned wealth of Jerusalem's population at that time. This statement is based on data of heritages registered at Jerusalem's *Sharī'a* court during a period of ten years shortly preceding our period (1790-1801).[7] In these years gross heritages of members of the group of notable families amounted to 51,941 *zolota*, and the net amount, after deduction of expenses and debts, was 14,679 *zolota*. As against this other gross heritages of more than 1,000 *zolota* each alone amounted to 185,157 *zolota* (net: 119,645). If we take heritages of members of notable families exceeding 1,000 *zolota* only, or, on the other hand, all heritages of others, the share of the notables in the group would be even smaller. Secondly, it should be noted that two waḳfs, of Sulaymān Ḳuṭayna and Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥusaynī, were much larger than all the new waḳfs established by other Jerusalemites. However that may be, it appears that the most important aspect of the notables' relationship with the waḳf institution was not the fact that their family waḳfs were perhaps relatively larger, wealthier and more numerous than those of ordinary people; it was rather their connection with waḳfs founded by others than their own family. In this category are included public waḳfs some of which may have been founded, centuries ago, by the ancestors of these families, but which have lost their obvious connection with them.

WAḲFS FOUNDED BY OTHERS THAN JERUSALEM'S NOTABLE FAMILIES

The Position of Notables within the Framework of Existing Waḳfs

Members of Jerusalem's notable families served early in the 19th century as *mutawallīs* not only of their family waḳfs but also of a number of important public waḳfs. Thus Wafā al-'Alamī was *mutawallī* of Waḳf al-Ḥaramayn (endowments in favor of the sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina), and other members of the 'Alamī family served generation after generation, as administrators of the Waḳf al-Bīmāristān al-Ṣalāḥī.[8] The Dāwūdīs-Dajānīs administered various waḳfs of shrines and mosques. First of all, they were *mutawallīs* of the waḳf of the famous tomb of David in Jerusalem, called Nabī Dāwūd, or Waḳf Sīdnā Dāwūd. According to a document from the year 1224/1809 their official investiture with this office by the Ottoman authorities dated from 1132-3/1719-21.[9] In addition, Shākir b. Khalīl al-Dajānī was appointed in 1810 as *mutawallī* and *nāẓir* of the waḳfs of two mosques, one in

the village of 'Allār and one in Bayt Nūbā.[10] Another Dajānī, Darwīsh b. Sulaymān, was appointed half a year later as *mutawallī* of the tomb of a shaykh in 'Amwās (Emmaus), after he had paid off the former *mutawallī* (of the Daḳḳāḳ family).[11] Still another one, Muḥammad Wafā al-Dajānī, was *mutawallī* of the waḳf of another sanctuary — together with 'Abd al-Raḥīm al-Jā'ūnī.[12] The Jā'ūnīs held other hereditary posts of waḳf administration as well. Thus Mūsā and 'Abd al-Badī' al-Jā'ūnī were appointed in April 1811 as *mutawallīs* of the waḳf of Muḥammad al-Nāṣirī b. Aḥmad al-Ṭawrī (Abū Ṭōr) instead of their father Muṣṭafā, formerly the *imām* of the Dome of the Rock,[13] and two other Jā'ūnīs, in December 1813, as *mutawallīs* of the waḳf of the Madrasa Bāsiṭiyya.[13] Members of the Abū al-Su'ūd family were *mutawallīs* of the waḳf of the mosque of 'Umar (situated in the Jewish quarter), and members of the Danaf (Anṣārī) family, hereditary guardians of the Dome of the Rock, administered the waḳfs of two mosques in Bittīr near Jerusalem.[14] Other notable families too held positions as *mutawallīs* of public waḳfs, though this found no expression in the court registers for the years dealt with in this study. Among these we should mention the Ḥusaynīs, the administrators of the Nabī Mūsā waḳf for generations and (according to one source) for some time also of the Ḥaṣṣekī Sulṭān waḳf. In the period discussed here 'Umar al-Ḥusaynī was appointed *mutawallī* of a waḳf in favor of the Shrine of Salmān al-Fārisī on the Mount of Olives founded by the Ottoman *mütesellim* of Jerusalem.[15] The Khālidīs transmitted for generations from father to son the administration of the waḳf in favor of the Madrasat al-Ḳurrā' al-Salāmīyya in the Silsila quarter of Jerusalem — a position acquired in 1789 from the al-Imām family for the down payment of 360 *zolota*.[16] During the years dealt with herein twelve new *mutawallīs* were appointed for public waḳfs, two of them from the establishment of Ottoman governors. Among the rest, members of the group of notables made up sixty percent, a somewhat higher proportion than among new *mutawallīs* of family waḳfs. Admittedly, the whole number of cases is rather small, but apparently even this small sample indicates that the notables had a relatively large share of the control of public waḳfs. It should be mentioned, however, that the largest of Palestine's public waḳfs were administered by the Ottoman governor and his representatives; the waḳf of the Dome of the Rock (Ṣakhra) and the Aḳṣā, of Ḥaṣṣekī Sulṭān, and of the Hebron sanctuary (Khalīl al-Raḥmān).[17]

Administration was not the only connection the notables had with existing public waḳfs in Jerusalem. Some of these families also enjoyed hereditary rights to certain posts within such waḳfs. This fact found its expression in the *sijill* when an incumbent alienated his right for a compensation. Thus, in February 1812, one of the guardians of the Dome of the Rock sold his right to the position of teaching in the al-Madrasa al-Tankiziyya, which position amounted to one-third of the whole salary, to the sons of 'Alī al-Khālidī, for the payment of 50 *ḳurūṣ (esedī)*. The right to another portion of this salary was already held by their father, the above-named 'Alī al-Khālidī. A year later, in

March 1813, Badr al-Ḥusaynī, the son of the former *naḳīb al-ashrāf* of Jerusalem, sold to Sulaymān Ḳuṭayna a position of daily Ḳur'ān reciting for which part of the income from two houses was endowed. The price paid for this transaction was 1650 *ḳurūṣ*, and the agent for Badr al-Ḥusaynī who carried it out was another member of the Khālidī family.[18] In each of these two transactions at least two members of the group of notable families were involved. In addition to such transactions, there is also other evidence for such hereditary posts. Thus, in May 1812 Yūsuf al-Nimrī was appointed by the *ḳāḍī* to supervise the water supply of *ḥammām al-'ayn* and of wells in Jerusalem, for which a daily salary of 4 *'oṣmānī* (*akçe*) from the waḳfs of the Dome of the Rock and the al-Madrasa al-Tankiziyya was allocated. He replaced his deceased father, who had inherited the position from his forefathers who had held it for more than one hundred years.[19] Incidentally, members of the Nimrī family held the post of *mi'mār baṣı* (chief architect) of Jerusalem throughout the period under discussion.

Jerusalem's notable families were also beneficiaries of direct allocations from *waḳf ghayr ṣaḥīḥ*, i.e. endowment of taxes on certain villages in Palestine. Such allocations were of course not mentioned in the *sijill*, but it is known from other sources that the Dajānī, Nusayba and Ḥusaynī families were recipients of such income.[20]

Jerusalem's Notables and the Dismemberment of Waḳfs

Throughout Islamic history waḳfs underwent a perpetual process of dismemberment. Their assets gradually deteriorated and sooner or later they were alienated. Theoretically the waḳf is eternal and inalienable, but specific legal devices were invented to make possible what economic and social necessity demanded. However, it was the established custom that such transactions needed the *ḳāḍī's* sanction. As a result, the *sijill* is replete with documents recording the alienation of property rights of waḳfs. This general rule was found to be valid for the *sijill* of Jerusalem for the years 1805-1813 which serves as the basis for this study.

In Jerusalem of the early 19th century, the dismemberment of waḳfs proceeded in various ways.[21] The reason given for all such transactions was the deterioration of the waḳf's property. One of the forms of alienation of the waḳf's rights to its property was a long-term (or perpetual) lease, called in the Jerusalem *sijill* of that period *ijāra ṭawīla*.[22] This transaction comprised the down payment of a lump sum by the tenant to cover a debt owed by the waḳf or expenses for repairs and restoration and a lease for a long term, generally 90 years, for a low rent, theoretically considered as *ujrat al-mithl* (the equitable rent) — i.e. variable, but in fact fixed for the whole period. *Ḥikr*, often translated as ground rent, was the grant of a permanent lease of land (as against buildings, *musaḳḳafāt*, which were the object of all the other operations). The tenant was supposed to maintain, ameliorate, plant or erect

buildings on this land. A seemingly harmless form of alienation was the execution of repairs by the tenant, whose expenses were considered a debt owed to him by the waḳf. However, in the overwhelming number of cases the amount of such expenses became an enforceable charge owed by the tenant on the property of the waḳf. This was called in early 19th century Palestine *al-khulū al-shar'ī al-murṣad 'alā*... [the repaired property]. Although theoretically it could be repurchased by the waḳf, in fact it became alienable, was inherited and transferred like any other property, and in many cases was even endowed in favor of another waḳf. These different kinds of alienation of waḳf assets appeared either separately or in various combinations. Finally, if nobody was found who would agree to rent the property even for a long term or to invest in its repair or restoration, the waḳf's *mutawallī* could ask the *ḳāḍī's* permission to exchange the property for other real estate. In fact, however, such 'exchanges' were made for money (*istibdāl bi'l-darāhim wa'l-danānīr*) — to be invested later, presumably, in other real estate.

The group of Jerusalem's families of notables played a dominant part in these various kinds of dismemberment of waḳfs and probably benefited considerably from the transactions in which they were involved. In the *sijill* for the years 1805-1814 there are 63 documents of *khulū, ḥikr, ijāra ṭawīla*, and *istibdāl*, and in more than half of them members of the group figure as recipients of such rights to deteriorated waḳf property. In addition, in about twenty-five of these cases members of the same group figured as *mutawallīs* of the waḳfs part of whose property rights were alienated. However, these data do not do justice to the overwhelming weight of the notables' role in these transactions for the simple reason that they and not other Jerusalemites were involved in the large operations. The total sum of debts contracted by the waḳf for repairs, of *khulū*, and of *istibdāl* as reflected in the *sijill* for the years dealt with in this paper amounts to 83,138 *ḳurūṣ*.[23] The group's share in this sum was 57,540 *ḳurūṣ*, i.e. almost 70 percent. The rest was divided up between two Ottoman officials (7,928 *ḳurūṣ* or almost 10 percent) and all other Jerusalemites (17,670 *ḳurūṣ* or 21 percent).

In fact, not all the 14 families on the list given in the Appendix participated in acquiring assets of the amount of 57,540 *ḳurūṣ* but only nine of them. Moreover, two operations alone accounted for most of this sum and for more than half of the total amount of 83,138 *ḳurūṣ*, one involving members of the Jārallāh, 'Alamī, Khālidī and Budayrī families (31,755 *ḳurūṣ*), and the other involving the Ḥusaynī family (10,500 *ḳurūṣ*).[24] These two operations are indeed worthy of a detailed description. According to a document registered at the Jerusalem *Sharī'a* court in Ṣafar 1228/February 1813, a soap mill located in Khān al-Zayt in Jerusalem, originally part of the property of the waḳf of Jārallāh Efendi, the former *ḳāḍī* of Jerusalem, had fallen into ruins and had been given in long-term lease (*ijāra ṭawīla*) for 24 *zolota* a year to Wafā Efendi al-'Alamī. Moreover, he was authorized to restore the property, his expenses to be considered his *khulū*. In fact he built on that spot a *khān*, a coffeeshop, an

oven, and shops, and turned the cellar into a stable. When his heirs inherited the *khulū* after his death, they sold the *khulū* of the cellar to Muḥammad al-Budayrī, who undertook to pay half the long term rent. However, the cellar was found to be somewhat dilapidated and Muḥammad al-Budayrī asked the *ḳāḍī's* permission to establish there a new soap mill, his expenses to become a *khulū* in addition to a former *khulū* he held in partnership with Mūsā Efendi al-Khālidī. Permission was granted, and when the work was completed (the result being described in minute detail in the document), it was found that the cost of materials and work had amounted to 23,755 *ḳurūṣ*. This amount was confirmed as a *khulū* of Muḥammad al-Budayrī on the soap mill, to be added to his former *khulū* of 8,000 *ḳurūṣ* (his part of the partnership with Mūsā al-Khālidī), all in all 31,755 *ḳurūṣ*. About a month later another *khulū* was confirmed, this time to 'Umar Efendi al-Ḥusaynī, the *naḳīb al-ashrāf* of Jerusalem at that time. Some time before, he had been authorized by the *ḳaḍī* and by the *muftī*, Muḥammad Ṭāhir al-Ḥusaynī, who acted as the *mutawallī* of the waḳf of his grandfather, 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Ḥusaynī (a former *naḳīb al-ashrāf*), to restore a large dilapidated arcade belonging to the waḳf of 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Ḥusaynī. In fact this property had been originally part of another waḳf, but 'Abd al-Laṭīf Efendi had rented it as *ḥikr* and established a *khulū* on it and endowed it as part of his waḳf. When he was authorized to undertake the repairs, a fixed rent, *ajr al-mithl*, of 40 *zolota* a year was agreed upon. 'Umar al-Ḥusaynī too established a soap mill at the cost of 10,500 *ḳurūṣ*, which became his *khulū* on the soap mill. It should be added that the recipient of waḳf property in the largest *istibdāl* transaction performed during the period under review was a member of the Khālidī family, Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Khālidī, the secretary of the Jerusalem *Sharī'a* court.[25]

To what extent property owned by Jerusalem's notables originated in the dismemberment of waḳfs may be gauged from the share of *khulū* and similar arrangements in the property endowed by them as waḳf. We have just mentioned that the new *khulū* acquired by 'Umar al-Ḥusaynī was in fact based on another *khulū* which 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Ḥusaynī had endowed as waḳf. In the same month another Ḥusaynī, Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Efendi, at the time *muftī* of Jaffa, established a waḳf in favor of his offspring consisting primarily of a *khulū* to the amount of 3,687.5 *ḳurūṣ*.[26] From this point of view, it would be interesting to investigate the large number of *waḳfiyyas* of these families, wherever they might be found. Here are three examples found in the files of the Jerusalem Land Registry. The waḳf of Maḥbūba al-Khālidī, founded in 1276/1860, included among the endowed property two properties shared with the Danaf family, inherited by the founder of the waḳf, which were a *khulū* established on the Waḳf al-Shaykh Ḳala'ūn, and another *khulū* consisting of an oven.[27] One of the Danafs, Dāwūd b. Muḥammad, guardian of the Dome of the Rock, had established a waḳf some years earlier, in 1265/1849. The property endowed consisted entirely of *khulū*.[28] A third *waḳfiyya* from the same source, a much later one, concerns the waḳf founded by Muḥammad b.

'Abd al-Raḥmān al-'Alamī on April 2, 1932. Among 13 properties endowed, five were situated on land belonging to the waḳf of the Dome of the Rock and let to the founder by way of *ijārataym*, and one, a house, was built on top of three shops belonging to the Waḳf al-Khālidī.[29] The *waḳfiyya* of a much earlier waḳf, founded in March 1727 by Shaykh Muḥammad al-Khalīlī, has been published recently. Its properties included two vineyards on land belonging to the al-Ṣalāḥiyya waḳf, which was entitled to a ground rent, *ḥikr*, a *khulū* amounting to 1,261 *ḳurūṣ* on the Madrasa Baladiyya, and a *khulū* of 673 *ḳurūṣ* on the Sūḳ al-Ḳaṭṭānīn as the result of repairs of this *sūḳ* paid by the founder.[30]

There can be no doubt that both the recipients of rights to deteriorated waḳf property and the *mutawallīs* of the waḳfs concerned derived considerable benefits from operations involving the dismemberment of waḳfs. Let us assume, for a moment, that all these operations were carried out in good faith. Even in this case, the recipients of such rights were able to acquire practically the perpetual holding of land or property needed as a basis for their investments for much less than its market price: a down payment for repairs or liquidation of a debt, and a fixed, nominal, yearly rent. The reason for this difference was, if the formula repeated in all these documents is credible, that because of the deterioration in the property the *mutawallīs* of the waḳf were unable to let it at a regular rent for a short period, or, that for lack of funds, they were unable to restore it to its original condition. Therefore, they reasoned, this apparently disadvantageous contract was in fact beneficial to the waḳf, since otherwise they would not even receive the (low) fixed rent, and, in case of *khulū*, at least formally its right to reclaim the property was reserved.[31]

There has always been some doubt whether in fact all these operations were conducted in good faith. If indeed one or some or many of them were not, i.e., the recipient of rights acquired benefits which were not justifiable by the real economic plight of the waḳf or its property (perhaps in exchange for some recompense to the *mutawallī*), the material gain of the recipient would be even greater. In such a case political and social influence might be decisive for the acquisition of these benefits.

Be that as it may, members of Jerusalem's notable families obviously had an advantage over other Jerusalemites in acquiring these benefits and rights. To some extent, this advantage was the same which favored them as *mutawallīs*, as incumbents of waḳf offices, and, for that matter, as founders of waḳfs. These considerations will be dealt with presently in the conclusion. However, it is necessary to mention two additional aspects of this question which may have influenced the choice of recipients of rights to dismembered waḳf property and the endorsement of such actions. First, in some cases there was a family connection between the recipient of such rights and the *mutawallī* of the waḳf. The most conspicuous case was the above-mentioned huge *khulū* and waḳf of the Ḥusaynīs, *nuḳabā' al-ashrāf* of Jerusalem. But in the course of the period dealt with here there were other cases too: Muṣṭafā al-Khālidī was granted the permission to make repairs to be considered a debt of the waḳf of Ḳāsim

Turjemān, his great-grandfather on his grandmother's side, administered by another descendant of the waḳf's founder; two members of the Daḳḳāḳ family acquired a *khulū* on property of a waḳf administered by another Daḳḳāḳ and founded by a forefather of this *mutawallī*; and Yūsuf al-Jā'ūnī acquired a *ḥikr* on a waḳf whose *nāẓir* was another Jā'ūnī. A particularly striking case was the following. In May 1814 for 1,850 *zolota* the sons of Mūsā al-Khālidī acquired from the *imām* of the Aḳṣā Mosque the post of daily *ḥadīth* reciting at the mosque, and the administration of the waḳf endowed for this post. A fortnight later the newly established *mutawallīs* granted a *khulū* on the property of this waḳf to a relative of theirs, Asmā, the daughter of another Khālidī.[32] No such connections could be ascertained with regard to Jerusalemites not belonging to our group of notable families. Secondly, members of these families dominated many of the committees appointed by the *ḳāḍī* to verify the claim that the waḳf had deteriorated, to examine whether the repairs had been carried out adequately, to approve the amount of expenses submitted by the recipients of rights to waḳf property, and to give their opinion concerning the rate of the rent of a long-term lease. In addition to the *muḥḍir* (summoning officer) and the *çoḳadār* (court attendant),[33] permanent members of these committees were the secretaries (*kātib*) and the chief architects (*mi'mār başı*). The former office was more or less monopolized by the Khālidī family, and the latter by the Nimrī family. In addition, these two families were abundantly represented in these committees by others than the holders of these offices. Sometimes a member of the Daḳḳāḳ family was appointed *kātib* and Jā'ūnī-*mi'mār başı*, and other Daḳḳāḳs and Jā'ūnīs appeared in these committees too. This did not change when members of the named families were the recipients of rights to the property of dismembered waḳfs or the *mutawallīs* of such waḳfs.[34] A specific, remarkable case was the following: When 'Alī Aġa, an Ottoman official, acquired a huge *khulū* on property of the waḳf of the Dome of the Rock and the Aḳṣā Mosque, the committee appointed to investigate the property represented many of Jerusalem's most important notable families. In addition to the usual Khālidīs, Nimrīs, and Daḳḳāḳs, it included two Ḥusaynīs (*naḳīb al-ashrāf* and *muftī*), an Abū Su'ūd, a Nusayba, a Ḳuṭayna, and others.[35]

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the 19th century Jerusalem had about 10,000 inhabitants of whom about 5,000 were Muslims.[36] Each of our named 14 families of notables represented of course much more than one family, but it is difficult to say how many. If it is assumed that each name represented a *ḥamūla* comprising 10-15 families of 5 persons each, the 'notables' of our study may have accounted, according to such a calculation, for about 15-20 percent of Jerusalem's Muslim population. But as was stated above, their private property probably accounted for a smaller percentage than this of the privately owned wealth of Jerusalem's inhabitants as represented in heritages of that period. Moreover,

members of these families constituted only 7.8 percent of the deceased whose inheritances were registered at the *Shari'a* court at that time, and it is improbable that their percentage among those whose heritages were not registered at the court was higher — rather the opposite may have been the case. Obviously, their share in the activity connected with waḳf was much larger than their share in the population and its privately owned wealth. However, it varied with regard to different aspects of this activity. As has been seen, they were not the most conspicuous group of founders of new waḳfs, both Ottoman officials and other Jerusalemites surpassing them in the number of waḳfs. However, a rough survey of the *waḳfiyyas* has shown that a calculation of the assets of these waḳfs may modify this conclusion. Their percentage among newly appointed *mutawallīs* of family waḳfs was a little larger, which indicates that their share of old and extant waḳfs was larger than that of newly founded ones. This is to be expected of families whose most important asset was their long-established eminence.

The importance of notable families is greater in connection with waḳfs founded by others than their own family and public waḳfs with no obvious connection with their family. First, the notables made up a larger proportion of new *mutawallīs* of public waḳfs than of family waḳfs, although the richest and most important waḳfs were administered by representatives of the Ottoman government. Nevertheless, since control of public waḳfs was prestigious and bestowed influence, the notables' predominant position in this sphere, compared with other natives of Jerusalem, reinforced their social and political standing. The same is true with regard to other hereditary posts within public waḳfs. However, an even larger proportion of notables was found among the recipients of various rights and property deriving from the dismemberment of waḳfs as the result of deterioration. The value of their share by far surpassed that of other Jerusalemites and, in this case also (and by even more) that of Ottoman officials. The latter were involved in controlling large incomes of public waḳfs, but not so much in creating private durable assets for themselves out of the disintegration of waḳfs — an interest more suitable for locally rooted residents.

How did Jerusalem's notables achieve their predominance within the waḳf system? To some extent, of course, as the result of their wealth. However, this cannot have been the main reason, since their relative position in the waḳf system by far surpassed their share of the town's privately owned wealth. Much more important was their social prestige and influence as well as tradition. It was their high standing which played a decisive part in their appointment as *mutawallīs* of great public waḳfs and to posts within these waḳfs. In many cases their forefathers long ago had been granted these privileges because of their eminence, and the force of custom and tradition influenced *ḳāḍīs* to preserve these functions within the same family generation after generation. Certain posts became the privilege of a particular family, posts which could be sold, but social consensus restricted their sale to members of other prestigious families.

Certainly social standing and family connections also played a role in the acquisition of rights on deteriorated waḳf property. True, in order to restore or repair buildings or to plant trees the recipients of such rights needed capital. But these rights were not granted as the result of public tender. *Mutawallīs* of private and public waḳfs had a say in choosing the beneficiary, even when the whole operation was conducted in good faith.

It should be added that the Ottoman administration needed the notables in provincial towns as intermediaries between the central government and the local population. Consequently, many of the notables' material and social privileges were granted to them by the Ottoman state. We have seen that some of Jerusalem's notable families enjoyed allocations from taxes endowed as waḳf by the sultans or their governors and some held hereditary posts as *mutawallīs* of waḳfs which were controlled from Istanbul (such as the Ḥaramayn) or other posts with which the incumbent had to be formally invested by the sultan (e.g., *naḳīb al-ashrāf*). By these actions the Ottoman government reinforced both the material and the social eminence of Jersualem's notable families.

This study has thus far dealt indiscriminately with a group of 14 families. In fact there were considerable differences among these families with regard to their position in the waḳf system (see Appendix). First of all there was a group of four families with the highest score in all aspects of involvement in the waḳf system which we have discussed: the 'Alamīs, Dajānīs, Ḥusaynīs, and Khālidīs (+ Turjemān). Members of these families were founders of large waḳfs or large *khulūs*, and at the same time *mutawallīs* of large public waḳfs. All these four families were mentioned five times or more in the *sijills* nos. 288-297 in connection with waḳfs (the highest score was the Ḥusaynīs' — 15, and the Khālidīs' — 14). It is interesting to note that these four families are the only families in the group who are mentioned in Murādī's biographical dictionary.[37] In Shim'oni's list of Jerusalem's notables in the 20th century, these four families are among the six "important" families which are mentioned in the *sijills* studied by us in connection with the waḳf.[38]

The second group consists of six families among whom are found, at the beginning of the 19th century, founders of large waḳfs of large *khulūs* and who continue to figure on Shim'oni's list of notables in the 20th century. For two of them, mentioned more than five times in our *sijill*, no indication has been found that they occupied an office connected with the waḳf: Nusayba (who were among the "important" families in the 20th century) and Ḳuṭayna. The same is true for the Budayrī family, which was mentioned only once in our *sijill* (in connection with the huge *khuḥī* described in detail). At least for the Nusaybas this omission seems to have been accidental. The other three families, Jā'ūnī, Jārallāh and Danaf-Anṣārī, were founders of large waḳfs, occupied important posts connected indirectly with the waḳf *ḳāḍīs* and guardians of the Dome of the Rock and figure among the "less important" families in Shim'oni's list. In our *sijill* only the Jā'ūnīs appeared frequently.

Only two families included in our group of "notables" do not figure on Shim'oni's list at all — the Nimrīs and the Daḳḳāḳs. They have been included nevertheless because they were hereditary incumbents of important offices and because they figure frequently in the *sijill*. All other families which were not considered worthy of mention by Shim'oni and which appeared in our *sijill* did so only once or twice and therefore were not included in the group. The Nimrīs and Daḳḳāḳs who appeared five times or more, were the founders of large waḳfs or *khulūs*, and occupied posts connected indirectly with the waḳf.

The opposite is the case with the last two families in the group. Shim'oni thought both of them worthy of mention among Jerusalem's notables, one of them even as an "important" family and in great detail — the Nāshashībīs. In our *sijills* the latter appeared only once as the recipient of a *khulū* whose size is unknown. This reflects very well the fact that the Nāshashībīs rose to prominence in Jerusalem only in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. A member of the other family, Abū Su'ūd, was a *mutawallī* but it is the only family from our group not mentioned at all as founders of large waḳfs or large *khulūs*.

It appears that the differentiated involvement of Jerusalem's notables in the waḳf system reflects rather well their graded economic and social importance. To verify this thesis it is of course necessary to study in depth the social and economic conditions in Jerusalem at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. Such studies are under way and hopefully this small contribution to one aspect of a larger problem may be of help.

Appendix: *Jerusalem's Notables and the Waḳf (1805-1814)*

Name of family	Frequency of appearance in the *sijill*	Founders of large waḳf or large *khulū*	Offices connected with waḳf		Mentioned by Murādī	Mentioned by Shim'oni	
			mutawallīs of public waḳf	others		among most important families	among other notable families
Abu Su'ūd	1		+				+
'Alamī	5	+	+		+	+	
Budayrī	2	+					+
Dajānī	7	+	+		+	+	
Daḳḳāḳ	5	+		+			
Danaf-							
Anṣārī	4	+		+			+
Ḥusaynī	15	+	+	+	+	+	
Jārallāh	1	+		+			+
Jā'ūnī	8	+	+	+			+
Khālidī-							
Turjemān	14	+	+	+	+	+	
Ḳuṭayna	7	+					+
Nāshashībī	1	?					
Nimrī	7	+		+			
Nusayba	5	+					

Note: This list includes all families mentioned in *Sijills* 288-297 of the Jerusalem *Sharī'a* court which were considered by Shim'oni (pp. 211-21) as belonging to Jerusalem's notables. The 'important' families are those discussed by him in detail (pp. 211-20) and the others, those whom he just noted shortly (pp. 220-1). The Nimrīs and Daḳḳāḳs, the only families not mentioned by Shim'oni, were included because they were the only families mentioned frequently in the *sijill* who were at the same time incumbents of important offices. (For references to Murādī and Shim'oni see notes 37 and 38). Frequencies of appearance in the *sijill* have been calculated for waḳf documents only, but membership in committees for the establishment of deterioration of waḳf property of expenses for restoration has not been taken into account.

Notes

1 Uri M. Kupferschmidt, "Palestinian Waqfs and the Supreme Muslim Council", paper submitted to the International Seminar on Social and Economic Aspects of the Muslim Waqf, Jerusalem, June 1979 (to be published). See also, for more details, idem, "The Supreme Muslim Council 1921-1937, Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (August 1978).

2 *Sijill* 288-297. The use of these documents was made possible through the assistance of Mr. 'Ādel Mannā' who copied them conscientiously in the course of research for his Ph.D. thesis on this period. I take this opportunity to acknowledge his great help with gratitude.

3 G. Baer, "The Waqf as a Prop for the Social System (16th-20th centuries)", paper submitted to the International Seminar on Social and Economic Aspects of the Muslim Waqf, Jerusalem, June 1979 (to be published).

4 Jerusalem *Sijill* 292, pp. 16-17 (hereafter recorded J.S. 292/16-17 and accordingly); 294/62-5; 295/232; 296/7; 297/86-7, 130-1, 161-2.

5 J.S. 291/56 (see also 295/189-190); 291/80; 292/15-16; 293/82; 294/135; 295/65; 295/177; (and see also 295/178-9); 295/228-9; 296/84; 297/13; 38, 133.

6 J.S. 295/209-10; 295/215-16.

7 These data were collected by my student Mr. Aryeh Spitzen for his M.A. thesis. I am grateful to him for making them available to me in advance.

8 J.S. 293/136; 288/73; 295/132; Isḥāḳ Mūsā al Ḥusaynī and Amīn Sa'īd Abū Layl (eds.), *Wathīḳa maḳdisiyya tārīkhiyya* (Jerusalem, 1979), p. 38. The *bīmāristān* (generally known as Mūristān) was established by the nephew of Ṣalāh al-Dīn. On *mutawallīs* from the 'Alamī family later in the 19th century, see Baedeker's *Palästina und Syrien*, (Leipzig, 1891), p. 77.

9 J.S. 293/9. Their connection with this shrine, however, seems to go back to a much earlier time.

10 J.S. 294/50.

11 J.S. 294/109.

12 J.S. 292/87.

13 J.S. 294/164; 297/41. In the past, the 'Alamīs had been involved in the waḳf of Abū Ṭōr (Aḥmad al-Thawrī) — see Muḥammad al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athr fī a'yān al-ḳarn al-ḥādī 'ashar* (Bayrūt, n.d.), vol. 2, p. 239.

14 J.S. 292/115; 295/28.

15 Kupferschmidt, "The Supreme Muslim Council", p. 256, n. 134; J.S. 296/75.

16 Documents included in the Jerusalem Land Registry (J.L.R.), 44. 84/444/930. For details see Baer, "The Waqf", notes 18 and 19.

17 Cf. J.S. 293/117; 294/2-3, 134; 295/103.

18 J.S. 295/93; 295/231.

19 J.S. 295/99.

20 Israel State Archives (I.S.A.), K/18/40; K/60/32; Palestine, *Collection of Judgments*, pp. 1850ff. (LA38/30).

21 In this paper we cannot go into a detailed analysis of the different forms of dismemberment of waḳfs. For the discussion of some of these devices see G. Baer, "Ḥikr", *EI²*, supplement to vols. 1-3 (to be published). The *khulū* (see below) in early 19th century Jerusalem will be the subject of a special study which we are preparing at present.

22 This was practically identical with the Ottoman *icāreteyn*.

23 Some of the figures are given originally in *zolota* and have been converted by me into *ḳurūš (esedī)* (1 *zolota* = ¼ of a *ḳurūš*). The benefit of a low rent for a permanent lease is difficult to calculate, and therefore the calculations are confined to waḳf debts, *khulū*, and *istibdāl*. In some of the 63 documents repairs and the establishment of a *khulū* were authorized only in principle and the amount was not yet fixed. In a very small number of cases no figures are mentioned. Thus the number of documents serving as the bases for the following calculations is 35.

24 J.S. 295/209-210; 228-229.

25 J.S. 293/140.

26 J.S. 295/232.

27 J.L.R. 298/41, lines 23-4, 30-33.

28 *Ibid.*, 3093/35, lines 7-19.

29 *Ibid.*, 546/32, lines 18-24, 28.

30 *Wāthīḳa maḳdisiyya*, pp. 39-41.

31 In some cases they added that the dilapidated state of the waḳf property was dangerous to the public.

32 J.S. 294/88; 295/28-9; 291/92-3; 297/118, 129.

33 Cf. R.C. Jennings, "Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri", *Studia Islamica*, 48 (1978), pp. 150-154.

34 Cf. J.S. 291/92-3; 292/87, 115; 294/88.

35 J.S. 295/73-4.

36 For various estimates see Y. Ben-Arieh, "The Population of the Large Towns in Palestine During the First Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century According to Western Sources", in M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 50-53.

37 Muḥammed Khalīl al-Murādī, *Silk al-durar fī a'yān al-ḳarn al-thānī 'ashar* (Cairo-Būlāḳ, 1291-1301/1874-1884), vol. 1, pp. 49, 70-1, 116; vol. 2, pp. 72ff., 330; vol. 3, pp. 88, 89, 132, 166; vol. 4, pp. 123, 218, 228.

38 Ya'akov Shim'oni, *'Arvey Eretz Yisra'el* (Tel Aviv, 1947), pp. 211-21. Cf. Appendix for the difference between "important" families and others.

A Note on the Muslim Religious Hierarchy Towards the End of the Ottoman Period

URI M. KUPFERSCHMIDT

This study represents an attempt to take a closer look at the Muslim religious hierarchy in Palestine towards the end of the Ottoman period. Still much research remains to be done on the overall picture, but I believe that at least one easily accessible Ottoman source which may be helpful in reconstructing a factual framework has not yet been fully used. I mean the different *sālnāmes* (yearbooks, almanacs) which were published by the Ottoman government and its agencies.[1]

As to the region of Palestine, the *Devlet Sālnāmesi* (State Almanac) which appeared annually from 1846/7 (1263 H.) onwards, becomes a useful instrument after 1888/9 (1306 H.) when lists of *nā'ibs, muftīs* and directors of *awḳāf* begin to appear. Before that date only the appointees in *sancak* capital seats were listed; thereafter we find also the other towns entered.

A second type of almanac is the somewhat more detailed provincial *sālnāme*. For the *vilāyet* of Syria this series was published from 1868/9 (1285 H.) until 1900/1 (1318 H.) almost on a yearly basis. Lists of *nā'ibs* and *muftīs* in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Hebron and Gaza can be found in them up to the edition in 1871/2 (1288 H.), after which date Jerusalem became an independent *sancak*. Unfortunately we have not yet found the yearbooks for Jerusalem for that period. The same series of *sālnāmes* contains somewhat more information on all towns in the north of the country, that is to say the *sancaks* of Acre and Nablus. Here we find the names of religious functionaries, including those of *Sharī'a* court clerks, the *ḳā'imaḳāms* of the *naḳīb al-ashrāf* and the *amīr al-ḥajj*, as well as the full composition of councils of which they were members. Naturally there is much information on Damascus as the most important regional administrative center. The city had five, and sometimes six, *Sharī'a* courts, a general *awḳāf* office and one for the Ḥaramayn endowments. The *sālnāme* lists all these (or rather, to be on the safe side, most of these) appointees, including, for instance, the staff of the *amīr al-ḥajj (mevkib-i ḥac-ı şerīf muḥāfīẓi)*. It goes without saying that no Palestinian town in the same period had a religious bureaucracy of this scope.

For the north of the country, after it was transferred to the jurisdiction of the *vilāyet* of Beirut, data are found in the yearbooks of that province. However, the *sālnāme* for Beirut appeared only 9 times from 1892/3 (1310 H.) until the end of the Ottoman period.

The *'Ilmiye Sālnāmesi* (Yearbook of the *'Ulemā* Class) — a third type of

almanac — appeared only once in 1918 (1334 Mal.) at the very end of the Ottoman era, but it contains highly valuable information and seems also to be more accurate than the other yearbooks. In it we find the names of — at rough estimation — some 2000 persons who held official *'ulemā* ranks (*merātib-i 'ilmiye*). Of these 19 could positively be identified as being of Palestinian origin; a few more were probably from the region.[2] There is also a list of graduates of the *Ḳāḍīs'* College in Istanbul and their latest posts by 1918. Out of 986 graduates of 60 courses (as from 1855/6 (1272 H.) onwards) 8 were of Palestinian origin: 3 from Jerusalem, 3 from Nablus, 1 from Haifa and 1 from Ramle.[3] For the sake of comparison it should be mentioned that in the same period 4 graduates came from Baghdad, 3 from Aleppo, 2 from Damascus and Tripoli (Leb.) each, and 1 each from Homs and Latakia. The small numbers from Palestine — and from the Arab regions in general — as compared to the hundreds of graduates from provincial towns in Anatolia, may reflect the policy of the *Ḳāḍīs'* College and the Ottoman government, as well as the rather small degree of Ottomanization in the Arab regions of the Middle East; it is interesting to note that all *ḳāḍīs* of Palestinian origin graduated during the reign of 'Abdülḥamīd. The availability of higher religious education in or near one's home country, as well as geographical and linguistic factors probably also played a role.

All the *sālnāmes* discussed suffer from inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the spelling of names and the use of titles and technical terms. Dates in the state's and province's almanacs often differ. However, the major problem is that usually no family names of functionaries are given, which means that this type of source swarms with Muḥammad Efendis and Maḥmūd Efendis. This, of course, reduces their usefulness as handy reference works, but on the other hand, double names—and in particular less-frequent ones—sometimes give us a lead. An Ottoman administrative rank stated may also be helpful in identifying persons. It may even happen that an official whose name is year after year given as 'Abd al-Laṭīf, all at once appears in one of the editions with his family name, which solves the problem. Here external evidence such as the biographies of learned men, local histories or the *sijills* are undoubtedly a rich supplement. Furthermore, family names, or a *nisba* in general, are sometimes mentioned such as in the case of the Damascene *Sharī'a* court officials (in the *sālnāme* of Syria) or in the case of many officials in the *'Ilmiye Sālnāmesi*. As a rule, it would seem that in the case of *'ulemā* the mention of a family name was more important than in the case of other Ottoman administrative personnel.

Compared with known sources which have often been biased towards the larger urban centers, the *sālnāmes* also contain data on smaller towns. In conclusion of this methodological introduction, it should be emphasized that I am using the *sālnāmes* to examine the religious bureaucracy. However, they — and especially the later provincial ones — contain a lot of valuable information on geographical, demographic, economic and social importance.

* * *

Provincial judges are generally called *nā'ibs*; towards the end of the Ottoman period also *ḳāḍīs*.[4] Only in one case was the term *ḥākim-i şer'ī* found, which may have been a temporary appointment.[5] The situation whereby one and the same *nā'ib* was in charge of both the *Sharī'a* court and the civil tribunal came to an end in most places in or around 1910. However, such a combined appointment persisted — according to the *sālnāmes* — in some of the smaller towns.[6]

According to an official regulation in 1873, *nā'ibs* in the Palestine region were appointed for a two-year period.[7] This is what Albert Hourani has defined as "the Ottoman instinct for preventing any subject obtaining too much power or keeping it too long".[8] In many cases we find a *nā'ib* holding office for no more than a year. Probably deaths and transfers account at least partly for these short terms of office, and from the *sālnāmes* it is not even clear whether all appointees actually reached their posts. A computation of all towns and appointments shows that the average *nā'ib's* term of office was about 1.7 years.

Who were these *nā'ibs*, what was their educational and social background and what parts of the Ottoman Empire did they come from? Unfortunately we do not have complete lists or statistics. We have no data whatsoever for Ottomans in general who were appointed by the Ottoman government as a favor or through bribery. However, some patterns do emerge. For instance, there is some useful data in the *'Ilmiye Sālnāmesi*. Fourteen *nā'ibs* serving in Palestine were graduates of the *Ḳāḍīs'* College in Istanbul and/or of the official *'ilmiye* establishment and their places of origin could be established beyond doubt. Two of them came from Istanbul, one from Damascus and one from Latakia; all the others came from smaller towns in Anatolia (and in two cases in Thrace). Of one of them, a *ḳāḍī* of Acre, it is recorded that he was the son of the *muftī* of Bodrum (west coast of Anatolia). It is not surprising, therefore, that the knowledge of spoken Arabic of many of those *nā'ibs* was insufficient. In 1910 one such *nā'ib* was for that reason transferred back to Adana.[9] In 1912 a Palestinian Arabic newspaper devoted special words of welcome to a newly appointed Turkish *nā'ib* whose knowledge of spoken Arabic was good.[10]

There is reason to assume that the Ottoman government was reluctant to appoint *nā'ibs* in their home towns. So far only a few such appointments in smaller towns have been discovered — for instance, somebody of the Fāhūm family in Nazareth and an al-Khayrī in Ramle.[11] Those Palestinians who graduated from the *Ḳaḍīs'* College in Istanbul also held posts (by 1918 or shortly before) elsewhere in such places as Istanbul, Mecca, Jidda, Iskenderun, Homs (Syria) and Khums (Libya), but not in Palestine. One of them was Khalīl al-Khālidī from Jerusalem who occupied several high positions in the office of the *şeyḫ ül-Islām* in Istanbul and who only later, under British rule, became the president of the *Sharī'a* court of appeal in Jerusalem. Similarly As'ad al-Shuḳayrī from Acre (not a graduate of the *Ḳāḍīs'* College) held high Ottoman religious offices outside Palestine.[12]

The screening of a biography of notables during the Mandate reveals four

more names of *ḳāḍīs*: apart from the above mentioned al-Khayrī none of the three others served in their home towns and two of them even held terms of office outside Palestine, respectively in Tripoli (Leb.) and Tobruk.[13] It is interesting to note that all four had first studied at al-Azhar and had later spent some time in Istanbul, where they had continued their studies, taken exams or simply worked in a ministry. Istanbul may have been an important station for those who aspired to a *ḳāḍī*-ship, but it is noteworthy that throughout the period the notable families in Palestinian towns remained orientated towards al-Azhar. And this was even true in the north of the country which was closer to Damascus than to Cairo: the Fāhūms of Nazareth, the Ṭabarīs of Tiberias and the Jazzārs of Acre all sent their sons to al-Azhar.[14]

This brings us to another interesting group, namely the local urban notables. They are the families which traditionally held the positions of *muftī, naḳīb al-ashrāf* or that of *baṣkātib* of the *Sharī'a* court.[15] If the assumption is correct that it was difficult to secure an appointment as *nā'ib* in one's home town, nevertheless more than a few members of these notable families became *nā'ibs* in nearby towns. For instance, there were two Khālidīs from Jerusalem and a Ṭahbūb from Hebron in Bethlehem, a Rāfi'ī from Haifa in Acre, a Fāhūm from Nazareth in Tiberias, a Labābīdī from Acre in Nazareth, and a Naḥwī from Safed in Gaza.[16] There are many more such examples which seem credible, but which could not be established beyond doubt. Even the names of notable families from Damascus are listed: at least it is supposed that two Maḥāsinīs who served respectively in Nazareth and Safed came from that city, and members of the 'Ābidīn, 'Āṣim and 'Abd al-Ghanī families possibly originated in Damascus too.[17]

Several other *nā'ibs* served two or three subsequent terms of office in different Palestinian towns or were reappointed in the same town after a few years. This may be an indication that they came from the region itself and not from other parts of the Empire. At least we suppose that it was the same Na'mān al-Jawharī who was *nā'ib* of Tiberias in 1888-9 (1306 H.), of Banī Ṣa'b (Tulkarm) from 1889/90 till 1890/1 (1307-1308 H.), and then from 1892/3 till 1893/4 (1310-1311 H.). A certain 'Alī Murtaḍā was *nā'ib* of Banī Ṣa'b in 1891/2 (1309 H.), then of Haifa in 1896/7 (1314 H.) and of Nablus from 1900/1 till 1901/2 (1318-1319 H.). A certain 'Abd al-Ḳadir Ḥikmat first served in Banī Ṣa'b from 1900/1 till 1901/2 (1318-1319 H.), then in Jaffa from 1902/3 till 1903/4 (1320-1321 H.) and finally in Hebron in 1904/5 (1322 H.).[18] Such examples also give us some insight into the upward mobility and social status of the positions concerned.

There are also several instances of persons who for a number of years filled the position of *kātib* or *baṣkātib* at a *Sharī'a* court and were then raised to the rank of *ḳāḍī*: a certain 'Abd al-Majīd first appears as *kātib* in Acre during the years 1874/5 and 1875/6 (1291-1292 H.), then as *baṣkātib* in 1878/9 (1296 H.) and finally as *nā'ib* in 1879/80 (1297 H.)[19] And Shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn al-

Mallāḥ, who, it is known, was born in Tripoli in 1882, became *baṣkātib* in Haifa in 1900 and *ḳāḍī* in 1918.[20]

As to the ascendancy of the position of *muftī* very important observations have been made by Porath. There is no doubt that the (temporary) law of 1913 which stipulated that "the *muftīs* stand at the head of their local *'ulemā*" only endorsed an already existing situation.[21] This relates, of course, to a Ḥanafī *muftī*, because where a Shāfi'ī *muftī* existed — in Palestine this seems to have been the case only in Jerusalem and Hebron during the 19th century — his status was inferior to that of his Ḥanafī counterpart. Although cases were found in which a *muftī* held that post for one year only, most *muftīs* served for many years in that capacity, and sometimes even for decades such as the case of Muḥammad Ṭāhir al-Ḥusaynī in Jerusalem, 'Alī Ef. Mīr in Acre and 'Abd al-Salām al-Ṭabarī in Tiberias. Their family backgrounds, often coupled with an extended term of office, gave them a preponderant weight in the *meclis-i idāre* (administrative council) of which they were 'natural', that is to say *ex officio* members. At the end of the 19th century, for instance, the Ottomans felt obliged to exile the *muftī* of Gaza who had undermined the authority of the *ḳā'imaḳām*.[22] So far, however, no evidence has been unearthed of an Ottoman attempt to force a *muftī* from outside upon a town in Palestine; such a rare appointment was made in Damascus in 1860.[23]

A *nā'ib* — as compared with a *muftī* — was generally not of local origin and served in that position only for two years or less; he would have much more difficulty turning his *ex officio* membership in the *meclis-i idāre* into a basis of power. One may even doubt whether *nā'ibs* played any active role on the *meclis*.[24] The *muftī*, in addition to his membership of the *meclis-i idāre*, was often also a member of the local education committee, and the head of the local *awḳāf* committee. An analysis of the composition of local *awḳāf* committees — which will be facilitated by the *sālnāmes* — will probably show that they were dominated by the same local notable families which supplied the *muftī*.[25]

Ottoman waḳf management is a subject which still needs much research; it also falls outside the scope of this paper. For Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre the names of the directors of *awḳāf* are mentioned in the *sālnāmes*, but nothing can be said on their origin and education. They occupied this office generally for a few — in some cases 7 to 9 — years.[26]

* * *

The British Mandate brought about some changes in this Ottoman legacy. The tasks of the Ottoman government and its agencies with regard to Muslim religious affairs were, to a large extent, taken over by the Supreme Muslim Council. The *Sharī'a* court system became completely separated from the civil court system. All *ḳāḍīs* (except for two former Ottoman appointees, both from Tripoli [Leb.]) were of Palestinian origin. They held office for several, sometimes for many years and were occasionally transferred from one town to

another. They might also fall victim to the whims of Ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī and the Supreme Muslim Council he headed. Even though this *muftī* of Jerusalem had a strong personal influence on the management of Muslim religious affairs — in some respects continuing Ottoman precedent — the failure to implement a new regulation for the election of *muftīs* made their numbers dwindle. Moreover, it would seem that Ḥājj Amīn's highhandedness coupled with the fact that more and more towns failed to have a *muftī* brought about a further deterioration in the high social status *muftīs* had enjoyed towards the end of the Ottoman period.[27]

Notes

1 For a survey see Midhat Sertoğlu, *Resimli Osmanlı Tarihi Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1958), s.v. Sālnāme, pp. 280-2. Cf. J. McCarthy and Y.D. Hyde, "Ottoman Imperial and Provincial Salnames", *MESAB*, 13/1 (1979), pp. 10-20, and Klaus Kreiser, "Quellen zur Landeskunde und Geschichte des Jemen in türkischer Sprache", in *Bamberger Geographische Schriften*, vol. 1 (Bamberg, 1978), pp. 93-122.

2 *'Ilmiye Sālnāmesi*, pp. 58-102.

3 They were: Aḥmad Khamāsh Ef. from Nablus (1295), p. 701; 'Abd al-Muṭallib Ef. from Jerusalem (1303), p. 707; 'Abd al-Majīd Ef. from Nablus — a former *ḳāḍī* of Jedda (1306), p. 709; 'Abd al-Ḳādir Ef. from Jerusalem — a former *nā'ib* of Khums in Libya (1306), p. 709; Khalīl Jawād (=al-Khālidī) from Jerusalem — mentioned as member of the *Shari'a* Publications Council in Istanbul (1313), p. 715; Ḥasan Ef. from Ramle — a former *ḳāḍī* of Iskenderun (1323), p. 723; Yūnis al-Khaṭīb Ef. from Haifa — 1st advisory *ḳāḍī* of Mecca; Muṭī' Ef. from Nablus — *ḳāḍī* of Homs (1324), p. 724. The Hijra years are the dates of graduation.

4 On *nā'ibs* in general (or *ḳāḍīs*) see: I.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Ilmiye Teşkilatı* (Ankara, 1965), pp. 83-132; *EI²*, s.v. 'Ilmiyye (U. Heyd and E. Kuran); Aref al-Aref, "The Closing Phase of Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem", in M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 337-8. The term *ḳāḍī* is used in the *Devlet Sālnāmesi* for 1334 (in all previous editions the term *nā'ib*) and in the *'Ilmiye Sālnāmesi* (dated 1334 Mal. = 1918).

5 *Sālnāme* for Syria of 1286, p. 64 (Jerusalem), Cf. Aref al-Aref, p. 337 where he seems to indicate that *nā'ib* and *ḥākim-i şer'ī* were synonymous.

6 See the terms *nā'ib ve-isti'nāf maḥkemesi ḥuḳūḳ re'īsi* for Damascus and Beirut (*Devlet Sālnāmes* for 1306 till 1326 [1888/9 till 1908/9]); *nā'ib ve-ḥuḳūḳ re'isi* for Beirut, Jerusalem, Acre and Nablus (*Devlet Sālnāmes* for 1300 till 1305 [1882/3-1887/8]); *nā'ib ve-bidāyet maḥkemesi ḥuḳūḳ re'īsi* for Jerusalem, Acre and Nablus (same source for 1306 till 1326); *ḳāḍī ve-bidāyet maḥkemesi* for Beersheba, Safed, Nablus, Tiberias, Jenin and Nazareth (same for 1334 [1915/6]). According to the *Sālnāme* for Syria the *nā'ib* in many towns headed a *meclis-i- da'vā-ı livā* or a *meclis-i temyīz-i livā* (between 1286 (1869/70) and 1296 (1878/9)). Cf. Iḥsān al-Nimr, *Tārīkh Jabal Nāblus wa'l-Balḳā'*, vol. 3 (Nablus, n.d.), pp. 52-3. On the joint function of *nā'ib* of the *Sharī'a* court and the presidency of the civil court, cf. V. Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine* (Paris, 1896), pp. 5-6. However, it seems that this work heavily relies upon data in the *sālnāmes*. On the disjunction of these functions see a letter from the German vice-consul in Jaffa to his consul-general in Jerusalem (17.10.1910): "Die Tätigkeit des Kadi, welcher bisher im Zivilgericht den Vorsitz führte, wird künftig sich nur auf die Mehkeme-Scherieh beschränken" (Israel State Archives, [I.S.A.] 67/A.XXII.22).

7 G. Young, *Corps de droit ottoman* (Oxford, 1905-6), vol. 1, p. 291.

8 A. Hourani, "The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle east", in K. Karpat (ed.), *The Ottoman State and its Place in World History* (Leiden, 1974), p. 71.
9 Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm, *Dhikrayāt al-Ḥakīm*, vol. 1: *Sūriyya wa'l-'ahd al-'Uthmānī* (Beirut, 1966), pp. 210-11.
10 M. Assaf, *ha-Yaḥasim beyn 'Aravim vi-Yehudim be-Eretz-Yisra'el, 1860-1948* (Tel Aviv, 1970), p. 339.
11 'Abdallāh al-Fāhūm al-Nīnī, *ḳāḍī* of Nazareth. See Aḥmad Samīḥ al-Khālidī, *Ahl al-'Ilm bayn Miṣr wa-Filasṭīn* (Jerusalem, n.d.), p. 38; Muṣṭafā al-Khayrī was for four years *ḳāḍī* of Ramle according to *al-Shakhṣiyyāt al-Filasṭīniyya ḥattā 'ām 1948* (Jerusalem, 2nd ed. of *Man huwa fī Filasṭīn*, 1979), p. 49. See also below.
12 *'Ilmiye Sālnāmesi*, p. 146; al-Khālidī, p. 39.
13 They were Muṣṭafā al-Khayrī (Ramle), Muḥammad Riḍā Dajānī (Jaffa), Yūsuf Ṣidḳī Ṭahbūb (Hebron) and 'Abdallāh Ḳishāwī (Gaza), see *al-Shakhṣiyyāt al-Filasṭīniyya*, pp. 49, 57, 83 and 121.
14 al-Khālidī, pp. 38-40.
15 The Khālidīs traditionally held the position of *baṣkātib* in Jerusalem, see B. Abu Manneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem in the Late 19th Century", in G. Ben-Dor (ed.), *The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict* (Ramat-Gan, 1978), p. 27; Mannā', p. 356 in the present volume.
16 Mannā', p. 355.
17 Cf. R. Roded, "The 'Ulamā of Damascus in the Twilight of the Ottoman Period", *ha-Mizraḥ he-Ḥadash*, vol. 26 (1976), pp. 15-26, in Hebrew.
18 See the *Devlet Sālnāmes* for these years.
19 See the *sālnāmes* of Syria for these years.
20 *al-Shakhṣiyyāt al-Filasṭīniyya*, p. 141. See also the *sālnāme* of Beirut for 1326.
21 Y. Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929* (London, 1974), pp. 186-7.
22 H. Gerber, "The Ottoman Administration of the Sanjaq of Jerusalem, 1890-1908", in *ha-Mizraḥ he-Ḥadash*, vol. 24 (1974), p. 23, in Hebrew.
23 Roded, p. 20.
24 Both the *nā'ib* and the *muftī* could be called upon to fill temporarily the place of an absent *mutaṣarrif*, but the former was the more obvious and the more frequent choice. See the circulars on the archive of the German Consulate in Jerusalem, I.S.A., 67/A.XXX.1[1].
25 For *muftīs* as members of the *ma'ārif meclisi (-komisyonu, -şu'besi)* see the *sālnāmes* of Beirut for 1310 till 1326. This was the case in Beirut, Acre, Tiberias and Safed; in Tiberias and Safed the *nā'ib* too is occasionally mentioned as a member of the education committee. *Muftīs* acting as *evḳāf komisyonu re'īsi* can be found in Beirut, Nablus, Acre and Tiberias (same sources). This was probably also the case in other towns, cf. U.M. Kupferschmidt, "The Supreme Muslim Council, 1921-1937 — Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The Hebrew University (1978), p. 249. In Beirut the *muftī* was also a member of the *yoklama ve-mubāya'a komisyonu* (*sālnāme* for 1310).
26 As to the official titles: *evḳāf muḥāsebecisi* in Beirut and Jerusalem until app. 1326, 1908-9, thereafter *evḳāf müdīri* (see all *sālnāmes*; *evḳāf müdīri* in Acre and Nablus till app. 1326 H., thereafter *evḳāf me'mūru*; see the *Devlet* and Beirut *sālnāmes*). The *sālnāme* of Syria for 1296, 1878-9, mentions an *evḳāf vekīli* for Acre and an *evḳāf muḥāsebecisi vekīli* for Nablus. In Beirut 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Ḥimāde occupied the post of *evḳāf müdīri* from 1888/9 till 1910/11 (1306 H. till 1328 H.); this was the longest tenure found. Maybe he was a relative of Ḥalīl Ḥimāde Paşa who was the Ottoman minister of *evḳāf* around 1908. If, on the other hand, he was a member of the notable Shī'ī Ḥimāde family an explanation is needed.
27 Kupferschmidt, pp. 214-30.

Was There A Feudal System in Ottoman Lebanon and Palestine?*

ALEXANDER SCHÖLCH

THE PROBLEM

In his "Réflexions sur l'usage du mot Féodalité", Claude Cahen states: "La vraie enquête scientifique n'est pas de chercher si une société est ou non féodale, mais en quoi elle l'est ou non, et comment organiquement s'interinfluecent les éléments, féodaux et non féodaux, qui font mouvoir son histoire".[1] This statement seems to invalidate the necessity of posing the question which forms the title of this study. One could indeed concur with Cahen provided that academic agreement about the definition and the geographical and historical dimension of the concept of feudalism had reached an advanced stage. However, we cannot start out from such an agreement in our concrete case. Our principal question, therefore, still has to be rather fundamental. What kind of epistemological interest and value will justify the exercise of trying to answer it? It seems to me that the question has an immediate historiographical and a larger theoretical relevance.

With regard to the historiographical relevance, the study could contribute to the clarification of an unsettled conceptual and interpretative problem. On the one hand we are confronted with the fact that a large majority of the historians who write on the development of Lebanon and Palestine during the four centuries during which this area was part of the Ottoman Empire, make use of the term *feudalism*. Even a considerable number of the authors who deal with Lebanon and Palestine in the 20th century, speak about *feudalism* or *feudal* phenomena. On the other hand, we have to take into account the vehement rejection of the usage of such a terminology as it has been formulated by Chevallier against Harik.[2]

As far as Chevallier attacks the precipitate usage of terms for institutions and social phenomena of preindustrial Europe as applied to apparently similar institutions and phenomena in Lebanon, one has certainly to concur with his criticism. But when he blocks the debate on the trans-European dimension of the concept of feudalism and of its applicability to the Middle East with the general argument that "des mots tels que *fief*, *féodal*, *seigneur*... portent des notions qui correspondent à un tout autre système, à une toute autre culture, à un tout autre esprit, que celles qui permettent de définir et d'expliquer les réalités du Proche-Orient",[3] one can no longer follow him. For Chevallier does not explain his rejection any more than the authors who use the terminology of feudalism in the Lebanese and Palestinian context reflect

systematically upon the concept as such. Chevallier's statement does not emerge from an analytical comparison; it is rather based on the absolutized impression of the historical specificity of his object of investigation.

A different culture and a different spirit, whatever they may be, do not exclude a parallelism of structures or structural elements of social organization. If this would be the case, one could not speak, for instance, of a Polish or Japanese feudalism[4] against the background of the 'classical' period of feudalism in Western Europe (9th to 13th centuries).[5] If we start, however, from the results the debate on feudalism has already reached and according to which Japan has also witnessed a feudal period, it must be regarded as legitimate to pose the question heading this study, depending whether striking similarities of social phenomena can be observed.

One may also hear another objection: The discussion of a Lebanese or Palestinian variant of feudalism is said to be old-fashioned and very traditional at a time when everybody is entering the debate on the Asiatic Mode of Production or on other nonorthodox concepts of 'modes of production'. In the world of scholars, there also exist trends and trend setters who try to set the standards for their trend-conscious colleagues. But to follow them in our present case would simply mean to leave an unsettled problem by the wayside. To leave no doubt: the discussion on the Asiatic Mode of Production[6] (and other 'modes') is very important for the analysis of the larger processes of socioeconomic and political transformationm of the Near East in the context of European penetration, as one needs to have a clear idea of the starting point of this transformation. On the one side, however, the discussion on the *AMP* still moves on a very elevated level of abstraction; on the other side it is certainly no coincidence that it has so far bypassed that part of the Mediterranean periphery we are concerned with whenever it has at all been attempted to anchor the debate empirically. (The Mediterranean examples are taken mainly from Turkey proper and, following Marx, from Algeria.)[7]

Furthermore, I do not believe that the historical analysis of the societies in North Africa and the Middle East can be based on one and the same interpretative concept. Rather one encounters a variety of social, economic, political and administrative structures within the Ottoman Empire in the course of its historical development up to the 19th century. It therefore needs to be stressed that it is meaningful and necessary to grapple with the problem of specific Middle Eastern variants of feudalism. The reward will in any case be a more precise understanding of the society and polity in question. And this alone can be the purpose of conceptual discussions and of the formation of theories. The title question of this study has to be understood in this sense; it definitely leads up to Cahen's statement which has been quoted above.

The theoretical relevance of our discussion results from its being embedded in the debate as to whether *feudalism* has to be the denotation of an historically and geographically singular form of political and socioeconomic organization or whether it can be understood as a potentially universal type of society or

social formation, i.e. whether the concept of feudalism has a trans-European dimension.

Two aspects of this debate have to be distinguished: One is the argument between Marxist and non-Marxist historians about the system of periodization of world history as it has been decreed in its most rigid form by Stalin,[8] and the discussion among Marxist historians about the revision of this legacy. The societies of the Arab and Ottoman Empires are still registered, as far as I can see, under *feudalism* by the vast majority of East European historians. This global application of the concept to the societies of North Africa and the Middle East since the spread of Islam had been rejected by writers such as Rodinson and Cahen.[9] We should also start from this rejection. The understanding of feudalism as a necessary and therefore universal stage of socioeconomic development is ahistorical and nonsensical.

The second aspect of this debate seems to be meaningful, however. To the same extent to which historians of the European Middle Ages of varied provenance and those of non-European societies not yet penetrated by European industrial capitalism try to agree upon structural characteristics of a type of society called 'feudal', the problem of the trans-European dimension of feudalism can be raised in a new form. And to the same extent to which different analytical approaches, different conceptual elements are merged into a synthesis, the question of Middle Eastern variants of feudalism can be asked anew. But how should the question be asked? The next task will be the formulation of a concept of feudalism which will form the basis of our empirical investigation.

The Concept of Feudalism

It cannot be our task to seek out the very image of European feudalism in non-European societies. The construction of the ideal type cannot simply consist in the description of one of the West European societies from the 9th to the 13th centuries apostrophized as 'classical' feudal polities. Rather, we have to start from all societies in the structure and dynamics of which one tends to see basic similarities, and then continue by distinguishing between essential structural characteristics and secondary phenomena. In the present stage of the debate and of theory formation there are a number of West European, East European, Mediterranean, and the Japanese preindustrial societies.

This does not guarantee, however, as a perusal of the literature quickly reveals, that we can already work with a well-tested, uniform concept of feudalism, even less with a theory also covering the genesis and the dissolution of feudal societies. The task of theory formation has not yet been 'completed'.

But in the debate which historians have been carrying on, especially since the late 1950s, a synthetic concept of feudalism is gaining shape which takes up and merges the various earlier approaches which have formed a triad of concepts of feudalism: legal historians among European medievalists have conceptualized

feudalism in the restricted sense of the fief system.[10] They examined the structure of legal relations among the nobility and the functioning of the medieval *regnum*. Social historians, inspired by the French *Annales* school, studied medieval society as a complex whole and developed the type of the feudal society.[11] Marxist historians contributed the concept of a feudal mode of production and social formation, and the interpretation of feudalism as a general stage of socioeconomic development.

Regarding this latter part of the triad, one can read in the *Sachwörterbuch der Geschichte Deutschlands und der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, published in 1969 in the GDR, under the heading *Feudalismus*:

> Sozialökonomische Gesellschaftsformation, deren Grundlage die feudalen Eigentumsverhältnisse bilden. Hauptproduktionsmittel ist der Grund und Boden, der Eigentum der weltlichen und geistlichen Feudalherren ist, während die unmittelbaren Produzenten, die Bauern, den entscheidenden Anteil des Bodens mit eigenen Produktionsinstrumenten selbständig bewirtschaften und durch außerökonomischen Zwang zur Leistung der Feudalrente veranlaßt werden. Der F[eudalismus] entstand zwischen dem 3. und 7. Jh., zuerst in einzelnen Gebieten Asiens, dann Europas; die meisten Länder der Welt sind durch diese Entwicklungsstufe gegangen..., wobei die Feudalordnung noch in vielen Ländern, bes. Asiens und Afrikas — z.T. bis ins 20. Jh. hinein —, weiterbesteht.[12]

Marxist historians in Western Europe, and also some of their colleagues in Eastern Europe, increasingly dissociate themselves from this ubiquitous and dogmatic categorization. Under the heading "The Feudal Mode of Production", Anderson,[13] for instance, describes what one would call in 'ordinary' medievalist parlance the character of the polity, of the society and of the economy of medieval Europe. He explicitly refers to the German historian Otto Hintze who as early as 1929 tried, on the one hand, to develop a synthetic concept of feudalism, especially by incorporating the economic dimension, and who, on the other hand, emphasized the univeral dimension of feudalism despite his rejection of an understanding of feudalism as a general stage of socioeconomic development.[14]

Anderson also stresses the fact that a narrow economic definition would be applicable in reality to the economic basis of extremely different historical societies. Through such a narrow economic approach, we may conclude, a specific feudal mode of production cannot be defined; it can only be determined as such through its embodiment in a politico-legal context. In a more general way, Anderson states: "Pre-capitalist modes of production cannot be defined except via their political, legal and ideological superstructures, since these are what determine the type of extra-economic coercion that specifies them".[15] These 'superstructures' are, in other words, no mere epiphenomena, but constitutive elements of feudalism as a type of society and polity on a particular economic basis.

The synthetic concept of feudalism which we have in mind thus cannot be constructed by simply joining together a number of optional fragments. A real synthesis is needed, a concept with a potentially universal dimension, as Hintze has already conceived. It will then be possible to compare societies with apparently similar structures.

Three spheres have to be taken into account, it being clearly understood that in the course of the analysis a strict separation of these spheres will not be possible:
the political and legal sphere — the organization of rule;
the social sphere — social stratification, social relations and social consciousness;
the economic sphere — production and consumption.
The following conceptualization[16] starts with this latter sphere.

The economic basis of feudalism is the agricultural production, the 'peasant economy'. The means of production are in the possession of self-reliant peasants who work their individual farms geared to the needs of their families. Property in land is conditional, not absolute. The surplus is appropriated by the feudal lord in the form of the feudal rent — in labor, kind and money through extraeconomic coercion, i.e. not only on the basis of economically constituted, but also of politico-legal relations of compulsion and dependence. In return, the feudal lord has to protect *his* peasants. Part of the land over which he thus has control he manages himself, or has it worked directly for himself. The appropriated surplus is predominantly used for consumptive purposes. Trade and commerce are part of this structure of appropriation and consumption. If towns and cities acquire corporate autonomy, if they grow as centers of capital accumulation, of distribution and production, and if thus a dynamic opposition between town and countryside develops, cities become an essential and dynamic factor of the socioeconomic transformation of the feudal system.

The nexus of politico-legal authority and economic control is the essence and consequence of the organization of rule. The basic element is the parcellization of sovereignty. The coherence of the polity (empire, kingdom, principality etc.) is not secured via a central administration and 'state' bureaucracy, but through a network of loyalties culminating in loyalty towards the head of the empire, kingdom etc. as a whole. There is a personal, not a functional, separation of authority which is intrinsically connected with the economic control of the various 'parcels' of rule. Subinfeudation is a common phenomenon. In return for his investiture or for the legitimization of an inherited or usurped position, the feudatory owes loyalty to his overlord, especially allegiance in times of crisis and war. The positions of the feudal lords are, or mostly become, hereditary and divisible; land and rule can thus be further parcellized, necessarily together. If he is not in war, the feudal lord is present at his seat (manor, castle etc.). His power rests on the coercive means at his personal disposal, especially armed horsemen, and on his jurisdictional authority which

is the central modality of wielding political power. His task is not, however, to supervise the observance and execution of general laws and decrees, but to interpret, administer and preserve existing traditional, customary laws.

The type of society which corresponds to these economic and politico-legal structures has recently been characterized as "Ensemble von standischen Klassen",[17] as the social structure not only results from the distribution and control of the means of production; social differentiation is determined economically, politically, and legally. The essential factor of the social order is the juxtaposition of a hierarchical noble estate of warriors on the one side, who legitimize their position with their military functions, i.e. with the protection they afford or ought to afford on various levels of the feudal society, and on the other side of the dependent peasantry. It is the exception that barriers between the distinct orders within the feudal polity can be surmounted. Personal loyalty and allegiance, personal protection and personal dependence are the principles of social relations which are symmetrical above the level of the 'immediate producers' and asymmetrical between peasant and lord. The logic of the asymmetry on this latter level consists in the endeavor to bind the peasants to the soil they work. But serfdom in the more restricted legal sense is not a necessary characteristic of feudalism. Personal dependence manifests itself in a variety of forms.

It is obvious that the elements of this concept of feudalism can only analytically be kept apart; as structural elements of a feudal polity they are overlapping. This appears to be an immanent confirmation of the coherence and usefulness of the concept.

MIDDLE EASTERN VARIANTS?

Introductory Remarks

Before we set out to clarify whether and in what respect we can speak of a feudal system in Ottoman Lebanon and Palestine, some introductory remarks about the geographical and historical delimitations are necessary.

1) The basic assumption underlying this discussion is the fact that in the vast geographical area which politically made up the Ottoman Empire from the 16th to the 19th centuries inclusively, there was no uniform 'social formation' or 'mode of production'. We are confronted, in other words, with regionally limited, varying administrative, social, and economic structures. There existed, e.g., differing forms of politico-legal and socioeconomic organization in Rumelia, in Anatolia, in Mount Lebanon, in the urban regions on the edge of the Syrian desert, in the Nile Valley and Delta, on the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula etc., which cannot be measured with one and the same analytical yardstick.

2) The second remark concerns the fact that some Ottoman areas were politically much more integrated into the Empire than others on which the

hold of the central administration was weak. Mount Lebanon, and during the 17th and 18th centuries also the Palestinian mountains, belonged to these latter areas. Not least on account of geographical factors, local forms of socio-political organization could exist and develop relatively autonomously there, the more so since a process of decentralization had already started in the Ottoman Empire by the end of the 16th century and did not reach its height until the 18th century.[18] The question of a Lebanese or Palestinian variant of feudalism has to be seen in this context of disintegration.

3) The restriction of the discussion to the Ottoman period may be justified by reference to the historical period on which this book concentrates but it also results from the fact that our knowledge of the socioeconomic development of Lebanon and Palestine during the Mamluk period is more limited. But I would like to mention one question which came to mind in this context: Did the implanted European feudal system of the 12th and 13th centuries have any impact on the subsequent politico-legal and social organization of the periphery of the Eastern Mediterranean? During the Crusades, an imported 'classical' feudal system had existed there for nearly two centuries which with the *Assises de Jérusalem* had received a codification of its legal fundaments that has been characterized as "the most lucid and most comprehensive portrayal of an extreme feudal state organization".[19] One would like to know whether or not the structures and institutions of the Crusader period during which European and local principalities in some cases existed side by side, did have effects in and beyond the Mamluk period, for instance in Mount Lebanon. I do not know the answer. There are, however, some hints according to which there were traces at least of the terminology in feudal documents from the period of the Crusaders in Lebanon.[20]

4) The last remark has to clarify two points: When we speak of Lebanon and Palestine in the following paragraphs, we refer in the first place to the *jabals*, the mountain subregions. Furthermore, the title question was not meant to imply that we would necessarily deal with two coherent, interrelated or structurally identical socio-political entities. The nexus between the two areas is rather based on an observation which Porath expresses thus: "The social regime in Palestine during the Ottoman period and even earlier closely resembled that of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, but without an emir".[21] First, the Lebanese case will be investigated, then we shall examine in what respect the Palestinian case differed from it.

Mount Lebanon[22]

It seems to be advisable to begin with the political organization about which information is more comprehensive than about other spheres; the political organization also forms the basic framework.

From its incorporation into the Ottoman Empire (1516) up to the Egyptian occupation (1831-1840), the Lebanon was *de facto* a tributary principality the

area of which expanded or shrank according to the overall relations of power in the region, the political structure of which, however, has in the first instance to be defined internally, i.e. not with reference to Istanbul. It is true that taxes were levied in the name of the sultan, but *de facto* the *amīr* or *ḥākim* handed over a tribute the amount of which varied in accordance with the balance of power of the day, and which sometimes failed altogether to be handed over.

The territory which the *amīr* represented externally, was composed of *muḳāṭa'āt*, of districts the socioeconomic and politico-legal control of which was in the hands of noble families or clans (i.e. patrilinear kinship groups). At the head of these districts or of its subdivisions stood the *muḳāṭa'acı* whose position was defined in relation to the *amīr*, not to the sultan. Only in the case of the *amīr* himself an investiture or confirmation by the sultan or his representatives took place.

The *muḳāṭa'acıs* were a hierarchically organized armed nobility, an estate of noble warriors. The usurpation of, confirmation in, investiture into or expulsion from their positions were internal, local events. In return for their investiture or for the legitimization of their authority, i.e. their politico-legal functions in a delimited area, they owed loyalty and military allegiance to the *amīr*, and they had to collect the apportioned part of the tribute.

The *amīr* represented the entirety of the *muḳāṭa'a* i.e. the principality, which through him was embedded in the larger political entity of the Ottoman Empire. He led the contingents provided by the *muḳāṭa'acı* into war, he administered capital jurisdiction and he mediated between the *muḳāṭa'acıs* in their frequent feuds. He had no right, however, to interfere in the administration of their districts. In any case, he did not have at his disposal the central bureaucratic institutions or military power to be able to do so. Through their personal armed retinue, the *muḳāṭa'acıs* upheld 'public order', administered justice (except in cases of capital crimes), and exercised economic control in their districts. Thus the *amīr*, while he resided in Dayr al-Ḳamar, had power over his palace only, whereas the district in which it was situated was under the authority of the Abū Nakads.

The economic basis of the Emirate was the agricultural and local handicraft which were oriented towards local needs and regional exchange. There was, furthermore, production of exportable silk; the profits from this activity were used for luxury consumption and for the supply of grain and oil from adjacent areas (e.g. from the Ḥawrān and from northern Palestine). There existed small market towns for the local and the limited regional exchange which did not, however, develop into urban centers. The urban centers on the coast and beyond the mountains were normally outside the sphere of the *muḳāṭa'āt*. But in these cities no corporate autonomy could develop; they were rather fixed points of the central power, the counterpoles of the autonomous mountain regions. When the coastal towns became motors of socioeconomic transformation, especially from the 1840s onward, this was an exogenous and externally oriented development.

Within the area of authority of a *muḳāṭa'acı*, the peasants worked their own plots, and partly they worked the land of the *muḳāṭa'acıs* or of other noble landlords. In the latter case, the rent normally consisted of half the produce. Especially on the property of the *muḳāṭa'acıs*, however, the peasants were subject to a number of further dues and burdens. Socioeconomic dependence, therefore, was felt to be particularly oppressive in areas where the land was predominantly in the possession of noble families as in the Kisrawān in the first half of the 19th century.

In this context it seems to be necessary to view critically Volney's account of the sanctity of private property and of the freedom of the peasants of Mount Lebanon in the late 18th century.[23] What is credible from the French traveller's report is the fact that the situation of the peasants was different, and on the whole better, than in other areas of the Middle East through which he travelled. But *de jure*, land was mainly *mīrī* also in Mount Lebanon, and legally the tribute consisted of the *mīrī* tax returns. More than in any other Middle Eastern region, however, the peasants and the noble landlords of Mount Lebanon obviously regarded themselves as *de facto* 'freeholders'. The peasants could hardly conceive of themselves as Ottoman taxpayers, as they did not come into direct contact with the Ottoman fiscal administration.

Rather the peasants were exposed to a multiform, partly irregular, and often excessive appropriation of the surplus they produced by the *muḳāṭa'acıs* while these exempted themselves from paying *mīrī* for their own land. The apportionment of the demands of the *muḳāṭa'acıs* among the families of a village or within a clan was probably rather well organized. The levies in kind, the fees and the corvée services which were demanded and which were to underline the dependence especially of those peasants who worked the land of the *muḳāṭa'acıs*, differed from *muḳāṭa'a* to *muḳāṭa'a* and from village to village according to customary rules; but in their local variants they were obviously rather regularized. Among these were dues in kind on the occasion of certain holidays or of a wedding in the house of a *muḳāṭa'acı*, fees for the use of roads, mills or scales, dues on sheep, on trade and handicrafts, court fees etc. Other manifestations of dependence were the requirement of the lord's consent to marriage and of his permission to move to another place. The general extortion of *mīrī* by the *muḳāṭa'acıs*, sometimes more than once in the same year, was not only the most important, but probably also the most irregular levy; not seldom armed retainers were quartered in a village until the demands had been met (whether, and to what proportion, in kind or in money, we do not know). The *muḳāṭa'acıs* legitimized their policy of appropriation not only with the tributary demands of the *amīr*, but also with the necessity to maintain an armed retinue, to fulfill their political and jurisdictional duties, and to protect and to arm *their* peasants in case of military conflicts.

The *muḳāṭa'acıs* lived in their districts, on their land, at their seat, in their palaces and castles. The *muḳāṭa'a* were hereditable and divisible within the noble 'houses' or clans; in this respect as well, the land and the politico-legal

authority over the peasants necessarily belonged together. The precise understanding of their innate nobility found expression in highly formalized relations among the *muḳāṭa'acıs*. Social barriers were difficult to surmount, marriages were contracted mainly on the same hierarchical level. Thus there existed a formalized hierarchy of nobility, but in principle, the *muḳāṭa'acıs* had all the same authority. Strictly speaking, even the *amīr* was only *primus inter pares*.

Opposite the entirety of the noble families stood the common peasants. The essential social relationship consisted in the affiliation of the peasants with and their loyalty towards the house of the *muḳāṭa'acı* whose duty it was to protect them. Thus the peasants found their central socio-political identity as followers of the *muḳāṭa'acıs* who spoke of them as 'our people' (*nāsunā*). Below this level, the peasants belonged to a clan and to a village, above it to a faction (ḳays or Yaman up to 1711, Yazbakī or Jānbulāṭī afterwards), or to a religious community. When the religious affiliation gained in importance, i.e. when it became an even more important socio-political factor, this was one of the causes of the dissolution of the socio-political system or, to formulate the concluding thesis, of the feudal system in Mount Lebanon.

The confrontation of the criteria elaborated in the second part of this paper with the synoptical presentation of the politico-legal and socioeconomic structures of Mount Lebanon in our view makes it possible and necessary to speak of a Lebanese variant of feudalism. But what are its pecularities and what makes it so difficult to come to an interpretative agreement?

The difficulties are rooted in two closely interrelated aspects. The first is the limit of the capacity for independent evolution of this society because the Emirate was located in an empire whose adjacent provinces were structured differently. Therefore the military-vassalic complex was much less developed and fomalized in Lebanon than in other feudal societies. The Emirate was also too much affected by the economic, political and military developments of surrounding areas and was too small an economic unit that it could be meaningful to ask, for instance, about the specific conditions of the transition to capitalism as one does, with comparative intentions, in the case of Japan. In addition, the political autonomy is only understandable in view of the early trends of disintegration in the Ottoman Empire.

The second aspect (which Chevallier rightly stresses) also concerns the incorporation of the Emirate into the Empire: the fiscal connection with Istanbul. With regard to this point, however, Chevallier insists on legal constructions to such a degree that the interpretation of historical realities becomes distorted. The *muḳāṭa'acıs* were not mere taxfarmers as he implies. Their position was essentially different from that of ordinary *mültezims* who usually had an urban base. In Mount Lebanon, the fiscality was not authentic, mediated through the *amīr* and the tribute he delivered. Nor did the role of the noble families or clans constitute an historical specificity. Such kinship groups also played an important role in early European feudalism and even more so in

Japanese feudalism. These aspects have thus to be characterized as historical variants which do not undermine the main thesis.

The Palestinian Mountains

When we now look into the case of Palestine, at first glance there is much to be said for Porath's statement on the resemblance of its social regime with that of Mount Lebanon, if we consider the parcellization of rule, i.e. the pegging out by the dominant families of areas of socio-political and economic control; the socioeconomic and juridical relations of dependence between the peasants and the 'nobility'; the nobles' conception of themselves, their way of life and their rivalries. The dissimilarities, however, and the deviation from our model concept, begin already with the form of the initial integration into the expanding Ottoman Empire. On account of its strategic and commercial importance (military and trade routes from Damascus to Cairo) Palestine was, in contrast to Mount Lebanon, administratively fully integrated after the conquest, it was in particular covered with *tīmārs* and *zi'āmets*.[24]

But contrary to the still widely used terminology it has to be stressed that these Ottoman 'military fiefs' did not constitute a feudal system,[25] as they served the *immediate* military and fiscal needs of the central administration. Through them, no system of parcellized sovereignty on the basis of a network of personal dependence was established. The *tīmārcus* existed side by side with the governors, they did not necessarily take their place. They fulfilled specific functions in a centralized state, but they exercised no seigneurial jurisdiction and remained essentially external to the rural production. Characteristically, the *tīmār* system declined parallel to the decentralization of the Empire.

Only when this system decreased in importance beginning in the late 16th century (with remnants lasting in Palestine into the 19th century), and when the governors' capacity to influence local events in the Palestinian *jabals* waned, a development set in which could *cum grano salis* be called feudalization.[26] Partially, however, the evolving structures rested on a tribal basis, as many of the new lords whose clans immigrated from the south and the east during the 17th and early 18th centuries were of tribal origin. Nevertheless, the stultifying forms of socio-political, legal and fiscal authority of local lords in the Palestinian *jabals* which were parcelled in a similar way to Mount Lebanon, can be compared to a certain extent with the situation prevailing in the Emirate.

But, and this is the second difference, in Palestine no formalized, coherent whole with a hierarchical top evolved. The sultan, or rather the Ottoman governors, remained direct points of reference for all local lords. There was no *amīr* to deliver the tribute, but the governor of Damascus collected, or tried to collect, the taxes during the annual *dawra*.

In Palestine, there were also heads of noble families who from their castles controlled their districts (though the control of particular villages or districts

was less stable than in Mount Lebanon), who appropriated the surplus produced by the peasants part of which they handed over to the Ottoman governors as taxes, who also administered justice on the basis of customary local norms and principles, who fought each other for the 'rent' and for the control over people (i.e. over potential followers)[27] and who fulfilled their military duties, who in particular contributed to the protection of the *ḥajj* with their retinues and with bodies of armed peasants. But when they were no longer *tīmārcıs*, they fulfilled their military duties in their capacity as district shaykhs and governors appointed by the Ottoman *vālī*. Normally, the position of shaykh was transmitted within the clan. If a *vālī* was successful in depriving a shaykh of his position, more often than not another member of the clan was ready to be appointed in his place.

If we speak of feudalization, we thus do not want to describe a system, but to characterize a process which led to the emergence of a fragmented power structure, to the usurpation of politico-legal authority by local lords combined with direct socioeconomic control of a dependent peasant population. In this process, the nonbureaucratic, personal element which distinguishes it from forms of mere administrative decentralization (like regional autonomy), was predominant. In other words, with a view to developed feudal societies, it is possible to point out feudal elements. The rule of the shaykhs of the Palestinian *jabals* thus differed both from that of the *amīr* and the *muḳāṭa'acıs* of Mount Lebanon and of Ḍāhir al-'Umar and Jezzār Paşa, while it can be compared to that of at least part of the *a'yān* and *derebeys* of Asia Minor and the Balkans.

Concerning the social relationship between shaykhs and peasants, tribal structures and patterns of behavior were obviously stronger in the Palestinian mountains than in Lebanon. In Palestine it seems more apt to speak of clan or tribal solidarity (*'aṣabiyya ḳabīliyya*) and affiliation than of relations of feudal protection and allegiance. Contemporary observers from outside the Palestinian *jabals* were sometimes astonished about the blind obedience of the peasants to their shaykhs.[28] But this is only a question of degree and not of principle differences. It had to do with the relatively recent tribal origin of many Palestinian clans and with their frequent direct contact with Bedouin tribes whom they encountered as enemies, whom they sought as allies in their feuds, or with whom they occasionally sought shelter.

In economic terms, landlordism seems to have been less pronounced in the Palestinian *jabals* than in Mount Lebanon, though this is again a question of degree only. But in large parts of the *jabals* the economic dependence of the peasants on their shaykh seems to have been more of a general "tributary mode", to use Samir Amin's terminology,[29] than of the specific "feudal mode". In the sphere of production there is a further problem. If communal forms of property and cultivation are regarded as a constitutive element of the Asiatic Mode of Production, the question of the significance of the *mushā'* institution in the Palestinian mountains has to be raised when we are trying to determine the character of the socioeconomic structure. *Mushā'* was a mixed form of

production and property: It was communal in the sense that a customary periodical redistribution of the land took place among the families of a village; the working and usufruct of the allocated parcels, however, were always individual/familial. But in Syria on the whole, the *mushāʿ* system had not penetrated the mountain regions or had at least fallen into desuetude there in Ottoman times.[30] This is also true for Palestine. In any case, neither olive plantations and vineyards nor mulberry plantations were redistributed. Individual/familial forms of property and cultivation certainly predominated in the *jabals* of Palestine. The significance of the *mushāʿ* system in the lowlands of Palestine in the late Ottoman and Mandatory periods is not a problem which concerns us here.

During the Ottoman period we thus find feudal elements in the socio-economic and politico-legal structures of the Palestinian *jabals*, but not a fully developed system which would allow us to speak of a variant of feudalism. Administratively, Palestine was to a considerable extent incorporated into the Ottoman administrative setup. Social relations were penetrated by tribal structures and elements; at least in part of the mountains, the appropriation of the surplus was more of a general 'tributary' character. Rather than feudal lords, the shaykhs should therefore be called local lords.

CONCLUSION

This study had a twofold purpose: In the first half, the question of a Lebanese or Palestinian feudal system was considered as part of the general debate on feudalism and a synthetic concept was offered as an instrument to be used in the historiographical discussions which take place especially on Mount Lebanon. The second half of the study tried to show that the Lebanese Emirate indeed constituted a variant of a feudal system, despite the qualifications that have to be made, but that we can only speak of feudal elements, not of a feudal system, in the case of the Palestinian *jabals*. Mount Lebanon, however, should be studied in detail by those interested in the debate on feudalism, especially in a Mediterranean context.

But it cannot be argued too strongly that in the course of European penetration, above all from the 1830s onward, the socioeconomic and administrative structures in both Lebanon and Palestine changed fundamentally. Two differing systems of a peripheral capitalism emerged. Therefore it makes no sense to speak of feudalism or persisting feudal structures in Lebanon and Palestine beyond the 1860s, or even with regard to contemporary phenomena.[31] Such a nomenclature is extremely misleading not only in the case of Palestine where no fully developed feudal system had existed, but also with regard to Lebanon, as it obscures the real social, economic and political structures which evolved after the dissolution of the feudal system. Patronage as a form of power, for instance, is not to be equated with feudalism.[32]

Thus, by investigating the meaning of 'feudalism' and by entering into the historiographical debate on its trans-European dimension, the present study has perhaps contributed to the analysis of the historical societies of the Lebanese and Palestinain mountains, and it may also be regarded as a contribution to the refutation of an inappropriate terminology with regard to social and political phenomena in the 20th century.

Notes

* I would like to thank the Institute of Islamic Studies of the Free University of Berlin, in particular Baber Johansen, Fritz Steppat and Axel Havemann, for having given me the opportunity of discussing the questions raised in this study during a two day seminar.

1 Claude Cahen, "Réflexions sur l'usage du mot Féodalité", *Recherches Internationales à la Lumière du Marxisme*, 37 (1963), p. 212.

2 Dominique Chevallier, "Les cadres sociaux de l'économie agraire dans le Proche-Orient au début du XIX[e] siècle: le cas du Mont Liban", in M.A. Cook (ed.), *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East* (London, 1970); Dominique Chevallier, *La Société du Mont Liban à l'epoque de la Révolution Industrielle en Europe* (Paris, 1971); Iliya F. Harik, "The Iqṭā' System in Lebanon: A Comparative Political View", *Middle East Journal*, 19 (1965); Iliya F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society, Lebanon, 1711-1845* (Princeton 1968).

3 Chevallier, "Les cadres sociaux", p. 344.

4 Witold Kula, *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System. Towards a Model of the Polish Economy 1500-1800* (London, 1976); J.W. Hall, "Feudalism in Japan — A Reassessment", in Heide Wunder (ed.), *Feudalismus* (München, 1974); Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London, 1974), pp. 435-461 ("Japanese Feudalism"); A. Lewis, *Knights and Samurai. Feudalism in Northern France and Japan* (London, 1974); A. Piper, *Japans Weg von der Feudalgesellschaft zum Industriestaat* (Köln, 1976); H.K. Takahashi, "La place de la révolution de Meiji dans l'histoire agraire du Japon", in M. Dobb et P.M. Sweezy, *Du féodalisme au capitalisme: problèmes de la transition*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1977).

5 The notion of 'classicism', however, seems to have been buried by the profession; see Georges Duby, "Féodalités Méditerranéennes", *Le Monde*, Oct. 27, 1978, p. 32 (report on an international conference).

6 Compare Ferenc Tökei, *Zur Frage der asiatischen Produktionsweise* (Neuwied, 1969); Gianni Sofri, *Über Asiatische Produktionsweise* (Frankfurt/Main, 1972); Anderson, *Lineages*, pp. 462-549 (The "Asiatic Mode of Production"); C.E.R.M. (ed.), *Sur le "Mode de Production Asiatique"* (Paris, 1974); L. Krader, *The Asiatic Mode of Production* (Assen, 1975); K.A. Wittfogel, *Die orientalische Despotie* (Frankfurt/Main, 1977), ch. 9.

7 C. Leggewie, "Asiatische Produktionsweise und Unterentwicklung", in B. Tibi and V. Brandes (eds.), *Handbuch 2, Unterentwicklung* (Frankfurt/Main, 1975); S. Divitçioğlu, *Asya Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı Toplumu* (Istanbul 1967); S. Yerasimos, *Azgelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1974); C. Keyder, "The Dissolution of the Asiatic Mode of Production", *Economy and Society*, 2 (1976); Y. Sertel, "Le concept de 'mode de production asiatique' et les interprétations de l'histoire ottomane", *Pensée*, 186 (1976).

8 J.W. Stalin, "Der Feudalismus als Grundtyp der Weltgeschichte", in L. Kuchenbuch and B. Michael (eds.), *Feudalismus — Materialien zur Theorie und Geschichte* (Frankfurt/Main, 1977).

9 Maxime Rodinson, *Islam et Capitalisme* (Paris, 1966), pp. 73-83; Cahen, "Reflexions"; see also Louis Dupree, "Medieval European Feudalism and the Contemporary Middle

East" *Report on Current Research* (Spring 1957), which is, however, a rather superficial paper.

10 A classical example is F.L. Ganshof, *Was ist das Lehnswesen?* (Darmstadt, 1967).

11 The classical work is M. Bloch, *Feudal Society*, 2 vols. (London, 1965).

12 Wunder, *Feudalismus*, p. 185.

13 Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* (London, 1974), pp. 147-153.

14 Otto Hintze, "Wesen und Verbreitung des Feudalismus", in Otto Hintze, *Feudalismus — Kapitalismus* (Göttingen, 1970).

15 Anderson, *Lineages*, p. 404.

16 It is based on the material and the ideas contained in the following works (in alphabetical order): Anderson, *Lineages*; Anderson, *Passages*...; J. Banaji, "The Peasantry in the Feudal Mode of Production: Towards an Economic Model", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 3/3 (1976); Bloch, *Feudal Society*; O. Brunner, "Feudalismus, feudal", *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1975); C.E.R.M. (ed.), *Sur le féodalisme* (Paris, 1974); M. Dobb, *Entwicklung des Kapitalismus — Vom Spätfeudalismus bis zur Gegenwart* (Köln, 1972); Hintze, *Feudalismus*; Kuchenbuch and Michael, *Feudalismus*; Kula, *An Economic Theory*; E. Lederer, "Feudalism as a Structure and Form of Society", *Études Historiques 1970*, publiées à l'occasion du XIII[e] Congrès International des Sciences Historiques par la Commission Nationale des Historiens Hongrois, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1970); P. Sweezy and others, *Der Übergang vom Feudalismus zum Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt/Main, 1978) [The German edition is identical with R. Hilton (ed.), *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism* (London, 1976), except that it contains an additional postscript by R. Hilton; the French edition (Dobb/Sweezy, *Du féodalisme au capitalisme*...) contains all the papers of the English edition except one, plus five additional contributions]; Wunder, *Feudalismus*.

17 Kuchenbuch and Michael, *Feudalismus*, p. 732.

18 See e.g. Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "Changes in the Relationship between the Ottoman Central Administration and the Syrian Provinces from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries", in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds.), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Carbondale, 1977); Albert Hourani, "The Fertile Crescent in the Eighteenth Century", in Albert Hourani, *A Vision of History* (Beirut, 1961).

19 Hans Eberhard Mayer, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Stuttgart, 1965), p. 151.

20 See e.g. A.N. Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon, 1250-1900* (London, 1939), pp. 47-48, footnote 4; but this study should rather be called an ahistorical than a historical work. Compare also Ibrahim Aouad, *Le Droit privé des Maronites au temps des Émirs Chihab, 1697-1841* (Lyon, 1933), pp. 109-112, whose assertions, however, had clear-cut political aims.

21 Y. Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 1918-1929* (London, 1974), p. 9.

22 This section is based on the following works: Aouad, *Le droit privé*; Chevallier, *La société du Mont Liban;* Chevallier, "Les cadres Sociaux"; Claude Dubar et Salim Nasr, *Les classes sociales au Liban* (Paris, 1976); Harik, "The Iqṭā' System"; Harik, *Politics and Change*; M.H. Kerr, *Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840-1868* (Beirut, 1959); Poliak, *Feudalism*; W.R. Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840* (Cambridge, 1963); Y. Porath, "The Peasant Revolt of 1858-61 in Kisrawān", *Asian and African Studies*, 2 (1966); K.S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London, 1965); I.M. Smilianskaya, "The Disintegration of Feudal Relations in Syria and Lebanon in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century", in C. Issawi (ed.), *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914* (Chicago, 1966); T. Touma, *Paysans et institutions féodales chez les Druses et les Maronites du Liban du XVII[e] siècle à 1914*, 2 vols. (Beyrouth, 1971-72).

23 C.F. Volney, *Voyage en Égypte et en Syrie pendant les années 1783, 1784 et 1785*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1825), especially vol. 2, chap. XII-XIII; Aouad, *Le Driot privé*, pp. 247-250 and 265-267 follows in Volney's footsteps.

24 See Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth and Kamal Abdulfattah, *Historical Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the Late 16th Century* (Erlangen, 1977); compare also Robert Mantran and Jean Sauvaget, *Règlements Fiscaux Ottomans, Les Provinces*

Syriennes (Beyrouth, 1951); Amnon Cohen and Bernard Lewis, *Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the Sixteenth Century* (Princeton, 1978).

25 For a discussion of pre-Ottoman feudalism in the Middle East see Claude Cahen, "L'Evolution de l'Iqta' du IX^e^ au XIII^e^ Siècle", *Annales*, 8 (1953); E. Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages* (London, 1976). For the Ottoman Empire, mostly discussed in terms of feudalism, see B.A. Cvetkova, "L'évolution du régime féodal turc de la fin du XVI^e^ jusqu'au milieu du XVIII^e^ siècle", *Etudes Historiques à l'Occasion du XI^e^ Congrès International des Sciences Historiques à Stockholm 1960* (Sofia, 1960); A.G. Gould, "Lords or Bandits? The Derebeys of Cilicia", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 7/4 (1976); H. Inalcık, "Land Problems in Turkish History", *Muslim World*, 45 (1955); V.P. Mutafčieva, "Sur le caractère du Timār ottoman, *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 9 (1959); V.P. Mutafčieva, "L'Institution de l'Ayanlik pendant les dernières décennies du XVIII^e^ siècle", *Études Balkaniques*, 2-3 (1965); Poliak, *Feudalism*; Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1 (Cambridge 1976); A. Sućeska, "Bedeutung und Entwicklung des Begriffes A'yân im Osmanischen Reich", *Südost-Forschungen*, 25 (1966); P.A. von Tischendorf, *Das Lehnswesen in den moslemischen Staaten, insbesondere im Osmanischen Reiche* (Leipzig, 1872); G. Veinstein, "A'yān de la Région d'Izmir et le Commerce du Levant (Deuxième Moitié du XVIII^e^ Siècle)", *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 20 (1975); E. Werner, "Despotie, Absolutismus oder feudale Zersplitterung? Strukturwandlungen im Osmanenreich zwischen 1566 und 1699", *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, (1972/3).

26 The following paragraphs are based on: M. Abir, "Local Leadership and Early Reforms in Palestine, 1800-1834", in M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975); 'Umar aṣ-Ṣāliḥ al-Barghūthī wa-Khalīl Ṭawṭaḥ, *Tā'rīkh Filasṭīn* (Jerusalem, 1923); Omar el-Barghuthi, "Judicial Cours among the Bedouin of Palestine", *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society*, 2 (1922); 'Omar es-Saleh el-Barguthi, "Traces of the Feudal System in Palestine", *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society*, 9 (1929) (these three latter studies are rather chaotic, but they are interesting for some details); A. Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century* (Jerusalem, 1973); Muḥammad 'Izzat Darwaza, *al-'Arab wa-l-'urūba*, vol. 2 (Damascus, 1960); Mrs. E. Finn, *Palestine Peasantry* (London, 1923); Miriam Hoexter, "The Role of the Qays and Yaman Factions in Local Political Divisions", *Asian and African Studies*, 9 (1975); R.A.S. Macalister and E.W.G. Masterman, "A History of the Doings of the Fellaḥin during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century", *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statements*, 1905 and 1906; Iḥsān an-Nimr, *Tārīkh Jabal Nābulus wa'l-Balqā'*, 4 vols. (Nablus, 1961-1975); Poliak, *Feudalism*; Moshe Sharon, "The Political Role of the Bedouins in Palestine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in Ma'oz, *Studies*.

27 Roger Owen (Oxford) has suggested to me that it may be that the surplus which the lords were vying for was so small that what mattered more was control over people (i.e. followers) than over the small amount of wealth which could be appropriated.

28 See Darwaza, *al-'Arab*, p. 224.

29 Samir Amin, *La Nation Arabe* (Paris, 1976), pp. 115-131.

30 Jacques Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient* (Paris, 1946), pp. 98-109; A. Granott, *The Land System in Palestine* (London, 1952), pp. 174-179 and 213-248; Paul J. Klat, "Musha Holdings and Land Fragmentation in Syria", *Middle East Economic Papers* (1957); Dubar and Nasr, p. 28.

31 To give just two examples of this misleading terminology: M. Kischli, *Kapitalismus und Linke im Libanon* (Frankfurt/Main, 1970), pp. 10, 74-75, 100-104; W. Hollstein, *Kein Frieden um Israel. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Palästina-Konflikts* (Frankfurt/Main, 1972), pp. 141-146.

32 Cf. Ernest Gellner, "Patrons and Clients", in Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (eds.), *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (London, 1977).

Social Patterns Among the Urban Elite of Syria During the Late Ottoman Period (1876-1918)

RUTH RODED

> It was not an accident that when Arab nationalism arose in a later age, its leaders were drawn largely from the same religious families whose scholars and divines already appear in the pages of Muradi Khalidi and Husaini, Bakri and Atasi, Mudarris and Jabiri...[1]

In writing these lines, the eminent orientalist Albert Hourani was expressing the commonly accepted view that an oligarchy of urban notable families dominated the politics of Syria from at least the 18th century to the middle of the 20th century. While the persistence of the urban notables as a group, and of certain families in particular, through the upheavals of centuries is remarkable evidence of the survival of traditional social patterns, the emphasis on continuity has obscured the changes which occurred over time in the composition of the Syrian urban elite and in their vehicles of power.

The Ṣamādīs and Bahansīs of Damascus, and the Muwāhibī and Bakhshā families of Aleppo — all prominent in Murādī's biographical collection — no longer appear among the notables of the 19th and 20th century.[2] On the other hand, leading families of the late Ottoman and Mandate period, such as the Nashāshībīs, the Mardams, Ḳuwwatlīs, Rikābīs, 'Aẓmas and 'Asalīs of Damascus, the Martīnīs, Ghazzīs, and Ibrāhīm Paşa family of Aleppo, and the Durūbīs and Raslāns of Homs, were actually "new upstarts" who rose to prominence in the 19th century.[3] Moreover, the Khālidīs and Ḥusaynīs, Atāsīs and Jābirīs, who maintained their primacy in 20th century Syrian and Palestinian politics were no longer just religious scholars and divines, but had obtained the kind of education and pursued careers which would ensure their entry into positions of power.[4]

Social patterns among the urban elite of Syria during the late Ottoman period are examined in an attempt to shed some light on this blend of continuity and change. The conclusions are based to a great extent on the quantitative analysis of biographical material on the notables of Damascus, Aleppo and Homs active during the period 1876-1918.[5] In addition, information on the forefathers and descendants of these notables was collected in order to provide the historical perspective necessary to properly evaluate the social behavior of the urban elite in the last decades of Ottoman rule.

The 19th century has been widely considered to be the advent of the modern age in Syria. It has also been characterized as a period of growing centralization in the Ottoman Empire and of increased penetration by the Ottoman center into the provinces. Professor M. Ma'oz has shown that the Syrian notables were not undermined by Ottoman policies in the *Tanẓīmāt* period, and actually managed to strengthen their position by cooperating with the Ottoman authorities, and particularly by penetrating reform institutions and using them to protect their own interests.[6] It remains to examine how the Syrian urban elite reacted to the changes and policies of the Hamidian and Young Turk periods.

*Innovation and Adaptation**

The social change with the potentially most far-reaching consequence which occurred in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century was the introduction of new educational opportunities which challenged the monopoly of traditional religious learning. Despite the attention focused on Western educational institutions established in the Ottoman Empire and on the Middle Easterners who studied in Europe, only a handful of Syrian urban notables (eleven out of 236 studied) followed this course.[7] Only one of the Syrian notables active during the period considered attended the famed Syrian Protestant College (later the American University of Beirut), and five others studied at the Lazarine College in Damascus.[8] In fact, of all the graduates from the American University of Beirut from 1872 to 1918, seventeen at most were Syrian Muslims from any social class.[9] These figures are not surprising since, as Hisham Sharabi has correctly observed, even a Muslim secularist could never feel quite at home attending a "Christian school," much less undertaking an extended stay in the Christian West.[10] For the majority of more traditionally minded Muslims, the very idea was anathema. Only 11 Syrian Muslim notables visited Europe during this period, whether to study or for other purposes.

For those Syrian Muslims who sought a modern education, the more popular course was to attend one of the new Ottoman schools in the provinces or in Istanbul. But this too presented several problems. First, the language of instruction in the Ottoman schools was, of course, Turkish, not Arabic. Thus, in choosing Ottoman education, a Syrian Arab was not only turning his back on traditional religious learning, but was to a certain extent cutting himeself off from Arabic culture as well.[11] Second, while modern state schools were established in Istanbul as early as 1827-1838,[12] the development of the Ottoman educational system was slow and sporadic and did not reach the provinces until much later. The first state middle schools (the *rüşdiyes*) were established in Syria in the 1850s and 1860s.[13] Despite the promulgation of an ambitious education law in 1869,[14] in 1880, there was only one military high school in Damascus, and aside from trade schools, it was the only institution of its kind in Syria.[15] In 1892, a government high school was opened in Aleppo.[16]

It was not until 1901 that an institution of higher learning — a medical school — was founded in Damascus.[17] This was followed by a military college in 1904 and a law school in 1912.[18] No comparable institutions of higher education existed in Aleppo during the Ottoman period.[19] In Homs, there were four middle schools in 1913,[20] and by the end of the Ottoman period state high schools had apparently been opened in both Homs and Hama.[21] Thus, for most of the period studied, Syrians who pursued Ottoman higher education travelled to Istanbul to attend the War College, the Law School or the *Mülkiye*, the school for civil servants.

Nevertheless, 32.3% of those Syrian notables whose educational background was identified studied in Ottoman civil or military schools. Moreover, as these educational opportunities expanded, Ottoman education became more popular. After 1908, the proportion of those who attended Ottoman schools jumped from 21.0% to 53.2% (see Table 1).

Clearly, the strongest incentive for attending state schools was that they prepared their students for careers in the Ottoman military and bureaucracy. Thus, it is not surprising that 83.9% of those who pursued Ottoman education, later entered Ottoman service (see Table 2). Nevertheless, a few Syrians who remained in religious careers and some other notables also availed themselves of Ottoman public education.

Although traditional religious education was losing ground, its influence on the Syrian urban elite should not be underestimated. Overall, 62% of those notables whose educational background is known had traditional religious education only. In the period 1876-1908, 75.5% of the population were *medrese*-trained, while in the later period the figure drops to 36.9%. It is important to bear in mind, however, that among those who attended Western or Ottoman schools, many received religious education as well. Thus, even those who had modern education were influenced by the religious teachers, particularly in the early, formative years.[22]

In addition to the conservatism of the population and a desire to remain in the Arabic cultural tradition, there were two additional incentives for attending the religious schools. First, Ottoman law exempted students of the *medreses* from military conscription, and during the reign of 'Abdülḥamīd II, this exemption was granted without any qualifying examination.[23] Second, religious education prepared its students for various religious and quasi-religious posts which were still quite prestigious and often lucrative.[24] Moreover, the relatively small number of graduates from the new educational institutions lagged far behind the manpower needs of the Empire. As a result, administrative positions were often given to the only other group in the society with formal education, the *medrese* graduates. Some 30% of those in purely Ottoman administrative careers received religious education only, and in the judiciary and educational administrations, they were more than half (56.7%) (see Table 3).

Another quantitative indicator which reflects innovation or adaptation is the

subject's continuation in the same career as his father (or other elder relative).** Of those notables about whom full information was obtained, 68.7% remained in the traditional family occupation, and almost half of these inherited their post as well. Only three individuals made what I would consider a radical career change. This pattern was equally true of those in the religious and the military-administrative fields, and did not change significantly over time (see Tables 4, 5 and 6). The inheritance of administrative and military posts was much lower than the religious (see Table 5).

Some 30% of the population studied engaged in what I would term adaptive rather than innovative behavior in their career paths. While not following precisely in their forefathers footsteps, they switched to careers which were not a radical departure from traditional family pursuits. The most common pattern was to transfer from traditional, religious, judicial and teaching positions to posts in the new "secular" judiciary and educational system. The son of a *ḳāḍī* became a judge in the new judiciary,[25] and the scion of a family which had taught in the mosques and *medreses* found his place in the new Ottoman school system.[26] This type of adaptive career change could also occur within the lifetime of one individual. As we have seen, traditionally educated *'ulemā* were often called upon to fill posts which were not really that different from their previous pursuits in the legal and educational fields.[27] 'Alā al-Dīn 'Ābidīn (1828-1888) perhaps best exemplifies this blend. Although his early career was firmly in the traditional pattern, he traveled in 1868 to Istanbul where he worked on the codification of Islamic law for the new court system (the *Mecelle*). Returning to Damascus, he was appointed to posts in the religious and *niẓāmī* judiciary. In 1875, he was appointed *ḳāḍī* of Tripoli (Syria) and in 1882, he became a member of the Damascus education committee. He also wrote textbooks for the new Ottoman elementary schools.[28]

The move from religious to *niẓāmī* careers was often the first step in a more radical but gradual change which might proceed over generations. Subsequent members of the same family would switch from the quasi-religious administrative posts to full assimilation in the Ottoman bureaucracy. The Ayyūbī family, for example, were secretaries in the *Sharī'a* courts of Damascus. Although Muḥammad Sa'īd Efendi (d. 1916) continued in this career, his brothers Ibrāhīm Khalīl Efendi and Muḥammad 'Alī Efendi had positions in the new court. Ibrāhīm Efendi's son, Aḥmad Mahdī, undertook an administrative career and rose to the post of deputy governor of the Hijaz. Other Ayyūbīs also rose to prominence in the Ottoman administration and military.[29] Also, while the first members of the family who entered the new quasi-religious administration usually had traditional education only, the next generation would obtain Ottoman schooling with an eye to Ottoman administrative careers. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Jābirī (1864-?) from the prominent Aleppine family of *muftīs* attained posts in the new court system although he had a traditional education. His three younger cousins (sons of the *muftī* 'Abd al-Ḳādir al-Jābirī) studied at the Istanbul Law School and the *Mülkiye* and

pursued Ottoman administrative careers.[30] This process of gradual adaptation continued into the Mandate period and helps explain the popularity of legal and educational careers among the Syrian elite.

The second major adaptive pattern which emerges in the late Ottoman period is the move by members of several Damascus families from teaching positions and other purely religious posts to the religious court system. Full analysis of this phenomenon is outside the scope of this discussion, but it would appear that what we are dealing with is a bid for power by second-level religious families against the older, entrenched notables.[31]

A third type of adaptation is worthy of note, although I would not consider it a career change. This is the switch from traditional positions of socio-political leadership to the new representative bodies.[32] The 'Ajlānī family of Damascus had dominated the key sociopolitical post of *naḳīb al-ashrāf* intermittently for hundreds of years. Darwīsh Efendi Manjak al-'Ajlānī was *naḳīb* and was also described as mayor of the city. His son Muḥammad was mayor, a member of the provincial council, and represented Damascus in the Ottoman parliament. One of Muḥammad's sons was a deputy in the Syrian parliament and minister of education and justice in the late 1940s and early 1950s.[33] This type of adaptation was characteristic of a number of other politically prominent Syrian families and underscores the continuity between traditional and modern representative institutions.

If one form of adaptation is the manipulation of new institutions to conform with traditional realities, the other side of the coin is the use of traditional institutions in adaptive ways. Unfortunately, this type of adaptation has received less attention, at least in part because of the disparaging approach to traditional institutions. One interesting example in the late Ottoman period was an effort to revive and expand Muslim public and private education through the existing *medreses* and the charitable trusts.

The movement to expand Muslim education and religious institutions in Syria was spearheaded by Sultan 'Abdülḥamīd himself as a response to the proliferating Christian institutions as well as for a variety of political reasons.[34] In Damascus, Midḥat Paşa during his brief tenure as provincial governor (1878-1880) urged the local notables to establish a charitable society for the promotion of education and even managed to pressure them to make financial contributions for this purpose. He succeeded in establishing a number of new schools, but by 1912, almost all of them had been closed.[35] Cemīl Paşa, the reforming governor of Aleppo from 1879 to 1886, met with greater success. He established thirteen new state elementary schools and initiated the construction of a new high school.[36]

The interesting aspect of Cemīl Paşa's efforts (and perhaps one of the reasons for his success) was that he established many of the new schools in old *medreses* that had fallen into disuse and financed these and other development projects from the funds of various charitable trusts. Also, he had the active assistance of at least some Aleppine notables. Moreover, there is evidence that

Cemīl Paşa's program in 1881-1883 was part of a broader movement, often initiated by local notables, to revive Muslim education and rejuvenate the waḳf which may not have been unique to Aleppo.

When the first Ottoman public school was founded in Aleppo, it was located in the Manṣūriyya *medrese*. This was possible because the *medrese* which had been built in 1791 was apparently no longer functioning and the administration of the trust had passed into the hands of the *muftī* Taḳī al-Dīn Mudarris (who as we shall see took a special interest in education).[37] In 1881, Cemīl Paşa, following instructions from Istanbul, used the same technique and with funds from the waḳf of the 'Aṣrūniyya *medrese* (which had been closed for two centuries) renovated part of the old building and founded a new elementary school.[38] The next year this method was institutionalized when a bureau of education was set up and charged a committee headed by Ḥājj 'Aṭāllāh Efendi Mudarris (brother of Taḳī al-Dīn Efendi) to investigate waḳfs with no valid documents, take over their properties, and use them for the establishment of new schools.[39] Within two years, twelve new schools were founded in mosques and *medreses* which either were not functioning or whose administration had apparently devolved on the *muftī* or the Muslim court.[40] In 1885, the first director of education who was not an Aleppine was appointed and he concentrated the funds from all the waḳfs under his control in a special budget for this purpose.[41] The new high school whose construction was decided upon in Cemīl Paşa's time, however, was not completed until 1892.[42]

But one should not get the false impression that the government or private individuals were developing public education at the expense of the declining religious institutions. During this period, parallel efforts were made to revive the *medreses* sometimes by the very same people who were involved in the expansion of Ottoman education. Cemīl Paşa himself renovated part of the Khusrawiyya *medrese* which had been destroyed in the 1822 earthquake.[43] Taḳī al-Dīn Efendi Mudarris, the brother of Ḥājj 'Aṭāllāh Efendi who played a key role in Cemīl Paşa's educational policy, dedicated property and his library to the 'Uthmāniyya *medrese*.[44] Their nephew, who also served on the waḳf committee, built a mosque in the new Jamīliyya quarter which the energetic governor developed and therefore was named after him.[45] A number of other Aleppine notables contributed to the revival of religious education during this period, usually through the vehicle of the waḳf[46] and apparently on their own initiative.

Of course, the use of traditional charitable endowments to promote education and to rejuvenate or expand existing institutions was not unique to the late Ottoman period,[47] and therefore, it is difficult to assess to what extent these initiatives were responses to 19th century realities or merely the continuation of age-old traditions. Moreover, in Aleppo there were certain local factors which facilitated this type of development activity. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, the city was revaged by a series of natural disasters and political upheavals, most notable of which was the earthquake in 1822. This

caused the destruction of many religious institutions and urban waḳf properties, and decimated some of the notable families, including religious dignitaries.[48] The poor state of affairs in the city spurred both government authorities and private individuals to develop (among other things) the educational institutions, and apparently freed some of the waḳf properties and institutions for diversion to other purposes. Also, some of the *'ulemā* who were active in these efforts were newcomers who had been brought to Aleppo to reinforce the weakened scholarly community.[49]

While the new waḳf and education administrations were trying to gain control of as many properties and institutions as possible in order to organize these services in a more centralized fashion, their efforts did not proceed without difficulties.[50] It was not until the appointment of Shaykh Yaḥyā Efendi al-Kayyālī as director of waḳfs in 1919 that a systematic and concerted effort was made to reform and revive the *medrese* system of Aleppo.[51]

Nevertheless, this example of the adaptation of traditional institutions to meet new needs is of particular importance because both the waḳf and the *medreses* have generally been viewed (even by Muslim commentators) as bastions of conservatism, decline and waste. Also, the attempts by government authorities to take over local charitable trusts (particularly where the initiators were outsiders) must also be viewed as an effort by the Ottomans to control economic and socioreligious resources.

Ottomanization

In dealing with the question of the Ottomanization of the Syrian urban elite in the 19th century, we are hampered by the lack of comparable data from earlier periods. Assimilation into the Ottoman establishment and the importance of good connections in the capital or with local Ottoman authorities characterized some of the Syrian notables of the 18th and even 16th and 17th centuries.[52] It is difficult to assess, therefore, whether this pattern was increasing in importance in the 19th century.

Of the total population studied, 42% had Ottoman experience (i.e. an extended stay in Istanbul and/or other non-Arab parts of the Empire); 36% are known to have been fluent in Turkish; and 26% had some Ottoman education (32% if we exclude the unknowns). Although the bulk of those with Ottoman education and/or who knew Turkish were Ottoman administrators or military officers, this overlap is not as strong among those with Ottoman experience. As we would expect, the officers and bureaucrats were the most Ottomanized (88.9% of the former and 73% of the latter had Ottoman experience; see Table 7). Half of those in the quasi-religious administration had Ottoman experience and this fits the transitional nature of these posts which we have described. The next most Ottomanized group, although below the overall average, is the "professional notables" i.e. prominent individuals who held neither military, administrative nor religious posts. Some of these were deputies to the Ottoman

parliament, but others visited Istanbul to promote their interests in less institutionalized ways. Finally, 23% of the religious administrators visited the capital, while only 13.8% of the teachers and religious functionaries did so. This finding dovetails with the Ottomanization of key religious posts which Voll has described for the 18th century.[53] Moreover, it supports the hypothesis that the mosques and *medreses* were more independent of government control than the religious judiciary.

Most important, the proportion of Syrian urban notables with Ottoman experience increases from the reign of 'Abdülḥamīd (38%) to the Young Turk period (55%; see Table 8).

Another indication of Ottomanization is the proportion of Syrian notables in the Ottoman bureaucracy and military, particularly in the central government or in non-Arab areas. In a study of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic elite, Professor J.S. Szyliowicz found a slight increase in the percentage of high ranking Ottoman administrators who originated from the Arab provinces during the Hamidian period, followed by a sharp drop after the Young Turk revolution.[54] Working with a different population, we found that 8.9% of the Syrian notables held posts in the central government, and the proportion did not decrease in the period 1908-1918 (in fact, there was a slight increase in the percentage, although the absolute number decreased; see Table 9). Some 41.5% of the population had positions in the Ottoman provincial administration, four of whom reached the post of provincial governor. Of those serving in the provinces, however, more than half were located in their home province, another 27.6% were sent to other Syrian or Arab provinces, and only 14.3% were posted outside the Arab heartland. After 1908, there is a drop in the number and proportion of Syrian provincial bureaucrats. The hardest hit were those on the province (*vilāyet*) and district (*livā*) levels, particularly those serving in their home province (see Tables 10 and 11).

Overall, 7.6% of the Syrian notables were in the Ottoman military, and the number and proportion of Ottoman officers increases sharply in the Young Turk period (see Table 12. This figure does not include the Syrian notables who were conscripted during World War I). Although a minority of the urban elite, the Syrian officers were the most Ottomanized and had an opportunity to make contact with the Young Turk officers who ruled the Empire in its last years.

Thus, while the Syrian urban elite was becoming more Ottomanized and increasingly turning to Ottoman higher education with an eye to Ottoman careers, the number achieving posts in Istanbul was not increasing and in the provinces was drastically cut. Moreover, Szyliowicz's findings indicate that fewer were attaining the highest-ranking posts.

During the reign of 'Abdülḥamīd II, the Ottomanization of the Syrian urban elite was to a great extent reflected on a traditional, noninstitutional level by direct and personal ties with the sultan himself. The meteoric rise to power and

wealth of two famous Syrians — Shaykh Abū'l-Hudā al-Ṣayyādī of Aleppo and Aḥmad 'Izzat Paşa al-'Ābid of Damascus — exemplified this phenomenon. While their backgrounds and careers were very different (and reflect the mixture of values which characterized the sultan's Arab policy), the power which emanated from the sultan through them radiated out over the entire fabric of Syrian urban politics.

In *The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine* published in 1912, Frederick J. Bliss portrayed Abū'l-Hudā al-Ṣayyādī as "a humble shaykh of the Rifā'iyya" and described his career as follows:

> Initiated as a poor young man into the order, Abu l'Huda became at first a faqir, going about chanting and jingling his tambourine. Later he was summoned to Istanbul where his beautiful voice brought him into general notice. Having established his reputation as a holy man with Prince Abdul Hamid by eating a live serpent in his presence, he was appointed his imam or private chaplain, preaching every Friday and interpreting his master's dreams. The influence over the sultan secured him control of religious affairs second only to that of the Shaykh al-Islam. He also became the sultan's astrologer...[55]

Hourani, writing a century later and from a different perspective, views Shaykh Abū'l-Hudā in a more positive light:

> An Arab from the province of Aleppo, he belonged to a family which for at least two generations had had a local reputation in the mystical orders. Gifted with great force of personality, he acquired a far wider fame; traveling first to Baghdad, then to Constantinople, he established a personal ascendancy over Abdulhamid, partly because of his reputation for supernatural powers, partly through his sagacity and political understanding. He played a large part in the sultan's religious policy, and wrote many works, both in prose and poetry...[56]

Shaykh Abū'l-Hudā was a very controversial figure in his own time and as a result there are conflicting versions of many details of his career which had political implications.[57] Although many of the Aleppine notables regarded him as an upstart (and challenged his claim to be a descendant of the Prophet),[58] his cousin 'Alī Khayrallāh (who died in 1872, before Abū'l-Hudā's rise to power) had already attained the post of paramount shaykh of the mystic orders of Aleppo.[59] Also, according to one source, Abū'l-Hudā gained his first important positions in Syria before his first visit to Istanbul.[60] Moreover, the image of an ignorant, primitive mystic (reinforced by the prominent pan-Islamist thinkers of the time who opposed him and his view of Islam) is belied by the fact that he apparently had a pretty broad (although informal) education and was said to know Turkish and French.[61] In the present state of our knowledge about the social role of the mystic orders in Syria, it is impossible to evaluate how influential Abū'l-Hudā's forefathers the Ṣayyādī

shaykhs were, particularly since a major source of information on them was Abū'l-Hudā himself. Nevertheless, even if Bliss' description of the family origins is exaggerated, there is no doubt that Abū'l-Hudā raised himself far above his antecedents.

Abū'l-Hudā is best known for his Rasputin-like influence over Sultan 'Abdülḥamīd (by all accounts a complex and unstable individual), but as Hourani points out he also played a critical role as chief propagandist, defending the sultan's claim to be caliph and calling on Muslims to rally round his throne.[62] He was also involved in 'Abdülḥamīd's program of educational expansion in Syria. At the same time, he used his influence to promote his own interests and those of his family and followers in Syria. With the active support and patronage of the sultan, he raised the Rifā'iyya to the most important Ṣūfī order in Syria, apparently obtaining exemption from military service for the descendants of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Rifā'ī.[63] In Aleppo, he built a *zāwiya* for the Ṣayyādiyya, the family order which was headed by his father.[64] He obtained the post of *naḳīb al-ashraf* and he, his brother and grandson filled the position.[65] Perhaps most important, in 1898, he brought about the appointment of his protégé Shaykh Muḥammad al-'Ubaysī (son of a merchant from Hama) as *muftī* in place of the local candidate who was nominated by the provincial governor.[66] As *muftī* and as agent of Abū'l-Hudā, Shaykh Muḥammad had a very powerful position in the city and amassed great wealth. He controlled a large number of religious trusts, and worked for their renovation and expansion. In fact, he managed to build such a reputation that he remained *muftī* even after his patron's demise and to the end of the Ottoman period.

As a result of his personal influence with the sultan, Shaykh Abū'l-Hudā was able to dominate the political, religious and economic life of Aleppo. While some of the notable families in the city resented his power and were barred from key positions by his intervention, others benefited from it. The Ḳudsīs had abandoned the post of *naḳīb* and switched to Ottoman careers before the rise of Ṣayyādī power. 'Abd al-Ḳādir Efendi al-Ḳudsī built a *zāwiya* for Abū'l-Hudā's father in Aleppo and had his own links to the Ottoman establishment. He had close ties with Abū'l-Hudā and served as secretary to the sultan from 1878 until his death in 1891.[67]

While the effects of Shaykh Abū'l-Hudā's influence persisted after the Hamidian period, he himself was swept out by the Young Turk revolution in 1908 (although he was already a sick man and died shortly after in Istanbul). Most of the Ṣayyādīs left the Ottoman Empire for Egypt and other countries after his death, and his descendants do not appear to have taken a place among the chief notables of Syria.[68]

The career of Aḥmad 'Izzat Paşa al-'Ābid of Damascus, Sultan 'Abdülḥamīd's other Syrian confidant, was almost the complete opposite of that of Shaykh Abū'l-Hudā. The 'Ābids were new upstarts who rose to power in the second half of the 19th century. It was Aḥmad 'Izzat's father Muḥī al-Dīn (Hōlū) Paşa who established the family wealth and prominence, attaining

the post of district governor.[69] Aḥmad 'Izzat was one of those few Syrians who had a Western education (although he also studied with the *'ulemā* of Damascus and completed his Arabic education with Nāṣīf al-Yāzijī).[70] Upon completion of his studies, his father placed him in Ottoman service as a secretary in the information (intelligence?) department. He later moved to the commercial court system and rose through the ranks until he became superintendent of all commercial and mixed courts in Istanbul. In 1895, he was appointed secretary to the sultan, and is best known for his central role in initiating the Hijaz railroad project which had religious, political and strategic aspects.

Aḥmad 'Izzat Paşa used his position and influence to place his brother, his brother-in-law and his nephew in high Ottoman posts and to acquire a vast fortune. His son Muḥammad 'Alī Bey was the only Arab to serve as an Ottoman ambassador. After the 1908 revolution, he was given political asylum by the British, eventually settling in Egypt (where he is said to have supported the Arab nationalist societies). Unlike the Şayyādīs, however, the 'Ābid family later returned to Damascus and took up prominent positions (Muḥammad 'Alī Bey was President of Syria).[71]

'Izzat Paşa was the center of a network of the most powerful notable families in Damascus who were linked by ties of marriage, and by connections with the sultan and the Hijaz railroad project. His son was married to a sister of 'Abd al-Raḥmān Paşa al-Yūsuf who commanded the *ḥajj* pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of the Hijaz,[72] and his sister was married to 'Alī Paşa al-Jazā'irī, son of the Amīr 'Abd al-Ḳādir whose older brother Muḥī al-Dīn Paşa was also a protégé of Sultan 'Abdülḥamīd.[73] The circle is completed by the fact that 'Abd al-Raḥmān Paşa's nephew was married to 'Alī Paşa al-Jazā'irī's daughter.[74] Moreover, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Paşa's wife was from the 'Aẓm family who were "purveyors to the Hijaz railroad".[75]

When 'Abd al-Raḥmān Paşa al-Yūsuf inherited the position of commander of the *Ḥajj* and a vast fortune from his maternal grandfather, he concentrated in his hands the wealth and influence of two Kurdish families which rose to power in Damascus in the 19th century.[76] Despite these weighty factors in his favor, it was the intervention by 'Izzat Paşa al-'Ābid which brought about his appointment at the age of 22 which was bitterly contested by other Damascus families.[77] Although, in theory, the construction of the Hijaz railroad should have undermined 'Abd al-Raḥmān Paşa's power base, it is clear that he benefited from the project and remained one of the two most powerful men in the city until the end of the Ottoman period (and after). He was a member of the Damascus commission for the railroad (which supervised the construction work) as was his chief rival Muḥammad Fawzī Paşa al-'Aẓm.[78] Also serving on the commission and in charge of the telegraph line to the Hijaz was Ṣādiḳ Paşa al-Mu'ayyad 'Aẓm, who was ADC to the sultan.[79] Ṣādiḳ Paşa had been placed in Ottoman service by his grandfather Aḥmad Mu'ayyad Paşa from the Hama 'Aẓm's (and a Kaylānī on his mother's side) who settled in Damascus and

became one of the richest men in Syria.[80] Little is known about this remarkable man except that he was an "advisor to the sultan" (despite the fact that he apparently had little or no formal education and held no other government posts). Nevertheless, his descendants were prominent Ottoman administrators and landowners, and called themselves Mu'ayyad in addition to the prestigious 'Aẓm name.[81]

The fifth family in the network, the Jazā'irīs, settled in Damascus in 1854 after the collapse of the Algerian revolt against the French headed by 'Abd al-Ḳādir al-Jazā'irī.[82] Already endowed with religious prestige, vast and independent economic resources, the support of some 8,500 Algerians who accompanied them to Syria, and connections with high government circles, they seem to have consolidated their power during the Hamidian period by the same kind of personal ties with the sultan described above. Muḥī al-Dīn Paşa was made ADC to 'Abdülḥamīd and raised to high military rank, although he does not seem to have filled any real military positions nor did he have formal military training.[83] His brother 'Alī Paşa was "carried into spheres of greater influence by his marriage with a sister of 'Izzat Paşa, the mighty Shadow behind the Throne in Constantinople."[84] It was this influence which apparently enabled him to expand the family's land holdings, including lands granted to Algerian immigrants by the Ottoman government.[85]

In short, during the reign of 'Abdülḥamīd II, the Ottomanization of the Syrian urban elite occurred both through new institutions and opportunities, such as Ottoman public education and careers in the Ottoman bureaucracy, and through traditional patterns of personal influence emanating from the sultan. It found its expression in religious revivalism with strong mystic elements as well as in development projects to which the urban notables were far from aloof. Most important are the cases where traditional influence was translated into a base for long-term family prominence, usually by turning to new types of education and Ottoman careers. This was accomplished by Hōlū Paşa al-'Ābid, Aḥmad Mu'ayyad Paşa, and 'Abd al-Raḥmān Paşa al-Yūsuf. It was not achieved by Shaykh Abū'l-Hudā al-Ṣayyādī.

As regards the question of Ottomanization, the Young Turk period is problematic because of the poorer quality and quantity of information available, and because the relations of the Syrian urban elite with the Ottoman center is linked to the difficult and controversial issue of pre-World War I Arab nationalism.[86] Descriptions of this period emphasize that the Turkification, centralization and secularization policies of the Young Turks alienated the Arab population of the Empire and challenged the interests of the urban elite. The demands voiced by the Syrian deputies in the Ottoman parliament and later by delegates to the 1913 Arab Congress in Paris, most of whom were from the notable class, confirm this view. In their call for decentralization and Arab rights, the demand for the appointment of Arabs to high administrative posts in the capital and the provinces and the recognition of the Arabic language take a prominent place.[87] Dawn has suggested that the Syrians who advocated

Arabism were those who did not attain state positions, and that whole families or branches of families may have been reacting to downward mobility.[88]

In this context, the question which concerns us is not the political views and loyalties of the Syrian urban elite, but rather whether the Young Turk policies barred Syrian notables from attaining positions of influence in the Ottoman establishment comparable to those they achieved in the Hamidian period although the two are undoubtedly related. As we have seen, our statistics indicate a mixed picture as to the number of Syrian notables serving in the Ottoman administration and an increase in the military. Of course, the numbers of notables attaining Ottoman positions and the ranks to which they were able to rise may not have satisfied the rising expectations of a generation which had increasingly availed themselves of Ottoman education and other forms of Ottoman experience. Second, as Dawn astutely pointed out, another key question is the impact of the Young Turk regime on the composition of the Syrian urban elite.[89]

The picture which emerges from examination of the biographical material from the Young Turk period is that the advent of a new regime in Istanbul did not bring about a dramatic change in the position of the most powerful Syrian urban families and that they maintained their prominence through Ottoman posts and connections with highly placed Ottoman officials. In Damascus, 'Aẓms, Yūsufs, Mu'ayyads and Jazā'irīs, all of whom had benefited from their ties with Sultan 'Abdülḥamīd, remained in postitions of power, and not surprisingly, were Ottoman loyalists until the downfall of the Empire. The Damascene who attained the highest Ottoman post was Muḥammad Fawzī Paşa al-'Aẓm who was minister of *Evḳāf* in the opposition government of Aḥmed Muḫtār Paşa, and one of the most influential men in the city. His son later wrote quite frankly about Muḥammad Paşa's support and connections with the Ottoman government (despite criticisms of some of the Young Turks policies) and his reservations about the Arab movement.[90] Muḥammad Paşa's main rival for power in Damascus, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Paşa al-Yūsuf apparently did not have any official Ottoman position during the Young Turk period (he was senator in the Ottoman parliament), but his brother was governor of several Syrian districts from 1913 until the end of the war.[91] Moreover, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Paşa was a member of the personal intelligence agency established by Enver Paşa (one of the Young Turk triumvirate) to deal with Arab separatism and European intervention. Because of his influence with the Bedouins of the Syrian desert and the Hijaz, he was charged with winning over the tribes to the Ottoman cause in the face of similar efforts by the Sharifian movement.[92] Ṣādiḳ Paşa al-Mu'ayyad, a high-ranking Ottoman officer, was also an undercover agent for Enver Paşa, as were 'Alī al-Jazā'irī, vice-president of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, and his son 'Abd al-Ḳādir Bey.[93] Even relatives of 'Izzat Paşa, who was so closely associated with the Hamidian regime, continued to hold high Ottoman positions in the Young Turk period.[94] Shukrī Paşa al-Ayyūbī, from an old religious family which had switched to Ottoman careers,

was a high-ranking Ottoman officer and "a prominent advocate of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire."[95]

Nevertheless, it is typical of this complex period (and perhaps of the politics of notables in general) that other members of these same families were leaders of the Arab movement and several were condemned to death, executed or exiled by the Turks during World War I.[96]

In Aleppo and Homs as well, the most powerful families (in particular the Jābirīs and Atāsīs) seem to have maintained their power through attainment of influential Ottoman posts, and there is circumstantial evidence that they were Ottoman loyalists.[97]

The kind of noninstitutional influence which was so critical in the Hamidian period apparently did not disappear during the Young Turks' rule. But, as the center of power moved from the sultan's palace to the clique of Young Turk officers, personal ties between Syrians and prominent Young Turks from their schooldays in the War College and *Mülkiye* or from postings together took the place of the network of influence emanating from 'Abdülḥamīd. Thus, in addition to the older families who took advantage of Ottoman careers and connections, there is a group of "new upstarts" who rose to power in the 19th century through the Ottoman military and bureaucracy. Although the founders of these families had sometimes taken the first steps up the ladder of mobility earlier in the 19th century, during the Young Turk period they enhanced and consolidated their position.

The personal ties of some of these new upstarts with Young Turk officers is perhaps best exemplified by the career of Maḥmūd Kāmil Paşa al-'Ayntābī, the most highly placed Aleppine at the end of the Ottoman period.[98] The son of an effendi who settled in Aleppo in 1853 and obtained a key administrative post, Maḥmūd Kāmil was a classmate of Enver Paşa at the Staff College in Istanbul. During the Ottoman action against the Yemeni revolt, he became known to other influential Young Turk officers and eventually held important posts in the War Ministry. He is best known as the "Hero of Üsküdar" in the Balkan war and he also fought valiantly in World War I, refusing to abandon Istanbul with the other Young Turk leaders.

Yūsuf Bey al-'Aẓma, from a Turkoman family of merchants and landowners, also graduated from the Staff College and commanded the Ottoman army in the Caucasus and later in Istanbul during World War I.[99] (His nephew Nabīh Bey had a similar career and several other 'Aẓmas were Ottoman officers).[100] Another graduate of the War College, 'Ali Riḍā Paşa al-Rikābī was one of the few Syrians to achieve the post of provincial governor.[101] The Rikābī family are descended from a Bedouin tribe of the Syrian desert, but 'Alī Riḍā's great-grandfather, Sulaymān Aġa, was a landowner.[102] His uncle Şāliḥ Paşa had already achieved the post of district governor (*mutaşarrıf*), but 'Alī Riḍā's connections in Istanbul obviously propelled the family even further.

Even in a smaller and more provincial city like Homs, Ottoman connections could increase the influence of relative upstarts to the point where they could

challenge the entrenched position of the older notables and gain prominence on a Syrian scale. The Durūbīs had been merchants in Homs since the 18th century, but in the 19th century 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Paşa (who was apparently an Ottoman administrator of the old style) increased the family's wealth tremendously. His son 'Alā al-Dīn Paşa attended the *Mülkiye* and rose to the rank of governor in the province of Syria.[103] Another *Mülkiye* graduate, Majīd Maẓhar Paşa Raslān, from a Baalbek family, served in various provincial posts during the Ottoman period, and later represented Homs in the Syrian parliament and cabinet.[104]

Despite their policy of secularization (and perhaps because of it), the Young Turks were not unaware of the importance of the post of *muftī* in the provincial cities. In Aleppo, the personal prestige and power of Shaykh Muḥammad al-'Ubaysī was such that he remained *muftī* even after the demise of his patron Abū'l-Hudā and until 1923. Nevertheless, there appear to have been several attempts to oust him from the post, and at least one of his rivals was a Young Turk backed man.[105] In Damascus, we have only a hint of the struggle that was going on for the post of *muftī*, but it seems that the repeated attempts to appoint Sulaymān Jūkhdār and the opposition of the Damascenes to his appointment reflect the same type of intervention by Istanbul.[106] In Homs, the conflict between the Atāsīs and other claimants to the *muftī's* post from the notable families was resolved, according to one source, by the intervention of Cemāl Paşa, the infamous Young Turk governor of Syria and his protégé As'ad al-Shuḳayrī.[107] Although this report by Adham al-Jundī may be exaggerated it dovetails with other clues that indicate that the Atāsīs were supported by the Young Turks.

Nevertheless, we should not forget that the Ottomanization of top religious positions in the 19th and early 20 centuries was not unique but has been identified as early as the 18th century.[108]

***

Despite the importance of Ottoman education, careers and connections during the Hamidian and Young Turk periods for both some of the established families and the new upstarts, it would be erroneous to conclude that the entire Syrian urban elite was going through a process of adaptation and Ottomanization. There is a large group of *'ulemā* and other notables who remained in traditional pursuits and do not seem to have diminished in prominence. In Damascus, and to a lesser extent in Aleppo, ancient and prestigious families whose prominence can be traced back to the 16th century appear in religious posts, as heads of the Ṣūfī orders, and in the representative bodies.[109] Full analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this study but the power of many of these families was connected with the popular appeal, prestige and autonomous economic resources (*waḳfs*) of the mystic orders. The independent power base of these families apparently safeguarded them against the long arm of the government and the vagaries of the times.

As'ad al-Bakrī (d. 1892), for example, inherited control of such vast *wakfs* that he could dispense with government positions.[110]

Second, there was less continuity among the notables of Aleppo even in the religious field than among the elite of Damascus. Part of the reason for this was the series of natural disasters and political upheavals which Aleppo underwent in the 18th and 19th centuries. But the relative prestige, power and independence of the religious elite in the two cities, as well as the ethnic composition of the notables may also explain this difference.

It is clear that the qualities which enabled the notable families to dominate the politics of Syria for centuries stood them in good stead during the late Ottoman period as well. Many established families adapted to changing circumstances and ensured their local position by connections with and assimilation into the Ottoman establishment. Others apparently remained in power because they had resources which were not diminished by the social and political changes of the times. Some fell by the wayside. Most important, infusion of new blood in the form of energetic and ambitious new upstarts contributed to a great extent to the survival of traditional notable power through the Ottoman period and into the 20th century.

Table 1. *Education by Period*

Education[1]	1876-1908	1908-1918	Total
Western	3.5%	9.9%	5.7%
Ottoman	21.0%	53.2%	32.3%
Religious	75.5%	36.9%	62.0%
(Unknown)[2]	(31)	— (21)	— (44)
	100.0% (143)	100.0% (111)	100.0% (192)

Notes:

1 An individual who had Western and religious education was included in the first category.

2 The absolute number of unknowns is indicated, but was not included in the calculations.

Table 2. *Education by Occupation (Column Percentages)*

Occupation	Education			
	Western	Ottoman	Religious	Unknown
Religious dignitary[1]	0.0%	1.6%	22.7%	(3)
Religious Administrator[2]	9.1%	4.8%	32.8%	(4)
Landowner	27.3%	3.2%	0.0%	(5)
Merchant	0.0%	0.0%	4.2%	(6)
Notable-Other[3]	27.3%	6.5%	16.8%	(11)
Ottoman administrator	27.3%	37.1%	9.2%	(8)
Ottoman military	9.1%	25.8%	0.0%	(1)
Niẓāmī judiciary and educational	0.0%	21.0%	14.3%	(6)
	100.0%(11)	100.0%(62)	100.0%(119)	(44)

Notes:
1 Teachers in religious schools and mosque functionaries.
2 Religious court officials, *muftīs* and their deputies.
3 Prominent and wealthy individuals who could not be fit into any other category.

Table 3. *Occupation by Education (Row Percentages)*

Occupation	Western	Ottoman	Religious	Unknown	
Religious dignitary	0.0%	3.6%	96.4%	(3)	100.0 (28)
Religious administrator	2.3%	7.0%	90.7%	(4)	100.0 (43)
Landowner	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%	(5)	100.0 (5)
Merchant	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	(6)	100.0 (5)
Notable-Other	11.1%	14.8%	74.1%	(11)	100.0 (27)
Ottoman administrator	8.1%	62.2%	29.7%	(8)	100.0 (37)
Ottoman military	5.9%	94.1%	0.0%	(1)	100.0 (17)
Niẓāmī judiciary and educational	0.0%	43.3%	56.7%	(6)	100.0 (30)

Table 4. *Continuation in Family Career by Occupation*

Occupation	Same	Adapt	Change	Unknown	
Religious dignitary	86.2%	13.8%	0.0%	(2)	100% (29)
Religious administrator	67.5%	32.5%	0.0%	(7)	100% (40)
Landowner	87.5%	12.5%	0.0%	(2)	100% (8)
Merchant	100.0%	0.10%	0.0%	(1)	100% (10)
Notable-Other	82.8%	12.8%	3.4%	(9)	100% (29)
Ottoman administrator	53.6%	39.3%	7.1%	(17)	100% (28)
Ottoman military	77.8%	22.2%	0.0%	(9)	100% (9)
Niẓāmī judiciary and educational	30.8%	69.2%	0.0%	(10)	100% (26)
	68.7%	29.6%	1.7%	(57)	100% (179)

Table 5. *Inherited Family Post by Occupation*

Occupation	Yes	No	Unknown or Not Relevant	
Religious dignitary	63.0%	37.0%	(4)	100.0% (27)
Religious administrator	52.6%	47.4%	(9)	100.0% (38)
Landowner	25.0%	75.0%	(6)	100.0% (4)
Merchant	50.0%	50.0%	(9)	100.0% (2)
Notable-Other	37.5%	62.5%	(14)	100.0% (24)
Ottoman administrator	7.4%	92.6%	(18)	100.0% (27)
Ottoman military	11.1%	88.9%	(9)	100.0% (9)
Niẓāmī judiciary and educational	16.7%	83.3%	(12)	100.0% (24)
	35.5%	64.5%	(81)	100.0% (155)

Table 6. *Continuation in Family Career by Period*

	1876-1908	1908-1918
Same	68.1%	66.3%
Adapt	30.4%	30.5%
Change	1.4%	3.2%
Unknown	(36)	(37)
	100.0%(138)	100.0%(95)

Table 7. *Ottoman Experience by Occupation*

Occupation	Ottoman Experience Yes	No or Unknown	
Religious dignitary	13.8%	86.2%	100.0% (29)
Religious administrator	23.0%	77.0%	100.0% (47)
Landowner	10.0%	90.0%	100.0% (10)
Merchant	18.2%	81.8%	100.0% (11)
Notables-Other	36.8%	63.2%	100.0% (58)
Ottoman administrator	73.0%	27.0%	100.0% (45)
Ottoman military	88.9%	11.1%	100.0% (18)
Niẓāmī judiciary and Educational	50.0%	50.0%	100.0% (36)
	41.9%	58.1%	(236)

Table 8. *Ottoman Experience by Period*

	Yes	*No or Unknown*	
1876-1908	37.9%	62.1%	100.0%(174)
1908-1918	55.3%	44.7%	100.0%(132)

Table 9. *Position in Central Goverment*

Position in Central Government	1876-1908	1908-1918	Total
Yes	9.8% (17)	11.4% (15)	8.9% (21)
No or unknown	90.2%	88.6%	91.1%
	100.0% (174)	100.0% (132)	100.0% (236)

Table 10. *Position in Provincial Government by Period*

Position in Provincial Government	1876-1908	1908-1918	Total
Vālī	1.1% (2)	2.3% (3)	1.7% (4)
Mutaṣarrıf	5.7% (10)	3.0% (4)	5.1% (12)
Ḳā'ımaḳām	4.0% (7)	7.6% (10)	5.1% (12)
Other *vilāyet*	27.0% (47)	17.4% (23)	22.5% (53)
Other *livā*	2.3% (4)	1.5% (2)	2.1% (5)
Other *ḳażā*	2.9% (5)	6.1% (8)	5.1% (12)
No	55.2%	59.1%	55.9%
Unknown	1.7%	3.0%	2.5%
	100.0% (174)	100.0% (132)	100.0% (236)

Table 11. *Location of Service in Provinces by Period*

Location	1876-1908	1908-1918	Total
Home province	64.0%	48.0%	58.2%
Other Syrian	13.3%	18.0%	14.3%
Other Arab	9.3%	18.0%	13.3%
Anatolia	9.3%	14.0%	11.2%
Balkans	4.0%	2.0%	3.1%
Unk	(3)	(4)	(6)
	100.0% (78)	100.0% (54)	100.0% (98)

Table 12. *Occupation by Period*

Occupation	1876-1908	1908-1918	Total
Religious dignitary	13.8%	12.1%	13.1%
Religious administrator	20.7%	16.7%	19.9%
Landowner	4.0%	4.5%	4.2%
Merchant	5.2%	2.3%	4.7%
Notable-Other	19.0%	13.6%	16.1%
Ottoman administrator	17.2%	22.7%	19.1%
Ottoman military	5.2%	12.9%	7.6%
Niẓāmī judiciary and educational	14.9%	15.2%	15.3%
	100.0% (174)	100.0% (132)	100.0% (236)

Notes

* I have preferred the terms "innovation" and "adaptation" to the widely used "modernization" or "westernization" because I believe they are ambiguous, misleading and value-laden. Innovation is defined as a relatively sharp break with the established ways of doing things. Adaptation is a more subtle type of change which may occur within traditional frameworks. Both innovation and adaptation may be responses to any external change, not necessarily emanating from the West.

** Because of the nature of Middle Eastern family relations, where position and power may be transmitted from grandfather to grandson, from uncle to nephew, or even from older to younger brothers, I have not restricted myself to the father-son comparisons which are generally used in sociological studies.

1 Albert Hourani, "The Fertile Crescent in the Eighteenth Century," *A Vision of History* (Beirut, 1961), p. 59.

2 Muḥammad Khalīl al-Murādī, *Silk al-durar fī a'yān al-ḳarn al-thānī 'ashar* (Būlāḳ, 1291-1301 H.), vol. 1, pp. 172-175; vol. 3, p. 60; vol. 4, pp. 179-183; vol. 1, pp. 9, 192-196; vol. 2, pp. 240-243; vol. 3, pp. 21-24; vol. 4, pp. 3-5; vol. 4, pp. 50-51; vol. 1, pp. 24, 221; vol. 2, pp. 26-30. The last shaykh of the Ṣamadī order I located died in 1812, Muḥammad Jamīl al-Shaṭṭī, *Rawḍ al-bashar fī a'yān Dimashḳ fī al-ḳarn al-thālith 'ashar* (Damascus, 1365/1946), p. 161. Ḥusnī lists a few members of the family who engaged in trade. Muḥammad Adīb al-Ḥusnī, *Kitāb muntakhabāt al-tawārikh li-Dimashḳ* (Damascus, 1346/1928), vol. 2, p. 855. On Muwāhibīs see also Muḥammad Rāghib al-Ṭabbākh, *A'lām al-nubalā' bi-ta'rīkh Ḥalab al-shahbā'* (Aleppo, 1345/1926), vol. 6, p. 510; vol. 7, pp. 65-67, 160, 162, 178; 'Abd al-Razzāḳ al-Bayṭār, *Ḥilyat al-bashar fī tarīkh al-ḳarn al-thālith 'ashar* (Damascus, 1380-1383/1961-1963), vol. 1, pp. 323-342. On the Bakhshā family, see also al-Ṭabbākh, vol. 6, pp. 402, 476; vol. 7, pp. 85-91, pp. 136-137; al-Bayṭār, vol. 2, pp. 708-709.

3 On the new upstarts in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs, see my unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, "Tradition and Change in the Late Ottoman Period: The Urban Notables of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama, 1876-1918", University of Denver (1984). The Nashāshībīs apparently fit into this category as well, although there is some evidence that their prominence may be traced back. Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1918-1929* (London, 1974), p. 213. Gabriel Baer found them mentioned in the Jerusalem *sijill* in the early 19th century.

4 For Khālidīs and Ḥusaynīs see: Zakī Muḥammad Mujāhid, *Al-A'lām al-sharḳiyya fī al-mi'a al-rābi'a 'ashra al-hijriyya* (Cairo, 1368-1369/1949-1950), vol. 4, pp. 159-160; Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament* (Baltimore, 1963), pp. 263, 267; Ali Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler* (Ankara, 1968-1969), vol. 3, pp. 170-171, 505, 585-586; The American University of Beirut Alumni Association, *Directory of Alumni, 1870-1952* (Beirut, 1953), p. 127; Ya'aḳov Shim'oni, *'Arvey Eretz-Yisrae'el* (Tel Aviv, 1946), pp. 211-212, 215-218. On Atāsīs and Jābirīs, see notes 26, 30 and 97 below.

5 For a full explication of the sources and methodology employed, see the first chapter of my thesis.

6 Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861* (London 1968), p. 87; Ma'oz, "Syrian Urban Politics in the Tanzimat Period between 1840 and 1861," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and Asian Studies*, 29, no. 2 (1966), pp. 277-301.

7 For complete figures on education, see Table 1. Practically every Western mission and Eastern church maintained schools in the major cities of Syria, and a small number of Muslim pupils attended some of these schools. For details on Christian schools, see: 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Awaḍ, *al-Idāra al-'Uthmāniyya fī wilāyat Sūriyya, 1864-1914* (Cairo, 1969), pp. 266, 308 (based on the *sālnāme* of 1886); Isabel Burton, *The Inner Life of Syria, Palestine and the Holy Land* (London, 1875), pp. 46-47, 103, 136-137; Georges Samne, *La Syrie* (Paris, 1920), pp. 190, 194, 198-206; H.H. Jessup, *Fifty-three Years in Syria* (New York, 1910), p. 778; John Murray, *Handbook for Travellers in Syria and Palestine* (London, 1875), p. 450; H.H. Jessup, *The Women of the Arabs* (New York,

1874), pp. 151, 212; Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie* (Paris, 1892), vol. 2, p. 179; K.T. Khairallah, *La Syrie* (Paris, 1912), p. 59; Karl Baedeker, *Palestine and Syria* (Leipzig, 1876), p. 85; Martin Hartmann, *Reisebriefe aus Syrien* (Berlin, 1913), p. 88.

8 The Lazarist mission school for boys, founded in 1775, was the oldest European school in Damascus. 'Awaḍ, p. 266; P. Hitti, "The Impact of the West on Syria and Lebanon in the 19th Century," *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, 2 (1955), p. 612.

9 This figure was gleaned from the American University of Beirut Alumni Directory.

10 Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875-1914* (Baltimore, 1970), p. 22.

11 An extreme case in 'Alī Riḍā Paṣa al-Rikābī who attended the *Ḥarbiye* military college in Istanbul. According to Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī, he didn't even know Arabic. Khayr al-Dīn Ziriklī, *al-A'lām: Ḳāmūs tarājim*, 2nd ed. (Cairo, 1954-1970/1373-1390), vol. 5, p. 100; Khalīl Toṭah (trans.), *Memoirs of Muhammad Kurd 'Ali: A Selection* (Washington, D.C., 1954), p. 87.

12 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1968), p. 84.

13 Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, p. 241; Kāmil al-Ghazzī, *Nahr al-dhahab fī ta'rīkh Ḥalab* (Aleppo, n.d.), vol. 1, pp. 165-166; Ṭabbākh, vol. 3, p. 442.

14 For details on this law see 'Awaḍ, pp. 258-259.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 260-261.

16 Ṭabbākh, vol. 3, p. 480; Ghazzī, vol. 2, p. 317.

17 Roderic D. Matthews and Matta Akrawi, *Education in the Arab Countries of the Near East* (Washington, D.C., 1949), p. 379; A.L. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria* (London, 1969), p. 195; Fahim I. Qubain, *Education and Science in the Arab World* (Baltimore, 1966), p. 432; Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm, *Dhikrayyāt al-Ḥakīm*, vol. 1: *Sūriyya wa'l-'ahd al-'Uthmānī* (Beirut, 1966), p. 59; H.B. Sharabi, "The Syrian University", *Middle Eastern Affairs*, 6 (May, 1955), p. 152. Tibawi, Qubain and Sharabi give the date as 1903; Ḥakīm gives 1904.

18 Tibawi, p. 195; Lewis, p. 182; Matthews and Akrawi, p. 379.

19 Qubain, pp. 435-436; Matthews and Akrawi, p. 402. The first modern institution of higher education in Aleppo was the Aleppo College founded in 'Ayntāb in 1876 and transferred to Aleppo after World War I.

20 M. Hartmann, p. 88.

21 Ẓāfir al-Atāsī graduated from the *i'dādī* school of Homs in 1911, *Man huwa fī Sūriyya* (Damascus, 1951), p. 20. The *i'dādiye* of Hama is mentioned in Jean Gaulmier, "Notes sur le mouvement syndicaliste à Hama," *Revue d'Études Islamiques*, 6, no. 2 (1932), pp. 99-101.

22 Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals*, p. 19.

23 Ghazzī, vol. 1, pp. 161-163; Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 297-301; Andreas Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (Chicago, 1966), p. 91.

24 Even in the 1940s students quit the official Lycée of Aleppo in midstudies to transfer to the Khusrawiyya *medrese* because this gave them access to jobs controlled by the department of waḳfs. Jean Gaulmier, "Note sur l'état present de l'enseignement traditionnel à Alep," *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, 9 (1942-1943), p. 32.

25 Shaykh Abū al-Naṣr Efendi al-Khaṭīb (1837-1906) was a *ḳāḍī* and teacher of traditional religious subjects. One of his sons became a *ḳāḍī*, but the other, Sayf al-Dīn (1888-1916), studied law in Istanbul and was appointed to the court of the first instance in Haifa. Muḥammad Jamīl al-Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim a'yān Dimashḳ fī niṣf al-ḳarn al-rābi' 'ashar al-hijrī* (Damascus, 1367/1948), pp. 112-113; Bayṭār, vol. 1, pp. 100-101; Mujāhid, vol. 3, p. 3; Adham al-Jundī, *Shuhadā' al-ḥarb al-'ālamiyya al-kubrā* (Damascus, 1960), pp. 129-130.

26 The Atāsīs of Homs had been teachers in the Nūrī mosque, but Abū'l Hudā (1861-1922) taught in the *rüṣdiye* of the city. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Safarjalānī (1876-), son of an *'ālim* and teacher, initially pursued a traditional education in Damascus, but eventually attended the teachers' college in Istanbul and held important posts in the educational administration throughout the Arab provinces. On Abū l-Hudā al-Atāsī and some of his forebears, see: Jundī, *Shuhadā'*, p. 50; Bayṭār, vol. 1, p. 341; vol. 2, pp. 846-848; on 'Abd al-Raḥmān Safarjalānī and his father: Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, p. 123; *Man hum fī al-'ālam al-'Arabī: Sūriyya* (Damascus, 1957), p. 308.

27 On the participation of Ottoman *'ulemā* in various reform projects, see Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II," *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, vol. 9: *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization* (Jerusalem, 1961), pp. 63-96.

28 Mujāhid, vol. 3, pp. 44-45; Bayṭār, vol. 3, pp. 1335-1337.

29 Shaṭṭī, *Rawḍ al-bashar*, pp. 22, 112; *Tarājim*, pp. 107, 118, 120, 121; Bayṭār, vol. 3, pp. 1344-1345; Ḥusnī, vol. 2, p. 835; Mujāhid, vol. 2, pp. 30-31, 92; Jundī, *Shuhadā'*, p. 184; *Man hum* (1957), pp. 61-62; Çankaya, vol. 3, pp. 730, 823-824; vol. 4, p. 1338; *Who's Who in the Arab World, 1967-1968*, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1968), p. 775.

30 Ḳasṭakī, al-Ḥimṣī, *Udabā' Ḥalab dhā wī al-āthār fī'l-ḳarn al-tāsi'-'ashar* (Aleppo, 1925), pp. 119-120; *Man huwa fī Sūriyya* (Damascus, 1949), pp. 78, 80-81; *Man huwa fī Sūriyya* (Damascus, 1951), pp. 138-139, 141, 142-143; *Man hum* (1957), pp. 121-123; *Who's Who* (1967-68), p. 804; Çankaya, vol. 4, p. 1563; Ṭabbākh, pp. 545-547; Mujāhid, vol. 2, p. 130.

31 Roded, "Tradition and Change".

32 *Ibid.*

33 Ḥusnī, vol. 2, pp. 809-810; Elia Qudsī, "Notice sur les corporations de Damas," *Actes du sixième Congres International des Orientalistes* (Leiden, 1884), vol. 2, pp. 10-11; Amos Gilboa, "The Local Damascus Elite in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" unpublished M.A. thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1967), pp. 46-47, 89 in Hebrew; Shaṭṭī, *Rawḍ al-bashar*, pp. 36, 56, 79, 101, 104, 112, 173; Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, pp. 55, 108, 120; Bayṭār, vol. 1, pp. 168, 341; vol. 2, p. 669; *Man hum* (1957), pp. 410-413; *Who's Who* (1967-68), pp. 766-767.

34 Tibawi, pp. 181-182.

35 Shimon Shamir, "The Modernization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Period of Abdulhamid," in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (Chicago, 1968), p. 376, 'Awaḍ, pp. 263-264; Baedeker (1912), p. 304; Nu'mān Efendī Ḳasāṭlī, *Kitāb al-rawḍa al-ghannā fī Dimashḳ al-fayḥā'* (Beirut: n.n., 1879), pp. 119-120.

36 On Cemīl Paşa's governorship of Aleppo, see Ṭabbākh, vol. 3, pp. 464-480.

37 Ṭabbākh, vol. 3, p. 442; vol. 7, pp. 141-145; Ghazzī, vol. 1, pp. 164-166; vol. 2, pp. 142-144.

38 Ṭabbākh, vol. 3, p. 466; Ghazzī, vol. 2, pp. 141-142. Dr. Butrus Abu-Manneh has pointed out to me that Sultan 'Abdülḥamīd gave specific instructions to establish new schools in *medreses* which had fallen into disuse. He was not, however, the innovator of this technique since as we have seen it was used in Aleppo when the first Ottoman school was established (see previous note). Barron notes that the Ministry of *Evḳāf* made grants for the multiplication of national schools, but it is not clear what period he refers to. J.B. Barron, *Mohammedan Wakfs in Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1922), pp. 44-45.

39 Ghazzī, vol. 1, pp. 165-167.

40 Ṭabbākh, vol. 3, pp. 469-470, 472. The Jardikiyya was an ancient *medrese* which had been endowed with half a village but had been turned into a coffeehouse, Ghazzī, vol. 2, p. 101; Ṭabbākh, vol. 3, p. 469; the Zaynabiyya and Bahramiyya mosques (built in 1003 H. and 919 H., respectively) as well as the 'Uthmāniyya *medrese* (built circa 1142) were to be administered by the court after the descendants and freed slaves of the founder died out. Ghazzī, vol. 2, pp. 146-147, 156-172. It is interesting to note that both the Bahramiyya and 'Uthmāniyya were renovated in the 1880s. A school was also built in the Ḥājj Mūsā mosque but there is evidence that the administration of this institution remained in the hands of the Amīrī family until the end of the Ottoman period. On the other hand, the Ḥājj Mūsā waḳf was listed in the records of the waḳf administration, and this implies that the superintendent of waḳfs obtained control over at least part of the endowment. Ghazzī, vol. 2, pp. 178-179, 610. The complicated but important question of which waḳfs or parts of waḳfs came under the jurisdiction of the government waḳf administration has yet to be answered.

41 Ghazzī, vol. 1, pp. 165-167.

42 Ṭabbākh, vol. 3, pp. 480, 482.

43 Gaulmier, p. 18.

44 Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 441-443.

45 *Ibid.*, pp. 555-559.

46 Aḥmad b. 'Aḳīl al-Zuwaytīnī, *muftī* and *mutawallī* of the Sha'bāniyya *medrese* for thirty-five years until his death in 1898, rebuilt a ruined windmill and twenty-two shops on the property. Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 469-473; in 1882, Muḥammad 'Alī Āġa Yakin dedicated a house to the 'Uthmāniyya and his son later dedicated eleven houses to the *medrese*. The houses had been built from income from *ḥikr* on the waḳf properties. The rejuvenation of the 'Uthmāniyya was really effected by the opening of a new road in 1899 which greatly increased the value of the properties, Ghazzī, vol. 2, pp. 156-172. The ancient and richly endowed Ḥallawiyya *medrese* was in ruins until 1895 when Shaykh Muṣṭafā Ṭalas, *mutawallī* and teacher in the school, dedicated a new waḳf to the institution. From then until 1918, various members of the Ṭalas family dedicated no less than eleven waḳfs to the *medrese*, Ghazzi, vol. 2, pp. 216-229; Gaulmier, p. 27. Shaykh Muḥammad al-'Ubaysī, *muftī* and *mutawallī* of several important waḳfs in the city was actively involved in the renewal of these institutions, including the Khusrawiyya and the Umayya mosque, Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 637-640. The Musrawiyya was the first *medrese* built by the Ottomans in Aleppo (961 H.), but it had been in a state of decline for over one hundred years and had been virtually dismantled during the uprising of 1850. In 1911, the *mutawallī* collected money from the waḳf income and rebuilt portions of the *medreses*, Ghazzī, vol. 2, pp. 116-124; Gaulmier, p. 18. In 1902, M. As'ad Paşa al-Jābirī restored the Dīwātiyya *medrese* which was near his home in the Firafara quarter in order to improve the study of Shāfi'ī law in the city, Gaulmier, p. 29; Ghazzī, vol. 2, pp. 144-145; Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 581-584.

47 A careful study of all the details on the waḳfs of Aleppo in Ghazzī and other sources may show that there was continuous establishment of new institutions, dedication of new endowments to existing mosques and *medreses*, and rejuvenation of declining institutions. Some prominent examples from the first half of the 19th century: In 1809, Ismā'īl Āġa Shurayf built eleven rooms in an ancient mosque and turned it into a well-endowed *medrese* (the Kurnāṣiyya), Ghazzī, vol. 2, pp. 174-175; in 1834, Ibrāhīm Āġa al-Sayyāf built and endowed the Sayyāfiyya *medrese*, Ghazzī, vol. 2, pp. 150-153, 585, 610; Gaulmier, p. 27; in 1839, the Ismā'īliyya *medrese* was built by the governor of Aleppo for Ibrāhīm Paşa, Ghazzī, vol. 2, p. 138; Gaulmier, p. 12; in 1884, Bahā' al-Dīn al-Ḳudsī restored the Ṣāliḥiyya *medrese* (which was called the Bahā'iyya thereafter) and his wife also provided it with a small endowment, Ghazzī, vol. 2, pp. 192, 596; Ṭabbākh, vol. 3, p. 468; vol. 7, pp. 440-441; in 1864, the Ḥisāmiyya *medrese* was renovated, Ghazzī, vol. 2, p. 139. Moreover, there is no evidence that this type of activity was unique to the 19th century. In the 18th century, at least three new major institutions were established: the 'Uthmāniyya *medrese* (1729), the Aḥmadiyya *medrese* (1752), and the Ḥājj Mūsā mosque (1763), Ghazzī, vol. 2, pp. 156-172, 52-58, 178-189; Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 67-72, 76-78, 23-30.

48 In the mid-19th century, *'ulemā* were literally recruited to fill important positions in the city because of the lack of appropriate local candidates. Aḥmad al-Termanīnī, Ḥusayn al-Ghazzī and Ṣāliḥ al-Martīnī are notable examples. Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 297-301, 331-335, 372-386; Ḥimṣī, pp. 5-6, 30-33; Adham al-Jundī, *A'lām al-adab wa'l-fann* (Damascus, 1954), vol. 2, pp. 17-18.

49 The Mudarris family settled in Aleppo in 1785 when Shaykh Ḥasan Efendi was appointed to a teaching position at the 'Uthmāniyya *medrese*, Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, p. 253; Aḥmad al-Zuwaytīnī's grandfather brought the family to Aleppo some time at the end of the 18th or early 19th century, Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, p. 236; Shaykh Bakrī al-Zabrī, who was *muftī* during Cemīl Paşa's educational expansion program, came from a relatively unimportant family of artisans, Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 456-458; Shaykh Muḥammad al-'Ubaysī was the son of a merchant from Hama (see below), Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 637-640. Many of these newcomers rose to prominence through teaching positions in the city's *medreses* and there is undoubtedly a connection between this influx of "new blood" and the construction and renewal of educational institutions. Thus, for example, the Sayyāfiyya *medrese* was built for Shaykh Ḥusayn al-Ghazzī who was brought to Aleppo because of the shortage of qualified *'ulema*, Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 297-301. Ṣāliḥ

al-Martīnī taught at the newly restored Sālihiyya. See notes 47 and 48.

50 In 1912, one Aḥmad Jawdat Efendi of Bursa suddenly appeared in Aleppo claiming the administration of the Sha'bāniyya *medrese* on behalf of alleged descendants of the founder. Until then, the Sha'bāniyya had been administered by the *muftī* or his agent in accordance with the stipulations of the endowment deed, Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 469-473; the animosity of some of the *a'yān* to Cemīl Paşa may also have been related to his attempt to gain control of local waḳfs, Ṭabbākh, vol. 3, pp. 475-479. The problems involved in government attempts to take over local waḳfs are outside the scope of this work but worthy of study.

51 Ghazzī, vol. 2, pp. 163-164; Ṭabbākh, vol. 3, p. 502; Gaulmier, pp. 12, 27.

52 See Roded, "Tradition and Change."

53 John Voll, "Old 'Ulama' Families and Ottoman Influence in Eighteenth Century Damascus," *American Journal of Arabic Studies*, 3 (1975), pp. 48-49.

54 Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Changes in the Recruitment Patterns and Career-Lines of Ottoman Provincial Administrators during the Nineteenth Century," in Moshe Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 249-283.

55 Frederick Jones Bliss, *The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine* (Edinburgh, 1912), pp. 235, 242-243.

56 Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (London, 1970), p. 107.

57 Ṭabbākh does not include him in his biographical collection, perhaps reflecting the Aleppine notables' attitude. The biographies used are from Bayṭār, Mujāhid and Jundī. Ḥusnī, who devotes several pages to a brief survey of the notables of Aleppo, mentions the Ṣayyādīs, and Ghazzī cites them among the quarter notables. Ḥusnī, vol. 2, p. 921; Ghazzī, vol. 2, p. 380.

58 Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, p. 271; Tibawi, p. 184. As a result, Bayṭār's biographies of members of the Ṣayyādī family go into their lineage in excrutiating detail in order to substantiate the claim. Bayṭār, vol. 1, pp. 72-94, 124, 494-497, 589-590; vol. 2, pp. 627-628, 1090, 1096, 1098.

59 Bayṭār, vol. 2, p. 1098.

60 Jundī, *A'lām*, vol. 1, p. 310. Mujāhid reports that he got his first important position (*naḳīb* of Jisr al-Shaghūr) after returning from Istanbul, vol. 3, pp. 117-119. Bayṭār also cites this version, vol. 1, p. 77.

61 *Ibid.* On the attitude of Afghānī, 'Abduh, Kawākibī, and Riḍā to Abū'l-Hudā, see Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, pp. 112, 151, 271, 301-302; Tibawi, p. 184.

62 Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, p. 107; Sharabi, pp. 13-14. Like his protégé Sultan 'Abdūlḥamīd's character has been the subject of debate among his contemporaries as well as historians. I learned of the traumatic experience of the sultan's childhood as well as his almost psychotic fears for his life from the lectures of my late teacher David Farhi. I do not think that the complex emotional relationship which apparently existed between the sultan and Shaykh Abū'l-Hudā in any way conflicts with the view that both men were acting on the basis of concrete political motives.

63 Nadra Moutran, *La Syrie de demain* (Paris, 1916), pp. 429-430, 434; Bliss, pp. 233, 235. The Rifā'iyya and Ḳādiriyya are generally considered the two most popular mystic orders in Syria in the 19th and early 20th centuries and there was apparently a strong rivalry between the two. It is said that the sympathies of the Ḳādiris were with the revolutionists in 1908, and this would imply that they felt they were losing their predominance in the Hamidian period. D.S. Margoliouth, "Ḳādirīya," *The Encyclopedia of Islam* (1st ed.), vol. 2, p. 611. Nevertheless, evidence from the Syrian biographical material shows that the rise of the Rifā'iyya preceded the Hamidian period. Moreover, the relationship between different mystic orders and suborders and the families associated with them is far from clear, and was apparently subject to the constantly changing coalitions and anti-coalitions. See Roded, "Tradition and Change". In this context, it should be noted that the descendents of 'Abd al-Ḳādir al-Kaylānī were also exempted from military service, and that Abū'l-Hudā linked his family in marriage to the Kaylānīs of Hama, the foremost family of the Ḳādiriyya in Syria. Jundī, *A'lām*, vol. 2, p. 312.

64 Ghazzī, vol. 2, p. 379.

65 Jundī, *A'lam*, vol. 2, p. 313; Ghazzī, vol. 2, p. 380; Ḥusnī, vol. 2, p. 921.
66 Ṭabbākh, vol. 4, pp. 637-640.
67 Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 437-440; Bayṭār, vol. 1, pp. 494-497. According to the lists I have compiled the last *naḳīb* from the Ḳudsī family was Bahā al-Dīn who held the post until 1848 and later was mayor and member of the provincial council, Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 440-441. The Aleppine family most often mentioned as resenting Abū'l-Hudā's rise to power are the Kawākibīs. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Kawākibī family position declined in the late 18th and early 19th centuries—the last member of the family to hold the post of *naḳīb* died in 1782 and the last *muftī* died in 1805. Aḥmad Bahā al-Dīn, father of 'Abd al-Raḥmān and Mas'ūd (d. 1882), was a Kawākibī from the maternal line. He achieved the post of *amīn fatwā* in the mid-19th century and was a member of the provincial council, but he never attained the *mufti*-ship. Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 109-114, 187-190, 401-402; Bayṭār, vol. 1, pp. 514-517; Herbert L. Bodman, Jr., *Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760-1826* (Chapel Hill, 1963), pp. 101, 102, 142.
68 As noted earlier, the Ṣayyādīs retained their position as heads of the *takkiyya* and quarter notables well into the 20th century and Abū'l-Hudā's grandson Tāj al-Dīn was *naḳīb* of Aleppo. The most prominent of the Ṣayyādīs after Abū'l-Hudā's death, however, was his son Ḥasan Khālid Paṣa (d. 1938) who was prime minister of Trans-Jordan. See note 51. In 1937, Abū'l-Hudā's remains were brought from Istanbul and reinterred in the family *zāwiya*. Jundī, *A'lām*, vol. 2, p. 312. This along with the positive tone of Jundī's biography apparently reflects rehabilitation of Abū'l-Hudā's image.
69 Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, p. 54; Ḥusnī, vol. 2, p. 853.
70 On Aḥmad 'Izzat Paṣa, see Mujāhid, vol. 3, pp. 13-14; Ziriklī, 2nd ed., vol. 1, p. 163; Ḥusnī, vol. 2, p. 854; Jundī, *Shuhadā'*, p. 161; Ḥakīm, vol. 1, pp. 58-59, 170-171; Tibawi, p. 183; Jacob M. Landau, *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda* (Detroit, 1971), pp. 12-13; René Tresse, *Le pelerinage syrien aux villes saintes de l'Islam* (Paris, 1937), p. 57; Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *The Desert and the Sown* (London, 1970), p. 212; M. Hartmann, pp. 18-19.
71 Additional information on the 'Ābids: M. Kurd 'Alī (Eng.), pp. 102, 104; Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, pp. 117, 119, 122. On Aḥmad 'Izzat's nationalist activities Jundī, *Shuhadā'*, pp. 13, 161.
72 Zahrā' al-'Ābid, described as a wealthy landowner in her own right. *Man hum*, p. 652; Ḥakīm, vol. 1, pp. 58-59.
73 Bell, p. 149. On Muḥī al-Dīn Paṣa, see Bayṭār, vol. 2, pp. 1423-1449.
74 Ḥusnī, vol. 2, p. 852.
75 Khālid al-'Aẓm, *Mudhakkarāt Khālid al-'Aẓm*, vol. 1 (Beirut, 1973), p. 69, William L. Ochsenwald, "Documents as Sources," *Middle East Journal*, 22 (Winter, 1968), p. 79.
76 On 'Abd al-Raḥmān Paṣa's maternal grandfather, Muḥammad Sa'id Paṣa Shimdīn, see Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, p. 88; Tresse, pp. 85-86. On the Yūsufs see Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, p. 59; Ḥusnī, vol. 2, pp. 852-853; Burton, p. 70; Yitzhak Hofman, "Po'alo shel Muḥammad 'Alī be-Suriya" unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1963), pp. 4, 13, 19.
77 Tresse, pp. 85-87, 302, 314.
78 Tresse, pp. 302, 306-307.
79 Mujāhid, vol. 2, p. 31.
80 Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, p. 29.
81 *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 119; Ḥusnī, vol. 2, 755, 795; *Man hum*, pp. 609-611; Jundī, *Shuhadā'*, pp. 94, 96, 156-157; 'Aẓm, vol. 1, *passim*; Jundī, *A'lām*, pp. 185, 189.
82 M. Michaux-Bellaire, "Les Musulmans Algériens au Maroc et en Syrie," *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 1 (March, 1907), pp. 499-511; Shaṭṭī, *Rawḍ al-bashar*, pp. 153, 213; vol. 2, pp. 96, 119; Bayṭār, vol. 3, 304-305, 1423-1449; Mujāhid, vol. 2, pp. 29-30, 72; Ḥusnī, vol. 2, pp. 696, 795.
83 Bayṭār, vol. 3, pp. 1423-1449; Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, p. 119.
84 Bell, p. 149.
85 Michaux-Bellaire, p. 499; Moutran, pp. 437-438.
86 There is a problem in locating full biographies for individuals who died in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s since they are not included in the traditional collections nor in the Who's Who (which first appeared in 1949). Bayṭār deals with the 13th century of the Hijra; Shaṭṭī includes full biographies up to 1907 (although he has a listing to 1931); Ṭabbākh goes to 1926; and Ḥusnī to 1920s. This gap has been partially bridged by

biographical information from the more general collections (Ziriklī, Mujāhid), from Jundī's two works, from the wide variety of other sources used, and finally, by piecing together information about fathers and sons from the two ends of the period. More serious is the fact that beyond the question of Arab nationalism, little work has been done on the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire during the Young Turk period.

87 *Al-Mu'tamar al-'Arabī al-awwal* (Cairo, 1331/1913), pp. 113-120; Sharabi, pp. 124-125; Samné, pp. 70-72.

88 C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism* (Urbana, Illinois, 1973), pp. 170-172.

89 *Ibid.*, pp. 193-194.

90 Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, p. 120; Ochsenwald, pp. 79-80; Tresse, p. 302; 'Aẓm, pp. 18, 22, 26-27, 41, 67-68, 80-87, 90-94. On the government of Muḫtār Paşa, see Lewis, pp. 220-225.

91 Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, p. 123; Ḥuṣnī, vol. 2, 852-853; Çankaya, vol. 3, 525-526; Harry Charles Lukach, *The Fringes of the East: A Journey Through Past and Present Provinces of Turkey* (London, 1913), pp. 195-196, 200-201.

92 Philip Hendrick Stoddard, "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: A Preliminary Study of the *Teşkilāt-i Mahsusa*," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University (1963), p. 176; 'Aẓm, pp. 90-91; Dawn, p. 7.

93 Stoddard, p. 176; on Ṣādiḳ Paşa and 'Alī Paşa, see notes 73, 78, and 79. For two views of the activities of 'Abd al-Ḳādir Bey al-Jazā'irī, see T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (New York, 1962), pp. 390, 405, 447; Jundi, *Shuhadā'*, pp. 191-192.

94 See note 71.

95 Dawn, p. 152; Mujāhid, vol. 2, pp. 30-31; Jundī, *Shuhadā'*, p. 184.

96 Rafīḳ Bey and Ḥaḳḳī Bey al-'Aẓm, Shafīḳ Bey Mu'ayyad, and Salīm Bey and 'Umar al-Jazā'irī were Arab nationalists even by the strictest definition. Dawn, pp. 174-175; Bayṭār, vol. 1, pp. 630-634; *Majallat al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī fi Dimashḳ*, 5 (November-December, 1925), pp. 561-563; Mujāhid, vol. 2, pp. 29-30; Jundī, *Shuhadā'*, pp. 96, 100, 156-159, 190-192. One 'Alī Jawdat al-Ayyūbī is listed as a member of al-Fatāt by Jundī (*Shuhadā'*, p. 14) and of al-'Ahd by Amīn Sa'īd, *al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-kubrā* (Cairo, 1934), vol. 1, p. 46. Since I have not been able to link him directly to the Ayyūbī family, he may be a "poor relation" — the type of person who Dawn notes was susceptible to Arab nationalism.

97 On Jābirīs, see note 30. For Atāsīs active during this period: Mujāhid, vol. 4, p. 72; Jundī, *A'lām*, vol. 1, pp. 48-49; Jundī, *Shuhadā'*, p. 50; Çankaya, vol. 3, pp. 531-532; *Man huwa* (1951), pp. 20, 23. Neither Jābirīs nor Atāsīs are listed by any of the sources as Arab nationalists and those in Ottoman service and military seem to have remained at their posts until the end of the war. On the appointment of Ṭāhir al-Atāsī as *muftī* of Homs by the intervention of Cemāl Paşa, see below.

98 Ṭabbākh, vol. 4, pp. 641-675; Mujāhid, vol. 2, p. 56.

99 Mujāhid, vol. 2, pp. 60-61; Ziriklī, 1st ed., vol. 3, pp. 1174-1175; Ziriklī, 2nd. ed., vol. 9, p. 2; Ḥuṣnī, vol. 2, p. 849.

100 *Man hum* (1957), pp. 436-442; Ḥuṣnī, vol. 2, p. 849.

101 Ziriklī, 2nd. ed., vol. 5, p. 100; Ḥuṣnī, vol. 2, pp. 850-851.

102 Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, p. 115; Ḥuṣnī, vol. 2, pp. 850-851; *Man hum* (1957), pp. 271-274.

103 Jundī, *A'lām*, vol. 2, pp. 72-75; Bell, p. 189; M. Hartmann, p. 83; Çankaya, vol. 3, p. 423; Ḥuṣnī, vol. 2, p. 927.

104 Çankaya, vol. 4, pp. 1218-1219; *Oriente Moderno*, 17 (February, 1937), p. 99; (October, 1937), p. 484; Ḥuṣnī, vol. 2, p. 927.

105 Ṭabbākh, vol. 7, pp. 623-635, 637-640.

106 *Man huwa*, pp. 171-172; 'Awaḍ, p. 119; Ḥakīm, vol. 3, p. 41; *Sālnāme* of the Damascus province 1326, p. 602. I am indebted to my friend and colleague Uri Kupferschmidt for placing this information at my disposal. See his article "A Note on the Muslim Religious Hierarchy in Palestine towards the End of the Ottoman Period" in this volume.

107 Jundī, *Shuhadā'*, p. 40; Jundī, *A'lām*, pp. 48-49. Another source reports that he became *muftī* of Homs in 1912, Mujāhid, vol. 4, p. 72.

108 Voll, "Ottoman Influence in Eighteenth Century Damascus."

109 See Roded, "Tradition and Change."

110 Shaṭṭī, *Tarājim*, pp. 46-47.

Ottoman Affinities of 20th Century Regimes in Syria

C. ERNEST DAWN

In the Arab successor states to the Ottoman Empire, government seemingly has been radically altered in the sixty years which have followed that Empire's collapse. Such perhaps is the common belief today. The socialist ideology of the Ba'thist regimes in Syria and Iraq and, to a lesser extent, their socialist economic measures appear revolutionary when compared to any of their Ottoman or post-Ottoman predecessors. Nevertheless, the Ba'thist regimes share some characteristics with antecedent governments. Most obviously, the Ba'thists have gained and exercised dominance by means of their control of the armed forces, just as their Young Turk precursors did from 1908 to 1918. This characteristic is but a pointer to a more general and more important one. The Ba'thists rose to power through state instruments. Before acquiring power they were members of state organs, the army or the bureaucracy, which they were then able to use to turn out and replace their superiors. This characteristic the Ba'thists share with every government since the Young Turks. In our search for understanding the political process in the Ottoman Arab provinces and their successor states it may be enlightening to compare the roads to power of the successive governments there.

The Ottoman Arab provinces in the latter part of the 19th century were governed by a structure in which the old tradition of sharp distinction between *devlet* and *re'āyā* retained considerable vitality. The tradition had been modified of course by the creation of representative bodies. These organs in the provinces gave voice to a large number of nonofficial elements, but not the vote. Government policies were decided at the center and carried out by officials under direct central control. Provincial governors, military commanders, administrative and judicial officials, central and provincial, all were appointed, assigned, transferred, and rewarded or disciplined by the center. This unitary structure was expected to apply the law and policies which were determined at the center.[1]

In its operation, the Ottoman state had to contend with the obstacles to unity which all state structures face. Like all states, the Ottoman was the final arbiter in a multitude of matters of vital concern to the members of state and society, *devlet* and *re'āyā*, the prime dispenser of benefits to officials and non-officials alike. Always of high importance was the state's position as the chief employer of educated personnel and the provider of livings to a substantial proportion of the educated, both Islamic and Westernized. The possession of

an official position was more than a living, for the Ottoman state was increasingly extending its authority in economic matters. As of old, the possession of agricultural land was decided by the government. Economic benefits of more recent origin which might be obtained through the state included assistance to those who engaged in agriculture, industry, or commerce.[2] The allocation of such benefits is intrinsically a matter about which members of state and society, officials and nonofficials, differ. The words of a 14th century Arab poet, Ibn al-Wardī, "Half the people are enemies of the one who has charge of the government; this, if he is just," were still quoted as apposite by an Ottoman Arab statesman at the beginning of the 20th century.[3] Those who participate in politics, government and opposition alike, always pursue the values of the society as a whole. High among the values of any society is the maintenance of the integrity and honor of the society in its relations with its neighbors. For a century or so, the Ottoman state had not been successful in meeting this requirement with respect to the most visible and troublesome neighbor, the Christian West. The resultant injured self-view had produced ideological ferment and sharpened competition for control of the state.

The state's intrinsic qualities made it the object of competition for the population of both state and society. Neither state nor society, neither official nor nonofficial, could form a collective entity to compete with the other as a unit. Competition for benefits and leadership of the society at large begins with relations and neighbors. Political conflict begins in the family and neighborhood. Political alliances also begin there, and in the nature of things competitors seek friends and allies who can assist them and are of like minds. In the Ottoman Empire, both officials and nonofficials had capabilities to influence decisions, to determine whether or not official actions were carried into effect. The state held the power of legal decision and backed it with the coercive power of the armed forces. But that power was in the hands of individuals, of officials who made decisions, of officers who commanded troops. Society possessed economic resources and human resources which could be organized into coercive force, but these resources also were in the hands of individuals. Thus officials and nonofficials formed primary alliances with each other to compete with similar alliances, the official perhaps aiming first at fellow officials, the nonofficials seeking preeminence over other non-officials.

The Ottoman state structure was the most important instrument of Ottoman politics. Nonofficials could influence officials in a variety of ways, beginning with outright bribery. Perhaps more important was the practice by wealthy nonofficials of providing financial support to allied officials when the latter were involved in conflicts with other officials which necessitated expensive travel.[4] Above all, members of the nonofficial upper class could, and on occasion did, utilize organized violence against the state through their leadership of popular organizations, notably the guilds and the youth

organizations in the towns. Very instructive in this respect is the concern and caution manifested by officials and notables alike toward a troublesome youth leader (*za'īm al-shabāb*).[5] But neither bribery, financial support, nor anti-state violence was sufficient, either singly or in combination. The state's coercive power, if applied with single-minded determination, was overwhelming. Accordingly, nonofficial elements needed allies in the state structure who could prevent the application of counterforce or lessen its severity and who could assist in obtaining the desired command from the center. Conversely, nonofficial discontent and violent opposition could be used by officials as evidence for the incompetence of opponent officials and as grounds for their dismissal.

Officials and nonofficials formed alliances with each other in opposition to similar groupings. Such alliances could be purely informal, sometimes transitory. They might consist of purely personal contacts or of cooperation between officials and nonofficials who were members of consultative representative bodies. But frequently Ottoman political connections between officials and nonofficials were long-lasting. The most effective means of forming this kind of alliance was to enter the corps of officials who staffed the state structure. Ottoman officials were recruited from all regions in the Empire. Provincial officials, at least, were transferred frequently, and a substantial portion of them served in many different areas as they advanced through the ranks. It was not uncommon for officials at the upper and highest levels of government at the center to have served previously in the provinces. Officials took their familial and local party ties and their attendant rivalries into the state structure. As the official moved about, he extended his ties, with non-officials in the places where he served and with officials from other regions with whom he worked. Thus specific personal connections were expanded. One connection might be linked to others, and far-reaching networks of linked connections might be formed which extended through many provinces to the center. Some persons entered state service with the advantage of having membership through origin in such a connection or network, but others were recruited afresh.

The Ottoman state was not sharply demarcated from the society. Instead, state meshed with society in an operative margin, which was constantly fluctuating, where state and society exerted direct mutual pressures. This operative margin was a nexus of relationships between officials and non-officials. The margin began at the *ḳāżā*, extended through the *livā* and the *vilāyet*, and culminated in the fluid complex of connections and networks which embraced the Empire. The margin was populated by people who constituted the upper class. We have an illuminating definition of this class, at the basic level of the provincial captial, from a successful member, Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm: "Included in the upper [class] are the governors and judges (*al-ḥukkām*) and their assistants who have charge of the governmental departments, the chiefs of religion, the *'ulamā*, the lawyers, the physicians, the

people of great wealth, business men, and the notables (*wujāhā'*), whether by their activities or by their membership in a family respected for at least a generation."[6] Significantly, both officials and nonofficials are included. For despite the continuing vitality of the tradition which distinguished *devlet* from *re'āyā* the state could never act independently of society. On the other hand, the state had greater potential coercive power. Thus, the state was the preferred instrument for political actions.

Such was the system by which the Ottoman provinces were governed during the latter part of 'Abdülḥamīd II's reign. Fortunately, the recently published memoirs of a Syrian Arab participant in the system, Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm, add life as well as details to the outline which can be put together from the scattered bits and pieces collected from the readily available previously published sources.

The Syrian provinces were represented at the imperial center by a number of highly placed individuals, each of whom was part of a network of personal connections in Syria. The most famous was Abū'l-Hudā al-Ṣayyādī, a shaykh of the Rifā'ī order, a native of the Aleppo region. Of similar eminence was a Damascene, Aḥmad 'Izzat al-'Ābid. A third was another Aleppine, Shafīḳ al-Ḳūrānī, who was minister of police.[7] Abū'l-Hudā's career is probably illustrative of the political pattern of each. Abū'l-Hudā, whose early history is cloudy, is an example of upward mobility. He was born in a small town or village to a family whose religious eminence was entirely local, of recent origin, and suspect in the eyes of some. Nevertheless, he was taken into one of the most important factions of notables in the great city of Aleppo, a faction which included the great and ancient Ḳudsī family. Political success came to him at an early age. After his first appointment by the government to a minor rural position, he advanced rapidly through progressively more distinguished posts until he became *naḳīb al-ashrāf* of Aleppo. Within a decade, by 1879, he had gained the favor of Sultan 'Abdülḥamīd II, who established him in the capital as confidant and counselor. Abū'l-Hudā by reputation was a man of great personal piety and charm to the religious, and his considerable literary talents were put to good use for the sultan.[8] His political acumen and skill were equally impressive. Before his establishment in the capital, he traveled widely, in Syria at least, visiting notables and *'ulemā* who received him as an honored guest, sometimes for lengthy periods. From his position in the capital, Abū'l-Ḥudā exerted a great deal of influence on appointments to official positions, especially the assignments of *shar'ī ḳāḍīs*, who retained a great deal of importance even in the semisecularized court system inasmuch as they occupied the presidency of the court in the provincial units. A *ḳāḍī* whose term was expiring commonly went to Istanbul to seek a new appointment through Abū'l-Hudā's intervention.[9]

Neither membership in the upper echelon of the central administration nor proximity of origins drew the three Syrians together. High position in the government, even at the center, did not erase involvement in the affairs of the

official's place of origin. Abū'l-Hudā was able to secure the position of *naḳīb al-ashrāf* in Aleppo for a relative and to exclude 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, a member of a more ancient family which had long occupied a leading position. Kawākibī was totally defeated. When his resistance by means of popular demonstrations and recourse to his connections in the administration failed, he went into exile from where he launched radical attacks on the Ottoman state.[10] The official's concern for the politics of his native place of necessity involved him in the affairs of many regions, some of them distant from his place of origin and the capital alike. 'Izzat al-'Ābid, as greatly interested in appointments in Damascus as Abū'l-Hudā was in appointments in Aleppo, supported a Damascene notable for the position of *amīr al-ḥajj*. Abū'l-Hudā had his own Damascene candidate. This case was settled by the local contenders who made their peace and sealed it with a marriage between the families of Abū'l-Hudā's candidate and of 'Ābid.[11]

The third Syrian, Shafīḳ al-Ḳūrānī, does not appear to have been close to his fellow Aleppine, Abū'l-Hudā. Events in Latakia as will be seen, indicate some rivalry. Events after 1908 indicate that the Ḳūrānīs had good relations with one of Abū'l-Hudā's most important Aleppine opponents, the ancient and great Jābirī family. Events after 1908 also indicate that both the Ḳūrānīs and Jābirīs had friendly relations with an Empire-wide network which ultimately became successfully revolutionary.

The interaction of competition between nonofficial elements with competition among a variety of loosely connected networks which extended through the levels of provincial government to the center was the operative force in the Ottoman state. It is significant that most of Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm's recollections of Ottoman politics are of disputes which involve local people and officials, not as opposing forces but as divided groups with rival elements in each who find friends and enemies in the other. Equally significantly the most frequent subjects of his recollections are appointments, the courts, and public security. The three were closely connected. The ability to mobilize and apply nonofficial violence was a source of influence which would be vitiated if the heroes of the youth of the quarter or town were arrested and sent to jail. The local notables needed friends among the provincial officials. The latter, in turn, needed friends among the notables and among other officials, in their own jurisdiction and others, in all levels of administration.

The administrative system could not produce quick effective decisions and frequently could reach no decision at all. There was no definite hierarchy. Instead, each issue was subject to a wide variety of influences. The representative bodies, the governors, and the officials, especially the members of the judiciary, each at three provincial levels, all had a say in any controversial matter, each could question any matter, and each could resort directly to the ultimate authority in the center. In one case, at Latakia, a dispute broke out between the *Sharī'a ḳāḍī*, a Damascene and a close friend of Abū'l-Hudā, and the *nā'ib al-'āmm*, a paternal cousin of Shafīḳ al-Ḳūrānī.

Both appealed to a high authority, who did nothing. The impasse continued until the *ḳāḍī* left at the expiration of his term. In another case, at Latakia, the same *ḳāḍī* gave support to his friend, a local notable who was an elected member of the court who desired reelection. Another local notable sought the seat. Both were nominated by the local bodies. The *vālī* of Beirut decided in favor of the nonincumbent. But the *ḳaḍī*, as president of the court, refused to allow the new member to take his seat. The *vālī* protested to higher authority, to no avail. The stalemate lasted for six months, until the expiration of the term of the *ḳāḍī*, Abū'l-Hudā's friend.[12]

Given the size of the Ottoman administration, there was ample opportunity for the formation of personal connections and extensive networks. Alliances originated at specific localities, but obviously success depended on a local group being able to forge ties with more far-reaching connections. Natives of Syria clearly needed to affiliate with groups originating in the Turkish-speaking areas. The extent of the need is suggested by data provided by Joseph Szyliowicz, describing a sample of eminent Ottoman officials (excluding religious officials and the military) who entered the administration during 'Abdülḥamīd II's reign. Persons born in Arab countries made up only 13 percent of the total, only 7 percent of the central administration, and only 23 percent of those who served in the Arab provinces. Even in the Arab provinces, Arab officials were outnumbered. Similarly there was little opportunity for officials who originated in Arab provinces to form far-reaching networks composed only of compatriots. Sixty percent of the officials born in Arab provinces served in the Arab countries, only 18 percent in the central administration.[13] Fortunately Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm's memoirs enable us to witness the formation of a network composed of Syrians and non-Syrians. This network was to play an important part in the subsequent history of the Ottoman Empire and of post-Ottoman Syria alike.

Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm was born in Latakia in 1879, of a Greek Orthodox family. His forebears, all physicians, had lived there since the late 18th century, the founder being the only physician in the region. The family was not among the rich Orthodox families, of whom there were many in Latakia and vicinity, but it had excellent connections. The Ḥakīms were an offshoot of the great Karam clan of northern Lebanon which also had branches in Damascus and Ḥawrān. As the physicians in Latakia, the Ḥakīms belonged to the upper class. Yūsuf's father married the daughter of a tobacco merchant and landowner, a member of an old wealthy family, and his younger brother was the chief secretary of the *mutaṣarrıflık* of Latakia. Though Yūsuf's social standing was high, his material prospects were not bright because his father suffered financial reverses as he entered old age. Unlike most Christians in Latakia, young Ḥakīm attended the state secondary school, where he became adept in Turkish. His father's financial difficulties precluded his attending one of the higher schools in Istanbul, but he did not have to wait long for employment. Two of his best friends, classmates at the secondary school, were members of the two richest

and most important Sunnite families in the province, Hārūn and Shawwāf, and a third school friend was the son of the gendarmerie commander. With connections like these, Ḥakīm had no trouble gaining an apprenticeship with the *dīvān* of the state court, whose chief was a Palestinian related to old friends of the Ḥakīm family. Ḥakīm's aristocratic friend, the young Hārūn, also entered government service.[14] Thus was formed a primary connection embracing great notables and lesser notables which established ties between officials and nonofficials in the government of a *livā*.

Before long Ḥakīm gained personal knowledge of the importance of patronage. The judicial council nominated a clerk in the court to fill a higher position and nominated Ḥakīm to fill the vacancy. But the vacancy disappeared when the Ministry of Justice replaced the judicial council's nominee for promotion with an intimate of a high official in Istanbul. Three months later, Ḥakīm was again disappointed when the ministry rejected him, despite local nomination, in favor of one supported by Abū'l-Hudā. Ḥakīm finally gained a permanent position in the court on the recommendations of the judicial inspector, who strongly urged the appointment of a Christian to the courts in Latakia. Ḥakīm's knowledge of Turkish aided him, for many of the judges did not know spoken Arabic well enough to understand testimony in the courts.[15]

If Ḥakīm resented Abū'l-Hudā because of his displacement by the latter's nominee, he showed no sign of it during the dispute between Abū'l-Hudā's friend, the *Sharī'a ḳāḍī*, and Shafīḳ al-Ḳūrānī's cousin, the *nā'ib al-'āmm*. Ḥakīm, in fact, maintained good relations with both. After a few years of service, Ḥakīm was brought into a major Empire-wide connection. His immediate associate was Muṣṭafā Ḥayrī, a native of Ürgüp in central Anatolia. Ḥayrī was a member of a famous scholarly family who developed a great reputation for piety and religious learning. But following the example of an older brother he completed the Law School in Istanbul and entered the state judiciary. After serving in Anatolia, he was assigned to Latakia as head of the criminal court. There he showed his independence by pressing a case against a friend of Abū'l-Hudā despite the *mutaṣarrif's* objection. Ḥayrī had grasped the nature of the political process. When Ḥakīm asked him why he did not have one of his highly placed relatives assign him to the capital, he replied, "I wish first to move about in the Ottoman lands in order to increase my knowledge of them, provided that the capital is the end of the travel."[16]

To judge from Ḥayrī's actions, the knowledge of the Ottoman lands that he sought was political. From Latakia, he went to Damascus as *nā'ib al-'āmm*. Before long, the network was at work. In 1904, a serious conflict occurred between the *nā'ib al-'āmm* and the *mutaṣarrif* in Latakia. The *ḳāḍī* and the chief of the criminal court, a cousin of Shafīḳ al-Ḳūrānī, remained neutral. Many local notables supported the *mutaṣarrif*. An investigation was carried out by a higher judicial official from the *vilāyet* capital. As the official was a friend of Ḥayrī's who had spoken highly of Ḥakīm, the latter was able to influence the

decision against the *mutaṣarrif*, who was transferred, while the *nā'ib al-'āmm* retained his post. In 1907, Ḥakīm's insistence on prosecuting the son of the gendarmerie commander for homicide led to his transfer by the judicial council. But Ḥakīm was supported by some notables, by the *mutaṣarrif*, and by Shafīḳ al-Ḳūrānī's cousin, the chief of the criminal court. Provided with financial assistance by a notable friend, Ḥakīm went to Damascus and persuaded the judicial inspector to support him to the Ministry of Justice. Ḥakīm won. Meanwhile, Ḥayrī had moved from Damascus to a higher position in Monastir. There he arranged to have a higher appointment in Monastir offered to Ḥakīm. The latter, however, declined at the urging of local friends. Once again Ḥayrī indicated the importance of movement for an official. He wrote Ḥakīm urging him to leave his "small native region (*waṭan*)" if he "intended to keep the officials' profession."[17]

Muṣṭafā Ḥayrī appears to have been a member of the Committee of Union and Progress. Ḥakīm says that Ḥayrī "took part in the deliverance from the Hamidian tyranny and proclamation of the Constitution."[18] A British diplomatic report had it that higher officials in Macedonia had quashed an inquiry into covert activities there early in 1908. In any event, Ḥayrī became very prominent after the revolution. He was elected to parliament from Niğde and served as vice-president of the Chamber. More importantly, he served as minister of *evḳāf*, minister of justice, and *şeyḫ ül-Islām*, and was clearly one of the most influential members of the Unionist upper echelon.[19] Our intention here, however, is not to insist that Ḥayrī played a leading role in the Young Turk revolution. Instead, it is to propose that Ottoman governance could not prevent revolution. The personal followings and networks into which much of the personnel of the administration were organized made unified control impossible. Such covert organizations could plot with the military to carry out coups or could utilize military coups which occurred independently. It is not likely that a military group acting independently could govern without the co-operation of people like Ḥayrī. The fact is that all governments installed by coup turn to people with some of his qualifications. He possessed all of them; a famous, apparently wealthy, family. Significantly, his son was long a member of parliament in the Turkish Republic, and briefly, prime minister. Besides the powers of a great notable, Ḥayrī had established important connections throughout the administration. He had relatives and friends in the central administration, associates and comrades in many provinces. Such a person obviously would continue to play a role in the postrevolutionary government unless he was eliminated by the revolutionaries. Those who had been clearly identified with the old regime had to be eliminated. But others would continue.

In Syria, Ḥayrī's connection flourished after the revolution. Abū'l-Hudā, 'Ābid, and Shafīḳ al-Ḳūrānī, so close to the throne, were banished from power. In Latakia, Ḥayrī's friends prospered, but the extent to which they had been knowing members of the revolutionary movement is obscure. Ḥakīm seems to hint that Ḥayrī had sent him at least one cryptic communication about the

approach of the revolution. He also speaks of the Committee's sending instructions to "its concealed brothers" after the revolution. But Latakia greeted the revolution with silence and inaction until the Committee sent instructions to "its concealed brothers" to form a local organization. Ḫayrī's protégé, Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm, and a number of great notables, Sunnite and Orthodox, including the head of the Hārūn clan, formed a committee. The Unionists dominated the parliamentary elections thereafter, with a Hārūn taking a seat after the situation had stabilized. Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm, owing to his friendship with Ḫayrī, was promoted, and now took his patron's advice. He served in the courts in Palestine and then in Tripoli. The revolution did not substantially change the operation of the administration, however. Ḥakīm's activities in Tripoli were reminiscent of his days in prerevolutionary Latakia. His connections with the notables and in the system, both the provincial and central administration, enabled him to overcome his opponents and in turn to rise to a position in the administration of the Lebanon.[20]

Syrians who had a good reputation within Ḫayrī's circle also survived the Young Turk revolution without loss. Shafīḳ al-Ḳūrānī, the minister of police, lost his position, but he was not imprisoned nor did his relatives suffer. One of his nephews, at least, was appointed chief of the court at Latakia after the revolution. (It may be that close relations existed between the Ḫayrī and Ḳūrānī connections. Besides the favorable way in which Ḥakīm depicts the Ḳūrānīs, it is possible that Shafīḳ's brother Ḥusnī al-Ḳūrānī, a counsellor of the court of cassation, was the judicial inspector of Syria and Monastir when Ḫayrī served there and was Ḫayrī's collaborator in arranging a promotion for Ḥakīm).[21] Another highly placed Syrian who survived the revolution owing to his good reputation was another Aleppine, Iḥsān al-Jābirī, who had been a member of the palace secretariat. He continued in the position.[22]

Ḥakīm's memoirs give us a glimpse of the way in which members of the bureaucracy participated in or aided or utilized the Young Turk revolution. The memoirs also cast a bit more light on the Syrian successors to the Ottomans after the latter's defeat in World War I. In 1929, inhabitants of Syria took steps to establish a Syrian state in the name of Arab nationalism. A self-proclaimed parliament was elected, a cabinet and an administration were formed, an army was raised, and political parties were organized. All used the ideology of Arab nationalism, but of the seventy-three men who composed the personnel of these bodies, 82 percent had no definite connection with Arab nationalism before 1919, 85 percent before 1914. Of these Arab nationalists who governed Syria in 1919-20, the largest single occupational group was composed of officials who had served the Ottoman government before 1919.[23] It is now definitely known, thanks to William Cleveland's work on Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī[24] and to Ḥakīm's memoirs, that some of these latecomers to Arabism had been professed Ottoman loyalists until the Empire's collapse. Ḥakīm and his friends were active members of Union and Progress to the end. Ḥakīm and his friends also did well in the new Arab nationalist Syria. Ḥakīm himself was a

member of the cabinet, and a Hārūn was a representative of Latakia in the parliament. Another member of the parliament who had been one of Ḥakīm's friends in Latakia was Aḥmad al-Ḳaḍamānī, a Damascene, who had been commander of the gendarmerie.[25] Iḥsān al-Jābirī, besides distinguishing himself in mobilizing the public under the banner of Arab nationalism, served as mayor of Aleppo and chief of King Fayṣal's secretariat.[26] This is a clear case of a personal network which retained its effectiveness under three different regimes. It seems likely that the other officials and notables who established and controlled the first Arab nationalist government in Syria, all veterans of Ottoman politics, had similar backgrounds.

Syria's first Arab nationalist regime was swept away by France, but the people who staffed that government survived. Most of them, having greater demands than France was willing to meet, made careers of opposing the Mandate, but they and people with similar origins and occupational histories provided the personnel for the governments which the French set up. Syria's political structure was now largely in the hands of Syrians, from 1943 onwards, entirely so. The place formerly occupied by the sultan and his ministers or the Ottoman parliament and its ministers was now occupied by a purely Syrian parliament and administration. Otherwise, the government in independent Syria was remarkably similar to that in the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

In independent Syria, politics began in the family or the neighborhood, and operated by means of alliances which were linked with other alliances into loosely connected nationwide networks. In Hama and electoral district, of the three chief notable families, two were badly divided. 'Abd al-Ḳādir al-Kīlānī was opposed by Nawras al-Kīlānī; the Barāzīs were split by a rivalry between Najīb on the one hand and Rāshid and his brother Ḥusnī on the other. Rāshid and Ḥusnī cooperated with 'Abd al-Ḳādir. As a result, they controlled the elections in 1926 and 1928.[27] Nawras al-Kīlānī concentrated on Hama city. As president of the directors of the leading secondary school, he organized the "educated youth." He also organized the craftsmen and artisans into syndicates. Nawras was assisted by a group of professional men, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, educators, and civil servants, who, however, belonged to merchant or landowning families. These included 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Kunbāz, Muṣṭafā and 'Uthmān al-Ḥawrānī, Ra'īf al-Mulkī, and Tawfīḳ and Ibrāhīm al-Shīshaklī. Nawras's group made great use of up-to-date political ideology. They presented themselves as the representatives of the educated and nationalist youth waging the necessary war against uneducated reactionary feudalist landowners. Ḥusnī al-Barāzī was the chief object of their campaign. For all their advanced thinking, however, in late 1930 Nawras al-Kīlānī's group established a working relationship with Najīb al-Barāzi.[28]

Like all political alliances, Nawras al-Kīlānī's grouping was unstable. The test came when preparations for the parliamentary elections began late in 1931. The group contained three candidates for only two seats. Najīb al-Barāzī and

Tawfīḳ al-Shīshaklī became the candidates of the group which received the blessing of the countrywide National Bloc. Nawras al-Kīlānī became a candidate on a list with Ḥusnī al-Barāzī. Although the latter had been a founder of the National Bloc, he now headed the government or moderate list, one which received the support of the 'Aẓms of Hama as well as of 'Abd al-Ḳādir al-Kīlānī. Tawfīḳ al-Shīshaklī gained control of Nawras al-Kīlānī's following in the city. On election day, Shīshaklī's supporters, claiming fraud by the election officials, took the ballot boxes by force. The gendarmes used firearms to restore order. The elections were postponed. When the elections were held, the National Bloc won all seats and had gained almost all the votes in Hama city. In the 1936 election, Najīb al-Barāzī and Tawfīḳ al-Shīshaklī were elected.[29]

The Hama city connection which Tawfīḳ al-Shīshaklī took over from Nawras al-Kīlānī retained its vitality for a long time. When parliament was restored in 1943, the alliance was ready. Tawfīḳ al-Shīshaklī had died, but his group formed a National Bloc list with Najīb al-Barāzī, which won all seats.[30] Two of the new deputies, Ra'īf al-Mulkī and Akram al-Ḥawrānī, were the political heirs of Tawfīḳ al-Shīshaklī. Mulkī was an original associate of Shīshaklī and Nawras al-Kīlānī. Akram al-Ḥawrānī, brother of 'Uthmān, another original associate of Shīshaklī and Kīlānī, joined Mulkī in the leadership of the group in the late 1930s and took over the leadership of a youth organization which 'Uthmān had formed in 1938.[31] The third newcomer was Ghālib al-'Aẓm, a member of Hama's number two landowing family. He had been a member of a radical Arab nationalist organization, the League of National Action.[32]

Parliament was not the only objective of politics in Hama. Position in the administration was just as desirable as it had been in Ottoman days. Here, both the ins and the outs achieved a degree of success. Among Tawfīḳ al-Shīshaklī's associates, Muṣṭafā and 'Uthmān al-Ḥawrānī had successful careers as officials.[33] But their opponents, 'Abd al-Ḳādir al-Kīlānī and Ḥusnī al-Barāzī, who had been totally denied success in parliamentary politics since 1932, were even more successful. Ḥusnī, at least, was a minister in a National Bloc government, and both he and 'Abd al-Ḳādir were governors of province in 1944.[34] Those who were unsuccessful at the local level could still have influence through the national government. As in Ottoman days, successful politicians were those who were members of networks which extended through the national political structure.

Society, through the medium of the local notables who were most successful in the parliamentary elections, may have held an advantage over the state during the life of the parliamentary regime, though the final verdict is not yet in. Whatever the case, the balance has clearly shifted strongly to the side of the state since 1949. Soldiers and officials manifestly have had the upper hand. Like their Young Turk precursors, they have gained dominance from within and through the agency of the state structure. There are also indications that

the soldiers and officials who have governed Syria since 1949 followed a path to power like the one which the Young Turks followed.

The officers who have led the Syrian army's intervention in politics beginning in 1949 had excellent connections with the notables and officials. The earliest group, centering loosely around Adīb al-Shīshaklī, included some of the famous names of Sunnite Syria: Kīlānī, Mālikī, Raslān, 'Aẓm, Niẓām al-Dīn, Ḳabbānī, Ḥusaynī in addition to Shīshaklī himself.[35] Adīb al-Shīshaklī's army following was closely connected to Tawfīḳ al-Shīshaklī's Hama following. Adīb's father, Ḥasan, was a political supporter of his kinsman Tawfīḳ.[36] Riyāḍ al-Kīlānī was a son of Nawras, the founder of the Hama group.[37] Bahīj al-Kallās and Aḥmad al-'Aẓm may have been related to Khalīl al-Kallās and Ghālib al-'Aẓm, who had collaborated with Akram al-Ḥawrānī. Akram was closely related to two charter members of the Hama group. Moreover, he was related by marriage to Adīb al-Shīshaklī.[38] Thus, Akram al-Ḥawrānī, the principal political heir to the Hama city group, was the Syrian politician who had the most intimate association with the political officers in 1949 and succeeding years. Political connections in the military could vary as quickly as among civilians. The result was a great deal of change in the most senior personnel but important Sunnite names, especially from central Syria, were borne by the leading military figures well into the 1960s.[39] The Hama connection continued to be important also. The Sarrājs of Hama had been associated with Tawfīḳ al-Shīshaklī in the 1930s and with Akram al-Ḥawrānī in the 1940s.[40]

Adīb al-Shīshaklī's following never established itself as an entity with an enduring organization and a pervasive ideology. Some of his associates succeeded where he had failed by forming an ideological party within the army. Again, the Syrians followed the Young Turk model. The officers adopted and took over a civilian party, the Ba'th.

A forerunner of the Ba'th was the League of National Action. This organization was formed in 1933 by Ṣabrī al-'Asalī, Aḥmad al-Sharābātī, both from Damascus, Ghālib al-'Aẓm of Hama, 'Abd al-Razzāḳ al-Dandashī from Tall Khalakh, and Ḥilmī and Fikrī al-Atāsī from Homs.[41] All of them bear some of the most prominent names in Ottoman Syria, and all, except for Dandashī, later had successful political careers. An 'Alawi member of the League, Zakī al-Arsūzī, and his disciple, Wahīb al-Ghānim, played the leading role in winning adherents to the Ba'th in Latakia.[42] Neither man was without established connections among the 'Alawis there. Arsūzī's father was a "lawyer and middling landowner of Antioch." Ghānim was the son of a landowner.[43] Najīb al-Arsūzī, a lawyer who resided in Alexandretta, was the 'Alawis' favorite attorney before 1908.[44] Ghānims were politically prominent in Latakia in the 1930s and 40s.[45] The three most visible 'Alawi Ba'thists since 1963, Jadīd, Asad, and 'Umrān, are hardly from the rural proletariat. All were sons of local landowning notables,[46] not in the class of Hārūn, of course, but few in Latakia or elsewhere in Syria were. But even the great Latakia families had

members in the Ba'th. An early military member, Mufīd Hawwāsh, bears the name of a family which for generations had provided the chiefs of a great 'Alawi tribe.[47] Even the Sunni notables affiliated with the Ba'th. Shūmān, a mercantile and landowning family comparable to the Hārūns, was represented in the Ba'thist cabinets.[48] Ṭawīl, a venerable learned-official family of Latakia and Alexandretta (in the old days), whose younger members participated in political activities with the sons of Shūmān and Hārūn, was represented by a very prominent officer in the army.[49] The affiliation of the 'Alawi officers' families with the great Sunnite notables in Latakia is certain. There are also signs of early contacts with Adīb al-Shīshaklī. He was the army commander in Latakia in 1947.[50] Moreover, Zakī al-Arsūzī was active in educational and political circles in Hama in 1947.[51]

The most important Ba'thists from north Syria also had connections with the great Sunnite notables. The founder of the party in Dayr al-Zūr, Jalāl al-Sayyid, was elected to parliament in 1949 on the list of Ḳāsim al-Hunaydī, who had already won two terms in parliament, and the list was the strongest "feudalist" list in the district.[52] Muṣṭafā Ṭalās, of Aleppo, has been one of the key Ba'thist officers. The Ṭalās family of Aleppo was an important family, long associated with the National Bloc. One of its members, As'ad, was director general of the foreign office and the brother-in-law of Colonel Sāmī al-Ḥināwī.[53] It may be worth noting that in 1947, Adīb al-Shīshaklī moved from Latakia to Aleppo to take up an expanded command which included Latakia and Aleppo.

The connections of the southern Ba'thists with the notable families are even more striking. 'Aflaḳ was from a well-to-do Christian family. Bīṭār was a very old and prominent family. Mālikī had long since been of top rank in Damascus. Similarly, the Druzes and the members from Ḥawrān who were recruited through 'Aflaḳ and Bīṭār came from the leading families of the region. Among the Druzes, Shūfī, Aṭrash, and 'Aysāmī reached the highest civilian echelons, while Ḥāṭūm, 'Ubayd, and Abū-'Asalī were eminent in military affairs.[54] In Ba'thist Syria in the 1960s, Ḥawrān was represented in both the army and the civilian authority by Miḳdād, Maḥāmīd, and Zu'bī, just as these families had represented Ḥawrān in the parliament and the administration in the old days.[55]

The soldiers and the Ba'thists, military and civilians, who came to dominate Syria after 1949 had close ties with the old regime. The leaders came from notable families, including some of the most prominent in Syria before 1949. Their initial affiliation into political connections took place within the parliamentary structure following procedures which were the norm during 'Abdülḥamīd II's reign. The original group of military revolutionaries was connected through Adīb al-Shīshaklī to the Hama city group of politicians which had been formed by Tawfīḳ al-Shīshaklī and then partly taken over and partly displaced by Akram al-Ḥawrānī. This group was affiliated with notables of the first rank, Nawras al-Kīlānī in the beginning, then Najīb al-Barāzī. The

Shīshaklī-Ḥawrānī connections established ties with the Ba'th. The Arsūzī nucleus of the Ba'th was an outgrowth of the League of National Action, whose organizers were notables of the top national rank. Arsūzī's recruits included major notables in Latakia as well as local notables. The organizer of the Ba'th in the Euphrates province, Jalāl al-Sayyid, entered politics in association with the dominant notables of the province. The southern Ba'th, organized by men with excellent family backgounds in Damascus, recruited from the leading families of Jabal Druze and Ḥawrān.

The political process in 20th century Syria has been very similar to that of Ottoman Syria. Men of established social position, ranging from local to national eminence, entered politics and state service in association with men of established position in the national state structure. Within the state structure, some of the followers were able to advance themselves and to become leaders of their own networks. With the disruption created by the Palestine war, they were able to lead their followers in the acquisition of dominant positions in the state. As in Ottoman times, the operative margin of politics where state and society mesh has been populated by people with influence and position in society, but within this margin the most successful contestants have won their success by use of state organs.

Notes

1 A detailed description of the government of Ottoman Syria is provided by 'Abd al-'Azīz Muḥammad 'Awaḍ, *Al-Idāra al-'Uthmāniyya fī wilāyat Sūriyya, 1864-1914* (Cairo, 1969); see also Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2: *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975* (Cambridge, London, New York, and Melbourne, 1977).

2 C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism* (Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1973), pp. 148-206.

3 Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm, *Dhikrayāt al-Ḥakīm*, vol. 1: *Sūriyya wa'l-'ahd al-'Uthmānī* (Beirut, 1966), p. 136.

4 Ḥakīm, pp. 141, 274-275.

5 Dawn, p. 171, at n. 15; Ḥakīm, pp. 121-125, 239-242, 254.

6 Ḥakīm, p. 83.

7 Shaw and Shaw, pp. 214, 215; Albert H. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*, paperback (London, Oxford, and New York, 1979), pp. 107, 267-268; A.L. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine* (London, 1969), pp. 182-183.

8 Butrus Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 15 (1979), pp. 131-138.

9 Ḥakīm, pp. 86-89.

10 Dawn, p. 171 at n. 15.

11 Ḥakīm, pp. 58-59.

12 Ḥakīm, pp. 118-120.

13 Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Changes in the Recruitment Patterns and Career-Lines of Ottoman Provincial Administrators during the Nineteenth Century," in Moshe Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), p. 261 and Table 3 (p. 262).

14 Ḥakīm, pp. 75-76, 104-111, 129.
15 Ḥakīm, pp. 113-114.
16 Ḥakīm, pp. 118-119, 126-128 (quotation, p. 128); *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, 19, 126-127, s.v. "Hayri Effendi, Mustafa."
17 Ḥakīm, pp. 128-129, 133-142, 148.
18 Ḥakīm, p. 128.
19 Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 1, 100, 105, 122, 130, 148-149, 159, 171-172.
20 Ḥakīm, pp. 148, 159-163, 182-183, 184-190, 203-293.
21 Ḥakīm, pp. 114, 148, 171, 183-184.
22 Ḥakīm, p. 171; *Man huwa fī Sūriyya* (1951), s.v. "Iḥsān al-Jābirī," p. 138.
23 Dawn, pp. 150-151, 157-159, 166-169, 178.
24 William L. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Satī' al-Husri* (Princeton, N.J., 1971).
25 Dawn, p. 175; Ḥakīm, p. 123.
26 *Man huwa fī Sūriyya*, 1951, s.v. "Iḥsān al-Jābirī."
27 *Oriente Moderno*, 4 (1924), p. 36, 311; 6 (1926), pp. 283, 327; 7 (1927), pp. 221, 568; 8 (1928), pp. 105, 106, 194, 196-197; *al-Nidā'* (Beirut), Jan. 5, Oct. 12, 14, 1932.
28 Jean Gaulmier, "Notes sur le mouvement syndicaliste à Hama," *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 1932, pp. 99-105; *al-Nidā'*, Nov. 11, 1931.
29 Gaulmier, pp. 118-119; *al-Nidā'*, Nov. 11, Dec. 15, 17, 22, 23, 25, 1931, Jan. 5, March 31, April 2, 7, 1932; OM, 11 (1931), p. 229; 12 (1932), pp. 51, 54, 241; 16 (1936), p. 681.
30 OM, 20 (1940), p. 540; Syria, Chamber of Deputies, *Waḳā'i'*, 3rd legislative period, extraordinary session, 1943, pp. 2-4.
31 Michael H. Van Dusen, "Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria," *The Middle East Journal*, 26 (1972), pp. 131, 132; Itamar Rabinovich, *Syria under the Ba'th* (Jerusalem, 1972), p. 9, n. 22; Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers* (Princeton, N.J., 1978), p. 728. Van Dusen says that Akram and 'Uthmān were brothers, Batatu says that they were cousins.
32 *Man huwa*, s.v. "Ghālib al-'Aẓm."
33 *Man huwa*, s.v. "'Uthmān al-Ḥawrānī," "Muṣṭafā al-Ḥawrānī."
34 *Man huwa*, s.v. "Ḥusnī al-Barāzī"; *al-Ḳabas* (Damascus), March 19, 1944.
35 *Alif-Bā'* (Damascus), April 4, 7, 9, 10, 29, June 7, 12, July 8, 21, Aug. 15, 16, 17, Nov. 15, Dec. 20, 21, 27, 1949.
36 *Man huwa*, s.v. "Adīb al-Shīshaklī"; *al-Nidā'*, Dec. 25, 1931.
37 *Alif-Bā'*, June 12, Nov. 4, 1949; *Man huwa*, s.v. "Fakrī al-Kīlānī."
38 *The Middle East Journal*, 9 (1955), p. 320.
39 An excellent survey is given in Eliezer Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (New York, 1970).
40 *Al-Nidā'*, Dec. 25, 1931, Aug. 17, 1932; *Alif-Bā'*, May 15, July 11, 1947; *al-Ḳabas*, May 16, 1947.
41 Syria, 'Aṣābat al-'Amal al-Ḳawmī, Bayān al-mu'tamar al-ta'sīsī "...al-mun'aḳid fī Ḳarāyil fī 24 Āb 1933," *al-Nahār* (Beirut), Dec. 17, 1936; *Man huwa*, s.v. "Ṣabrī al-'Asalī," "Ghālib al-'Aẓm," "Fikrī al-Atāsī," "Makram al-Atāsī," "Aḥmad al-Sharābātī."
42 Sylvia G. Haim, "The Ba'ath in Syria," in Michael Curtis (ed.), *People and Politics in the Middle East* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1971), pp. 132-138; Rabinovich, pp. 6-7; Van Dusen, p. 133; Nabil M. Kaylani, "The Rise of the Syrian Ba'th, 1940-1958: Political Success, Party Failure," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 3 (1972), p. 3; John F. Devlin, *The Ba'th Party: A History From Its Origins to 1966* (Stanford, Calif., 1976), pp. 7-9, 10, 14; Eric Rouleau, "The Syrian Enigma: What is the Ba'th?" in Irene L. Grendzier (ed.), *A Middle East Reader* (New York, 1969), pp. 158-160, 164.
43 Batatu, pp. 722, 724.
44 Ḥakīm, p. 122.
45 *Al-Nidā'*, Nov. 26, 1931; *al-Ḳabas*, March 24, 1944.
46 Batatu, pp. 1226, 1228.

47 Van Dusen, p. 133, n. 44; Ḥakīm, pp. 69, 237, 287; *al-Nahḍr*, Oct. 31, 1936; July 1, 7, 1947.

48 *Al-Ḥayāt* (Beirut), Sept. 24, 1965; *al-Jarīda* (Beirut), March 3, 1966; *al-Nidā'*, Dec. 29, 31, 1931; *al-Ḳabas*, Jan. 11, June 1, 20, 1944, April 22, 1947; Ḥakīm, p. 95.

49 *Al-Ḥayāt*, Dec. 10, 1964, Aug. 17, Oct. 12, 13, 1965; *al-Ḳabas*, April 11, July 4, 1947; *al-Nidā'*, Dec. 29, 31, 1931; Ḥakīm, p. 74.

50 *Al-Ḳabas*, June 11, 1947.

51 *Alif-Bā'*, Feb. 21, 1947.

52 *Alif-Bā'*, Oct. 14, 16, 18, Nov. 15, 16, 1949.

53 *Al-Nahḍr*, Dec. 11, 1964, Aug. 17, Dec. 22, 1965; *al-Nidā'*, June 11, Sept. 20, 1932; *al-Ḳabas*, May 14, 1944; *Alif-Bā'*, July 3, 1947, Dec. 20, 21, 27, 1949.

54 *Al-Nahḍr*, May 12, 1963, Feb. 7, Dec. 15, 16, 1964, Dec. 22, 1965, Sept. 7, 1966; *al-Ḥayāt*, Oct. 31, 1963, Feb. 7, 1964, Aug. 17, Sept. 7, 24, Oct. 12, 1965, Feb. 24, 1966; *al-Jarīda*, July 10, Nov. 20, 1963, Feb. 24, 1966; *al-Nidā'*, Sept. 9, Dec. 17, 1932; *al-Nahḍr*, Nov. 17, 18, Dec. 4, 1936; *al-Ḳabās*, Sept. 28, 1944, May 9, June 17, July 3, 1947.

55 *Al-Nahḍr*, May 12, Aug. 6, 1963; Dec. 23, 1965, Sept. 24, 1966; *al-Ḥayat*, Aug. 17, Sept. 24, 1965; *al-Jarīda*, Dec. 16, 1964, March 3, 1966; *al-Nidā*, July 7, 1932; *Alif-Bā'*, April 10, 1947; *al-Ḳabās*, June 17, 1947; *al-Nahḍr*, Nov. 13, 15, 1936.

The Growing Economic Involvement of Palestine with the West, 1865-1914

GAD G. GILBAR

The late 1860s mark the beginning of a new period in the economic and social development of Ottoman Palestine. During the 45-50 years prior to World War I Palestine's economy underwent a process of modernization and growth surpassing both in force and scope anything it had experienced during the first seven decades of the 19th century and perhaps ever since the Ottoman conquest of the country. Nor did Palestine lag behind other economies in the Middle East, such as those of Syria, Anatolia and Iran, in the thrust of the economic changes that it underwent during the period under discussion.[1]

The modernization and growth that resulted from the increase of inputs of the factors of production, including technological changes, were not only expressed in an increase in the national product, but in important structural changes as well in the sectors of agriculture, manufacture and services, in the patterns of consumption and savings, and in the distribution of capital and incomes. These economic processes helped to generate a number of important social changes, the most outstanding of which was the emergence of a new layer among the elite of Palestinian Arab society.

At the root of these economic and social developments was a factor that was exogenous to the economy and society of Palestine. It was not Ottoman reforms, nor Templar settlement, nor the first Jewish waves of immigration, nor even foreign activity in Palestine in general that had caused them, but the fact that at the time Palestine's economy became increasingly linked to the world economic system, and particularly to the economies of Europe (see Tables 1 and 2). This connection exposed Palestine's economy to the influence of the changes taking place in the economies of Europe, and generated new forces and processes within it. However, though the moving factor was external, the bearers of this growth were primarily local Arab-speaking Muslims and Christians.

* * *

Growth in the volume of Palestine's foreign trade was apparent in the period under discussion. The available data are insufficient to enable us to reconstruct comprehensive periodical series of the visible imports and exports, let alone of the invisible imports and exports. However, they do give us an indication of the main trends. It seems that from the late 1860s onwards, visible imports grew in absolute terms at ever-increasing rates. These rates were particularly high in the

years 1906-1913. Thus, for example, visible imports through Jaffa port rose in current prices from £137 thousand in 1873 to £460 thousand in 1905 and to £1.313 million in 1913. The total visible imports through the three main ports of Palestine (Jaffa, Haifa and Gaza) amounted to £1.951 million in 1913 (see Table 3). The main import items (Jaffa port) were cotton goods and foodstuffs — i.e., coffee, sugar, rice, flour and tobacco (see Table 4).

Generally, it would seem that, until the end of the 19th century, visible exports grew at rates comparable to those of visible imports. But from 1899 onwards the growth of visible exports lagged behind that of visible imports. Thus, for example, visible exports through Jaffa port grew from £172 thousand to about £307 thousand in 1898, and to £745 thousand in 1913. The total visible exports through the three main ports of Palestine amount to £1.253 million in 1913 (see Table 3). The main export items (Jaffa port) were oranges, soap, sesame and wines (see Table 5).

Data on the flow of merchandise through the country's three main ports show that an ever-growing deficit in both absolute and relative terms existed in Palestine's balance of visible trade during the 15 years which preceded World War I. Since no data are available about the transit component in visible imports and exports, nor any on the visible trade of Palestine through other ports (primarily that of Beirut) and via overland routes, it is impossible at this stage to determine the exact sizes of visible imports and exports, or whether a deficit in the balance of visible trade did exist at the end of the Ottoman period.

Despite the poor quality of the data, we have enough to go on in order to conclude that there was an impressive growth in Palestine's visible foreign trade, and particularly sea trade. Even were we to assume that total visible imports and exports together in the early 1860s amounted to some £1 million — data which are assuredly not an underestimation — and were we even to assume as well that total visible imports and exports together in 1913 amounted to only £3.2 million (i.e., the visible foreign trade through Jaffa, Haifa and Gaza), then visible foreign trade in current prices more than tripled over a span of about 50 years. It is interesting to note that seaborne visible foreign trade of Ottoman Syria, excluding Palestine, had hardly doubled (from £3.5 million to £6.8 million) during the same period.[2] The composition of both visible imports and exports clearly indicate that the increase in the country's visible foreign trade occurred as a result of the rise in the standard of living in the European economies as well as in the Palestinian one.

* * *

The new demands and supplies of goods and services, created as a result of growing economic links between Palestine and the world economic system, brought about significant changes in the structure and output of each of the three sectors of production. In agriculture there was a growth in the contribution of cash crops to the total agricultural output. This growth stemmed mainly from an expansion of the cultivation of citrus. Oranges and

Table 1. *Tonnage of Sailboats and Steamships (entered), Jaffa Port, 1879-1913*

	Sailboats	Steamships	Total
1879	25,821	188,016	213,837
1881	29,337	195,798	225,135
1882	17,362	—	—
1884	24,146	192,872	217,018
1886	21,167	438,177	459,344
1887	20,396	441,306	461,702
1888	21,467	439,039	460,506
1889	17,395	393,352	410,747
1890	—	—	454,254
1891	20,445	379,721	400,166
1892	17,186	422,171	439,357
1893	23,807	513,775	573,582
1894	—	—	536,959
1895	15,934	587,734	603,668
1896	17,362	493,973	511,335
1897	14,003	500,499	514,502
1898	20,994	510,844	531,838
1899	17,118	412,326	429,444
1900	15,955	507,575	523,530
1901	15,188	617,645	632,833
1902	11,161	503,926	515,087
1903	12,429	576,820	589,249
1904	13,711	704,936	718,647
1905	15,653	803,325	818,978
1906	18,277	907,680	925,957
1907	16,885	912,076	928,961
1908	21,815	1,014,557	1,036,372
1909	15,648	1,154,771	1,170,419
1910	21,379	1,115,391	1,136,770
1911	23,630	1,025,461	1,049,091
1912	12,079	1,014,084	1,026,163
1913	16,166	1,160,315	1,176,481

Sources:

1879 Amzalak, "Jaffa, 1879," *CR*, 26, pp.1016-1017.
1881 Amzalak, "Jaffa, 1881," *CR*, 36, pp. 1157-1158.
1882 Amzalak, "Jaffa, 1882," *CR*, 20, pp. 633-634.
1884 Amzalak, "Jaffa, 1884," *CR*, 19, pp. 970-971.
1886 Moore, "Jaffa, 1886," *DCR*, 164, p. 2.
1887 Moore, "Jerusalem, 1887," *DCR*, 363, p. 3.
1888 Moore, "Jaffa, 1888," *DCR*, 529, p. 2.
1889 Kayat, "Jaffa, 1889," *DCR*, 773, p. 2.
1890-1891 Dickson, "Palestine, 1890-91," *DCR*, 1023, p. 7.
1892 Dickson, "Palestine, 1892," *DCR*, 1186, p. 6.
1893 Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1893," *DCR*, 1350, p. 8.
1894-1895 Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1895," *DCR*, 1698, p. 9.
1896 Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1896," *DCR*, 1872, p. 9.
1897 Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1897," *DCR*, 2050, p. 12.
1898 Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1898," *DCR*, 2217, p. 10.
1899 Dickson, "Palestine, 1899," *DCR*, 2405, p. 9.

1900 Dickson, "Palestine, 1900," *DCR*, 2584, p. 10.
1901 Dickson, "Palestine, 1901," *DCR*, 2822, p. 9.
1902 Dickson, "Palestine, 1902," *DCR*, 2962, p. 10.
1903-1907 Blech, "Palestine, 1907," *DCR*, 3974, p. 21.
1908-1910 Satow, "Jerusalem, 1910," *DCR*, 4697, p. 13.
1911-1913 McGregor, "Jerusalem, 1913," *DCR*, 5339, p. 16.

lemons had been cultivated in Palestine and exported from the country already before the 1870s. However, it was only in that decade that large-scale expansion occurred in both orchard acreage and the size of crops. This expansion was particularly apparent from the second half of the 1890s until the outbreak of World War I. Orchard acreage increased from 7,500 *dunam* in 1880 to 33-35 thousand *dunam* in 1913 (see Table 6).[3] Since the crop involved was an export product there was a marked increase in the quantity of oranges exported and in the income accruing therefrom. Exports through Jaffa port increased from 50 thousand cases in 1862 to 200 thousand cases in 1890, and to some 1.609 million cases in 1913; and income rose from about £5 thousand in 1862 to £83 thousand in 1890, and £298 thousand in 1913 (see Table 7). This development made circus the major export product of the economy in the years 1904-1913, when income from circus exports constituted about one-third of the total income from exports shipped through the port of Jaffa (see Table 5).

The expansion of citrus cultivation was made possible not only by the growth in inputs of land and capital, but by technological innovations as well.

Table 2. *Visible Imports and Exports by Countries, Jaffa Port, 1885 and 1913*

	Imports[1]				Exports			
	1855		1913		1885		1913	
	£'000	%	£'000	%	£'000	%	£'000	%
Great Britain[2]	52	18	195	15	24	18	208	28
France	63	22	112	9	29	22	48	6
Austria	64	22	114	9	7	5	28	4
Russia	18	6	108	8	7	5	48	6
Germany	5	2	74	6	—	—	23	3
Italy	3	1	20	2	17	13	10	1
Egypt	41	14	72	5	30	23	265	36
Turkey	26	9	325	25	18	14	80	11
Total	288	100	1,313	100	133	100	745	100

Notes:
1 Including transit trade.
2 Including British Colonies.

Sources:
1885 Moore, "Jaffa, 1886," *DCR*, 164, p. 3.
1913 McGregor, "Jerusalem, 1913," *DCR*, 5339, pp. 15-16.

Table 3. *Visible Imports and Exports through the Ports of Jaffa, Haifa and Gaza, 1873-1913 (in £ at current prices)*

	Imports				Exports			
	Jaffa	Haifa[1]	Gaza	Total	Jaffa	Haifa[1]	Gaza	Total
1873	137,000				247,000			
1874	113,871				207,516			
1875	110,668				258,156			
1876	230,822				436,257			
1877	198,596				119,314			
1879	231,079				188,414			
1881	246,178				248,538			
1882	281,298				280,028			
1884	271,440				117,034			
1885	287,740				132,579			
1886	240,880				119,555			
1887	232,045				186,371			
1888	253,065				204,315			
1889	275,622				244,561			
1890	259,811				447,010			
1891	287,700				400,530			
1892	342,597				258,466			
1893	349,540				332,628			
1894	273,233				285,604			
1895	275,990				282,906			
1896	256,090				373,447			
1897	306,630				309,389			
1898	322,430				306,780			
1899	390,260				316,158			
1900	382,405				264,950			
1901	426,310				277,635			
1902	405,550				203,390			
1903	439,775				322,335			
1904	473,320				295,300			
1905	460,000				370,000			
1906	660,000	——	65,500	——	500,000	——	205,100	——
1907	809,000	199,000	62,200	1,070,200	484,340	272,700	9,200	766,240
1908	803,400	284,500	105,150	1,193,050	556,370	371,700	206,240	1,134,310
1909	973,143	——	78,060	——	560,935	——	49,760	——
1910	1,002,450	399,100	62,315	1,463,865	636,145	70,500	10,162	716,807
1911	1,169,910	375,100	53,250	1,598,260	710,660	90,000	77,150	877,810
1912	1,090,019	460,400	96,495	1,646,914	774,162	346,700	67,000	1,187,862
1913	1,312,695	530,000	108,230	1,950,925	745,413	200,000	161,120	1,106,533

Note:

1 Data include Acre.

Sources:

1873-1877 Avitsur, *Nemal Yafo*, Appendix, Table 9.
1879 Amzalak, "Jaffa, 1879," *CR*, 26, pp. 1012, 1014.
1881 Amzalak, "Jaffa, 1881," *CR*, 36, pp. 1153, 1155.
1882 Amzalak, "Jaffa, 1882," *CR*, 20, pp. 629, 631.
1884 Amzalak, "Jaffa, 1884," *CR*, 19, pp. 966, 968.
1885-1886 Moore, "Jaffa, 1886," *DCR*, 164, pp. 2-3.

1887-1888 Moore, "Jaffa, 1888," *DCR*, 529, pp. 1-2.
1889 Kayat, "Jaffa, 1889," *DCR*, 773, pp. 1-2.
1890-1891 Dickson, "Palestine, 1890-91," *DCR*, 1023, pp. 5-6.
1892-1893 Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1893," *DCR*, 1350, p. 7.
1894-1895 Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1895," *DCR*, 1698, pp. 7-8.
1896-1897 Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1897," *DCR*, 2050, p. 11.
1898-1899 Dickson, "Palestine, 1899," *DCR*, 2405, p. 8.
1900-1901 Dickson, "Palestine, 1901," *DCR*, 2822, p. 8.
1902 Dickson, "Palestine, 1902," *DCR*, 2962, pp. 8-9.
1906 Freeman, "Palestine, 1906," *DCR*, 3771, p. 11.
1903-1907 Blech, "Palestine, 1907," *DCR*, 3974, pp. 19-20, 24.
1907-1908 Heard, "Beirut, 1908," *DCR*, 4329, p. 25.
1908-1910 Satow, "Jerusalem, 1910," *DCR* 4697, pp. 11-12, 19-20.
1909-1912 Ḥusaynī, p. 149.
1911-1913 McGregor, "Jerusalem, 1913," *DCR*, 5339, pp. 14-15, 19-20.
1913 Kalla, *Foreign Trade*, p. 257.

These innovations account, at least partially, for the significant differences between the growth rate of orchard acreage and the growth rate of the quantity of crop exported in the years 1890-1913. While orchard acreage rose by about four times, the quantity of crop exported increased by more than eight times (see Tables 6 and 7). The expansion of citrus cultivation was initiated from the outset by the Arab private sector in Palestine.[4] The Ottoman authorities did not play a role in this development and their sole contribution consisted of levying a custom's duty of only 1 percent on citrus exports, at a time when custom duties on agricultural exports normally ranged from 8 to 11 percent.[5] The Jewish sector began to invest in the cultivation of citrus on a significant scale only towards the end of the century. A rapid expansion in orchard acreage in Jewish settlements took place in the decade prior to World War I. This acreage grew from 5,840 *dunam* in 1905 to about 10,000 *dunam* in 1914.[6] Thus, on the eve of World War I, some 30 percent of the total citrus acreage was Jewish-owned, and about 70 percent was owned by Arabs (see Table 6). The expansion of citrus cultivation to the extent of the crop becoming one of the most important agricultural products in the economy stemmed from its high profitability, which was not only greater than the profitablitiy of subsistence crops, such as wheat and barley, but also greater than that of crops such as grapes, almonds and olives.[7] This high profitability was the consequence of the high quality of Jaffa oranges, an absence of competitors and the growing demand for citrus in the British market, to which most of the crop was exported. All of this ensured high prices and profits.

The rise of the citrus branch had many consequences. It gave great impetus to the development of Jaffa, which within one generation grew from a small town to the second largest city in Palestine, with some 50 thousand inhabitants at the end of the Ottoman period.[8] The expansion of citrus was one of the important factors in the development of the port of Jaffa which grew from being a minor port in 1860 to becoming the main port of Palestine in 1914. Of all the ports in the Levant only Beirut surpassed it in the volume of imports and

Table 4. *The Three Major Import Items, Jaffa Port, 1879-1913 (in £ at current prices and percents)*

	I	II	III	Total
1879	73,333 sugar	29,574 rice	27,852 coffee	231,079
	31.7	*12.8*	*12.1*	*100*
1881	75,000 sugar	44,333 fancy goods	30,367 rice	246,178
	30.5	*18.0*	*12.3*	*100*
1882	77,197 sugar	49,506 rice	41,321 fancy goods	281,298
	27.4	*17.6*	*14.7*	*100*
1884	62,868 sugar	46,506 rice	39,600 cotton goods	271,440
	23.2	*17.1*	*14.6*	*100*
1885	68,960 sugar	42,300 rice	41,850 cotton goods	287,740
	24.0	*14.7*	*14.5*	*100*
1886	46,080 cotton goods	36,000 sugar	22,400 fancy goods	240,880
	19.1	*14.9*	*9.3*	*100*
1887	48,600 cotton goods	33,750 sugar	25,400 fancy goods	232,045
	20.9	*14.5*	*10.9*	*100*
1888	66,500 cotton goods	43,300 rice	23,900 fancy goods	253,065
	26.3	*17.1*	*9.4*	*100*
1889	90,800 cloth	74,000 cotton goods	46,200 rice	275,622
	32.9	*26.8*	*16.8*	*100*
1890	77,000 cotton goods	27,300 fancy goods	22,000 rice	259,811
	29.6	*10.5*	*8.5*	*100*
1891	71,500 cotton goods	61,500 timber	28,000 iron	287,700
	24.9	*21.4*	*9.7*	*100*
1892	78,850 cotton goods	77,500 timber	30,240 rice	342,597
	23.0	*22.6*	*8.8*	*100*
1893	74,900 cotton goods	60,200 timber	42,600 rice	349,540
	21.4	*17.2*	*12.2*	*100*
1894	60,550 cotton goods	35,500 rice	35,200 sugar	273,233
	22.2	*13.0*	*12.9*	*100*
1895	61,125 cotton goods	36,000 sugar	32,500 rice	275,990
	22.1	*13.0*	*11.8*	*100*
1896	59,250 cotton goods	35,750 sugar	20,200 cloth	256,090
	23.1	*14.0*	*7.9*	*100*
1897	59,700 cotton goods	43,105 coffee	32,000 sugar	306,630
	19.5	*14.1*	*10.4*	*100*

Sources: See *CR* and *DCR* for Jaffa, Jerusalem and Palestine, Table 3 above.

exports (see Table 8). Furthermore, the development of this branch contributed greatly to the emergence of a new region of economic activity in Palestine. Until the period under discussion, the economic importance of the central coastal region was very limited. By 1914 it was one of the major regions of economic activity. As we have already observed, the development of this branch resulted in an increase of cultivated area, in a growth in capital formation and in technological improvements. The influence of developments in the areas of capital formation and technology was felt in other agricultural branches as well. Ultimately the development of the citrus branch provided an

	I	II	III	Total
1898	56,600 cotton goods	41,600 sugar	35,500 rice	322,430
	17.6	*12.9*	*11.0*	*100*
1899	61,500 cotton goods	51,200 coffee	33,000 sugar	390,260
	15.8	*13.1*	*8.5*	*100*
1900	115,050 cotton goods	36,440 rice	30,080 coffee	382,405
	30.1	*9.5*	*7.9*	*100*
1901	100,600 cotton goods	53,500 flour	45,400 rice	426,310
	23.6	*12.6*	*10.7*	*100*
1902	112,900 cotton goods	62,500 flour	42,800 tobacco	405,550
	27.8	*15.4*	*10.6*	*100*
1903	175,000 cotton goods	39,600 tobacco	37,300 rice	439,775
	39.8	*9.0*	*8.5*	*100*
1904	160,000 cotton goods	47,000 tobacco	38,800 rice	473,320
	33.8	*9.9*	*8.2*	*100*
1905	180,000 cotton goods	40,200 tobacco	33,100 sugar	460,000
	39.1	*8.7*	*7.2*	*100*
1906	259,000 cotton goods	48,000 sugar	43,000 tobacco	660,000
	39.2	*7.3*	*6.5*	*100*
1907	267,670 cotton goods	53,325 tobacco	51,725 hardware	809,000
	33.1	*6.6*	*6.4*	*100*
1908	231,750 cotton goods	58,510 tobacco	55,210 rice	803,400
	28.8	*7.3*	*6.9*	*100*
1909	261, 785 cotton goods	70,615 rice	61,345 sugar	973,143
	26.9	*7.3*	*6.3*	*100*
1910	244,550 cotton goods	91,110 flour	67,555 sugar	1,002,450
	24.4	*9.1*	*6.7*	*100*
1911	262,340 cotton goods	122,700 flour	80,400 timber	1,169,910
	22.4	*10.5*	*6.9*	*100*
1912	243,080 cotton goods	100,000 timber	50,000 tobacco	1,090,019
	22.3	*9.2*	*4.6*	*100*
1913	240,800 cotton goods	150,625 flour	107,000 timber	1,312,695
	18.3	*11.5*	*8.2*	*100*

impetus for developments in other economic sectors, such as handicrafts (the manufacture of wooden cases), commerce, banking and transportation.[9]

Three additional cash crops underwent a process of expansion in cultivation: olives, sesame and grapes. The acreage of olives, for centuries one of the primary agricultural branches in Palestine, increased by thousands of *dunams* in the four or five decades prior to World War I; by 1914 it totaled 475 thousand *dunam*.[10] There are no data at our disposal on the growth rates in the olive crops, but there is no doubt that these rates did increase. This can be ascertained from the rapid growth in the soap output of Palestine, olive oil being the main raw material in the manufacture of soap. Like citrus, the olive was a major factor in the growth of visible exports. As of the 1870s the export of olives, in their primary state as oil, gradually decreased. This was due to the fact that most of the crop was used in the production of soap, a commodity which underwent a striking increase in volume of exports and accrued income during the last decades of Ottoman rule.

Table 5. *The Three Major Export Items, Jaffa Port, 1879-1913 (in £ at current prices and percents)*

	I	II	III	Total
1879	74,074 olive oil	55,000 soap	26,250 oranges	188,414
	39.3	*29.2*	*13.9*	*100*
1881	81,348 wheat	50,520 oranges	37,778 soap	248,538
	26.2	*21.5*	*16.4*	*100*
1882	73,330 wheat	60,330 oranges	45,794 soap	280,028
	32.7	*20.3*	*15.2*	*100*
1884	37,132 sesame	17,202 oranges	13,296 soap	117,034
	31.7	*14.7*	*11.4*	*100*
1885	32,000 sesame	26,500 oranges	13,722 soap	132,579
	24.1	*20.0*	*10.4*	*100*
1886	45,530 sesame	29,400 oranges	9,000 maize	119,555
	38.1	*24.6*	*7.5*	*100*
1887	42,500 sesame	38,400 soap	36,000 oranges	186,371
	22.8	*20.6*	*19.3*	*100*
1888	55,000 oranges	45,000 soap	28,125 sesame	204,315
	26.9	*22.0*	*13.8*	*100*
1889	62,669 sesame	51,200 oranges	33,600 soap	244,561
	25.6	*20.9*	*13.7*	*100*
1890	109,320 sesame	83,120 oranges	44,700 soap	447,010
	24.5	*18.6*	*10.0*	*100*
1891	124,000 soap	108,400 oranges	30,800 sesame	400,530
	31.0	*27.1*	*7.7*	*100*
1892	69,350 sesame	62,000 oranges	46,800 soap	258,466
	26.8	*24.0*	*18.1*	*100*
1893	112,000 soap	69,500 oranges	52,940 sesame	332,628
	33.7	*20.9*	*15.9*	*100*
1894	114,000 soap	51,000 oranges	42,153 sesame	285,604
	39.9	*17.9*	*14.8*	*100*
1895	93,240 soap	65,000 oranges	42,750 sesame	282,906
	33.0	*23.0*	*15.1*	*100*
1896	113,114 soap	72,600 oranges	59,800 sesame	373,447
	30.3	*19.4*	*16.0*	*100*
1897	81,900 soap	75,800 oranges	40,000 sesame	309,389
	26.5	*24.5*	*12.9*	*100*

Sources: See *CR* and *DCR* for Jaffa, Jerusalem and Palestine, Table 3 above.

Cultivation of olives was almost entirely in the hands of the Arab sector in Palestine. Of the total of olive orchards in the country in 1914, only some 11 thousand *dunam*, or only 2.3 percent, were owned by Jewish farmers.[11] Unlike citrus, olive cultivation continued to be centered in the traditional geographic areas of economic activity, namely in the country's hilly regions, and this branch did not undergo significant technological improvements; nor did it generate a chain of changes in other branches, apart from the manufacture of soap.

Sesame, another important traditional cash crop in Palestine, expanded in its cultivation following the sharp fall in the prices of raw cotton on the world

	I	II	III	Total
1898	82,500 oranges	62,000 soap	28,000 sesame	306,780
	26.9	*20.2*	*9.1*	*100*
1899	125,750 soap	77,000 oranges	26,100 watermelons	316,158
	39.8	*24.4*	*8.3*	*100*
1900	74,215 oranges	44,550 soap	30,560 sesame	264,950
	28.0	*16.8*	*11.5*	*100*
1901	86,525 oranges	57,000 soap	35,350 wines	277,635
	31.2	*20.5*	*12.7*	*100*
1902	86,500 oranges	29,260 sesame	18,720 soap	203,390
	42.5	*14.4*	*9.2*	*100*
1903	93,435 oranges	77,650 soap	30,350 wines	322,335
	29.0	*24.1*	*9.4*	*100*
1904	103,950 oranges	62,000 soap	37,860 wines	295,300
	35.2	*21.0*	*12.8*	*100*
1905	114,650 oranges	59,910 soap	47,020 wines	370,000
	31.0	*16.2*	*12.7*	*100*
1906	162,000 oranges	100,000 soap	60,000 sesame	500,000
	32.4	*20.0*	*12.0*	*100*
1907	179,185 oranges	88,870 soap	47,325 sesame	484,340
	37.0	*18.3*	*9.8*	*100*
1908	168,945 oranges	141,385 soap	54,745 sesame	556,370
	30.4	*25.4*	*9.8*	*100*
1909	185,815 oranges	145,425 soap	50,481 sesame	560,935
	33.1	*25.9*	*9.0*	*100*
1910	235,605 oranges	157,959 soap	60,925 wines	636,145
	37.0	*24.8*	*9.6*	*100*
1911	217,500 oranges	144,300 soap	98,000 sesame	710,660
	30.6	*20.3*	*13.8*	*100*
1912	283,600 oranges	254,000 soap	60,400 wines	774,162
	36.6	*32.4*	*7.8*	*100*
1913	297,700 oranges	200,000 soap	60,530 wines	745,413
	39.9	*26.8*	*8.1*	*100*

market in the second half of the 1860s. Areas allocated to cotton growing in the 1850s and the beginning of the 1860s were sown with sesame after the termination of the Civil War in the United States.[12] During most of the period under discussion, the greater part of the crop was exported, and sesame often constituted the primary export product of the economy (see Table 5).[13] Sesame was cultivated almost entirely by the Arab sector, and thus was the only cash crop to whose expansion the Jewish sector hardly contributed. The increase in sesame crops brought about the establishment of several *ḥalwa* factories.[14]

The fourth cash crop to undergo rapid expansion was grapes. This too, was one of Palestine's traditional crops. But, unlike olives and other cash crops, its expansion took place for the most part in the Jewish sector and, to a lesser degree, in the Templar settlements. As is well known, vineyards were the major agricultural branch in the Jewish settlement that had been established with the support of Baron Edmond de Rothschild. Vineyard acreage in the Jewish

sector grew apace during the last 15 years of the 19th century. In 1890 this acreage totaled some 11 thousand *dunam* and in 1900 some 25 or 26 thousand *dunam*.[15] The grape crop was used in the Jewish wine industry, whose exports grew steadily. In 1903 wine constituted the country's third-largest export item and continued to be a major export item in the decade prior to World War I (see Table 5). The expansion of this crop came to a halt and even declined at the beginning of the 20th century as a consequence of the crisis experienced by the wine industry throughout the world in those years. Because of the crisis, vineyard acreage in the Jewish settlements shrank, and in 1914 totaled only some 14 thousand *dunam*.[16] Despite this development, wine continued to be one of Palestine's main export items.

But development in the agricultural sector was not solely in the direction of growth. At least one crop, namely cotton, which had experienced very rapid growth in the first half of the 1860s, subsequently found itself in deep crisis as a result of the termination of the American Civil War. In the period under discussion cotton was a marginal crop whose contribution to the agricultural output of Palestine was very low.[17] In the last decades of the 19th century there was also a decline in the export of wheat.[18] However, it should not be assumed that this necessarily resulted in a decline of grain crops. The decline in exports resulted from a decline in the price of grain on the world market during the second half of the 19th century that had taken place because of the increasing supply of wheat and barley from the United States. The decline in prices on the export markets of Palestine's wheat made its export unprofitable. Concurrently, Palestine's population increased from 450 thousand in 1875 to about 700 thousand in 1914,[19] and its standard of living rose.[20] Therefore, it is possible that surpluses, which had been exported in the 1850s and 1860s, were from the 1870s and onwards consumed locally to an ever-increasing extent. In other words, total output of wheat and barley did not necessarily decrease during this period.

To conclude then, though there are apparently no estimates for the value added of the agricultural sector in the last 40-50 years of Ottoman rule in Palestine, it seems that the growth that characterized the four cash crops described above more than offset the decline in other agricultural products, and created a significant real growth in the total agricultural product — and perhaps an increase, as well, in the real agricultural product per capita. It would also appear that in the breakdown of the agricultural product into subsistence crops and cash crops, the relative share of the latter increased. These developments not only explain the growth in agricultural exports, but they also had an important impact on developments in the handicrafts, industry and services sectors.

* * *

In Palestine, as in other economies in the Middle East, growing imports of cheap industrial products from Europe hit the country's traditional

handicrafts, of which the most important were the weaving and spinning of textile, glassblowing, tanning and pottery. The decline of these handicrafts, a process that had already started in the first half of the 19th century, became more pronounced in the period under consideration. Particularly hard-hit were textile weaving and spinning, whose producers were unable to compete with rising textile imports, which had grown from about £28 thousand in 1879 to about £260 thousand in 1913 (in current prices; see Table 4). Against this development it is no wonder that there was a marked decline in the number of looms in the centers for these crafts, such as Gaza, Nablus (Rafidiya), Hebron and Ramallah.[21]

However, we should not conclude from this that all traditional handicrafts declined sharply and disappeared. Several handicrafts declined slightly, while others registered a growth.[22] This can be explained by three main factors. The first of these was the adjustment of handicrafts to new local demand patterns i.e., the demand for cheap industrial products. So, for example, when weaving with imported cotton threads began in Palestine, workers no longer paid as strict attention to the quality of their product as they had in the past.[23] The growth of textile output in Majdal, which occurred at the end of the period under discussion, resulted from the production of cheaper quality, low-priced cloth that could compete successfully with imported textile on the local market.

Secondly, there was the factor of increased demand in neighboring countries (that of Egypt in particular) for handicraft products manufactured in Palestine, especially for soap made from olive oil. The result was an increase in output. The growth in demand for soap was effected by a rise in the level of income in neighboring economies and by the preference of Muslim consumers for soap manufactured by their coreligionists from olive oil, which would ensure its meeting the requirements set down by Islamic religious law. The impressive growth in the output and export of soap was made possible by the channeling of olives away from being exported as oil to being used by the local soap industry, and as a result of an increase in the olive crop. The growth in exports was also brought about by improvements that took place in the trade routes between Palestine and its neighboring countries.

The total output of soap grew from less than one thousand tons in the 1870s to some 10 thousand tons in 1913.[24] Export of soap through Jaffa port increased from £55 thousand at the end of the 1870s to £254 thousand in 1912, which was a peak year in incomes from soap exports during the late Ottoman period. In the period under discussion soap was one of the three main export items of the economy, and for a number of years in the 1890s it was the most important export item, with a relative share of one-third of total exports (see Table 5). Though it is possible to point to other economies in the Middle East in which a traditional handicraft contributed at high rates to the total income from exports,[25] the case of Palestine would seem to be unique. For the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th were a period during which traditional handicrafts were generally on the decline, and industrial products

Table 6. *Acreage of Citrus Orchards, 1880, 1900 and 1914 (in dunams)*

	Arab sector	Jewish sector	Total
1880	7,500	—	7,500
1900	12,000	2,000	14,000
1914	23,000	10-12,000	33-35,000

Sources: Weakley, "Syria," p. 193; D. Gurevitch and A. Gretz, *Ha-hityashvut ha-haḳla'it ha-'Ivrit be-Eretz-Yisra'el* (Jerusalem, 1937/8), pp. 42-44; Tolkowski, *'Etz hadar*,

Table 7. *Exports of Oranges, Jaffa Port, 1879-1913*

	Cases	£
1879	—	26,250
1880	—	—
1881	170,500	500,520
1882	116,350	60,330
1883	—	—
1884	78,885	17,202
1885	106,000	26,500
1886	98,000	29,400
1887	180,000	36,000
1888	221,000	55,000
1889	205,000	51,200
1890	200,000	83,120
1891	270,000	108,400
1892	248,000	62,000
1893	278,000	69,500
1894	280,000	51,000
1895	260,000	65,000
1896	242,000	72,600
1897	290,000	75,800
1898	230,000	82,500
1899	310,000	77,000
1900	251,000	74,215
1901	361,450	86,525
1902	304,090	86,500
1903	447,675	93,435
1904	467,500	103,950
1905	456,152	114,650
1906	548,718	162,000
1907	630,512	179,185
1908	675,926	168,945
1909	744,463	185,815
1910	835,767	235,605
1911	869,850	217,500
1912	1,418,000	283,600
1913	1,608,570	297,700

Sources: See *CR* and *DCR* for Jaffa, Jerusalem and Palestine, Table 3 above.

Table 8. *Tonnage of Steamships Cleared at Principal Ports of Syria and Palestine, 1910-1913*

	1910		1911		1912		1913	
	tons'000	%	tons'000	%	tons'000	%	tons'000	%
Beirūt	1,701	32	1,535	32	1,233	27	1,748	31
Jaffa	1,115	21	1,025	21	1,014	22	1,160	20
Tripoli	896	17	824	17	859	19	1,092	19
Haifa	771	14	750	15	685	15	793	14
Alexandretta	632	12	573	12	556	12	676	12
Latakia	170	3	120	2	128	3	181	3
Sidon	61	1	23		26	1	50	1
Gaza	——		9		7		8	
Total	5,346	100	4,859	100	4,508	100	5,708	100

Note: Percents may not total because of rounding.

Source: U.K., Foreign Office, *Syria and Palestine*, Handbook no. 60 (London, 1920), pp. 148-150.

Table 9. *Centers of Soap Production in Syria and Palestine, 1908*

	'000 okes	%
Nablus	4,000	24
Jaffa	3,000	18
Al-Baḳā'	2,000	12
Tripoli	2,000	12
Aleppo	1,400	8
Antakya	1,220	7
Nezib	1,000	6
Damascus	600	3
Beirut	500	3
Other	910	6
Total Palestine	7,250	44
Total	16,630	100

Note: Percents do not total because of rounding.
Source: Weakley, "Syria," p. 63.

were the most important, or at least among the most important, items of import.

The increase in soap production was almost entirely the result of private initiative in the Arab sector.[26] The centers of production in Palestine were in Nablus and Jaffa, and to a lesser degree in Gaza, Lydda, Ramle and Haifa (see Table 9). However, it is interesting to note that the prosperity which this branch enjoyed at the end of the Ottoman period did not bring about technological changes in the process of production.[27]

The third and final factor that contributed to the growth in output of the country's handicraft sector, and to the increase of exports in this category, was the expansion of demand in the West for handcrafted goods from Palestine, primarily articles of religious ornament. The increase in demand for religious ornaments received an impetus from the rise in the number of pilgrims and tourists visiting Palestine.[28] At the beginning of the 20th century private entrepreneurs from Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Jaffa began to export religious ornaments for the use of Christians and Jews alike, and in the years 1906-1908 and 1912-1913 these exports through the port of Jaffa totaled some £20 thousand or more per annum (see Table 10). In contrast to the situation in the manufacture of soap, in this handicraft Jewish entrepreneurs and craftsmen were prominent as well.[29]

Numerous attempts were made in the period under discussion to develop a modern industry in Palestine. Modern factories were established for the production of textiles, oils, glass, building materials, iron products and other industrial goods.[30] Of all these experiments only the wineries established by Baron Edmond de Rothschild at Rishon le-Tziyon and Zikhron Ya'akov significantly contributed to the local economy. Production in the winery at Rishon le-Tziyon began in 1890 and, two years later, at Zikhron Ya'akov.[31] Less than 20 years later, in 1911, exports of wine and spirits from these wineries amounted to about £78 thousand.[32] However, even these ventures did not succeed in preventing the accumulation of deficits in their balances, and had it not been for Baron Rothschild's financial assistance, it is doubtful whether the wineries would have continued producing at all.[33]

The insufficiency of data on changes that took place in the aggregate value added in the handicrafts and industrial sector makes it impossible to determine if this sector also underwent a process of growth in aggregate terms. However, this sector did not necessarily undergo a process of decline; it is possible that those handicrafts and industries that registered growth offset the decline in the branches that were hurt by European competition. In this context it is worth noting that in the decade prior to World War I, handicrafts and industrial goods were often two of the three main export items through Jaffa port, and that these goods constituted about 36 percent on the average, of the total income from visible exports (see Table 10).

* * *

The last decades of Ottoman rule in Palestine saw substantial investments in construction. These investments were mostly in the private sector i.e., building for housing and business, and, to a lesser degree, of a public nature, undertaken by the Ottoman administration, by the waḳf and by local and foreign communal organizations and institutions; the latter category included construction of government offices, edifices for religious rites (mosques, churches and synagogues), schools and hospitals.[34] Housing construction was prominent in the cities (outside the city walls of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus,

Haifa and other towns), but also existed in the rural areas.[35] These investments were made by the Arab and the Jewish populations and by foreigners, and they brought about a change in the settlement landscape of the country. Impetus to growth in this sector was given by a population increase, both natural and the result of immigration, and by a process of urbanization in Palestinian society.[36] This growth was made possible by capital imports of immigrants and a variety of foreign institutions, societies and firms.[37] It seems that investments in this sector were one of the important components in the economic growth of Palestine in the period under discussion.

* * *

Growth and modernization also characterized the majority of the services. For the first time in many decades public and private investments were made for the development of the economy's physical infrastructure, both in the field of energy production and water supply, and in that of transportation and communication networks. Thus, for example, a number of windmills were constructed in Jerusalem and Haifa, and the water mills in the Galilee were improved.[38] There was a steady increase in the use of the steam engine, and later on the internal combustion engine, in various branches of the economy. In turn, the growth in the number of internal combustion engines made possible an increase in the number of deep water wells and in the supply of water for agriculture.[39] In the field of transportation and communication, railways were built for the first time in Palestine, first running east to west and later north to south as well.[40] In addition roads were paved along the major commercial arteries (see Table 12) and passenger carriages came into use.[41] The Ottoman administration also invested in the development of the ports at Jaffa and Haifa, though on a small scale.[42] In the second half of the 1860s construction of a telegraph network began linking Palestine to the capitals of Europe through Beirut and Istanbul.[43] In 1869 the first post office was opened in Palestine. It was established by the Austro-Hungarian Post in Jerusalem. In time, other foreign governments, as well as the Ottoman government, also opened post offices in the country.[44] There was also a marked increase in hotel construction, particularly in Jerusalem and Jaffa.[45] The development of the transportation and communication networks was one of the few fields in which investments by the public sector played a prominent part. However, private foreign investors and foreign governments, too, contributed to this development.

Developments described above in agriculture, handicrafts, industry and transportation affected an increase in the commercial activity. There was a rise in the number of big importers and exporters, and of wholesale and retail merchants.[46] At the same time there was an increase in the scope of commercial transactions, particularly in foreign trade. Specialization in this branch began to take place, and trading firms started to emerge among the big Arab merchant families.[47]

Table 10. *Exports of Major Handicrafts and Industrial Goods, Jaffa Port 1904-1913 (in £ at current prices)*

	Soap	Wines and spirits	Religious ornaments	Total	% of total exports
1904	62,000	37,860	9,000	108,860	39
1905	59,910	47,020	12,580	119,510	32
1906	100,000	36,000	20,000	156,000	31
1907	88,870	33,850	23,040	145,760	30
1908	141,385	42,200	26,750	210,335	38
1909	145,425	33,535	8,687	187,645	33
1910	157,959	60,925	12,205	231,089	36
1911	144,300	77,600	19,150	241,050	34
1912	254,000	60,400	22,000	336,400	43
1913	200,000	60,530	20,800	281,330	38

Source: See *DCR* for Jerusalem and Palestine, Table 3 above.

Table 11. *Merchandise Transported by Train, Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway, 1906-1913 (in tons)*

	Jaffa-Jerusalem	Jerusalem-Jaffa	Total
1906	33,942	4,000	37,942
1907	35,685	4,500	40,185
1908	32,196	3,500	35,696
1909	32,000	5,300	37,300
1910	36,000	6,000	42,000
1911	40,000	6,400	46,400
1912	33,750	4,000	37,750
1913	43,500	4,300	47,800

Sources: Weakley, "Syria," p. 98; Satow, "Jerusalem, 1910," *DCR*, 4697, p. 10; McGregor, "Jerusalem, 1913," *DCR*, 5339, p. 10.

Table 12. *Major "Provincial" Roads, 1910*

	Width in meters	Length in km.
Beirut-Acre-Haifa	6-8	140
Haifa-Nazareth-Tiberias	6-8	70
Jenin-'Afula	6	18
Jerusalem-Jaffa	7-8	61
Jerusalem-Hebron-Gaza	6-7	120
Jerusalem-Jericho	6	42
Bayt Jālā-Bethlehem	5-6	11

Source: Weakley, "Syria," pp. 84-85.

Changes also occurred in banking. For the first time large European banks established branches in Palestine. On the eve of World War I, branches of the Banque Impériale Ottomane, Crédit Lyonnais, Deutsche-Palästina Bank and the Anglo-Palestine Company were operating in Palestine. In 1914 these banks had 18 branches in the country (see Table 13).[48] There seems also to have been a substantial growth in the scope of the activity of traditional banking. The role of the big merchants in awarding credit to the fellaheen and other strata in the society grew at an ever-increasing rate.[49]

Finally, at the end of the Ottoman period, there was an increase in investments in human resources. The educational system underwent a quantitative expansion. The Ottoman authorities, waḳf funds, the minority communities and foreign institutions — Jewish as well as Christian — all contributed their share to this development.[50] There was also a qualitative change in education, resulting from both the adoption of Western methods and the establishment of general and vocational secondary schools.[51] Investments of the missionary institutions in Palestine, the Jewish community, the Templars, the waḳf funds and the authorities brought about an improvement in health and sanitation services. On the eve of World War I there were some 19 hospitals in the three major cities of Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa,[52] and during the period under discussion a number of municipalities began to provide sanitary services.[53]

To sum up the development in the services sector, it seems that this sector, too, underwent important changes that included a real increase in the aggregate value added accruing from it.

* * *

The growth and modernization of Palestine's economy appears to have brought about an increase in the average real income and in the standard of living. There is evidence to support this conclusion. First, throughout the period under discussion there was an increase in imports of "luxury goods" for local consumption, such as sugar, coffee and tobacco, at rates that were higher than the increase in the population (see Table 14). Secondly, it seems that there was an increase in per capita grain and rice consumption.[54] Thirdly, there was an increase in the acquisition of durable goods, such as hardware and furniture.[55] Fourthly and finally, foreigners residing in Palestine for prolonged periods in the final decade of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century reported that a rise in the urban and, possibly, the rural standard of living did in fact occur.[56]

However, not all strata of society seem to have benefited equally from the country's economic growth. There is reason to suppose that the income of those employed in branches that were closely tied to export — and particularly big merchants, and the owners of orchards and soap factories — rose at higher rates than that of the other strata in the population, especially of the fellaheen who cultivated subsistence crops and of craftsmen whose products were no

longer in high demand. It seems, therefore, that the process of growth — along with other processes taking place in Palestine's economy and society, such as the usurpation by the local elite of *mīrī* land and waḳf assets — heightened the extent of inequality in the distribution of capital and income in the Palestinian Arab society, a process that intensified after World War I.

Table 13. *Modern Banks in Palestine, 1914*

	Founded	Seat of Firm	Capital		Branches in Palestine
Banque Impériale Ottomane	1863	Istanbul	FF	250,000,000	Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa
Crédit Lyonnais	1863	Lyons	FF	250,000,000	Jaffa, Jerusalem
Deutsche Palästina-Bank	1899	Berlin	DM	20,000,000	Jaffa, Jerusalem Haifa, Nablus Nazareth Gaza
Anglo-Palestine Company	1902	London	£	120,000	Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa, Tiberias, Safed Hebron, Gaza
Banque Commerciale de Palestine	1911	Jerusalem	T£	50,000	Jerusalem

Source: Ruppin, *Syria*, p. 67.

Table 14. *Imports of Coffee, Sugar and Tobacco, Jaffa Port, 1900-1913 (in £ at current prices)*

	Coffee	Sugar	Tobacco	Total
1900	30,080	28,890	——	58,970
1901	18,350	26,800	——	45,150
1902	9,250	19,200	42,800	71,250
1903	14,150	22,070	39,600	75,820
1904	8,385	33,140	47,000	88,525
1905	7,850	33,100	40,200	81,150
1906	17,000	48,000	43,000	108,000
1907	18,715	40,960	53,325	113,000
1908	26,365	38,620	58,510	123,495
1909	24,560	61,345	54,400	140,305
1910	21,600	67,555	67,000	156,155
1911	22,060	64,840	72,200	159,100
1912	30,000	41,600	50,000	120,600
1913	51,900	53,600	67,300	172,800

Source: See *DCR* for Palestine and Jerusalem, Table 3 above.

Notes

1 Cf. Gabriel Baer, "The Impact of Economic Change on Traditional Society in Nineteenth Century Palestine," in Moshe Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 495-498. In light of existing data (see below), Baer's conclusion "... that economic changes [in Palestine] were extremely small, not only in absolute terms but also in comparison with neighbouring areas..." is incorrect (*ibid.*, p. 495).

2 For data on visible imports and exports through the various Syrian ports see Mohammad Sa'id Kalla, "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Syria, 1831-1914," Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, Washington D.C. (1969), p. 32, t. VI; pp. 254-257, t. I (appendix). See also Ch. Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa* (New York, 1982), p. 24, t. 2.1.

3 See also Shmuel Avitsur, *Tmurot be-ḥakla'ut Eretz-Yisra'el, 1875-1975* (Tel Aviv, 1977), pp. 182-183.

4 Consul John Dickson, "Report on Irrigation and Orange Growing at Jaffa," U.K., Foreign Office (hereafter, F.O.), *Diplomatic and Consular Reports* (hereafter, *DCR*), Miscellaneous Series, no. 300 (London, 1893), p. 2 (hereafter, Dickson, "Orange Growing," *DCR*, 300).

5 *Ibid.*

6 See further, Shmuel Tolkovski, *Pri 'etz-hadar* (Jerusalem, 1966), p. 254; Avitsur, *Tmurot be-ḥakla'ut*, p. 184; cf. Arthur Ruppin, *Syria: An Economic Survey* (New York, 1918), pp. 27, 31-32.

7 Dickson, "Orange Growing," *DCR*, 300, pp. 3-4; "Report by Consular Agent Amzalak on the Trade and Commerce of Jaffa for the Year 1881," F.O., *Consular Reports* (hereafter, *CR*), Commercial no. 36 (1882), p. 1159 (hereafter, Amzalak, "Jaffa, 1881," *CR*, 36); Consul Dickson", Report on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine for the Year 1900," F.O., *DCR*, Annual Series (hereafter, AS) 2584 (1901), p. 6 (hereafter, Dickson, "Palestine, 1900," *DCR*, 2584); Consul Dickson, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine for the Year 1905," F.O., *DCR*, AS 3561 (1906), p. 5 (hereafter, Dickson, "Palestine, 1905," *DCR*, 3561); Consul Blech, "Report on the Trade of Palestine for the Year 1907," F.O., *DCR*, AS 3974 (1908), pp. 12-14 (hereafter, Blech, "Palestine, 1907," *DCR*, 3974); Consul E.C. Blech, "Report on the Trade of the Consular District of Jerusalem for the Year 1908," F.O., *DCR*, AS 4222 (1909), p. 17 (hereafter, Blech, "Jerusalem, 1908," *DCR*, 4222).

8 This figure is given by Consul P.J.C. McGregor in his "Report on the Trade of the Consular District of Jerusalem for the Year 1913," F.O., *DCR*, AS 5339 (1914), p. 11 (hereafter, McGregor, "Jerusalem, 1913," *DCR*, 5339).

9 Ernest Weakley, "Report upon the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Syria," U.K., *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers*, vol. 87 (London, 1911), p. 193 (hereafter, Weakley, "Syria").

10 Avitsur, *Tmurot be-ḥakla'ut*, p. 153. See also V. Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine* (Paris, 1895), pp. 98-115. Cf. Weakley, "Syria," p. 58.

11 Avitsur, *Tmurot be-ḥakla'ut*, p. 154; Cf. Ruppin, pp. 31-32.

12 Shmuel Avitsur, *Ḥayey yom-yom be-Eretz-Yisra'el ba-me'a ha-tesha'-'esre* (Tel Aviv, 1972), p. 254.

13 See also Weakley, "Syria," p. 198.

14 Ruppin, pp. 47-48; Avitsur, *Ḥayey yom-yom*, p. 255.

15 Simon Shama, *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel* (London, 1978), pp. 120-129; Avitsur, *Tmurot be-ḥakla'ut*, p. 157.

16 Blech, "Palestine 1907," *DCR*, 3974, p. 11; Ruppin, pp. 31-32; Avitsur, *Tmurot be-ḥakla'ut*, p. 157.

17 Consul Dickson, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine for the Year 1903," F.O., *DCR*, AS 3223 (1904), pp. 6-7 (hereafter, Dickson, "Palestine, 1903," *DCR*, 3223).

18 Exports of wheat through Jaffa port decreased from £81,348 and £3,330 in 1881 and 1882 respectively to £3,560 and £1,920 in 1896 and 1896 respectively. See Amzalak,

"Jaffa, 1881," *CR*, 36, p. 1153; "Report by Consular Agent Amzalak [*sic*] on the Trade and Commerce of Jaffa for the Year 1882," F.O., *CR*, Commercial no. 20 (1883), p. 629 (hereafter, Amzalak, "Jaffa, 1882," *CR*, 20); Consul John Dickson, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of the Consular District of Jerusalem for the Year 1896," F.O., *DCR*, AS 1872 (1897), p. 8 (hereafter, Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1896," *DCR*, 1872).

19 For data on the size of the population in the various districts of Palestine, see and compare, Muḥammad Rafīq and Muḥammad Bahjat, *Wilāyat Bayrūt*, vol. 1 (*al-ḳism al-janūbī*), (Beirut, 1335 H.), pp. 8, 171-172, 181, 231, 274, 352, 364, 380. Cuinet, pp. 93, 179, 520-521, 627-628, 663, 667, 677; McGregor, "Jerusalem, 1913," *DCR*, 5339, p. 2; Ruppin, pp. 6-7; Fred M. Gottheil, "The Population of Palestine, circa 1875," *MES*, 15, no. 3 (1979), pp. 310-318; Justin McCarthy, "The Population of Ottoman Syria and Palestine, 1878-1914," in Gad G. Gilbar (ed.), *Studies in the Economic and Social History of the Middle East, 1800-1914, AAS*, 15, no. 1 (1981), pp. 18-29.

20 See below.

21 Acting Consul Freeman, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine for the Year 1906," F.O., *DCR*, AS 3771 (1907), p. 3 (hereafter, Freeman, "Palestine, 1906," *DCR*, 3771); Avitsur, *Ḥayey yom-yom*, pp. 266-267.

22 See below and also Dickson, "Palestine, 1905," *DCR*, 3561, p. 8; Blech, "Jerusalem, 1908," *DCR*, 4222, pp. 18-19; H.E. Satow, "Report on the Trade of the Consular District of Jerusalem for the Year 1910," F.O., *DCR*, AS 4697 (1911), p. 16 (hereafter, Satow, "Jerusalem, 1910," *DCR*, 4697); H.E. Satow, "Report on the Trade of the Consular District of Jerusalem for the year 1911," *DCR*, AS 4850 (1912), p. 16 (hereafter, Satow, "Jerusalem, 1911," *DCR*, 4850).

23 Dickson, "Palestine, 1905," *DCR*, 3561, p. 8; Blech, "Jerusalem, 1908," *DCR*, 4222, p. 19; Satow, "Jerusalem, 1910," *DCR*, 4697, p. 16.

24 Rafīq and Bahjat, vol. 1, pp. 119-121; Iḥsān al-Nimr, *Ta'rīkh Jabal Nāblus wa'l-Balḳā'*, vol. 2 (Nablus, 1962), pp. 288-293; Weakley, "Syria," pp. 60-63.

25 Exports of carpets in the years preceeding World War I accounted for 12-13 percent of Iran's total visible exports. See *The Statesman's Year-Book* (London, 1907), pp. 1307-1308; 1908, p. 1345; 1909, p. 1092.

26 The relative share by the Templars and the Jewish sector in soap production was very small. See Weakley, "Syria," pp. 60, 62-63.

27 Al-Nimr, vol. 4 (Nablus, 1970), p. 207; Weakley, "Syria," p. 61.

28 Consul John Dickson, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of the Consular District of Jerusalem for the Year 1895," F.O., *DCR*, AS 1698 (1896), pp. 3, 6 (hereafter, Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1895," *DCR*, 1698).

29 Weakley, "Syria," p. 52; Avitsur, *Ḥayey yom-yom*, pp. 272-274.

30 Ruppin, p. 52; Avitsur, *Ḥayey yom-yom*, pp. 317-345.

31 Consul John Dickson, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine for 1890-91," F.O., *DCR*, AS 1023 (1892), p. 4 (hereafter, Dickson, "Palestine, 1890-91," *DCR*, 1023); Consul Dickson, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine for the Year 1904," F.O., *DCR*, AS 3410 (1905), p. 8 (hereafter, Dickson, "Palestine, 1904," *DCR*, 3410); Schama, pp. 121-124.

32 Consul P.J.C. McGregor, "Report on the Trade of the Consular District of Jerusalem for the Year 1912," F.O. *DCR*, AS 5107 (1913), p. 12.

33 Schama, p. 154; Avitsur, *Ḥayey yom-yom*, pp. 341-342.

34 See, for example, Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1895," *DCR*, 1698, p. 7; Dickson, "Palestine, 1905," *DCR*, 3561, p. 9; Blech, "Jerusalem, 1908," *DCR*, 4222, p. 19; Satow, "Jerusalem, 1911," *DCR*, 4850, p. 15.

35 Al-Nimr, vol. 3 (Nablus, n.d. [1970?]), pp. 65-66; "Report by Vice-Consul Schmidt on the German Colony at Caiffa [August 1879]," F.O., *CR* Commercial no. 2 (1880), p. 127; Amzalak, "Jaffa, 1881," *CR*, 36, p. 1159; Consul Noel Temple Moore, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Jaffa for the Year 1886," F.O., *DCR*, AS 164 (1887), p. 1 (hereafter, Moore, "Jaffa, 1886," *DCR*, 164); Consul John Dickson, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of the Consular District of Jerusalem for the Year 1893," F.O., *DCR*, AS 1350 (1894), pp. 4, 6 (hereafter, Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1893," *DCR*, 1350);

Consul-General Drummond-Hay, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Beirut and the Coast of Syria for the Year 1900," F.O., *DCR*, AS 2662 (1901), p. 12; Consul-General Drummond-Hay, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Beirut and the Coast of Syria for the Year 1901," F.O., *DCR*, AS 2836 (1902), p. 15; Consul Dickson, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine for the Year 1902," F.O., *DCR*, AS 2962 (1903), p. 6 (hereafter, Dickson, "Palestine, 1902," *DCR*, 2962); Dickson, "Palestine, 1903," *DCR*, 3223, p. 3; Nahum Gross, "Tmurot Kalkaliyot be-Eretz Yisrae'l be-sof ha-tekufa ha-'Othmanit," *Cathedra*, 2 (Nov. 1976), p. 112; Ruth Kark, "The Rise and Decline of Coastal Towns in Palestine," in Gad G. Gilbar (ed.), *Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914: Studies in Economic and Social History*, Vol. 1, forthcoming.

36 For figures on the size of the population in towns see and cf. Rafiq and Bahjat, vol. 1, pp. 113-114, 231-232, 352, 382; Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, "The Population of the Large Towns in Palestine during the First Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century, according to Western Sources," in Ma'oz, p. 68; Gottheil, "Population," pp. 315-317.

37 See Consul Dickson, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine for the Year 1899," F.O., *DCR*, AS 2405 (1900), p. 3 (hereafter, Dickson, "Palestine, 1899," *DCR*, 2405); Satow, "Jerusalem, 1911," *DCR*, 4850, p. 5; Ruppin, p. 12; Nahum Gross, "Sof ha-tekufa ha-'Otomanit, 1902-1913," in *Banka'i le-uma be-hitḥadshutah* (Tel Aviv, 1977), pp. 31, 101 (n. 21).

38 Avitsur, *Ḥayey yom-yom*, pp. 321-322, and idem, "Wind Power in the Technological Development in Palestine," in this volume.

39 Consul Dickson, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine for the Year 1901," F.O., *DCR*, AS 2822 (1902), p. 4 (hereafter, Dickson, "Palestine, 1901," *DCR*, 2822); Dickson, "Palestine, 1902," *DCR*, 2962, pp. 4-5; Avitsur, *Ḥayey yom-yom*, pp. 333-334, 339-340.

40 See further, Weakley, "Syria," pp. 97-109; Walter Pinhas Pick, "Meissner Pasha: Railway Pioneer in Palestine and Surrounding Countries," in Gilbar, *Palestine*, forthcoming; Ruth Kark, "Transportation in Nineteenth Century Palestine: Reintroduction of the Wheel," in Gad G. Gilbar (ed.), *Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914: Studies in Economic and Social History*, vol. 2, forthcoming.

41 Weakley, "Syria," pp. 82, 84-85; Kark, "Transportation". See also Table 11.

42 Consul Moore, "Trade and Industries of Jerusalem for the Year 1887," F.O., *DCR*, AS 363 (1888), p. 5 (hereafter, Moore, "Jerusalem, 1887," *DCR*, 363); Consul Noel Temple Moore, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of Jaffa for the Year 1888," F.O., *DCR, AS*, 529 (1889), p. 3 (hereafter, Moore, "Jaffa, 1888," *DCR*, 529); Alex Carmel, *Toldot Ḥaifa bi-yemey ha-Turkim* (Haifa, 1969), pp. 153-154; Shmuel Avitsur, *Nemal Yafo be-ge'uto u-ve-shki'ato* (Tel Aviv, 1972), pp. 107-108; Kark, "Transportation."

43 Avitsur, *Ḥayey yom-yom*, p. 307.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 308.

45 Dickson, "Jerusalem, 1895," *DCR*, 1698, p. 6; Karl Baedeker (ed.), *Palestine and Syria. Handbook for Travellers* (Leipzig, 1912), pp. 19, 22.

46 See further Iris Agmon, "Palestine's Foreign Trade, 1878-1914," M.A. thesis, University of Haifa (1984); Amos Lewenberg, "The Socio-Economic Elite of Haifa during the Late Ottoman Period," M.A. thesis, University of Haifa (in preparation).

47 See, for example, al-Nimr, vol. 2, pp. 296-298; Blech, "Palestine, 1907," *DCR*, 3974, p. 12.

48 See further, Ruppin, pp. 66-69; Gross, "Sof ha-tekufa," pp. 67-70.

49 Satow, "Jerusalem, 1911," *DCR*, 4850, p. 16; McGregor, "Jerusalem, 1913," *DCR*, 5339, p. 18; Ruppin, pp. 69-70.

50 Al-Nimr, vol. 3, pp. 87, 129; Cuinet, p. 564; Satow, "Jerusalem, 1911," *DCR*, 4850, p. 15; Ruppin, p. 83.

51 Jacob Landau, "The Educational Impact of Western Culture on Traditional Society in Nineteenth Century Palestine," in Ma'oz, pp. 499-506. Cf. Shimon Shamir, "The Impact of Western Ideas on Traditional Society in Ottoman Palestine," in Ma'oz, pp. 507-511.

52 Baedeker, 1912, pp. 8, 22-23, 229.

53 Rafiḳ and Bahjat, vol. 1, pp. 136-138; al-Nimr, vol. 3, pp. 32-33; Carmel, pp. 164-166; Ruth Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality at the End of Ottoman Rule," *AAS*, 14, np. 2 (1980), pp. 128-131.

54 Avitsur, *Nemal Yafo*, pp. 55-56. Cf. Gross, "Sof ha-teḳufa," pp. 43-44; idem, "Tmurot Kalkaliyot," pp. 122-123.

55 Imports of hardware through Jaffa port increased from £15,483 in the years 1901-1905 (average) to £31,300 in 1911-1913 (average). See Dickson, "Palestine, 1905," *DCR*, 3561, p. 11; McGregor, "Jerusalem, 1913," *DCR*, 5339, p. 14. See also Freeman, "Palestine, 1906," *DCR*, 3771, p. 4.

56 Consul Dickson, "Report on the Trade and Commerce of the Consular District of Jerusalem for the Year 1898," F.O., *DCR*, AS 2217 (1899), p. 6; Dickson, "Palestine, 1904," *DCR*, 3410, p. 5; Freeman, "Palestine, 1906," *DCR*, 3771, p. 6. Cf. Kalla, pp. 219-220; Gross, "Sof ha-teḳufa," p. 57.

Money and Product Flows in Mid-19th Century Palestine: The Physiocratic Model Applied*

FRED M. GOTTHEIL

In the mid-19th century, people visited Palestine for any number of reasons, but not to study its economy. Still, in describing what they saw, heard, read and felt, these visitors also put down numerous observations and remarks about economic conditions. However sporadic and impressionistic any of their comments may appear to be, together they add up to a vivid picture of the Palestinian economy that is internally consistent and probably quite accurate. It can be summarized as follows:

They described an economy that was quite primitive, chronically stagnant, and highly exploitive with regard to the income and product flows that occurred among producing and nonproducing classes. Taxes and interest rates were emphasized as mechanisms used to shift the national product from the peasant class to the nonproducers. With few exeptions, the peasantry was kept at minimum subsistence level. Peasant consumption and savings satisfied only the basic needs. Savings had no productive function. Net investment did not occur. Lack of security for both persons and property, and the *expectations* of insecurity greatly influenced peasant productive behavior.

Although agriculture was the primary mode of production, the population was still uncharacteristically urbanized. Artisans, merchants, and in the larger towns even light manufacturing complemented the agricultural population. A smaller proportion of the population was nomadic, producing within that class consumption and production patterns typical of nomadic life. Conflict between the settled and nomadic populations over land use seemed unending and, at times, was singularly responsible for violent shifts in annual peasant production.

Other factors, associated with the state, such as the capricious procedures for taxation, conscription and obligatory labor service influenced the mobility of individual peasants and even entire villages, thereby affecting regional production. And, of course, as in all cases of agricultural economies, production was always subject to the whims of climate.

This cursory review of the 19th century Palestine economy holds few surprises. It conforms closely to the patterns of production and distribution commonly associated with traditional 19th century LDC agriculture. While

Palestinian history is, of course, particular, the particularities seem to modify only slightly the general features of its like systems.

The purpose of this study is to develop an analytical structure of the Palestine economy during the mid-19th century that reflects the condition described above and to identify within the structure those economic mechanisms that were employed to promote the particular ser of interclass money and product flows.

THE PHYSIOCRATIC MODEL: A FIRST APPROXIMATION

Perhaps the best approach to an analysis of the mid-19th century Palestine economy is by recourse to the physiocratic model. This model was developed in France in the latter part of the 18th century to explain how an economy "works." In the mechanics of this explanation, the structure of interclass money and product flows was developed for the first time. Although the model is highly abstract and elemental, it still contains the essential components and relationships that described a generalized, agrarian system. Marx, by the way, generally highly critical of competing expositions on economics, called the physiocratic model "the most brilliant idea of which political economy had hitherto been guilty." The connection between this model and the mid-19th century Palestine economy will become apparent.

The physiocratic model describes a premodern economy in terms of its class structure and production character.

(1) *Class Structure:* The economy is composed of three classes identified by economic fuction. They include: (a) the peasants, who are assumed to compose one half of the population and produce agricultural commodities in the form of food and raw materials; (b) the manufacturers — including crafts and tradesmen — who are assumed to account for one quarter of the population and produce and exchange manufactured commodities; and (c) the landlords — including subgroups of clergy, administrators, and military — who are assumed to constitute the remaining one quarter of the population and are nonproducers.

(2) *Production Character:* The peasant class produces agricultural commodities greater in value than the value of resources used in production. That is to say, peasants produce a surplus. The manufacturers, on the other hand, simply transform — value for value — resources into manufactured commodities. Landlords, already noted, produce nothing at all. Their *raison d'être* is explained by the fact that in the past, they cleared, drained and irrigated the lands upon which the peasants cultivated. They thereby retained proprietory rights to these lands which afforded them annual rent.

The mechanics of the model's interclass money and product flows are described in the Appendix. Suffice it here to identify the model's major findings. They are shown in Diagram 1.

First, the physiocrats made explicit the relationship between resources

applied to agricultural production (R), and the total agricultural production (TAP), i.e.,

$$TAP = b(R)$$

where $b > 1$ describes the creativity of the producing class.

Second, the physiocrats identified the surplus in the form

$$S=(TAP—R)$$

as the upper limit to the income of nonproducers, i.e., the landlord class. Third, equating surplus to the landlord's income, the process of sequential interclass money and product flows reproduces the system's initial conclusions so that stationary equilibrium results.



Diagram 1

THE PALESTINE MODEL

The physiocratic model is instructive when applied to the circumstances of mid-19th century Palestine. Adjustments can be made in the Palestine model to conform more closely to the Palestine reality without violating the tenets of the physiocratic model both with respect to the character of the money and product flows and to the resource-output relations.

Like the physiocratic model, the Palestine example identifies the peasant class as the primary contributor to production and surplus. Furthermore, the surplus constitutes the income source from which nonproducers make claim on the system. But the Palestinian case differs in several respects from the physiocratic one. Unlike the physiocratic model where initial conditions are reproduced, 19th century Palestine faced long-run depopulation, desertions by

entire populations from producing villages and erratic annual production that over periods of time produced actual production decreases. The two models are compared in Diagram 2.

TAP identifies the physiocratic production function. The surplus, S, is equated to the landlord's income while the residual, TAP — S, is precisely the level of resources required by the peasant class to reproduce the previously attained level of total production. TAP reflects those conditions that mark the Palestinian reality, e.g., the level of applied technology, the system of land tenure. The tenure system discouraged the use of best-known and available technology, producing levels of output inferior to those levels that would have obtained under different tenure conditions. In addition, the presence of the Bedouin and the systems of taxation and military conscription generated inter-class product distribution that left the peasant class with resources insufficient to maintain the previously obtained levels of total production. The contraction of the resource base, from R1 to R2 and so on, traces the system's deterioration in performance.



Diagram 2

MONEY AND PRODUCT FLOWS IN MID-19TH CENTURY PALESTINE

The interclass transactions that reflect such a performance are outlined in Diagram 3.

The centerpiece is the peasant class. Its relations with the state, the moneylender, the merchants, and the Bedouins shape both the character of output and its distribution among the economic classes. While market forces play some role in resource allocation, production and consumption outcomes follow patterns established by traditions that promote and maintain unequal power relations among the classes. In some circumstances, the exercise of force plays a decisive role. Consider first the peasant-Bedouin link. Force dominated this relation.



Diagram 3

The Peasant-Bedouin Link

The Bedouin economy during the mid-19th century was essentially pastoral. Its principal source of wealth was in the form of livestock — goats, sheep, cattle, horses, and camels.[1] The Bedouin's economic links to the peasant class were informal and highly capricious. They represented, for most of the transactions, a unilateral transfer of income and wealth, sometimes marginal, but at other times quite significant. The influence of the Bedouin on the peasant system, however, was considerably more extensive than these income and wealth shifts may suggest. These habitual transers themselves created a *set of expectations* among the peasants that affected their decisions on how much land to take under cultivation. C.F.T. Drake noted in 1872:

> Less than eight years ago, the Plains of Esdraelon was the favorite summer grounds of the various tribes... These sons of the desert not only prevented the cultivation to any great extent of this wide and fertile plain, but also exacted blackmail from the unfortunate peasants, whose cattle and crops were, notwithstanding this, frequently lifted or destroyed. On my first visit to the plain in 1870, *not more than one sixth or one fifth was under cultivation and the same was the case the following year.*[2]

British Consul to Jerusalem J. Finn, tells, in 1877, of a village that because of the Bedouins had reduced cultivation from fifty to six *feddans*.[3] His colleague, U.S. Consul to Jerusalem A. Beardsley, reported in an 1872 dispatch to Washington that nine-tenths of the Jordan Valley and large tracts of the plains of Sharon had not been cultivated for years.[4]

Finn, in an 1853 dispatch to London, reported, "...in the South, the country is harassed in every direction by wild Arabs who are plundering and destroying the growing crops of millet and stores of wheat belonging to the villages."[5] In still another diplomatic letter of that year, he noted that the Bedouins, camped by the Christian village of Arṭās, brought their cattle, camels, sheep and goats daily for water into the valley where they destroyed fences and trampled on market vegetable gardens.[6] Two years later, he reported that at Hebron: "...vineyards around are cut down — in one direction 2,000 *feddans* of standing corn are destroyed by flocks and herds."[7] Describing conditions in the north country, he wrote: "...on the plains of Esdraelon, crops were destroyed *and whole villages abandoned* by the inhabitants."[8]

A year later, in 1856, Finn reported that Bedouins from the Jordan Plain allowed no wheat to pass from the plains to the towns and that the fertile plain between Gaza and Bayt Jubrīn had been occupied by the Bedouins.[9] Elsewhere he noted that the plain between Ramle and Gaza had been desolated by the Bedouin. In the district of 'Arḳūb, they "...cut down fruit trees, and by means of their flocks and camels devoured the green crops to a fearful extent."[10]

In his *Byeways of Palestine* (1877) Finn describes a Bedouin-peasant compulsory partnership:

> The district around — indeed, all eastward of 'Anata — is now unappropriated; parts of it, however, are sown... by the people of the nearest village in a compulsory partnership with the petty Arabs of the Jordan Plain. The peasantry are forced to find the seed and the labour, and yet are often defrauded of their share of the produce by the so-called partners bringing up friends and auxiliaries from the Plain, just as the grain is ripening, and carrying off the produce by night, or setting fire to whatever they cannot seize in this hasty operation..."[11]

Finn's accounts of the Bedouin's propensity to plunder is widely supported. W.M. Thomson (1862), for example, commented on the Bedouin presence south of 'Abadiyya "...*the entire valley of the Jordan is abandoned* to the Bedouin and there is not an inhabited village until you reach Jericho."[12] Of the Bedouin's presence in the valley of Esdraelon, he wrote:

> Their system of desolation is worked out in this fashion: they pitch their tents in the vicinity of a village, and in such numbers as to bid defiance to the inhabitants. Of course their camels and their flocks roam over the unfenced plain, and devour a large part of the grain while growing; and when it is ripe, they either steal it or compel the farmers to *present* them a heavy percentage as the price of their protection. From the village itself, chickens, eggs, sheep, cows and even horses disappear and can never be recovered. Many of the inhabitants move off to escape from these annoyances, and, the village thereby weakened, the Arabs provoke a quarrel; someone is wounded or killed, and then the place is sacked and burned.[13]

In some situations, the peasants' tribute to the Bedouin became regularized in the form of *khuwwa* tax.[14] Kitchener, for example, noted for 1877 a £300 tribute from the peasants in the Tiberias region to the Banū Ṣaḫr tribe.[15] Bovet wrote (1883): "Each tribe preserves a sort of independence and carries on its affairs on its own account; there are whole villages which pay taxes, not to the pasha, but to some Bedouin emir, and there is many a district of Palestine in which the representative of the Porte could not venture himself without as much certainty of being robbed as any chance comer."[16]

Hardly a writer failed to make similar observations concerning the influence of the Bedouin on the area put to cultivation by the peasant class. Peasant behavior in restricting capacity was perfectly rational. With no constraint placed on the Bedouin's freedom to plunder, the expected income from cultivation of areas not immediately adjacent to the village was clearly less than the cost of seed, draft animals, and labor. In some regions, the peasant even substituted the castor plant — an inferior annual plant — for the olive because Bedouin plunder would undo only an investment of one year's labor as opposed to the multiple years required before the olive tree bore fruit.[17]

While the costs of such Bedouin activity is virtually impossible to measure, it

is reasonable to conclude that the loss to the peasant class during the mid-19th century had been substantial. The loss, we noted, represented not only the unilateral transfers of income and wealth, but equally important, the significant reduction in the peasant's productive base, i.e., R^1 to R^2.

It should be further noted that the license to plunder depended upon the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the Turkish army whose responsibility it was to maintain law and order. When the army was of sufficient strength and willing, Bedouin plundering was substantially checked. During such periods, descriptions of peasant cultivations contrasted sharply with those offered above. In fact, during such periods, some Bedouin tribes were actually forced to pay tent and animal taxes to the state. The 'Arab al-Faḍl tribe of the Golan — of 320 tents — for example, paid an annual tax of 38,400 piastres to the state in lieu of military service.[18] There was, however, no regularity to an effective military presence and for most of the period under discussion, little check was placed on Bedouin behavior.

While coercion of the varieties discussed above represented the dominant link between the peasant class and the Bedouin, it was not the only one. In many instances, and again due to pressures exerted by the Bedouin, and in some cases by the state, peasants voluntarily joined Bedouin tribes in an auxiliary capacity and, by agreement, exchanged shares of their produce for protection against other tribes. In still other instances, peasants abandoned entire villages for the security of Bedouin encampments, this time seeking refuge from Turkish military conscription and taxation.

And although the power relation between the peasant and the Bedouin was always unequal, it did not preclude them from engaging, in particular times and places, in actual market exchanges. Kitchener, for example, noted in 1884: "Notwithstanding the constant blackmail they had to pay to different tribes, they made a good deal in trading with the Bedouin in barley, wheat, beans, etc."[19] Concerning trade with merchants, Finn reported in 1858: "within the last four years, Bedouin has taken to trade in partnership with the Bethlehemites in silk goods, in cottons, in soap, and in other articles of merchandise, with the coast of the Red Sea."[20] K. Baedeker in 1894 reported that the merchants of Hebron carried on a brisk trade with the Bedouin, purchasing, among other things, goat hides for the manufacture of water skins.[21] And in Jerusalem, Warren reported that the supply of barilla used to manufacture the blue dye — for garments that were later sold to Bedouin women — was brought to Jerusalem from the Dead Sea by the Bedouin.[22]

While the Bedouin constituted a class distinct from others in Palestine, differences among Bedouin tribes with respect to economic function became increasingly apparent. Proximity to and contact with the peasants and merchants contributed to changes not only in life-style through trade, but also in their internal productive system. Tribes in the coastal plains and around Gaza took to cultivating the soil.[23] The Ta'âmira tribe, Conder wrote: "actually degraded themselves by sowing barley which they sell in

Bethlehem."[24] Spencer in 1850 described the primitive mode of Bedouin ploughing: "a rope is passed over the camel's hump, and being attached to the plough, an Arab walks behind and guides the machine."[25] Finn observed that the Bedouin actually purchased slaves — a large slave market existed in Gaza — to sow and reap for them.[26]

Bedouin trade and agriculture, nonetheless, must be regarded as having been strictly subordinate activities. Their system, by geography and inclination, was essentially closed. Their imprint upon the other classes in the Palestine economy, and notably the peasant class, was capricious and subversive, diminishing not only the peasant's income and wealth, but also its resource base.

The Peasant-State Link

The impact of state activity on the peasant class constituted still another form of peasant abuse and created, as in the Bedouin case, conditions that encouraged an actual reduction in productive capacity. The money and product flows that connected the peasant class to the state involved the tax farmer as a principal intermediary. The primary link was taxation.

Although the tax system included direct and indirect taxes on land, persons, animals, raw material, and market commodities, the most damaging to the peasant was the state levy on agricultural output.

Direct taxes on land and output were customarily differentiated according to the three types of land tenure. They were (1) *mūlk* or freehold property that was generally close to the village and almost invariably used by the peasants as gardens or orchards, (2) *mīrī* land owned by the state but held in common by the village with peasants possessing indivisible rights to sowing and cultivation, and (3) waḳf land owned by the mosque. The *mīrī* was the most important form of property. It was land used by the peasants in the production of major crops, e.g., wheat, barley, beans, millet, and tobacco.

All three land tenures were tied to an annual money tax payable directly to the state. This tax applied to uncultivated as well as to cultivated lands and amounted to approximately three to five percent of the land value. But the tax that contributed most to the oppression of the peasant class was the tithe, *a'shār*, which was applied only to the arable *mīrī* lands. While the *a'shār* was nominally 10 percent, in reality, it was considerably higher.

In the case of *a'shār*, the state was not the depository of its collection. Instead, it auctioned off the tax right to the highest bidder who acquired the right by paying the state a much larger sum than the actual value of the tithe, in addition to the customary bribes. However, after acquiring the right, this tax farmer was at liberty to impose as high a tax as he could collect on the helpless peasant. As will be shown below, the tax farmer was in a privileged position *vis à vis* the peasant on the matter of collection.

First of all, no peasant was allowed to begin harvesting until the tax farmer

arrived at the village to evaluate the crops still on the field. In this way, the peasant, fearing the overripening of the grain, was literally at the mercy of the tax farmer. The tax farmer understood well that delays in discussion and settlement of tax obligations only improved his bargaining position. After days of "inspection" during which time the peasants had to house and feed the tax farmer's entourage — including soldiers supplied by the government to assist in collection — an agreement was reached on a fixed quantity of output that was to represent the tithe.

The bargaining, however, continued. Once the harvest was collected on the threshing floor, the tax farmer was likely to reopen negotiations. And until an accord was again reached, no distribution of the peasant's grain was permitted. Once again, the tax farmer's willingness to stall a tax agreement worked against the peasant.

The inevitable result of such a series of negotiations was described by S. Bergheim: "...I can safely say from close observations that I have made during nearly ten years' farming in the Sharon plains near Ramle, that the amount collected by the *a'shār* rarely, if ever, averages under one third of the whole crop, instead of the legal tenth..."[27] Finn described 1858 as a particularly light tax year estimating the *a'shār* at 20 percent.[28] Conder estimated the tax at 50 percent.[29]

Considering the informalities associated with such tax collection, the levy was highly capricious. Some villages completely escaped taxation while others were left untaxed for considerable periods of time. Still others were habitually and discriminately taxed. Conder's sample of three villages showed no relationship between acres cultivated and tax assessed.[30]

In some villages, the pressures of taxation became unacceptable. Peasants simply abandoned the village entirely. Such village desertions, which were rather commonplace, suggest the marginality of the peasants' economic circumstance. Obviously, the fixed capital stock, including peasant homes left behind, were insufficient to deter mobility. The capital equipment — essentially the wooden plough — was as mobile as the peasant's livestock. While some desertions of villages were only temporary, other village populations moved permanently to new locations anticipating the possiblities of a better tax condition. Clearly, from the evidence offered, land was available.

Kitchener, commenting in 1879 on the desertion of Ẓahiriyya wrote: "Owing to the bad year, the inhabitants were not able to pay taxes, and found it better to desert their homes."[31] Tweedle reported the desertion of Abū Dīs.[32] Conder observed the economic conditions of the low country north of Caesaria: "The miserable villages stand deserted and half-broken down, and the ruin of the broken spirited inhabitants by the exactions of greedy tax farmers gives a desolate appearance to its whole extent..."[33]

In some cases, village desertions took the form of population shifts from rural to urban locations. Wilson reported that "...the ever growing poverty of the people, due for the most part to the increasing burden of direct taxation, is

making it less and less possible for them to live from the land. This tends to drive many, especially of the poorer or less thrifty of the peasants, to the towns to seek work."[34] It also tended to drive some out of Palestine. Beardsley's dispatch to Washington in 1872 read:

> Every year villages are deserted, the inhabitants flying to Egypt to save themselves and their personal effects from being seized by taxes. Hundreds of acres of the richest land in the world are given up to the desert because the exorbitant taxes cannot be paid. What with the land tax, payable yearly whether the harvests are good or bad, the tithes, the head tax, and the many local taxes, together with the impositions of the collectors and every official with whom they came in contact, the poor farmer is fleeced out of house and home and is only too glad to escape to Egypt with the rags upon his back. The land thus abandoned reverts to the government and lies year after year uncultivated, until it is hardly distinguished from the desert.[35]

As the taxable land becomes less, he noted, the burden on the remaining lands increase. Wilson, too, referred to this migration outcome.[36]

Poll, conscription, and "sales" taxes added considerably to the peasant's already overburdened tax condition. W.J. Stracey described these additional tax sources thus: "Everything is taxed: every fruit tree, so none are planted; every cow or horse etc.; every vegetable sold out of a private garden. Every eighth egg is not taxed but taken by the government."[37] Fish, too, was heavily taxed.[38]

Both Russell[39] and Warren argued that the state practice of taxing the trees immediately after planting served only to retard cultivation which may have been the reason for the tax.[40] Conder noted that in the village of Ḳarāwa, a peasant told him that the 1873 tax on the olive trees exceeded the value of the crop.[41] The tax imposed on raw material was considered responsible for the killing off of native industry.[42]

The customhouse taxes imposed on market commodities brought by the peasants to town were also rather substantial.[43] Morris estimated a 40 percent tax on roots brought to Jerusalem. An additional 10 percent was levied by the village shaykh.[44] Warren estimated the custom taxes at 33.3 percent.[45]

While the village shaykh served as the mediator, arbitrator and representative in village as well as in matters affecting the state, the shaykh's complicity in the taxation system is well documented.[46]

Military conscription "taxes" were particularly informal depending upon the randomness of selection, the peasant's estimated savings and the accompanying bribes. Christians and peasants from the Golan were not conscripted into military service but were compelled, instead, to contribute an equivalent sum in money.[47] While Muslims were eligible for military conscription, they, too, were permitted to purchase substitutes. In Ṭūbās, villagers paid £100 in bribe for an annual exemption.[48] In Dāliya, the price for substitution was $250.[49] Warren

cited a case of L150.[50] In many cases entire villages deserted, unable to produce the substitution costs. Like taxes and the Bedouin plunder, military conscription served to diminish both the incomes and the resource base of the peasant class.

Peasant-Merchant-Moneylender Link

The hardships imposed upon the peasant class by the state and the Bedouin brought about a linkage with the merchant class that seemed to strengthen and even exacerbate those sets of economic hardships. The merchant class became a major provider of credit to the peasants, and ultimately, through the growing permanent debt, became another claimant on the peasant's already highly accounted-for production.

Although most peasants accumulated personal savings, seldom were such savings employed in the cancellation of debt, or in the payment of taxes when current income was insufficient. Rather, it appears that such savings were reserved principally for a highly precautionary purpose: to be used, in the last resort, to avoid military conscription.

Peasants were prepared to go into substantial debt to satisfy not only immediate state tax demands, but also to cover personal expenses associated with marriage purchases and funerals.[51] These expenditures alone appeared sufficient to thrust the peasant into debt with the merchant from which he could never extricate himself.[52] Commenting on the peasant's inclination to indebtedness, Tristram wrote: "their ingenuity is exercised not in keeping out of debt, but in scheming to avoid payment of their debt."[53]

The rates of interest charged were exceptionally high. Thomson wrote: "Every one borrows who can, all lend who have it, and the rate is enormous. Twenty-five percent is common. I have known fifty, sixty, and even a hundred percent asked and given."[54] Conder reported a 40 to 50 percent range.[55] Oliphant estimated the range between 30 and 40 percent.[56] Wilson estimated it at 20 to 40 percent.[57]

Loans were seldom repaid on schedule and when paid, a new one negotiated to finance anticipated costs. Default itself was common. The effective rate on loans to peasants, therefore, must have been somewhat lower than the market rate charged. However, if Warren's estimated return for commercial investment in Jerusalem of 15 to 20 percent is a reasonable reflection of the Palestine reality, than the Conder *et al.* ranges for the rates of interest, even adjusted for default, appear also to be reasonable.[58] Although merchants were a major source of credit, they were by no means the only source. Tax farmers, effendis — particularly those in the *meclis* — and even village shaykhs served as moneylenders to the peasant class.

A second link that connected the merchant class to the peasant was the network of markets in villages and large towns. In the villages, wheat, fowl, eggs, and other forms of produce were bartered by the peasants for the manufactured goods from towns, e.g., shoes, turbans, cloaks, rice, coffee, sugar, tobacco, soap, petroleum, matches, hardware, saddlebags, drugs, powder, shot, flint, steel, etc. Merchants later resold the purchased village produce in town for cash.[59]

Peasants trading in the larger towns were at a disadvantage with respect to the determination of prices and value. First, unable to incur the costs of waiting, the peasants had to sell their produce almost immediately after harvest when prices were at their lowest. The merchants, on the other hand, were able to keep the produce off the market long enough to obtain the higher prices and substantial windfalls.[60] Second, the wheat and barley that was brought on the market by the peasant was measured for sale by a professional, who bribed and manipulated the recorded quantities to the merchant's advantage. In one case Neil observed a difference amounting to 30 percent of the value.[61]

In the large market centers, merchants had a monopoly of power *vis à vis* the peasant class. Finn described the situation in Jerusalem:

> The wealthy Moslems residing in Jerusalem prevent peasantry from bringing in their stores on their own account. They buy them outside the walls and permit no peasant to sell excepting through their agents. By this means, though the crops are good, the prices in Jerusalem are exorbitant and there appears to be no remedy. The Pasha is powerless and the Municipal Council with their relatives are themselves the culprits. There are no foreign merchants of wealth sufficient to offer a check to these proceedings.[62]

On another occasion, Finn wrote: "A far more serious evil than ever there is, still untouched, the dearness of provisions arising from most dishonest control of market prices by native monopolists."[63]

The distinction between town and village was marked also by the numbers and diversity of tradespeople and artisans. While some villages were unable to support a single artisan,[64] the Jerusalem population of tradespeople and artisans was estimated by Warren at 1,930, accounting for 10 percent of its working population. These included 143 shopkeepers, 189 grocers, 141 bakers, breadsellers, and butchers, 151 smiths, 62 tailors, 86 coffinmakers, 36 carpenters, 84 soap makers, 11 corn sellers, and 22 money changers.[65]

The town population in Palestine — 3,000 persons or more — is compared in Table 1 to the total village and Bedouin populations.[66] While the 16 towns represented only 2.5 percent of the population locations, they accounted for fully 28.5 percent of the Palestine population.

Table 1. *Population Estimate for Palestine, circa 1875*

	Number of locations	Population
Villages	613	333,700
Towns	16	140,385
Total settled	629	474,085
Bedouin		18,595
Total population		492,675

The principal towns and their populations are shown in Table 2.[67]

Table 2. *Population Estimate for Eight Palestine Towns (1860-1885 median)*

Safed	24,615
Jerusalem	20,000
Jaffa	10,000
Gaza	18,000
Nablus	13,000
Haifa	6,400
Hebron	10,000
Bethlehem	5,000

Jaffa was the principal town for external trade. Cotton, wheat and barley from Nablus, Esdraelon and as far away as the Ḥawrān and the Ḥūla Lake were brought by caravan to Jaffa for export to Europe and Egypt.[68] Other items for commercial trade such as soap, tobacco, fruits, hides, olive oil, wool and seasame were also important contributors to the merchants' income.[69]

Bethlehem artisans specialized in the manufacture and sale of religious items such as beads, crosses, and rosaries made from olive wood and mother-of-pearl.[70] These were an important source of Bethlehem's income. Nablus supplied the entire country and much of the export market with manufactured soap, a major contributor to its income.[71] Hebron artisans specialized in the manufacture of glass.[72]

The merchant class, in this way, became the principal intermediary between the Palestine economy and the external world of commerce. Internally, its link to the peasant class, while marked by unequal bargaining strengths in the marketplace, was, nevertheless, a market relationship.

On the other hand, facility in the money economy allowed the merchant class to play still another role with respect to the peasant: that of moneylender. In this capacity, the class became another important claimant upon the peasant's production.

Peasant-Landowner Link

During most of the 19th century, the state *was* the landowner class. While private peasant holdings in the form of *mülk* did exist, the far more important property holdings were in the form of *mīrī*. By the mid-19th century, however, the state adopted a policy that permitted the conversion — through sales — of state land to private holdings. In some cases, uncultivated lands not associated with any village were offered. If put to cultivation by private holders, the state stood only to gain by additions to tax revenues.

In other cases, however, the state sold land already under cultivation. Title to entire villages was so transferred. In such situations, the tax on land value was still payable, but this transfer of property eliminated the overfarmed title. Instead, the state received the title's estimated capitalized value.

One of the largest of such sales occurred in 1872. The entire north half of the plain of Esdraelon — 70 square miles with 20 villages — was sold to one person: Mr. Şurşūk. The price was £20,000. The taxes derived from these villages were £4,000; the income was estimated at £12,000 annually. Conder remarked of this sale: "How so one sided a bargain came to be is a piece of secret Turkish history, perhaps never to be cleared up, but the title cannot be considered secure under the ordinary government of the country."[73] Another consequential, single conversion from state to private holding was the sale of the Abū Shūsha village — 5,000 acres — to Mr. Bergheim.[74]

But the more common form of new private holdings occurred with the sale of individual villages or parts of villages to town merchants, moneylenders, effendis, and even foreigners and village shaykhs.[75] Title to property was transerred either directly by the state in a manner similar to the Şurşūḳ-Bergheim purchases, or indirectly through the peasants themselves. For many debt-ridden peasants, ownership was a transitory condition. After acquiring parcels of land from the state, many had to sell both these holdings and rights to cultivation in order to meet their unceasing debt obligations.[76] In other cases, when peasants were unable to pay land tax, the state simply auctioned off the property.[77]

Thus, for the vast majority of the peasants, land relations were ultimately one of two kinds: either the traditional form of *mīrī* or the contractual relations with the private landowners.

In contrast to the claim system that the state imposed upon the peasant production, the link between the peasant class and the landowner was established by a sharecropping-like system. Usually, the private landowner supplied the peasant with an advance of seed and noninterest-bearing money with which to purchase necessities for the cultivation of the land. At harvest the distribution of the product was arranged thus: first, deductions were made for payment of the state tax; second, the landowner was repaid the value of the seed and money advanced; and third, the residual — the net product — was divided equally between the peasant and the landowner.[78]

THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE

The Want of Security

In describing the sources of economic progress, T.R. Malthus contrasted the economic conditions in Ireland and England thus:

> There is indeed in Ireland a fatal deficiency in one of the greatest sources of prosperity, the perfect security of property; and till this defect is remedied, it is not easy to so pronounce upon the degree in which the redundant capital of England would flow into Ireland with the best effect... If under a state of things where all kinds of property were secure ... Ireland would be beyond comparison richer than England. This is what is wanted to give full scope to her great natural resources...[79]

For mid-19th century Palestine, the most important obstacle to progress was neither deficiencies in capital, land or labor, but — as Malthus pointed out for 18th century Ireland — the want of security.

Bedouin plundering, the capricious nature of the Turkish military, the state's tenure and tax farming systems, and indebtedness created, for the peasant class, an environment of economic insecurity. Under utilization of land resources and, at times, wholesale desertions of entire producing villages were logical consequences of the system. Under the conditions described above, it would have been unreasonable for the peasant class to have invested in land improvement or fixed capital stock. The peasant's production horizon was, by these circumstances, limited to one year. Moreover, these conditions generated expectations of continued insecurity which were, with few exceptions, fulfilled.

The Role of the State

Such an outcome, interestingly, was not necessarily an unattractive one to the state. Although economic arguments — à la physiocratic model — can be offered to show that under such uncertain and oppressive conditions, not only peasant well-being, but state revenue too, was less than the system was capable of generating, it was by no means clear that the state would have preferred a more productive outcome.

On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the state's fiscal policy in mid-19th century Palestine was specifically designed to perpetuate Palestine's stagnating condition. Not only did the state show no interest in financing Palestine's infrastructure, it prevented others — notably Palestinian merchants and Europeans — from investing in transportation and other developmental projects.

Finn reported on the unsuccessful attempt by Gaza and Jaffa merchants to improve their facilities:

> The merchants in Gaza cannot obtain leave to have a magazine on the

> beach for depositing their corn for lading, much of which is consequently lost or spoiled before it can be embarked. The town of Jaffa cannot get a second gate but all the ingress and egress of trade yearly increasing must take place at one gate to the great discomfort of the inhabitants. And no improvement of that or any other harbour can be made. The merchants in vain cry out: "Let us do it ourselves — we will do these things without charge to the government" — they are not allowed to attempt it.[80]

The repeated requests by Europeans to finance road and railroad projects in Palestine were similarly rejected by the state.[81]

The state's opposition to economic progress in Palestine was, from its point of view, perfectly rational. Warren described the Turkish attitude: "We want no discoveries; we want no attention paid to Palestine; we want no roads. Leave the place alone. If it becomes rich, we shall lose it; if it remains poor, it will continue in our hands."[82] Finn was informed that new and improved roads would only make it easier for the English artilery.[83] Wilson reported the general Turkish view: "The Sultan wishes to be let alone — Turkey is not yet ready and willing to be plucked."[84]

The Economic Condition of the Peasant Class

Considering the character of the system's money and product flows, the peasant's standard of living — measured in terms of income available for current consumption — can be described in the form:

$$C = (1 + b)\,[TAP - (t + iDd)] - S$$

where C = current consumption, TAP = total agricultural production, b = the percent of TAP acquired by the tax farmer, i = the money rate of interest, D = the value of debt outstanding, d = the rate of default on debt, and S = savings.

The examination of the system's money and product flows suggests that the level of peasant's "visible" consumption appeared to be on or approaching subsistence. The critical relationship in the above identity was

$$b = f(TAP)$$

That is to say, variations in b were related to variations in the harvest. In periods of good harvest the yields obtained by the tax farmer were high. In a similar, informal way the state and other claimants on the peasant's production were able to exact somewhat higher returns in years of higher output. The residual — the peasant's own economic condition — appeared to be the invariable.

The one qualification to this conclusion concerns the level of peasant savings. It served, as noted above, the highly precautionary purpose of substituting for conscription. For understandable reasons it could not be used for either investment or consumption. The actual level of savings accumulated by the peasants was essentially unknown. Secrecy was crucial to such savings. As Warren described: "If a peasant grows rich and looks fat, and indulges in

luxuries, he finds himself put in prison and eased of his wealth, so he grows rich and looks poor; but not all. Some grow poorer every day."[85] The evidence seems to suggest that, like the system as a whole, the economic condition of the peasant in mid-19th century Palestine was one of chronic adversity.

Appendix

Diagram 1 shows that the classes are initially in possession of the following resources: the peasants hold three units in the form of food, raw material and manufactured commodities; the manufacturers hold two units in the form of food and raw material; and the landlords hold a claim on the peasant class for two units of money. Peasants hold, at the outstart, the two units of money.

In the first stage of production and transactions, peasants, using the three units of resources, create five units of output; while manufacturers, using two units of resources, produce two units of manufactured commodities. The production is shown in Diagram 2.

In the second stage, peasants transfer the two units of money to the landlords in rent payment.

In the third stage, landlords purchase with the rent money a unit of food from the peasants and a unit of manufactured commodities from the manufacturers.

In the fourth stage, peasants are left with four units of output and a unit of money. With this unit of money, they purchase a unit of manufactured commodities from the manufacturers.

In the fifth stage, the manufacturers, having sold the two units of manufactured commodities to the peasant and landlord classes, hold the two units of money. They are now able to purchase a unit of food and a unit of raw material from the peasant class. For the manufacturers, the circular flow of money and product has been completed. They possess, as initially, the resources of a unit of food and a unit of raw material.

In the sixth stage, the peasants, once again, hold the two units of money. Moreover, they have the unexchanged units of food and raw material as well as the acquired unit of manufactured commodities. In other words, the initial resource conditions have been restored.

Finally, landlords, too, have reestablished the initial condition. Consuming the food and manufactured commodities, they once again possess the rent claim on the peasant class.

Notes

* I am indebted to my colleague Peter Schran for sharing with me his ideas on the writing of this paper.

1 John Wilson, *Lands of the Bible, Visited and Described*, vols. 1 and 2 (London, 1847), p. 162.
2 Charles Drake, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1872), pp. 180-181.
3 James Finn, *Byeways in Palestine* (London, 1877), p. 113.
4 A. Beardsley, National Archives (Washington), U.S. Consular Dispatch (Jerusalem), Jan. 30, 1872.
5 James Finn, Public Record Office (London), FO 78/962 (Jerusalem), Aug. 29, 1853.
6 Finn, FO 78/962, Sept. 19, 1853.
7 Finn, FO 78/1120, June 6, 1855.
8 Finn, FO 78/1294, Jan. 26, 1857.
9 Finn, FO 78/1294, Jan. 26, 1857.
10 Finn, FO 78/1383, April 13, 1858.
11 Finn, *Byeways*, p. 212.
12 W.M. Thomson, *The Land and the Book; or, Biblical Illustrations Drawn from the Manner and Customs, the Scenes and Scenery of the Holy Land* (London, 1862), p. 394.
13 *Ibid.*, pp. 478-479.
14 H. Kitchener, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1877), p. 176.
15 *Ibid.*
16 Felix Bovet, *Egypt, Palestine and Phoenicia* (New York, 1883), p. 132.
17 Finn, *Byeways*, p. 228; pp. 266-267.
18 "The Janlon", *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1888), p. 54.
19 H. Kitchener, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1884), p. 215.
20 Finn, FO 78/1383, Oct. 9, 1858.
21 K. Baedeker, *Palestine and Syria* (Leipzig, 1894), p. 138.
22 Charles Warren, *Underground Jerusalem* (London, 1876), p. 511.
23 C. Drake, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1873), p. 105.
24 Claude Conder, Reignier, *Tent Work in Palestine* (London, 1889), pp. 261-262.
25 J.A. Spencer, *The East: Sketches of Travel, Egypt and the Holy Land* (New York, 1850), p. 244.
26 Finn, *Byeways*, p. 9.
27 S. Bergheim, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1894), p. 198. See also Wilson, pp. 291-293.
28 Finn, FO 78/1383, Aug. 9, 1858.
29 Conder, p. 333.
30 *Ibid.*
31 Kitchener, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1878), p. 12.
32 W.K. Tweedie, *Environs of Jerusalem: Pictorial and Descriptive* (London, 1871), p. 22.
33 Conder, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1874), p. 15.
34 Wilson, p. 5.
35 Beardsley, Jan. 30, 1872.
36 Wilson, p. 102.
37 W.J. Stracey, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1880), p. 241.
38 A. Goodrich-Freer, *Inner Jerusalem* (London, 1904), p. 32.
39 Howard Wm. Russell, *A Diary in the East* (London, 1869), p. 369.
40 Warren, p. 453.
41 Conder, p. 333.
42 *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1879), p. 10.
43 Friedrich Rosen, *Oriental Memories of a German Diplomatist* (London, 1930), pp. 24-25.
44 Robert Morris, *Free Masonry in the Holy Land* (Morris, La Grange, Ky., 1879), p. 407.
45 Warren, p. 500.
46 Wilson, p. 292. See also Finn, FO 78/1383, Oct. 9, 1858.
47 *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1888), p. 49.

48 *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1878), p. 62.
49 Laurence Oliphant, *Haifa or Life in Modern Palestine* (New York, 1887), p. 163.
50 Warren, p. 453.
51 Albert Rhodes, *Jerusalem as I See It* (London, 1865), p. 431.
52 Wilson, p. 290.
53 H.B. Tristram, *Eastern Customs in Bible Lands* (London, 1844), p. 253.
54 Thomson, pp. 321-322.
55 Conder, p. 334.
56 Oliphant, p. 178.
57 Wilson, pp. 288-289.
58 Warren, p. 497.
59 Wilson, p. 76.
60 G.R. Lees, *Village Life in Palestine* (London, 1905), p. 160.
61 J. Neil, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1881), pp. 325-326.
62 Finn, FO 78/1294, Jan. 26, 1857.
63 Finn, FO 78/1383, April 13, 1858.
64 F. Klein, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1881), p. 303.
65 Warren, pp. 490-493.
66 F. Gottheil, "The Population of Palestine, Circa 1875", *Middle Eastern Studies*, forthcoming.
67 *Ibid.*
68 Thomson, pp. 442-443.
69 A. Beardsley, Sept. 30, 1870.
70 William C. Prime, *Tent Life in the Holy Land* (New York, 1857), p. 238.
71 Oliphant, p. 341.
72 Baedeker, p. 138.
73 Conder, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1879), p. 10.
74 Conder, p. 371.
75 Warren, pp. 497-498.
76 Wilson, pp. 290-291.
77 Finn, FO 195/808, March 20, 1867.
78 *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1891), p. 105.
79 T.R. Malthus, *Principles of Political Economy* (Oxford, 1951), pp. 349-350.
80 Finn, FO 78/1294, Jan. 26, 1857.
81 Finn, FO 78/1383, Oct. 9, 1858.
82 Warren, pp. 452-453.
83 Finn, FO 78/962, Sept. 19, 1853.
84 H. Wilson, National Archives (Washington), U.S. Consular Dispatch (Jerusalem), Oct. 8, 1880.
85 Warren, p. 453.

Wind Power in the Technological Development of Palestine

SHMUEL AVITSUR

Mankind's first motor — the horizontal waterwheel — originated in the geographical area of Palestine; and along with it there developed a number of rather sophisticated ancillary installations (rising basins, aruba-penstock, etc.) which made this wheel highly efficient in its exploitation of available water power. When equipped with iron-bound wheels, as in the late 19th century, the horizontal mill attained an exploitation efficiency of nearly seventy percent. In contrast to the thorough exploitation of water power in Palestine, the energy latent in the wind or in moving air was scarcely tapped for productive purposes (except in the winnowing of grain or the artificial creation of draught by means of hand-operated bellows). The only really effective exploitation of wind power was in transportation (i.e. sailing ships).

The windmill probably originated in Persia. Like the early local waterwheel, these first windmills were horizontal, that is they had a horizontal wheel on a vertical shaft turned by mat sails. Exploitation of wind power for productive purposes (especially milling) was widespread in Europe long before it was attempted in Palestine. In fact, the earliest attempts to introduce the windmill into the country coincided with the beginning of the industrial revolution in Europe.

Evidence about the existence of windmills in Palestine is found from about the second quarter of the 18th century onward in various literary and documentary sources. The earliest indication comes from the Englishman Richard Pococke's book of eastern travels.[1] He mentions a ruin on the Mount Scopus — Mount of Olives range in Jerusalem — which was known to the local people as "the windmill" and he therefore marked the site "Windmill Hill" on his map. The Italian Giovanni Mariti, who visited Palestine and other Near Eastern countries in the third quarter of the 18th century, and wrote about his travels, mentions that there was a windmill at Acre.[2] De Volney, a French savant and the head of the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce, wrote of a windmill at Ramle which apparently had been constructed by Venetian carpenters.[3] All the above references to windmills in Palestine date from the middle and second half of the 18th century. In the last two cases the evidence is quite clear and unequivocal: the references are to actual windmills seen by the writers themselves on their respective visits. However, in regard to the Jerusalem windmill there is only the legend on Pococke's map, though it may be strongly assumed that there had been a windmill on the site. In any case,

these were the first indisputable references to industrial wind power exploitation (i.e. grain milling) in Palestine. It is doubtful that these windmills were active for any length of time, since no further reference to them after the 18th century has been found.

An apparently officially promoted scheme to construct a number of windmills to supply military personnel as well as civilians with flour is recorded from the period of Muḥammad 'Alī's rule in Palestine (1832-1840). The diary of the Greek monk Neophytos[4] reveals that Muḥammad 'Alī had appointed his stepson Ibrāhīm Paşa commander-in-chief of the "Egyptian" military forces in the Levant; and it was seemingly the latter's initiative which resulted in the construction of a windmill in the Jerusalem area. The existence of windmills in Jerusalem at that period has been confirmed by G. Dalman's researches made at the beginning of the 20th century. The Armenian community also constructed a windmill, mainly for its own use, inside the walled area of Jerusalem. The windmill which was located in the garden of the Armenian monastery, began to operate a few days before Ibrāhīm Paşa's windmill on Mount Zion, even though its construction was started some time after the latter's. Other windmills in the Jerusalem area were sited north of Shu'fāt (the ruins of this windmill were seen by Dalman), near 'Ayn 'Arīk, and on the summit of al-Bīra.[5] The latter windmill, no longer preserved, is commemorated in the name given to this summit on modern maps: Ra's al-Ṭāḥūna (summit of the mill). In the 1930s this became the site of the first broadcasting transmitter in Palestine.

In all probability these windmills were of the classic Mediterranean type, known as "Aegean" windmills, which are equipped with cloth sails suspended on masts like the sails on boats. The movable cap of these mills could be turned towards the wind by means of a longer lever pole. In an article published in the early part of this century, the architect Conrad Schick, a renowned researcher of Jerusalem's history and a long-time resident of the city, mentions that Ibrāhīm Paşa's windmill was furnished with large millstones originally brought from Gaza. Because of their great weight these stones could not be transported in the usual manner on camel back; instead they were rolled along the ground all the way to Jerusalem by specially recruited teams of fellaheen.[6] This windmill had a short working life, probably scarcely more than one year (it began to operate at the end of August 1839, while Muḥammad 'Alī's rule in Palestine did not outlast the year 1840). After Ibrāhīm's troops pulled out of Jerusalem, the windmill was destroyed by an enraged mob.[7]

In fact, this deed by the Jerusalem mob signaled the end of what may be called the second phase in the effort to exploit wind power for industrial purposes in Palestine. It is advisable to make a sharp distinction between the two early phases in the endeavor to utilize wind power in Palestine: in the first phase the windmills were built by local commanders or officials (*aǧa* of Ramle, Ḍāhir al-'Umar at Acre) to supply the local demand for flour, while those built in the second phase belonged for the most part to the far-reaching scheme of

technological innovation drafted by Ibrāhīm Paşa for the territories under his control. The local windmills were set up in places where water power to drive watermills was not available. Furthermore, they were meant, in combination with the watermills, to raise flour milling (a traditionally female domestic task) to the level of an industry, or at least a protoindustry.

The third phase in the story of wind power utilization in Palestine is intimately associated with Sir Moses Montefiori. When Montefiori visited Jerusalem in 1839 he was already informed about the existence of two windmills (i.e. Ibrāhīm Paşa's and the Armenian windmill); moreover, it may be assumed that he learnt about the other windmills then being constructed to the north of the city during that visit. Nor could the fate of these windmills (i.e. the destruction of one [Ibrāhīm's] and the failure or near failure of the others) have escaped his notice on his later Jerusalem visits. If at the time he asked himself (as he may well have done) why these windmills fell so far short of expectations, he would probably have concluded that the cause of failure inhered in the windmills themselves: the "Aegean" windmill with its low output, light construction and inefficient wind power exploitation simply was not adequate to meet the demands of large-scale grain milling and could not compare in performance to the advanced European windmills. At all events, on one of his later visits to Jerusalem, in 1855, he decided to enlarge the scope of his activities for the welfare of its Jewish community (which earlier had included a scheme to set up a weaving shop for training *yeshiva* students as weavers) by adding one essential industrial enterprise, namely a grain windmill. This windmill was to be of the most modern and technically advanced type then available in Britain.

The construction of the windmill proved a troublesome enterprise: first the Ottoman ordinance prohibiting building within a certain distance outside the walls of Jerusalem had to be overcome; then there was the difficulty of transporting the various parts of the windmill from the beach at Jaffa to the site at Jerusalem; and finally one had to contend with fierce oppositon from the owners of the horse-powered mills who feared (justly enough) that the new windmill would deprive them of their livelihood. This led them to some desperate measures; they not only tried to interfere with the actual construction of the windmill but also summoned a sorcerer to cast spells in order to avert the impending "disaster" and by his curses and maledictions prevent the operation of the mill. But, as often happens in such cases, both the hopes of its supporters and the fears of its opponents were proved excessive. As ordained by Montefiori, all the mechanical equipment of the windmill — of the latest and most advanced design — was ordered from a British manufacturer. With the steam engine in the ascendant, much ingenuity was expended at the time to improve the efficiency of windmills. Equipment of this advanced type had so far been installed in only a minority of the windmills in Britain itself. The equipment was designed for a solid, stone-built tower mill with a movable cap that could be turned into the "eye of the wind" by means of an automatic

fantail. This fantail, which is usually mounted at the tail pole, is really a miniature windmill that turns the roller-mounted cap on its steel runners. The mill cap carries the shaft on which the sails of the windmills are mounted. So long as the mill faces squarely into the wind its sails revolve and through a system of gears activate the grinding machinery. But once the wind changes direction it loses its grip on the sails of the mill, which then comes to a stop. At this point the automatic fantail comes into action since its vanes, which formerly had their edges to the wind, are now rotated and so begin to turn the cap until its sails once again face squarely into the wind. At the same time, the vanes of the fantail revert to being edge-on to the wind and cease turning.

Two windmill specialists, one of them an architect of windmills (apparently both came from Canterbury, the neighboring city to Ramsgate where the Montefiori estate was located), were commissioned to install and assemble the mechanical equipment and supervise the running-in of the mill. According to a contemporary account published in the London *Jewish Chronicle* it needed forty men to transport each major piece of equipment from the Jaffa beach to the site of the windmill. The transfer of the equipment and its installation in the newly built windmill tower took some four months. The windmill, which even today looms high above the low roofs of the Mishkenot Sha'ananim and Yemin Moshe neighborhoods, rises to a height of 50 feet (ca. 15 m) and the wall of its base is 3 feet (91 cm) thick.[8] A sum of £1450 or $7250 (at the contemporary rate of exchange) is reported to have been spent on the windmill. It is not clear, however, if this sum was for the equipment only or included also the cost of constructing the tower.

Notwithstanding the sorcerer's maledictions, the fears and misgivings of its competitors, and past disappointments in this field, the windmill started on its career. We know from contemporary evidence that the windmill was equipped with four sets of millstones. Of course, the earlier type of mill with wood-frame cloth sails could never have been equipped with this number of millstones. These earlier windmills had four sails of cloth which could be furled and unfurled like the sails on a boat. Thus when the windmill was not required to operate its sails were completely furled, while at other times, if too stiff a breeze risked overrunning of the mill, its sails were reefed to slow down its rotation speed.

Montefiori appointed a lessee for the windmill who was required to operate it on his own responsibility, that is at his personal financial risk. The price fixed for milling one *roṭel* (2.88 Kg) of grain undercut the customary price charged by the horse mills by two *paras* (1 *para* = 1/40 part of a piaster). In other words, the windmill's price for milling one ton of grain was cheaper by 15 piaster than the price of the competing horse mills (each family milled approximately 70-90 kg of grain per month).

It is known for certain that the windmill was in operation in 1858 (it may even have begun to operate in late 1857), but it had definitely ceased to operate by 1887 when A.M. Luncz wrote about it in the second volume of his annual

Yerushalayim (Jerusalem).[9] In a travel diary entry (dated 6 August 1874), made during his last stay in Jerusalem, Montefiori mentions that he visited the windmill and climbed up into the mill-cap where he found everything well maintained, except the grindstones which were "quite worn", though this did not seriously interfere with their milling action. Therefore, we have definite evidence that the windmill was active for at least a period of 16 years; furthermore, it is most likely that it operated for not less than twenty years, though probably with interruptions.

This first modern windmill in Jerusalem, constructed on the initiative of Sir Moses Montefiori (and apparently entirely financed by him), was soon followed by other windmill projects. Chronologically the earliest of these (and probably directly inspired by Montefiori's example) were the windmills constructed by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate on a site owned by it near the Old City of Jerusalem (in the area of today's Reḥavya). This site, on higher ground, was better suited to exploit the prevailing winds than the site of the Montefiori windmill. Apparently the Greek Patriarchate's windmills were conceived as a strictly business venture.

Rephaim, the German Templar colony in Jerusalem, was started in 1870 and almost at the same time a windmill was erected there. This windmill operated for only a short period. A low-profile windmill (today no longer visible because of modern high-rise buildings nearby) was erected in the courtyard of the Ratisbonne Catholic Foundation (1874) in Jerusalem.[10] No information has been found as to how long this windmill functioned, nor for whom it was destined (presumably, it was not for the people of the Foundation itself). At all events, its original industrial purpose was soon forgotten; not long ago there appeared an article in one of the local newspapers which rather fancifully described the surviving structure of this windmill as a "beacon tower", designed for communication by light signal with the port of Jaffa.[11] The fact that the windmill is not in line of sight with Jaffa port did not apparently trouble the journalist in the least.

In one of his recent books on his childhood and youth in Old Jerusalem, (*Yerushalayim tmol shilshom*), Ya'aḳov Yehoshu'a mentions the windmills of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. As told to him by one of its priests, the Archimandrite Daniel, there had been in the past (the time referred to is just over a century ago) four windmills in the new town of Jerusalem belonging to the Greek Patriarchate (that is, three more in addition to the one surviving windmill). At first blush, this would seem to be an exaggerated number; yet if one examines the map of Jerusalem in Baedeker's travellers guide of 1876 one sees that actually *five* windmills are marked on it, all located outside the Old City walls on the west side. These windmills included the "Montefiori Windmill", sited on the highest point of Mishkenot Sha'ananim; also a windmill in the Ratisbonne Foundation's grounds; and somewhat farther west, though fairly close by and still within the area of today's Reḥavya neighborhood (the ground of which once belonged to the Greek Orthodox

Patriarchate) two windmills located side by side at some 450 meters from the surviving windmill near today's Kings Hotel. With regard to a possible third windmill of the Orthodox Patriarchate (or fourth, if the above-mentioned disused windmill is taken into account) no site has yet been identified. From all this it may be concluded that the number of windmills in Jerusalem in the 1870s was far greater than hitherto imagined; but this expansive development came to a halt and was almost totally reversed during the 1880s and 1890s.

Almost all the windmills in Jerusalem at this period were constructed to provide the inhabitants of the city with increased grain milling facilities, since the existing horse-powered mills could not cope with the growing demand.

In this same period a few windmills were also erected outside Jerusalem in other parts of the country (which have left their toponymic reminder in the shape of further Ra's-al-Ṭāḥūna hill tops). The last of these windmills outside Jerusalem was erected by the German Templars near Haifa's seashore (the area of today's Bat Galim). It must be admitted that for the most part these windmills were not notably successful, which not only discouraged the construction of further mills but inhibited the operation of the existing ones.

As yet, there has not been any serious analysis of the causes that led to the disuse of these windmills (nor, for that matter, do we really understand what led to their construction in the first place). From the little information on the subject in the annual reporting on developments in Palestine by Luncz, Graevsky and others, it has been construed that the disuse of the windmills was directly linked to the arrival of the steam mills. But this is an oversimplification. The truth seems to be that windmills were introduced at the end of a transitional period of development which had begun earlier and was logically destined to lead to the complete mechanization of grain milling. Lack of data and the passage of time now make it difficult to follow this transitional development for particular localities; nevertheless this should not prevent us from charting its course through the country generally.

From the little that is known of the Montefiori windmill it may be inferred that its lessee did not properly attend to its maintenance and, moreover, was inclined to a certain lack of moral scrupulousness. He was perpetually requesting money for repairs and allowed the mill to stay idle until the money arrived, whether from genuine inability to finance the repairs himself or as a means to pressure his patron and master is unclear — though one may guess that both factors were involved. Somehow he managed to make it appear as if he was doing his patron a favor each time the windmill resumed operation. There is also the suspicion that few of the Jerusalem craftsmen were expert enough to carry out the repairs; this meant that some of the work had to be sent outside and spare parts had to be obtained from abroad. But apart from these human shortcomings there were purely objective reasons, related to specific local conditions, as to why this windmill did not perform as well as had been anticipated, and evidently the planners and builders of the windmill had not bothered to inform themselves beforehand of these conditions.

Wind conditions in Jerusalem with their relatively low velocities and irregular frequency throughout the year could not guarantee the continuous operation of windmills there; this applied especially to the Montefiori mill which was sited inconveniently on a point below the highest elevation in the area surrounding the Old City walls. But probably the major cause of failure was technological: the machinery of these windmills was designed for milling the soft European wheats, which required less power (i.e. wind strength) than grinding the local hard wheat used for bread making in Palestine. As a result these windmills were only poorly utilized since wind strengths were rarely adequate to overcome the resistance induced in their grinding machinery by the hard wheat. One can easily imagine the frustration and impatience of customers forced to wait for a strong enough breeze to activate the mill's machinery and grind their wheat. There were probably not more than twenty days in the year when the mill's four sets of grindstones could be operated together. At other times there was perhaps just enough wind to drive one set. But often there was no wind at all, or it was too feeble to drive even one set of grindstones. This meant that milling a given quantity of grain considerably exceeded the time normally allowed for it, sometimes as much as two or three times.

The first steam mill in the country was put into operation in Jerusalem in 1878; but even sometime before this, while the remaining windmills struggled to keep going in rather unsuccessful competition with the traditional beam mills, there had been introduced a viable alternative to both the windmill and the horse-driven grain mill. This was the horse treadmill. Unlike the windmill, the treadmill was independent of the wind conditions and, with relays of horses, could be operated round the clock. Moreover, in comparison with the traditional horse grain mill its output was larger, while the price per unit weight of grain milled was approximately the same.[12] Since the primary investment of the Montefiori windmill (i.e. construction of its tower, mechanical equipment, etc.) had been provided by the philanthropic initiator of the project, its lessee-operator only had to meet the costs of the day-to-day running of the mill. But this did not apply to the other modern windmills (e.g. the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate's windmill) whose owner-operators had to finance the construction and equipping of their windmills out of their own funds without the benefit of a philanthropic patron. They found the financial investment to be a heavy burden; while the windmill, once in operation, held out little hope of a profitable return. There is evidence to suggest that the windmills of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate were replaced by a treadmill.

This third and final phase in the history of the grain windmill in Palestine virtually ended in the early 1880s. But not altogether, for there was a continuation in the form of two windmills in Haifa, on adjacent sites, which operated (at least intermittently) until the time of the British conquest in 1917. The earlier of these two windmills was put into operation already in 1872. What ensured these mills their long operating life was the fact that a steam (or

kerosene motor?) mill had been integrated with them. Because of this their customers were assured of continuous service, since during the windy part of the day (usually most of the afternoon) the windmill units could be operated while during the wind slack hours one switched to the steam mill. This arrangement was basically similar to that of the combined grain mills operated in Europe and the United States during the second part of the 19th century. Later, integrated mills (i.e. kerosene motor and windmill) became more common as, for instance, the windmill near today's Kings Hotel in Jerusalem.

From information supplied by Shmu'el Grupper (born in Zikhron Ya'aḳov, where his father had been the baker) it is evident that not all the customers of the Haifa mills came from the German colony and the town of Haifa. As told by him, the householders of his native village regularly took their grain to be milled at the Haifa mills, and for this purpose they would form into a party which set out before nightfall in order to reach the mills by early morning. They transported their grain in carts which, immediately after arrival, they unloaded. After weighing and bagging their grain they stacked it ready for milling. This done, and having unharnessed and fed their draught animals, they had time on their hands which they used to go shopping in town. Returning, they might find that some of their people's grain had already been milled, while that of the others was still waiting to be tipped into the hoppers. But they delayed their departure until everyone's grain had been milled, as they were determined to return in one convoy the way they had come. Why they should have preferred to go all the way to Haifa when they had a large water-powered grain mill nearby (on Naḥal Taninim [Crocodile Rivulet], near today's Kibbutz Ma'agan Mikha'el) is difficult to understand, but perhaps explained by the fact that the track to the Taninim mills was virtually impassable to carts.

To sum up, it would appear that the grain windmills in Palestine during the three major phases of their existence (second half of the 18th century; period of Muḥammad 'Alī's rule; third quarter of 19th century) were never more than of marginal importance in the context of available milling facilities. This applies even to their peak phase, during the 1860s and 1870s, when modern windmills of European manufacture were introduced. Though technologically advanced, these windmills were capable of reducing only slightly, and not for more than a short period, the gap that was opening between the demand for flour (caused by the growing urban population) and the capacity of the existing milling facilities to supply it. Due to its large Jewish element, Jerusalem, which at the beginning of the 19th century had only some 8000 inhabitants, had grown by mid-century to be the country's biggest city. At the beginning of the 20th century it already had a population of nearly eighty thousand. The problem of milling facilities was particularly acute in Jerusalem. It was less so in Haifa, where at least the inhabitants of the surrounding villages had access to the Kurdaneh water mills on the sources of the Na'aman river. However, this possibility was not open to the town dwellers without pack animals (the great majority); these had to make use of the animal-driven grain mills (milling one's

grain became easier once a steam or kerosene motor mill was added). In the *Survey of Western Palestine* the Haifa windmill is described as being of the Dutch type, but equipped with English-made gearing and grinding machinery.[13] The flour produced by these modern windmills was apparently superior in quality (i.e. probably finer ground) to that of the horse-driven grain mills.

It should not be thought that the utilization of wind power for industrial purposes was restricted only to grain windmills. Wind power was also utilized for pumping water, though this had to await the development of the wind turbine in the United States. Basically the wind turbine consists of a number of small iron vanes set radially in a wheel (similar in design to the impeller wheel on the local horizontal water mills); later, during the Mandatory period, wind motors equipped with propellers were introduced. Both types of wind motor operate at wind strengths lower than those required by conventional windmills. The initial introduction of the wind turbine during the 1880s coincided in fact with the beginning of the phasing out of the conventional grain windmills. At this stage wind motors were used only for water pumping.

Until the introduction of the wind pump, drinking water had generally been drawn from a well by one of three methods, all involving the use of human muscle power. They ranged from the simplest: drawing up the bucket manually on the end of a rope, which sometimes passed over a pulley; via the use of a hand wheel for winding up the bucket rope; to the use of the tread wheel (operated by the simultaneous push-pull action of the drawer's arms and legs, reinforced by his body's weight). When more than just drinking water was needed (for various domestic purposes; irrigating small plots such as kitchen gardens, etc.) two additional water-raising methods were available. The swipe or *shādūf* was manually operated and used primarily to lift water from shallow wells and streams. On the other hand, the inclined plane lift exploited animal power and was designed for water raising from deep wells. The much larger quantities of water required for irrigating citrus plantations or meeting the consumption needs of entire villages were supplied by animal driven *antilias* (Persian wheels). The *antilias* were equipped with endless chains of pottery scoops or wooden scoop boxes; but there was an effective limit to their lifting capacity (ca. 10 meters depth) beyond which even the strongest animal (i.e. camel) could not raise the water-filled scoop pots or boxes.

When W.F. Lynch, the American naval officer who made a scientific survey of the Dead Sea, visited Jaffa in 1848 he met there his country's consular representative, the Armenian Murād. Apparently Murād owned a citrus plantation that was irrigated by a Persian wheel (*antilia*) through a network of open channels. To mitigate the heavy loss of water due to this network of open channels, Lynch advised his host to install a wind pump instead of the Persian wheel. But the advice was premature, falling on deaf ears.[14]

Another attempt to install a wind pump in a citrus plantation was made a short time after the Lynch-Murād meeting. The person concerned was Rabbi

Yehuda Halevy of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) who settled in Jaffa in 1832 as rabbi of its small Jewish community and also acted as the local representative of the Jerusalem community organization and rabbinate. It is reported that he bought (according to some sources, also planted) a citrus grove near Naḥal Ayalon (Brook of Ayalon). In a letter to Sir Moses Montefiori, dated 28 July 1853 and written in English, he requested Montefiori to send him a wind-driven water pumping machine, of the kind he had heard about from local Amercian settlers (who had established a farm settlement on Mount Hope, not far from Halevy's grove); he added that if a machine of this type became available to him he could irrigate another four gardens (i.e. groves) with its aid.[15] Montefiori failed to respond to this request; however, at a later date he bought the grove from Halevy which became the "Montefiori Plantation", eventually the Montefiori Quarter, today an integral part of Tel Aviv-Jaffa.

When the German Templars established their agricultural settlement Sarona in the coastal plain near Jaffa (today part of the municipal area of Tel Aviv-Jaffa) they dug a communal well to provide the settlement's water supply. They had to dig down to 24 meters before reaching groundwater — far too great a depth for water raising by animal-driven *antilia*. Because of the cost the use of a steam pump could not be entertained; moreover, recent experience with the Bergheim steam mill in Jerusalem had painfully demonstrated the disadvantages (high fuel costs, lack of water for the boiler during part of the year, maintenance difficulties due to lack of trained mechanics, etc.) of steam-powered installations in this, as yet, very underdeveloped country. Since neither animal nor steam power would do, it was found that the answer was wind power. A wind turbine erected on top of a steel pylon (a much cheaper construction than the conventional, stone-built windmill tower) driving a water pump. This wind pump was first installed in 1879, that is almost at the end of the settlement's first decade. From contemporary evidence we know that the wind pump operated continuously (except during windless periods of course). The water was pumped into a reservoir and from there transferred through pipes to the settlers' courtyards.[16]

Some three years after the installation of the wind pump at Sarona the founding settlers of Petaḥ Tiḳva had to find the most suitable means of pumping from a deep well. Plagued by malaria and various other illnesses, they decided to transfer their settlement to another healthier location (Yehud) where they built permanent houses and dug a communal well. With its 46 meters' depth, this well was much deeper than the well at Sarona. As a matter of fact, the idea of a wind pump had already occurred to the Petaḥ Tiḳva founders when their future settlement was yet in the planning and discussion stage; they even incorporated it in their statutes which mention the possibility of pumping water by means of "a wheel turned by the wind". With the help of a money donation, they purchased and installed a wind pump of similar model to the one at Sarona — but first had to deepen their well to 52 meters. The total cost of this water installation (i.e. sinking of the well, wind turbine and pylon, water

pump, etc.) was 12,000 francs (4800 rubles or 2800 dollars). At the time it was optimistically — and mistakenly — thought that this wind pump could also provide water for irrigation (especially to irrigate a grove of citrons the settlers had planted). Even more mistaken was the notion that the wind motor could be utilized for grain milling. This wind pump continued in operation even after the original Petaḥ Tiḳva settlers left the village and allowed squatters to take over the houses. The Bilu pioneer H. Ḥisin, writing in a contemporary Russian-Jewish journal, relates that when he visited Yehud in 1895 the only sign of life he saw in all the village was the revolving wheel of its wind pump, perched on its tall pylon like some "fantastic bird of prey". The wind pump at Yehud had a fairly short life, for apparently some time around 1900 it had already disappeared.[17] At least, so we learn from Shim'on Kushnir, the son of one of the families later settled in the village, who recalls that his people got their water from the local well by the age-old, hand-drawing method.

Water pumping by means of wind motors is also mentioned in the Russian language pamphlet "Description of the Jewish Settlements in Eretz Yisra'el" by Merowich, which includes factual and statistical information on these settlements.

The wind pump at Yehud was the first such device to be installed in a Jewish settlement (and the second wind pump in the country altogether), though apparently it had been preceded by several (unrealized) projects for wind-powered water pumping installations at other places. In one case we have the evidence of the contemporary map of Miḳve Yisra'el in its founding year (1870) (this map is reproduced in the centenary publication of this famous agricultural school, edited by Yosef Shapira). One spot on this map is marked "windmill", that is a wind-powered installation (whether grain windmill or wind pump is not clear) was intended to be erected at the spot. Yet despite the legend on the map, evidently indicating the planners' intentions, no wind-powered installation was ever erected at Miḳve Yisra'el.

Two other unrealized projects for utilizing wind power in the Jewish settlements were: 1) a scheme to utilize wind power to irrigate the agricultural lands of Petaḥ Tiḳva and 2) a plan to install a wind pump at the first well of Rishon le-Tziyon, because of that well's "unreasonable depth", which made it unsuitable for water raising by animal-driven *antilia*. Brill tells us that the settlement lacked the money to purchase a wind pump, and therefore Joseph Feinberg was sent to Europe to persuade likely benefactors to provide loans for this purpose. Although unsuccessful in this, he proved persuasive enough to sway the heart of one generous donor, Baron Edmond de Rothschild, who in later years invested millions on the tiny developing Jewish community in Palestine.[18] Though Rishon le-Tziyon would remain without a wind pump, there was to be a vast injection of capital that drastically changed the scale and pace of Jewish development in the country, and indeed its effect was felt until the outbreak of the World War I.

Another wind pump in a Jewish agricultural context existed at Aaronsohn's

experimental agricultural station at 'Atlīt. This installation, which operated on the average eight hours in every twenty-four-hour period,[19] was more powerful and of larger capacity than the wind pump at Yehud. Wind pumps were also installed at various nonagricultural locations. One of these was at the German Templar settlement in Haifa (for domestic water supply); while another (unsuccessful) wind pump was erected in the area of today's Zion Square in Jerusalem.[20]

At a somewhat later period a wind pump was installed at the spring near Metula, a Jewish village in Upper Galilee. This installation was financed by the Jewish Settlement Organization (YICA). For economic reasons a wind pump was preferred to a motor-powered pump, since its operation required neither fuel nor a special attendant. A main pipe conveyed the water from the spring to the village, where it was distributed through subsidiary pipes to the individual homesteads. Unfortunately this water supply did not perform well. The breeze was not always strong enough to properly activate the wind pump (which moreover had been erected in a comparatively low-lying spot) and consequently there was a lack of pressure in the pipes and often no water in the taps. In an attempt to overcome this shortcoming a small reservoir was built at the highest point in the village and the inhabitants drew their water from there. But even this arrangement did not work out, because of the frequent breakdowns of the wind pump which the village smith was unable to repair satisfactorily. So the villagers abandoned their "windmill" and went back to the old way, that is trekking to the spring and hauling the water back to the village in tin canisters loaded on donkeys. A wind turbine also existed at the German Catholic monastery near 'Eyn Sheva' (al-Tabḥa, today Karey Deshe), which in addition to driving a water pump also powered some machine tools in the monastery's metal workshop.

However, the main use for wind-powered pumping installations was found along the tracks of the Hijaz Railway, especially along its section through the Transjordan desert and southward to Medina. At every desert halt with a nearby well a wind pump and a water tank on stilts were installed. A similar wind-powered water installation was also constructed at the Haifa terminus of this railway. When the British built the standard-gauge railway from Ḳanṭara to Haifa (the Turkish-built Hijaz railway was narrow gauge), which passed through the Sinai desert, they also installed wind pumps and water tanks at the halts along this line. The Circassians, who had been settled in the Golan region by the Turkish administration, also made use of wind-powered water pumping installations, especially at Ḳunayṭra. But these were a reversion to an earlier type — "Aegean" cloth-sail windmills, here adapted to pump water from the shallow wells in this region.

Yet, despite the above-mentioned examples of wind-powered water pumping, the use of such installations in this country was rather limited, especially in comparison to Cyprus or Crete. This lack of enthusiasm for wind-powered installations can be explained on two grounds. On the one hand, the initial

investment for installing a wind pump was quite considerable; and on the other hand, there was always the risk that irrigation water would be lacking at the very time it was most needed, that is during the critical growing period before the harvest. While two to three days' water supply could always be stored for a limited purpose, as on the railways, this was not feasible where irrigation water was concerned since the quantities involved were too large to be stored by individual farms. Hence, a week's interruption of the breeze could prove fatal to the crops. This explains why, despite the superficial attraction of a "costless" source of energy, the wind pump failed to take hold in this country.

During World War I there was a half-serious attempt to utilize wind power for the propulsion of a rail car. Members of a German air force unit, stationed at the time at Merḥavya near 'Afula in the Jezreel Plain, commandeered a flat car belonging to the Hijaz Railway, on which they mounted a mast and sail, and so created a wind-propelled rail car. They used this vehicle, which they facetiously dubbed "Phönizischer Badeexpress" (Phoenicia Bath Express)[21] to transport them on their furloughs to the "metropolis" of Haifa (a very small town, at that time). Of course their contrivance was more ingenious than effective, since the wind rarely blew in the right direction (the prevailing wind is westerly, in the direction Haifa-'Afula), and so they were condemned to frequent waits and interrupted journeys. Eventually this shortcoming was put right by a Jewish engineer, Baruch Katinka, who mounted an aircraft engine, "borrowed" from the German unit, on the rail car — which admittedly made its journey independent of the wind direction, but also, somewhat less of a lark.

Notes

1 R. Pococke, *A Description of the East* (London, 1748), vol. 2, part 1, p. 29 and map (after p. 6).
2 G. Mariti, *Voyages dans l'isle de Chypre, la Syrie et la Palestine* (Neuwied, 1791), tome 2, p. 94.
3 C.F.C. de Volney, *Voyage en Syrie et en Egypte pendant les années 1783, 1784 et 1785* (Paris, 1787), vol. 2, p. 308.
4 Neophytos, Monk of Cyprus, *Annales of Palestine, 1821-1841* (Jerusalem, 1938), p. 131. A partial translation was published in *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society*, 13 (1938).
5 G. Dalman, *Arbeit und Sitte in Palästina* (Gutersloh, 1933), vol. 3, p. 251.
6 C. Schick, "Die Baugeschichte der Stadt Jerusalem", *ZDPV*, 17 (1894), p. 265. Schick mentions two windmills, but there is no contemporary evidence (i.e. from 1830s) to conform this.
7 Neophytos, p. 134.
8 *Ha-Magid*, no. 2, 7th Shvaṭ, 5619 (1859), p. 7 also quoted by S. Sheva in his *Eretz Tziyon vi-Yerushalayim* (Jerusalem, 1973), p. 26. See also A.M. Hyamson, *The British Consulate in Palestine* (London, 1939), part 1, pp. 258, 262-264.
9 *Yerushalayim* (ed. by A.M. Luncz), vol. 2, 5647 (1887), pp. 125-126.

10 Possibly this windmill also appears on Schick's map of 1879, included in his article "Das Land zwischen Jerusalem und dem Todten Meer", *ZDPV*, 3 (1880). See also K. Baedeker, *Jerusalem and its Surroundings; Handbook for Travellers* (London, 1876), pp. 100-101 (1973 reprint).

11 Amos Levav, "She Lives in a Four Hundred Years Old Beacon Tower", *Ma'ariv* (August 13, 1976), in Hebrew.

12 For details on these treadmills, see S. Avitsur, "ha-Midrakhiyot ba-aretz", *Teva' ve-Aretz*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1961), pp. 126-132.

13 C.R. Conder & H.H. Kitchener (eds.), *The Survey of Western Palestine, Memoirs*, vol. 1 (London, 1881), pp. 283, 356. These windmills appear on the map of Haifa in Baedeker's *Palestine and Syria* of 1912.

14 W.F. Lynch, *Narrative of the United States' Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea* (London, 1841), p. 441.

15 S. Halevi, "Pardes Montefiori", *Cathedra*, 2 (1976), p. 162 and p. 165.

16 F. Lange, *Geschichte des Tempels* (Stuttgart, 1899), p. 818. See also *ZDPV*, 6 (1883), p. 40.

17 A.M. Luncz, *Luaḥ Eretz Yisra'el li-shnat "tarsab"* (Jerusalem, 1901), p. 12.

18 I. Brill, *Yesud ha-Ma'ala* (Mainz, 1883), p. 164 (in Hebrew).

19 S. Tolkowsky, *What We Have Achieved and For What We Hope in Eretz Yisra'el* (Petrograd, 1918), p. 31, in Russian.

20 *Palästina* (1912), photo on p. 42.

21 Pinhas Pick, "Meissner Pasha: ḥalutz ha-rakavot be-Eretz Yisra'el u-shkhenoteha", *Cathedra*, 10 (1979), p. 128.

Foreign Involvement

Egypt's Reawakening Interest in Palestine During the Regimes of 'Alī Bey al-Kabīr and Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab: 1760-1775

DANIEL CRECELIUS

Throughout most of its turbulent history Palestine has been drawn into the political orbit of larger and stronger states centered in Syria or Egypt. It also frequently served as an important land bridge linking Egypt and Syria in one political and economic unit, as it did during the period of the Mamluk sultanate (1250-1517). Following their conquest of Syria and Egypt, however, the Ottomans imposed a decentralized administration in their Arab provinces that effectively broke down the natural unity of the Egyptian-Syrian region. Separate administrations supervised by governors who were to confine their activities to their assigned areas were established in Syria, Palestine and Egypt. In this manner Egypt's political and economic potential in particular were carefully contained within the Ottoman administrative apparatus, while Palestine, part of the province of Damascus, acted as an effective barrier to the northward expansion of Egyptian influence. Local leaders became subordinate to the Ottoman governors just as regional concerns were overshadowed by Ottoman imperial interests.

The reemergence of specific provinces in the Ottoman Empire as independent actors in the game of nations is linked to the rise of district leaders, usually referred to as *a'yān* (local notables), who took advantage of Ottoman weakness in the eighteenth century to establish local regimes that followed policies beneficial to their own regions, and hence detrimental to the Ottoman central government. Such were Shaykh Ḍāhir al-'Umar of Galilee and 'Alī Bey and Muḥammad Bey of Egypt, whose mutual ambitions gathered Egypt and Palestine into a close political and economic embrace such as the two regions had not experienced since the Ottoman conquest of the area in 1516-17.

Historians of the Ottoman Empire, concentrating their attention upon the central government in Istanbul, have tended to view Shaykh Ḍāhir and the Ḳazdughlī amirs as little more than *a'yān*, a type of local rebel with limited resources by whom the Ottoman Empire was plagued for most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The shortness of their reigns (Ḍāhir is an exception), the instability of their regimes, and the ability of the sultan's

government to survive their numerous challenges have tended to obscure the positive achievements of their brief careers. But Shaykh Ḍāhir, 'Alī Bey and Muḥammad Bey, whose mutual ambitions were for the brief span of half a decade intimately intertwined, posed perhaps the most serious military challenge the Ottoman Empire had to face within its borders in the eighteenth century. Their regimes elaborated radical new domestic and foreign policy objectives that had far-reaching consequences for the course of Ottoman history.

This study focuses on the reigns of 'Alī Bey (1760-66; 1767-72) and Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab (1772-75) in an effort to elucidate the fundamental policy changes for which they were responsible. In pursuing their own selfish ambitions these two Mamluk amirs represent the reassertion of traditional Egyptian objectives in the adjacent regions, including Palestine, and the reemergence of Egypt as an important political power in the eastern Mediterranean after more than two centuries of submission to Ottoman authority and interests. They also initiated a series of abortive policies whose goal was to link Palestine and Egypt once more in an economic and political union.

'Alī Bey's Mamluk predecessors maintained relations with the Ottoman government and several other political entities in their border regions, but they can scarcely be credited with a coherent foreign policy. Content to satisfy their limited ambitions as officers in the various Ottoman military corps or as beys in the Mamluk beylicate, the Mamluk leaders remained completely preoccupied with defending their own positions within the ever-changing constellation of Mamluk, Ottoman, and Bedouin military alignments and too beset by domestic enemies to develop a rational and comprehensive foreign policy. None prior to 'Alī Bey had been able to break the vicious circle of petty internal warfare that kept the Mamluk beylicate in almost constant turmoil.

Through cunning and audacity 'Alī Bey broke the cycle by overwhelming his enemies and fighting his way to total dominance in the Egyptian province. With all domestic rivals, Mamluk, Ottoman or Bedouin, destroyed or checked, he was able to take almost complete charge of the extensive revenue system in his province and to exile the Ottoman governor. 'Alī Bey's financial strength permitted him to build up a more powerful house (*bayt*) than had been seen in Egypt since the Ottoman conquest and to engage in military operations beyond the immediate borders of his own province. 'Alī Bey was moreover no ordinary Mamluk leader, for his grand designs reveal an audacious, imaginative and cunning mind. Contemporaries were well aware of his unusual qualities. In addition to the frequent comments on his baseness, ruthlessness, tyranny and disregard for tradition one finds occasional evidence of his more positive qualities. The contemporary Egyptian historian al-Jabartī, for instance, remarked that 'Alī Bey read the history of the classical Mamluk period and hints that he was interested in recreating the medieval Mamluk sultanate destroyed by the Ottomans in 1516-17. This conscious desire to recreate the

Circassian state was also noted by 'Abbūd Ṣabbāgh, the historian of Shaykh Ḍāhir al-'Umar.[1]

For two and a half centuries the Mamluks of Egypt had either willingly confined their ambitions, or had them confined, to the narrow valley of the Nile and the Egyptian delta. Now 'Alī Bey committed enormous revenues and provisions to conquests outside Egypt. 'Alī's vision of the new state comprised, in fact, almost precisely the territories controlled by the Mamluk sultanate on the eve of the Ottoman conquest. Egypt of course was to be the base of 'Alī Bey's revived Mamluk state. The Red Sea coasts with their important ports of Jidda and Mocha and the holy cities Mecca and Medina in the interior were to form one wing of the new empire. The Syrian coast with its numerous active trading ports and its vital urban centers Aleppo and Damascus in the interior would form the other wing. This empire would be created by the might of 'Alī Bey's newly enlarged armies and sustained by the revival of trade with the European states, whose commercial activities in the area had been expanding throughout the course of the eighteenth century. Specifically, 'Alī Bey saw great advantage in reopening the Red Sea route to the European merchant houses in India. He encouraged them to ignore the centuries-old Ottoman ban against European shipping north of Jidda and invited them to sail directly to the Egyptian port of Suez. He also actively encouraged the Europeans to increase the volume of their trade in Egyptian and Syrian ports.

The political support that the Palestinian regime was to give to 'Alī Bey's international policies owed much to the personal alliance that 'Alī Bey had apparently forged with the octogenarian Shaykh Ḍāhir al-'Umar (1730-75), the most powerful of the local Palestinian *mültezims* or tax farmers. Shaykh Ḍāhir's considerable political influence which stretched from the Galilee to the Mediterranean Coast, made him more powerful than the governor of Sidon, whose subordinate he technically was, and enabled him to defend himself against the weak governors of Damascus. This power was a direct consequence of the increased profits he had learned to derive from the European merchant houses operating out of the coastal ports under his control. These competed for the right to buy the cotton and grain crops produced in Ḍāhir's villages.[2] In his ability to gain considerably larger profits from direct trade with the Europeans and in his eagerness to expand this trade Shaykh Ḍāhir had anticipated 'Alī Bey and Muḥammad Bey by several decades, but Palestine had neither the produce nor the international position to rival Egypt's inherent potential.

The personal friendship between 'Alī Bey and Shaykh Ḍāhir seems to have developed during the period in 1766 when 'Alī Bey was temporarily driven from Egypt into exile in Palestine by the Ottoman governor of Egypt and his Mamluk protégés. Whereas it was common for Egyptian Mamluks to seek refuge in Palestine, it is another indication of 'Alī Bey's uniqueness that he was able to turn this temporary setback to advantage by making a positive alliance that strengthened his overall position. In the old leader 'Alī Bey he found a kindred spirit, a man of similar ambitions who was himself a rebel against his

sovereign and who was eager to exploit the economic potential of his province through increased trade with the European states. Shaykh Ḍāhir, like 'Alī Bey, was also eager to extend his control beyond the traditional borders of his assigned *iltizāms* and saw cooperation with a revived Mamluk beylicate in Egypt as a means of challenging the Ottoman governors in Sidon and Damascus.

The first signs of the new alliance seems to have been the presence of troops from Palestine and Syria with 'Alī Bey's forces in 1769. In late March 1769, Muḥammad Bey, 'Alī Bey's mamluk and chief commander, moved against dissident Mamluks and the powerful Hawwāra Bedouins of the Ṣa'īd with a sizeable force that included Mamluk, Ottoman, Druze, Albanian, Mutawalli (Shi'ites of southern Lebanon), and Syrian Christian troops.[3] The Palestinian contingents could have been supplied by Shaykh Ḍāhir, whose support for 'Alī Bey's ambitions can be interpreted as a way of furthering his own ambitions in Palestine. The pacification of the Ṣa'īd brought all of Egypt from the cataracts to the Mediterranean under 'Alī Bey's absolute control and permitted him to concentrate on his international ventures.

Once he was established in power for the second time, 'Alī Bey gave numerous assurances to the European commercial houses that he would support their efforts to expand their trade in his domains and would grant them the necessary political protection to pursue their activities in the face of considerable local opposition. He hoped to reap substantial profits from this trade and attempted to reposition Egypt as the midpoint in the trade route he hoped to revive between India and Europe. He had tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain a firman from the Ottoman government which would lift the ban on Europeans from trading north of Jidda. Eventually, in 1768, he compelled the Ottoman governor Ḥamza Paşa to grant him the desired firman.[4] Knowing that such trading would never be sanctioned by the Ottoman government and being concerned about the effects that the unilateral breaking of the ban might have upon the status of French trade in the rest of the Ottoman Empire, the French restrained their commercial instincts until such time as 'Alī Bey's firman would be approved by the sultan, but the Venetians, after some hesitation, plunged into the Red Sea trade.[5]

A fortuitous combination of events now provided 'Alī Bey with the opportunity to expand his influence beyond his own borders under the cloak of performing the sultan's own tasks. But in exceeding the sultan's limited objectives, 'Alī Bey was to declare his true intentions and to provoke a serious crisis with the Ottoman government. The incident that gave 'Alī Bey his first opportunity to operate outside the boundaries of his own province occurred in 1769 when the *sharīf* of Mecca died. Following the death of the *sharīf*, the recognised ruler of Mecca and its surrounding territories, a contest for the succession broke out between two rival branches of the Hāshimī house. 'Abdallāh, the defeated candidate, then proceeded to Istanbul where he obtained from Sultan Muṣṭafā III a letter that authorized 'Alī Bey to help

'Abdallāh to secure the desired position.[6] As Egypt was traditionally responsible for the protection of the holy cities in the Hijaz and annually dispatched there a large pilgrim caravan with a sizeable armed escort, this request by the sultan was not in itself unnatural. But 'Abdallāh's arrival with the sultan's firman fitted perfectly into 'Alī Bey's emerging plans to establish an extensive empire of his own, carved from the Ottoman Empire and based on trade with the European nations. 'Alī Bey could hardly resist the invitation to invade the Hijaz not only because it would lay the foundation of his new state but also because it was from the sultan with whom he was then in dispute. The timing was also fortuitous, for Egypt had been entirely pacified and 'Alī Bey could confidently send his troops to foreign soil.

The general command of the Arabian campaign was given to Muḥammad Bey, who left Suez in May 1770 at the head of land forces, while Ḥasan Bey departed with a small fleet for Jidda. Mecca and Jidda were quickly seized and the Sharīf 'Abdallāh was installed as the new ruler of the area. To reap the rewards of his ambitious Hijaz campaign 'Alī Bey had given specific orders to his commanders for the development of the Indian trade. The port of Jidda was repaired to receive the ships 'Alī Bey hoped would soon be induced to visit his own domains. He had also given specific orders for his commanders not to molest European traders whom they might encounter in the Red Sea ports.[7] It was at Jidda that British merchants from Bengal made contact with 'Alī Bey's Mamluks and raised the possibility of sending their ships directly from India to Suez. The result of these initial contacts was the formal agreement Muḥammad Bey signed with James Bruce in 1773 and the arrival of British ships in Suez in 1775.

Venetian sources claim that Muḥammad Bey had instructions to conquer as far down the Arabian coast as Mocha and Yemen. 'Alī Bey also promised the French to build an aquaduct linking the Nile to the Red Sea at Suez, so one begins to understand the enormity of the benefits he hoped to derive from his Hijaz venture. Few of 'Alī Bey's plans materialized, however, for Muḥammad Bey returned prematurely, much to 'Alī Bey's apparent disgust.[8] 'Abdallāh could not long maintain himself without the support of an Egyptian garrison and was soon driven out by his rival. A canal linking the Red Sea with the Mediterranean would not be built for another century, and European powers refused to increase their trade through the Red Sea, despite urgings by their own merchant communities which were eager to respond to 'Alī Bey's invitation. In the end, the exigencies of world politics determined the European states to work for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a barrier to Russian expansion into the Middle East and to preserve the privileges which they enjoyed in the Mediterranean ports of the Empire rather than risk them for uncertain profits in the Red Sea promised by an unstable provincial regime. Nevertheless, the attempt to revive the Red Sea trade continued to interest 'Alī Bey's successors. Both Muḥammad Bey and Murād Bey signed treaties with European companies to attract their trade through the ports of Suez and

Alexandria. Muḥammad 'Alī Paşa while extending Egyptian influence under the pretext of crushing the Wahhābīs on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, penetrated Arabia as far eastward as the Persian Gulf.

Muḥammad Bey returned from the Hijaz in late 1770, by which time 'Alī Bey was engaged in nothing less than the conquest of Palestine and Syria. As important as the Hijaz campaign was in 'Alī Bey's grand design, the conquest of Palestine and Syria, preparations for which had proceeded fitfully for over a year and a half, appears to have been his major objective. As early as February 1769, 'Alī Bey had given a hint of his developing interest in Syrian affairs when he petitioned the sultan to depose 'Oşmān Paşa of Damascus on the flimsy excuse that this governor was harboring Egyptian exiles.[9] Then in February 1770, the French consul in Cairo d'Amirat had ordered the French consul in Acre to deliver to Shaykh Ḍāhir 10,000 piastres on 'Alī Bey's account for the recruitment of troops for 'Alī Bey.[10]

Even as the Hijaz campaign was unfolding the Cairo consular community was made ominously aware of 'Alī Bey's greater ambitions, for in July 1770 he requested modern artillery pieces from, of all sources, Venice and the Knights of St. John of Malta, two Christian powers with a long history of hostility towards the Ottoman Empire.[11] These revelations give some indication of the lengths 'Alī Bey was willing to go to in soliciting help from Christian states in his growing conflict with the sultan. French consular correspondence reported shortly afterwards that 'Alī Bey had asked for the loan of French artillery experts.[12] Eventually 'Alī Bey was able to acquire the services of eleven European military advisors, but these made no immediate impression upon the fighting ability or organization of the Mamluk armies.

Conditions in the Ottoman Empire in 1769-70 favored intervention in Syria by 'Alī Bey and Shaykh Ḍāhir because an incredible series of crises had stretched the capabilities of the Empire to breaking point and threatened to dismember it. Karīm Khan of Persia appeared to be on the verge of seizing southern Iraq, including the important entrepots of Basra and Baghdad, while smaller revolts in Asia Minor and the European provinces had dissipated imperial strength in these Ottoman heartlands. But such problems were overshadowed by the disastrous and humiliating war with Russia that dragged on from 1768-74. It therefore seemed impossible for the Empire to find the resources with which to resist an advance into Palestine and Syria by 'Alī Bey and Shaykh Ḍāhir. To humiliate the Ottomans further, in July 1770 a Russian fleet commanded by Count Orlov suddenly appeared in Mediterranean waters and destroyed the greater part of the Ottoman navy at Çeşme before driving the battered remnants into Asiatic harbors. For the next several years this Russian squadron, manned mostly by island Greeks, cruised eastern Mediterranean waters virtually at will, intervened at points along the Asiatic and Syrian coasts and disrupted European and Ottoman commerce in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean.[13] After 'Alī Bey's expulsion from Cairo in 1772 and his retreat to Palestine he and Ḍāhir offered port facilities and

supplies to this squadron in return for military aid. Although the Russians received 'Alī Bey's proposals for an alliance with sympathy, they failed to intervene effectively on his behalf.

'Alī Bey had acquired a formidable ally in Shaykh Ḍāhir. Aided by his seven sons, Shaykh Ḍāhir had gained hegemony over most of Palestine. Like 'Alī Bey, he was in open revolt against his sovereign, but his position was more precarious because of the presence of powerful Ottoman forces in Syria and in several Palestinian towns such as Jerusalem and Jaffa. With his sons in command of strategic fortresses in Palestine, Ḍāhir could offer 'Alī Bey not only an appreciable contingent of fighting men, but also a secure bridgehead from which 'Alī Bey could launch his main assaults against the interior. Ḍāhir's control of the important port of Acre permitted 'Alī Bey to provision his forces by sea instead of hauling his supplies over the difficult land route between the Egyptian delta and Palestine.

The Syrian campaign was opened in November 1770 when 'Alī Bey sent 'Abd al-Raḥmān Aġa at the head of a small force to Gaza, where through trickery he was able to kill the powerful Bedouin Shaykh Salīt, whose tribe posed a potential barrier to the Egyptian forces. This force having secured the route to Palestine, a few days later 'Alī Bey dispatched Ismā'īl Bey with a large army. On November 11, Sulaymān Bey 'Umar Kāshif departed from Damietta by sea with yet another force.[14] Though Ismā'īl and Ḍāhir had gained control of most of Palestine and had established themselves in southern Syria by the end of December, they did not press their advantage against 'Oṣmān Paṣa, who was able to lead the annual pilgrim caravan safely from Damascus to Mecca and to bring it back successfully to Damascus, despite the rebels' attempt to interdict it. It was necessary, therefore, to send Muḥammad Bey at the head of yet another large Egyptian force. Between April and May 1771, Muḥammad Bey cleared 'Oṣmān's partisans from all of Palestine with the exception of Jerusalem, Sidon and a few well-fortified towns. By June 8 the combined forces of Muḥammad Bey, Ismā'īl Bey and Shaykh Ḍāhir had occupied Damascus, which, apart from a small garrison in the citadel, surrendered once 'Oṣmān Paṣa had fled. Muḥammad Bey was given orders by his master 'Alī Bey to appoint governors to the districts already conquered and to continue his conquests deeper into Syria.[15] The revived Mamluk beylicate of Egypt was now at a peak not enjoyed since Ḳānṣūh al-Ghūrī had lost Syria in 1516, because Damascus was in Mamluk hands and the way to Aleppo was open. Yet 'Alī Bey's grandiose scheme suddenly collapsed, the powerful *bayt* he had created disintegrated into hostile factions, and his career took a sharp turn for the worse when Muḥammad Bey inexplicably abandoned his conquests by withdrawing his forces from Damascus only ten days after accepting the surrender of the city. His pell-mell retreat to Cairo remains an unexplained mystery.

Muḥammad Bey's withdrawal from Damascus not only exploded 'Alī Bey's dreams for the conquest of Syria but exposed Shaykh Ḍāhir to the wrath of the

Ottoman government, which then determined to punish its rebels and regain control of the important territories lost in the recent fighting. Shaykh Ḍāhir immediately dispatched letters to 'Alī Bey asking that the Egyptian army be sent back to Syria before 'Oṣmān Paṣa could begin his expected counter-offensive.[16] For the rest of his days 'Alī Bey committed himself to the reconquest of Palestine and Syria and to his alliance with Shaykh Ḍāhir, but events in Egypt condemned his efforts to failure.

While Muḥammad Bey refused repeated orders to lead the army back to Syria, 'Alī Bey rushed Shaykh Ḍāhir whatever aid he could in the circumstances. This consisted largely of cash for the purchase of provisions, small contingents of troops and continued promises of the return of his army. Immediately upon Muḥammad Bey's unexpected return to Cairo, 'Alī Bey had dispatched his confidant and private secretary, the Copt Rizḳ, to assure Ḍāhir of his intention to return the army to Syria. Rizḳ discussed plans for the new campaign and delivered cash to Shaykh Ḍāhir to stock provisions for the renewed struggle. Informed sources expected the imminent return to Palestine of an even larger Egyptian army under the command of 'Alī Bey's nephew, Riḍwān Bey.[17] In October 1771, seventeen ships loaded with provisions had left Damietta for Jaffa, which was at that time still in Egyptian hands. At the same time Muṣṭafā Bey Jāwīsh led a contingent of 700-800 men to Gaza by the overland route.[18] 'Oṣmān Paṣa was deposed in this same month and was succeeded by Muḥammad Paṣa al-'Aẓm, who showed no more aggressive intentions towards the rebels than had his predecessor. Though the rebels lost some districts to forces loyal to the Empire, they nevertheless maintained control of the important coastal districts and their harbors. 'Alī Bey continued to dispatch supplies and small contingents of men to Shaykh Ḍāhir, but these were insufficient to turn the battle tide in their favor.[19] By the spring of 1772 these minor military operations were completely overshadowed by the contest for power that had broken out between 'Alī Bey and Muḥammad Bey in Egypt.

The mutual distrust that had poisoned the relations between the two powerful beys finally erupted into violence in January 1772 when 'Alī Bey expelled Muḥammad Bey from the capital. It did not take long after that for the popular Muḥammad Bey to rally the dissident Mamluk and Bedouin forces of the Ṣa'īd for a countermarch on Cairo. 'Alī Bey was dealt a severe blow during this period by the defection of Ismā'īl Bey and the greater portion of his forces to Muḥammad Bey's cause. It was necessary, therefore, for 'Alī Bey to flee once more to Gaza in April 1772, when Muḥammad Bey's superior forces marched on Cairo.

'Alī Bey's allies no longer had sufficient revenues or forces to carry their attack into Syria, but they were able to defend themselves in Palestine. Yet they knew that eventually the strength of the Empire would seriously strain their own limited resources, so they renewed attempts to enlist Russian aid against their common enemy. Negotiations with Count Orlov, who had remained in his Aegean haven, proceeded cordially, but he was precluded from intervening

on their behalf by an armistice which his government had signed with the Ottoman Empire. When the armistice was broken only four months after its signing, Orlov was free to aid the allies, but 'Alī Bey's biographer and friend Lusignan, who was present at most of the negotiating sessions with Orlov's lieutenants, sadly remarked that despite the frequent declarations of friendship which passed between the two sides, the promises of Russian military aid, including the intended transport of 3,000 Albanian troops for use by the allies, were never fulfilled.[20] The most the Russians did was to disrupt shipping along the coast, bombard the town of Beirut and participate for a time in the siege and bombardment of the city of Jaffa.[21] Their fleet also appeared off the Egyptian coast shortly after the battle of al-Ṣāliḥiyya when 'Alī Bey was wounded and captured, but it did nothing more than capsize a few ships in the harbor.[22]

In an effort to deprive the beleaguered allies of necessary supplies and foodstuffs Muḥammad Bey intercepted all land and sea traffic between Egypt and Palestine, but he could not halt the lucrative, contraband grain trade which the European captains, particularly the French, carried to Palestine from the port of Damietta. The test of will between Muḥammad Bey and 'Alī Bey came to center on the strategic city of Jaffa, which the latter had lost and was determined to reduce by siege. While Shaykh Ḍāhir and 'Alī Bey controlled the land side of the city, its port remained open. Muḥammad Bey now attempted to relieve the pressure on Jaffa by sending supplies to the city by this route, aware perhaps that the fall of the city would provide the necessary base for an attempt by 'Alī Bey to return to Egypt. As long as Jaffa remained in hostile hands it would be risky for 'Alī Bey to attempt to return to Egypt across Gaza and Sinai, for his extended supply lines would be exposed. Despite the supplies which Muḥammad Bey was able to send to Jaffa, the city finally succumbed to famine and capitulated in February 1773 after an eight-month siege.[23]

It was apparent to both 'Alī Bey and his ally Ḍāhir that their respective fates were mutually dependent. If their combined forces could consolidate their position in Palestine, then 'Alī Bey might hope to gather a force sufficient to regain his paramount position in Egypt. From this base he could protect Ḍāhir and with Egyptian revenues could launch new campaigns into Syria. His failure to regain Egypt would leave them both in an exposed position, for they would be hard pressed to resist both the hostile forces gathering in Syria and the powerful Mamluk army of Egypt if it should reappear in Palestine. It was this fear of being crushed between the hammer of Egypt and the anvil of the Empire that induced 'Alī Bey to make a final attempt to wrest Egypt from Muḥammad Bey's control.

Without waiting for the promised Russian help to materialize, 'Alī Bey led a small army said to have numbered between 3,000-6,000 men, including two of Ḍāhir's sons, Shaykh Ṣalībī and Shaykh Karīm, into the delta where a much larger force led by Muḥammad Bey moved into position to intercept it at al-Ṣāliḥiyya. The battle that would determine not only the leadership of Egypt,

but the course of subsequent events in Palestine, Syria and the Ottoman Empire, finally commenced on May 1, 1773.[24] Despite some initial successes, 'Alī Bey's numerically inferior force was quickly overwhelmed, all the more easily after the Maghribī infantry deserted at a crucial moment. His faithful Mamluk 'Alī Bey Ṭanṭāwī and Shaykh Ṣalībī were slain and Shaykh Karīm and Lusignan fled, but 'Alī Bey refused to leave his tent. He was gravely wounded during his capture and was transported to Cairo where he died of his wounds on May 8.[25]

Although the second invasion of Syria was delayed for almost two years, Muḥammad Bey's activities in the interval demonstrated his own continued interest in the affairs of Palestine and Shaykh Ḍāhir's activities. In the fall of 1773, Muḥammad Bey called upon Shaykh Ḍāhir to return the effects of the deceased 'Alī Bey, particularly the vast treasure he was supposed to have had with him in exile, and demanded that Ḍāhir evacuate Nablus, Gaza, Ramle and Jaffa, which the sultan had assigned to him in 1771, but whose revenues he had never been able to collect.[26] At the same time he apparently petitioned the sultan for a reconfirmation of the formal right to administer these *iltizāms* which had been assigned to him in 1771.[27]

While Shaykh Ḍāhir remained in control of the disputed region, refusing either to return 'Alī Bey's possessions or to hand over the revenues and administration of those southern Palestinian districts, Muḥammad Bey began to make preparations for a campaign against him. In early 1774 he levied a tax of 300 *pataques* on every village in Egypt to pay for the proposed war against Ḍāhir and continued throughout the year slowly to marshal his forces and supplies. In January 1775 two of Ḍāhir's ships were seized in Damietta while transports to carry artillery, munitions and infantry were being assembled in that port.[28]

The planned war against Ḍāhir obviously had the Ottoman government's consent, for the French ambassador reported from Istanbul that the sultan was obliged to assign Muḥammad Bey the requested *iltizāms* of Gaza, Ramle and Jaffa and that two caravelles had been placed at his disposal for the coming struggle with Ḍāhir. As the campaign unfolded the Druze Amir and other shaykhs in the neighboring mountain districts received firmans from Istanbul instructing them to give aid to the Egyptian forces in their struggle against Shaykh Ḍāhir.[29] It was a classic case of the Ottoman central government using provincial leaders, themselves potential rebels, to bring down a rebel who had through his activities attracted the attention of the sultan's government in Istanbul.

Convinced that Muḥammad Bey would eventually return to Syria, Shaykh Ḍāhir had been maneuvering to head off the invasion by making his peace with the sultan. As early as February 1774 he had agreed with 'Oṣmān Paṣa of Damascus to accept the province of Sidon in return for evacuating southern Palestine and paying the taxes he had failed to forward to Istanbul, but the Ottoman government in Istanbul never confirmed this agreement.[30] Again in

the fall of 1774 Ḍāhir offered to submit to the sultan and to pay his taxes if he would be confirmed in the *iltizāms* he then held.[31] As the pressure of the impending invasion mounted on Ḍāhir and the Ottoman authorities, who themselves could not relish the appearance of Muḥammad Bey in Syria at the head of a powerful Mamluk army, the Ottoman government and Ḍāhir made their peace. In April 1775, when the long expected invasion was still in its early stages, an emissary of the Ottoman government arrived in Sidon with a pardon for Shaykh Ḍāhir. It was also reported that the Ottoman government had sent a message to Muḥammad Bey, then besieging Jaffa, assigning him the revenues of the territories between Sidon and Gaza — previously held by Shaykh Ḍāhir — which he had requested and instructing him to cease his advance into Syria.[32] By this time, however, Muḥammad Bey's long-planned invasion was unfolding and he was unwilling to halt his attack before achieving his objectives. He therefore ignored the sultan's instructions and continued the siege of Jaffa and military activities northwards along the coast.

Gaza and Ramle had quickly been overrun by the Egyptian forces, but Jaffa, commanded by Yūsuf Ṣabbāgh, decided to resist. The city withstood the siege until May 29, when its walls were finally breached by mines set by one of the Englishmen whom Muḥammad Bey had brought with his artillery corps.[33] The massacre of the citizens in the city, which Jabartī claims was suggested by Muḥammad Bey's lieutenants, had its desired effect upon the rest of the Palestinian population, which quickly ceased its resistance. Beirut and Sidon capitulated to Muḥammad Bey's naval forces and Ḍāhir, weakened by the desertion of his son 'Alī and sensing the irresistible nature of Muḥammad Bey's coming attack, fled his capital Acre on May 24 to find refuge in the mountains. Acre capitulated to a small naval force that had come from Haifa on May 30, but since there were not enough troops to maintain order the situation in the city collapsed into chaos.[34]

Muḥammad Bey's second Syrian campaign was a severe blow to the inhabitants of Palestine, particularly to the Christian fathers and the French merchants, whom Muḥammad Bey suspected of siding with 'Alī Bey and Shaykh Ḍāhir. At Jaffa Muḥammad Bey began a systematic destruction of Christian religious structures. He pulled down the hospice of Terre Sainte and ordered the monks of Nazareth to pay the staggering sum of 700 purses.[35] In his first audience with the French merchants in Acre, Muḥammad Bey demanded that they produce the treasures of 'Alī Bey, Shaykh Ḍāhir and Ibrāhīm Ṣabbāgh, Ḍāhir's chief customs agent, which he insisted they were hiding. Muḥammad Bey certainly gave every indication that he believed the treasures he sought were hidden somewhere in the city, for he toured the pillaged city himself, looking in various of Ṣabbāgh's shops and warehouses for them, and gave orders to tear down palaces and fortified places within the city.[36]

As his frustration at not finding the treasures mounted, so his displeasure with the foreigners increased. Despite the arrival of a firman from Istanbul

granting protection to the Carmelite fathers, Muḥammad Bey sent soldiers to pull down their monastery on Mt. Carmel.[37] Approximately 500 terrified foreigners mustered in the French compound were convinced that Muḥammad Bey was going to massacre them on June 11, but on the evening of June 10 the incredible news of his death spread confusion through his army, which, except for the Maghribī troops, evacuated the city on the morning of the 11th. On the 12th Ḍāhir al-'Umar reentered the city and established order.[38]

During the brief period that all the major cities on the southern Syrian coast were in his control Muḥammad Bey assembled an authority not enjoyed by any other Egyptian Mamluk in two and a half centuries. He was allegedly at Acre when he received the news that he had gained unprecedented authority in Egypt and that his conquests in Palestine had been recognized by the sultan. According to European diplomatic sources in Istanbul, the new sultan, 'Abdülḥamīd I, conferred on Muḥammad Bey the rank of *vezīr* with three tails and appointed him governor of Egypt. But astute observers remarked that he would decline that honor, for it was seen to be a trap set for him by the Ottoman government. If he accepted the rank he would be eligible for regular rotation to another post the following year.[39]

In combining the authority of *shaykh al-balad*, or head of the Mamluk beylicate, with that of governor of Egypt Muḥammad Bey achieved greater control over the fiscal, administrative and military structures of Egypt than any Mamluk had enjoyed since the Ottoman conquest in 1517. He had successfully attached southern Syria to the beylicate of Egypt and was on the verge of establishing a powerful autonomous Mamluk state within the very heart of the decaying Ottoman Empire when death cheated him of his accomplishments and sent the Egyptian army, which had been in a similar position in 1771, reeling back to Egypt.

There can be little doubt that Muḥammad Bey was about to establish an autonomous state within the Ottoman Empire, for in his Syrian campaign of 1795 he gave clear indications that he would no longer be constrained by his legal ties to the Empire and the sultan. Although he apparently had Ottoman approval for the war against Shaykh Ḍāhir, an Ottoman naval force cruised off the Palestinian coast, to observe and restrain the Egyptians rather than to aid them. 'Oṣmān Paşa of Damascus also nervously watched the methodical advance of the Mamluk forces, wondering if they would stop at Sidon or turn inland towards Damascus.

Muḥammad Bey disregarded the pardon that the Ottoman government had granted Ḍāhir as well as the order to halt his own advance. He ignored the sultan's firmans granting protection to the various Christian religious orders in Palestine, whose edifices he proceeded to tear down. If we can believe Jabartī, Muḥammad Bey had resolved to press his campaign deeper into Syria, probably against Damascus, just before his sudden illness and death. Such a campaign would definitely have been beyond the provinces assigned to him by the sultan.

Jabartī reports a meeting between Muḥammad Bey and his amirs that had striking similarities with the momentous session held by the beys after their conquest of Damascus in 1771. Just the same as before, the beys believed that their campaign was over with the achievement of their immediate objectives and expressed a desire to return to their homes and wives in Egypt. But Muḥammad Bey ordered them to remain in place, to govern the conquered provinces and to prepare for further conquests deeper into Syria. Murād Bey was appointed governor of the key city Acre and its surrounding territory. The beys, says Jabartī, left the council chagrined and agitated and returned to their tents to reflect upon their situation.[40]

Ḍāhir's strength had been almost entirely drained by the Egyptian attack, so he found it impossible to recapture the territories from which he had recently been driven. When the Ottoman forces, which had stood aside to observe the struggle between the antagonists intervened against the weakened leader Ḍāhir, he was forced to abandon Acre itself and was cut down in August 1775. His severed head was forwarded to Istanbul by the Grand Admiral as evidence of the elimination of one of the sultan's most persistent and tenacious rebels.[41]

Incredibly, through the astute manipulation of forces not even under its control, and without using its own meager military resources, in the space of only two and a half years the Ottoman government was freed of three of the most dangerous rebels it had faced in the Arab provinces in the eighteenth century and had regained a semblance of control over provinces that had been virtually autonomous. Egypt no longer threatened to invade Syria, for the powerful regime put together by Muḥammad Bey disintegrated in factional strife after his death. Though the Ottomans could not regain military or administrative control of Egypt, not even by sending an expeditionary force against the Mamluks in 1786, they were able to force the Ḳazdughlī amirs to fulfill most of their military and financial obligations to the Empire for the greater part of the period prior to 1798. But they did succeed in reimposing their tenuous discipline over Ḍāhir's provinces and, moreover, enjoyed the revenues of those territories.

The Ottoman Empire displayed amazing resilience in the face of numerous challenges posed by the rise of independent-minded provincial leaders in the second half of the eighteenth century. It finessed brilliantly, using its residual fragile, political leverage in its provinces to pit one rival against the other, thus to eliminate its enemies without expending its own inadequate military resources. But in reviewing the history of the campaigns by 'Alī Bey, Muḥammad Bey and Shaykh Ḍāhir al-'Umar for autonomy it should not be overlooked that the Empire enjoyed an incredible stroke of luck in Muḥammad Bey's totally unexpected death, just at the moment when he was in an unchallenged position to establish an autonomous regime in Egypt and Palestine.

Though the three leaders failed in their immediate objectives to gain autonomy and found a dynasty, their activities helped to change fundamentally

the character of the relationship between their provinces and the central government and between their provinces and Europe. They had, first of all, built up military forces with which the Ottoman central government could no longer cope and had wrested control of the Ottoman provincial financial administration from the central government. Thus, they prepared the ground for leaders like Aḥmed Jezzār Paşa and Muḥammad 'Alī Paşa who, despite paying the required taxes to the central government, established autonomous regimes in their respective provinces with relative ease.

In seeking European military help and by encouraging European merchants to expand their commercial activities in their territories, the provincial leaders were primarily responsible for the dramatic acceleration of cultural, economic, military and political contacts between their provinces and the European states in the second half of the eighteenth century. In particular, the attempts by 'Alī Bey and Muḥammad Bey to open the Red Sea to European shipping, and the general encouragement that all three leaders gave to European merchants, particularly the French, brought these areas into renewed direct contact with Europe after a long period of relative isolation. In renewing economic contacts with European states these three leaders also sought to establish a monopoly over the exchange of goods and products with Europe. In this way, too, they paved the way for the more famous Jezzār Paşa and Muḥammad 'Alī Paşa. Their efforts cannot be ignored, therefore, in reviewing the subsequent history of their respective provinces.

Notes

1 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Ḥasan al-Jabartī, *'Ajā'ib al-āthār fī al-tarājim wa'l-akhbār* (Būlāḳ, 1297 H.), vol. 1, p. 318. 'Abbūd Ṣabbāgh, *al-Rawḍ al-zāhir fī ta'rīkh Ḍāhir*, Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris), F.A. 4610, folio 15.

2 An excellent review of Ḍāhir's career can be found in Amnon Cohen's *Palestine in the 18th Century: Patterns of Government & Administration* (Jerusalem, 1973).

3 Jabartī, vol. 1, p. 335. The French consul at Tripoli reported that Ḍāhir had secretly passed 2400 troops to 'Alī Bey. See Archives Nationales (Paris), hereafter AN, B_1, 1121 (Tripoli de Syrie), June 13, 1770.

4 John Livingstone, "'Alī Bey al-Kabīr and the Mamlūk Resurgence in Ottoman Egypt, 1760-1772," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton University (1968), p. 112.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 113-115.

6 Jabartī, vol. 1, p. 350. James Bruce, *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile* (Edinburgh, 1790), vol. 1, p. 273, claims that everyone knew in 1769 that 'Alī Bey had intentions to invade the Hijaz the following year.

7 Jabartī, vol. 1, pp. 350-351; Livingstone, "'Alī Bey al-Kabīr and the Mamlūk Resurgence," pp. 118-19 and p. 169. See also David Kimche, "The Opening of the Red Sea to British Ships in the late Eighteenth Century," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 6 (January, 1972), pp. 63-71; Edward Ingram, "From Trade to Empire in the Near East — I: The End of the Spectre of the Overland Trade, 1775-1801," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 14 (May, 1978), pp. 3-21; François Charles-Roux, *Autour d'une Route. L'Angleterre, l'Isthme de Suez et l'Égypte au XVIII^e Siècle* (Paris, 1922) and "France, Egypte et Mer Rouge, de 1715 à 1798," *Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne* (January, 1951), pp. 117-195.

8 Livingstone, "'Alī Bey al-Kabīr and the Mamlūk Resurgence", pp. 119 and 169.
9 Jabartī, vol. 1, 309.
10 AN, B_1, 1034 (Seyde), March 6, 1770, citing d'Amirat's letter of Feb. 12, 1770. Though Ḍāhir eventually demanded 25,000 piastres of the French consul, he settled for 4,000 debited against customs charges at Acre. B_1, 1034 (Seyde), April 4, and April 18, 1770. Chambre du Commerce de Marseille (Marseille), J-799 (Seyde), May 13, 1770 has attached a bulletin dated March 30 in which it is made clear that the 10,000 piastres were for the recruitment of troops.
11 Livingstone, "'Alī Bey al-Kabīr and the Mamlūk Resurgence," p. 129.
12 AN, B_1, 334 (Le Caire), Sept. 18, 1770. See also Livingstone, "'Alī Bey al-Kabīr and the Mamlūk Resurgence," pp. 129-130.
13 Heavy losses suffered by French trading houses at the hands of the Russian squadron and pirate ships prompted the French government in 1775 to dispatch four frigates, each accompanied by smaller ships, to eastern Mediterranean waters. Two were stationed along the Morea and the Dardanelles, the third took up station between Stancho and Cyprus and the fourth protected shipping along the Levant coast. The appearance of this squadron had a salutary effect upon French commerce. See AN, B_{III}, (Maisons de Commerce de Marseille), July 3, 1775.
14 Jabartī, vol. 1, p. 351.
15 Jabartī, vol. 1, p. 365; AN, B_1, 334 (Le Caire), Bulletin from d'Amirat, June 24, 1771.
16 Public Record Office (London), hereafter PRO, SP 97 (Turkey), Box 47 (1771), 206-207.
17 PRO, SP 97 (Turkey), Box 47 (1771), 206, Sept. 17, 1771, citing a report from Acre, Ḍāhir's capital; AN, B_1, 1035 (Seyde), July 13, 1771.
18 AN, B_1, 1035 (Seyde), Nov. 9, 1771, The news of Muṣṭafā Jāwīsh is contained in a letter dated Oct. 22, 1771, included in B_1, 91 (Alep), Nov. 17, 1771.
19 PRO, SP 97 (Turkey), Box 48 (1772), 4, Jan. 3, 1772; 13, Jan. 7, 1772. Sidon was temporarily lost to Ottoman forces, then regained by the allies.
20 S.K. Lusignan, *A History of the Revolt of Ali Bey against the Ottoman Porte* (London, 1783), p. 131.
21 AN, B_1, 1035 (Seyde), Nov. 29, 1772; B_1, 110 (Alexandrie), Aug. 6, 1772, report damage done by the Russian squadron. Beirut was attacked on June 18, 1772. See Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus: 1723-1783* (Beirut, 1966), p. 293.
22 AN, B_1, 335 (Le Caire), June 26, 1773.
23 AN, B_1, 1036 (Seyde), February 17, 1773.
24 Jabartī, vol. 1, p. 376; AN, B_1, 335 (Le Caire), May 1, 1773.
25 Jabartī, vol. 1, p. 377, first remarks that he died of his wounds, but then he mentions the rumor that he had been poisoned. Not wishing to place himself in a position of judgment, Jabartī concluded, "God knows if his death was natural." *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 382. Other sources raise the possibility of poison, but d'Amirat, in his dispatch of June 26, 1773, asserted unequivocally that 'Alī Bey died of his wounds. AN, B_1, 335 (Le Caire), June 26, 1773.
26 AN, B_1, 1036 (Seyde), August 31, 1773; Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, pp. 49 and 148.
27 Archives des Affaires Étrangères (Paris), hereafter AAE (Correspondance Politique — Turquie), vol. 161, January 4, 1775.
28 AN, B_1, 335 (Le Caire), April 20, 1774 and Jan. 28, 1775.
29 AAE (Correspondance Politique — Turquie), vol. 161, Jan. 4 and April 3, 1775; Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, p. 49.
30 Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus*, pp. 303-304. 'Oṣmān Paṣa, too, was eager to avoid an invasion by the Mamluk army of Egypt and sought peace with Ḍāhir. See also Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, p. 47.
31 Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus*, pp. 303-304; Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, pp. 47-48.
32 AN, B_1, 111 (Alexandrie), May 5, 1775; B_1, 1037 (Seyde), April 7, 1775.
33 AN, B_1, 111 (Alexandrie), June 4, July 8, 1775; PRO, SP 97 (Turkey), Box 51, 79ff. contains letters written in Italian by the Franciscans of Acre to their coreligionists in Aleppo. The first letter referring to the events at Jaffa is dated June 16, 1775.

34 Jabartī, vol. 1, p. 413; PRO, SP 97 (Turkey), Box 51, 79 letter of the Franciscan head at Acre.

35 AN, B_1, 335 (Le Caire), June 5, 1775; PRO, SP 97 (Turkey), Box 51, 80, letter of the Franciscan head at Acre.

36 AN, B_1, 1037 (Seyde), review of events May 20 to June 15, 1775.

37 PRO, SP 97 (Turkey), Box 51, 79, letter of the Franciscan head at Acre.

38 PRO, SP 97 (Turkey), Box 51, 80 letter of Guiseppe Blanc.

39 PRO, SP 97 (Turkey), Box 51, 62, July 3, 1775; AN, B_1, 442 (Constantinople), June 3, 1775; AAE (Correspondance Politique — Turquie), vol. 161, July 3, 1775. George Baldwin, *Political Recollections Relative to Egypt* (London, 1801), p. 172, also asserts that Muḥammad Bey had been named *paṣa* of Egypt as well as *shaykh al-balad* and remarks on the uniqueness of that situation. Jabartī, on the other hand, claims that Muḥammad Bey had sent his *kethüdā*, or agent, to Istanbul with magnificent presents for the sultan and a request that he be granted the government of Egypt and Syria. He alleges that the firman of investiture, the robe of honor and the insignia of office reached Muḥammad Bey in Acre three days before his death, but this is clearly an error as consular reports make no mention of the arrival of such honors. In writing the obituary of Ismā'īl Āğa, Muḥammad Bey's *kethüdā*, Jabartī corrects his own mistake by noting that while the firman of investiture had been prepared, the news of Muḥammad Bey's death reached Istanbul before Ismā'īl Āğa's departure. The firman was then withdrawn and Ismā'īl Āğa sailed directly to Egypt. Consular records assert that Muḥammad Bey's campaign had the prior approval of the Ottoman government and that Muḥammad Bey had been assigned the revenues of the area between Sidon and Gaza. These details were apparently confirmed in the firman that was withdrawn. The news of its preparation, rather than the document itself and other honors, probably reached Muḥammad Bey in Acre and it is the government of the Palestinian coast, not all of Syria, to which Jabartī refers. See Jabartī, vol. 1, pp. 413-414, and vol. 2, p. 20; AN, B_1, 111 (Alexandria), May 5, 1775; AAE (Correspondance Politique — Turquie), vol. 161, Jan. 4, 1775. Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, p. 49, mistakenly refers to Muḥammad Bey as the governor of Egypt.

40 Jabartī, vol. 1, p. 414, AN, B_1, 1037 (Seyde), review of the events of May 20 to June 15, 1775.

41 AAE (Correspondance Politique — Turquie), vol. 161, Oct. 28, 1775; Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, p. 50.

Some Findings on Prussian and Ottoman Policies in Palestine During the 1840s Based on the Writings of Dr. Gustav E. Schultz, the First Prussian Vice-Consul to Jerusalem 1842-1851

YAIR HIRSCHFELD

Prussian Diplomacy in Palestine during the 1840s

Dr. Gustav Ernst Schultz was the first Prussian vice-consul in Jerusalem. He was appointed in 1842 and remained in Jerusalem until his premature death, in October 1851. At the time of his appointment Schultz was only thirty two years old and was already well known for his Oriental studies, made at the University of Koenigsberg. Since 1838, when he was only twenty-seven, he had been a lecturer in Oriental literature. He spoke fluent Arabic and Hebrew.[1] Schultz's interest in Jerusalem and the Middle East as a whole was scientific. This impression is strengthened by reading his little book *Jerusalem*,[2] which is concerned with scientific problems, mainly geographical and archaeological, of Jerusalem, while the political history of the Ottoman period is not dealt with at all.

In spite of the fact that the position of a Prussian vice-consul to Jerusalem was somewhat prestigious and offered Schultz many opportunities to develop his scientific knowledge and studies, he was not apparently very enthusiastic about it. As early as November 1843, only ten months after his arrival in Jerusalem, Schultz asked his superior, Consul-General Mayor von Wildenbruch, in Beirut, to fix the date for his departure.[3] Two months later Schultz offered his resignation[4] and a month later he again expressed dissatisfaction.[5] In his book *Jerusalem* which was written on a visit to Berlin in 1845, Schultz complained about the difficult living conditions in Jerusalem.[6] Travelers describing Schultz stated that he had a somewhat melancholic personality.[7] Tobler, a traveler to the Holy Land who was by profession a physician, even stated as a reason for Schultz's death in 1851, his proclivity to mental depression.[8]

Schultz owed his appointment to his friendship with Baron Christian von Bunsen,[9] who was the closest adviser of King Fredrick Wilhelm IV of Prussia. The foundation of the Prussian vice-consulate in Jerusalem had been a most important act of state, a consequence of direct intervention by King Fredrick

Wilhelm IV and Baron Christian von Bunsen. It was their intention to increase Prussian activities in the Holy Land, in order to pursue several purposes at one and the same time. Having to face the challenge of the rising national liberal forces at home, King Fredrick Wilhelm IV intended to strengthen the power of the Church and to promote religious attitudes among Prussia's population. The creation of some Prussian presence in the Holy Land and the offering of aid to Protestant pilgrims would serve this interest.[10] On the diplomatic level, King Fredrick Wilhelm IV hoped to improve relations with Great Britain and eventually to form, if possible, a British-Prussian alliance. It seemed, from a Prussian point of view, that there was much sense in such a policy. Among the four European powers, Great Britain was actually the only one with which Prussia had no conflict. Prussia's worst relations were with France. In the summer of 1841, the French had openly threatened to go to war against Prussia. Although Prussia had been linked with Russia and Austro-Hungary, in the Holy Alliance, it turned out that this alliance of Europe's conservative forces benefited the Prussians very little. Berlin was at loggerheads with Vienna over the question, who would dominate the German Bund. At the same time Russian and Prussian interests were opposed to each other in relation to Saxony and to influence in certain regions of Poland.[11]

The first step towards the promotion of Prussian-British relations was taken in July 1840, when Heinrich von Buelow, the Prussian minister in London, encouraged Lord Melbourne, the British prime minister, to use military force to solve the Eastern Question, and to compel Muḥammad 'Alī to retreat from Syria.[12] Pursuing this policy, King Fredrick Wilhelm IV sent Baron Christian von Bunsen to London in 1841. A first proposal to internationalize the Holy Land and to establish European control in the different Holy Places was rejected. As a new idea, Bunsen forwarded a proposal to establish an Anglo-Prussian Protestant bishopric in Jerusalem. Half of the money needed would be provided by Prussia, while the other half would be raised from private British Protestant sources, such as the Christian Mission for Jews in Palestine. The British would be the first to appoint a bishop, who would stay in office for four years; thereafter the appointment of the bishop would alternate between Prussia and Britain. Moreover, the Prussians clearly hinted that in all matters concerning the church, as well as in political affairs linked with the church's activities, they would accept British predominance.[13]

These proposals were advantageous enough for the British. In general Prussian diplomatic support in the Middle East was rather useful, because Great Britain had to compete against French influence in Egypt and French support to Muḥammad 'Alī as well as against Russian influence on the Sublime Porte. The proposal to establish an Anglo-Prussian Protestant bishopric in Jerusalem offered the British not only Prussian support, but also enabled them to enlarge their activities in Palestine and to deal with religious affairs, thus creating a certain counterweight to the Russian-backed Greek Orthodox community.[14]

The Prussians on their side did everything to strengthen the newly won alliance. Baron von Bunsen, the man who had proposed the foundation of the Anglo-Prussian Protestant church in Jerusalem, was, at the end of 1841, appointed German minister to London, and remained in this position until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854.[15] The pro-British tendency of Prussian policies is clearly discernible in the documents of the Prussian Jerusalem vice-consulate; Schultz was ordered repeatedly to coordinate his activities with his British colleague and to accept in every way British wishes and propositions.[16] Schultz acted according to these instructions and seems to have been happy about them. He regarded both English consuls highly, especially Consul Young, about whom he wrote: "All the Christian Parties recognize Mr. Young's dignity and his excellent disposition."[17] The relationship between Dr. Schultz and Young's successor, James Finn, seems to have been less amicable although still friendly. Expressions of praise by Schultz about Finn, similar to those he made about Young, are not to be found in the files. However, it might well be that the reason for this was that Schultz and Finn were only together in Jerusalem for a short time. James Finn arrived in Jerusalem in spring 1846,[18] while Schultz left Jerusalem in summer 1847 to replace Wildenbruch in Beirut. In 1848 Schultz left for Europe, only returning to Jerusalem in summer 1850. Shortly afterwards he fell sick, until his death in October 1851.[19]

The great Prussian interest in British activities in Jerusalem and the Holy Land found its expression even in small matters. On November 20, 1849, Finn founded the "Literary Society of Jerusalem."[20] Immediately thereafter, the king of Prussia himself announced, probably upon Schultz's initiative, that all the members of the "Literary Society" were free to use the Royal Library connected with the Prussian hospice and vice-consulate.[21]

An appreciation of the attitudes held by Schultz and his colleagues towards the British, reveals the interesting fact that many Prussian officials admired Stratford Canning and his policy of inducing reform in the Ottoman Empire. For instance, Dr. Georg Rosen, who succeeded Schultz as Prussian consul in Jerusalem, wrote in his *Geschichte der Tuerkei von dem Sieger der Reform in Jahre 1826 bis zum Pariser Traktat vom Jahre 1856*:

> England began to be looked at, almost exclusively, as the only state which had the will and the power to help Turkey to overcome her difficulties. The discerning energy of Stratford Canning achieved for England an almost unlimited influence at the Porte...[22]

F. Eichmann, who was from 1853-1856 Prussian minister at the Porte remarked: "Lord Stratford is a personality England ought to be proud of,"[23] and Prussia's foreign secretary, von Buelow, wrote in one of his letters to Schultz: "If Sir Stratford Canning is going to handle the affair with the seriousness and the ability we believe him capable of, you may rely on the success of this undertaking."[24]

Nevertheless, as a rule, the Prussians did not follow the British pattern of

interfering in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, Schultz was ordered to refrain from any such tactics. Consul-General von Wildenbruch expressed this in a letter to Schultz as follows:

> It is important to show the Turkish government that we recognize her efforts to diminish her difficulties. We shall not confirm her suspicion that we work against her efforts or that we mistrust her authority. You should not act like some consuls of other European powers, who do not support the Turkish government, and only seem to exist in order to put obstacles in her way.[25]

The Prussians did not hesitate to dissociate themselves from the British, in order to follow the principle of noninterference. This Prussian attitude is illustrated by an incident which is widely reported in the consular documents.

In summer 1843, Schultz reported that an Englishman, Mr. Gowan, rode on horseback into the city of Jerusalem, thereby offending the religiously prescribed codex of behavior for non-Muslims. Leaving his horse alone for a moment, he bought some grapes. In the meantime Turkish soldiers began hitting the horse, and when the Englishman came back, they also started to hit him. An Austrian Jewish citizen, Simeon Rosenthal,[26] at the time under Prussian protection, intervened in order to help Mr. Gowan. Consequently Mr. Rosenthal was also battered by the Muslim soldiers.[27]

We get the impression that Schultz was initially inclined to follow the example of his British colleague and to complain seriously about the incident to the *paşa*.[28] However, Wildenbruch instructed Schultz that there was no place for an intervention with the local authorities, writing:

> I can only regret that the security of the Europeans was endangered by the unwise action of an official of a European power. I cannot interfere in this affair and must leave it to you.... You will see that our protected people will not give the slightest cause to blacken the name of the Prussian government. Mr. Rosenthal is to blame himself for what has happened. I want to ask you to reprimand Mr. Rosenthal officially.[29]

The Prussian policy of noninterference in Ottoman affairs was not intended only to promote friendly relations between Berlin and Istanbul, but was simultaneously directed towards Austro-Hungary and to a lesser extent also towards Russia. Prussia aimed to avoid any friction with the Austrians or Russians. Therefore it was most important to keep a low profile for Prussian activities in Palestine, thereby attracting as little attention as possible. Moreover, Prussia as a conservative European power was inclined to look on and stress the principle of legitimate rule, which had been one of the main ideas of the European order achieved in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna. The Holy Alliance between Austro-Hungary, Russia and Prussia had been based on the promotion of this idea. Although the diplomatic alliance between Austro-Hungary, Russia and Prussia had become obsolete by the 1840s, the idea of

legitimacy was still valid and adhered to by all three governments. Prussia's policy of noninterference and support for the legitimate Ottoman rule, was intended to stress this point, and clearly received approval in Vienna. Finn described this as follows: "In political ideas it was natural that the two German consuls should have much in common."[30]

Prussia's relations with the Russians were for two reasons less cordial. First, the Russians disliked the newly formed Anglo-Prussian alliance, which in effect had already caused severe political damage to Petersburg. In the light of Russia's poor relations with France, due to the prevailing lack of understanding between Tsar Nicholas and Louis Phillipe, and of Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkan areas, Prussia's pro-British attitude, pushed the Russians into diplomatic isolation.[31] Secondly, the Russians perceived the Anglo-Prussian Protestant missionary activities as a direct challenge to the Russian protected Greek Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, for Schultz the situation was relatively easy, as there was no Russian consulate in Jerusalem. The Russian consul-general in Beirut, Basily, had been since his appointment in 1843 also in charge of Jerusalem, but he paid only sporadic visits to the Holy City.[32] Schultz reported on Basily's visits to Jerusalem, but invariably without any special warmth or hostility.[33]

The Prussians did nothing to moderate the divergent interests. On the contrary, in the Ḥaṣbayyā affair of 1844, this became abundantly clear. As Muslim law forbade proselytizing Muslims, the Protestant missionaries had to direct their activities towards Jews and members of the different Christian sects. In Ḥaṣbayyā, in the Lebanon, a group of Greek-Orthodox Christians converted collectively to Protestantism provoking strong opposition from the Greek Orthodox Church, as well as the Russian consulate. Wildenbruch openly and vehemently sided with the Protestant missionaries, hoping to bring about close cooperation with British Consul-General Colonel Rose. It was, however, the British, who this time advocated a more compromising attitude. The affair ended with a clear Russian victory making the Prussians understand that diplomatic cooperation with the British in religious affairs was somewhat hazardous.[34]

Schultz's relations with the French consul in Jerusalem were bad, if not hostile. King Fredrick Wilhelm III as well as King Fredrick Wilhelm IV never accepted King Louis Philippe as an equal and thus precipitated strained relations with France. Moreover, German nationalist feelings were anti-French. The crisis of summer 1841, when the French had threatened to declare war upon Prussia had not been forgotten. The French-Prussian tension of the summer of 1841 was a direct outcome of the Eastern crisis of 1839-1840 — the French government had sought to compensate the loss of prestige resulting from the diplomatic defeat they encountered, when Muḥammad 'Alī was forced to withdraw from Syria.[35] Consequently, the Prussians believed that keeping French influence as low as possible would only be in their own interest. Schultz and Wildenbruch reported their satisfaction about the low Ottoman

esteem for the French, writing: "Mehmet Kibrizli's judgement was completely right, as he decided to send instead of the two hundred soldiers demanded for the welcome of the new French consul, only twenty".[36]

Schultz also reported his efforts to curb French interests. He was especially annoyed about the hoisting of the French flag. This led to violent demonstrations against the French. It seems that Schultz's annoyance resulted not only from his dislike of the French, but also from his fear that the incident of the French flag could easily have provoked a Muslim attack on all foreign consulates.[37]

The main task of the Prussian Jerusalem vice-consulate was to promote Protestant religious and philanthropic activities. This was done most carefully. Schultz was trying to obtain permission to build a Protestant church in Jerusalem. Yet, he was ordered to leave the matter to his British colleague and to act only if the British consul should ask him to do so.[38] After permission to build the church was refused,[39] the Prussians tried to intervene by bribing the *paşa* and also by giving valuable presents to the Greek Orthodox patriarch, whom they thought was responsible for the Ottoman refusal.[40] Any straightforward diplomatic pressure or the like was left to the English diplomats, particularly to Stratford Canning.[41]

Other Prussian-supported Protestant missionary activities were concerned with the erection of a school and a hospital in Jerusalem, and with the care of Jews who enjoyed Prussian protection. In the last year of Schultz's life, 1851, 457 patients were treated in the Protestant hospital, while 5113 people got medicine and 2713 were treated in their homes.[42] In helping Jews, Schultz was following the British example and was quite prepared to overcome serious legal difficulties in offering protection to Jews, always acting with the knowledge of his superiors.[43] It should be noted that in Safed, for instance, the Prussian consular agent was a Jew.[44] Furthermore, Schultz was annoyed about some Protestant missionary activities which created animosity among the Jews.[45] His philo-Semitic activities created a precedent, which was by and large followed by his successors.[46]

The immediate effect of Prussia's diplomatic and missionary activities was clearly most beneficial to certain sectors of the population in Jerusalem and Palestine. However, seen from a historical perspective it also had negative results. The philanthropic missionary activities increased inersectarian competition and jealousy. Moreover, due to the Protestant activities the rather delicate balance of power between the Greek Orthodox and the Catholic and Uniate communities was upset. Prussian Protestant activities and the diplomatic support offered to religious undertakings not only from the vice-consulate in Jerusalem, but more important from King Fredrick Wilhelm IV and von Bunsen, challenged both Russian and French diplomats in Palestine. They were confronted with a seemingly omnipotent British influence at the Sublime Porte, being coordinated with missionary activities which threatened to diminish the support of the Russian-protected Greek Orthodox Church, and

the French-protected Maronites, Catholics and other Uniate groups. Consequently Russian and French diplomatic and missionary activities were accelerated in Palestine.[47] This again created the atmosphere and some necessary preconditions for the internecine sectarian warfare, which finally, in 1853, contributed to the outbreak of the Crimean War.

Dr. Schultz as Observer of Ottoman Rule in Palestine

Before we examine Schultz's observations on Ottoman rule in Jerusalem and Palestine it should be stressed once more that the Prussian consuls as a rule were well disposed towards the Ottomans.[48] However, they were strongly influenced by the local population, and therefore, often turned in times of conflict against the Ottoman authorities and towards the aspirations of the local populace, although their instructions were always to support the "legal Turkish authorities."[49] The Prussian consuls were dependent to reports received by them from all kinds of different sources. Therefore, it is not astonishing that Schultz's reports to Beirut or to Berlin are sometimes contradictory.[50]

The main struggle of the Ottoman authorities during the 1840s was to impose direct rule on Palestine. This was only possible by first undermining and then breaking the power of the local chieftains, by disarming the local population and by the introduction of conscription and direct taxes.[51] Most important for the success of any reform, and even prior to that simply for the introduction of direct Ottoman rule in Palestine, was the power and the personality of the *paşa* governing the district.[52] Schultz, while evaluating every *paşa* thoroughly did not pay much attention to the restrictions of power imposed on the *paşa* from Istanbul or from the capital of the *eyâlet*.[53] However, he condemned the Ottoman system of changing the *paşa* almost every year.[54] Although a main guideline of Prussian policy was to support Ottoman authority wherever they could, Schultz described the weak *paşas* in quite a favorable manner, while strong *paşas*, such as Meḥmed Ḳıbrıslı were harshly and vehemently criticised by him.[55] This attitude of Schultz was directly opposed to the attitude of his superior, Major von Wildenbruch, and stemmed from Schultz's disagreement to the rather harsh methods of "strong" governors.[56]

Little material is to be found in Schultz's reports on the *paşa's* primary instrument of government, the regular army. The picture Schultz gives about the army, is that it was well enough organized to defend foreigners who enjoyed diplomatic standing.[57] The troops were, however, not sufficiently disciplined to prevent them from causing hardship and mischief toward the local population. In April 1843, Schultz reported the "flag-incident." When the French consul hoisted the tricolor, the army very effectively controlled an imminent, violent Muslim demonstration.[58] Speaking about the abuses and disadvantages of the army organization, Schultz reported on May 27, 1846,

that the troops stationed in Hebron, had not received any salary for months. The commander of the garrison had complained about the lack of money, and the man in charge of the supply for the army, Antonius Ayyūb — a former French consular agent — still had to receive 1,000,000 piastres. In the meantime Ayyūb refused, or simply was not able to perform his duty. The consequence was that the soldiers tried to obtain food from wherever they could, looting local inhabitants.[59]

Schultz described the negative effects of the replacement of troops. He pointed out that the act of changing troops, under the given conditions, necessarily caused difficulties and irregularities. For instance, Meḥmed Ḳıbrıslı Paşa's garrison, which left Palestine in September 1846, committed many crimes on their way from Jerusalem to Jaffa. They forced Christian craftsmen to work for them and held them for eight days as prisoners in order to have them at their disposal for the transport of their luggage. On the day of their departure, Schultz reported, the soldiers murdered a Jew.[60]

Schultz did not take much notice of the irregular troops, mentioning only in one case, the employment of four to five hundred *başıbozuks* in Hebron.[61] These troops were undisciplined, underpaid, ill-fed and badly equipped. Schultz's colleague, Finn, reported in this context that a chief of police in Jerusalem was known to be the head of the local burglars.[62]

Schultz's report on the Ottoman efforts to establish direct control over Hebron and Nablus are of some interest. In Hebron, the Ottomans were exploiting the differences between the Ḳaysī and the Yamanī sections, who had also organized themselves beyond the limits of the town area. The Ḳaysī were represented by Aḥmad Ağa Jundār and Shaykh Ibn Samḥān. The Yamanīs were led by 'Abd al-Raḥmān, who enjoyed the support of the Abū-Ghūsh family.[63] According to Schultz, Meḥmed Ḳıbrıslı Paşa incited both factions one against the other, thereby precipitating a local civil war. Moreover, he induced them to compete in offering presents, whereby 'Abd al-Raḥmān offered the sum of 80,000 piastres, for being installed as governor of Hebron. Finally, in June 1846, Ḳıbrıslı Paşa moved his own troops to Hebron, thereby taking direct control of the city and putting an end to the civilian unrest he himself had caused.[64] In August the same year, the Ottoman victory in Hebron was used to establish authority over the southern Bedouin tribes which were represented by "Musleh al-Azazeh from Beit Djibrin, Sheykh Othman al-Lakham from Beit Atab, and Sheykh Muhammad Abd al-Nabi from Beit Ida."[65]

Because of his absence from Jerusalem Schultz did not report the further development of the struggle for the control of Hebron. It soon turned out that the Ottoman success was only of temporary value. After Meḥmed Ḳıbrıslı Paşa left Palestine in May 1847, his two successors, Ẓarīf Muṣṭafā and Edhem Paşa lost control of Hebron and the 'Abd al-Raḥmān family returned to their old methods of local rule.[66]

The struggle for the establishment of direct rule in Nablus was carried on by

the Ottoman governors in different ways. The first way was to try to appoint a governor from outside. Weber, Schultz's assistant, reported Muṣṭafā Paşa's attempt to appoint a man of his own from a Jerusalem family to the governorship of Nablus.[67] As he did not succeed, the next move was to acknowledge the rule of one of the rival families in Nablus, thereby to gain their support. Schultz reported from Beirut that Maḥmūd 'Abd al-Hādī was appointed governor of Jenin in place of a member of the Ṭūḳān family.[68] Schultz implied that it was the policy of the Porte to follow a change of *paşa* by a change of Ottoman support from the Ḳaysī to the Yamanī section, or vice versa. Schultz underlines this theory with the example, that Meḥmed Ḳıbrıslı supported the Ḳaysī section, while his successor Muṣṭafā gave support to the Yamanīs.[69]

The Struggle for Rule in the Towns — The Meclis

One of the main innovations introduced by the Ottoman reforms was the establishment of the *meclis*, mainly set up to assure the cooperation of the local population with the Ottoman governor. In reality the *meclis* itself became the focus of the struggle for power in the cities.[70]

On September 24, 1851, two weeks before he died, Schultz wrote quite an extensive report on the newly set up *meclis* in Jerusalem. He first described the tasks of the *meclis*: "All affairs of the urban and provincial administration are brought for consultation to the *Mejlis*; sometimes the *Mejlis* is used as a court."[71]

Schultz mentioned the *maẓbaṭa* and the fact that all members of the *meclis* had to sign it. Then Schultz explained the composition of the *meclis*. The Jerusalem *meclis* had at the time of its foundation in 1851, eight full members, four Muslims, three Christians and one Jew. The Muslims were: Muḥammad Darwīsh Efendi, a certain Shaykh 'Uthmān, As'ad Efendi and Sayyid Infuf[?] al-Nusayba. The Christians were: Y'aḳūb al-Arḍī (Latin Church), Shammās Juluf (Greek), and Jiryes al-Khayyāṭ (Armenian). The Jewish member was Ḥayim el-Serish. Ex officio members were the *mufti* Muṣṭafā Efendi, the *naḳīb al-ashrāf* Muḥammad Efendi al-Khālidī, his brother in an unspecified capacity and the *ḳāḍī*.[72] If special questions were dealt with other people were invited, for instance for military problems the *ḳā'imaḳām* and/or the *binbaşı*.

The full members from the Muslim community were chosen by lot from the five hundred most-distinguished Jerusalemites. The full members of the other communities were appointed by their communities. The *meclis* normally met twice a week under the chairmanship of the *paşa*, and also additionally, for small sessions once a week. On special occasions the *meclis* could be summoned immediately.

Schultz criticized this new institution. He argued that while the *meclis* was set up mainly to check the power of the governor, it had the opposite effect. Before the *meclis* existed, the local gentry was able to oppose the *paşa's* political

conduct, while now the *paşa* got the signature of all the *meclis* members on his *mażbaṭa*. No one among the local gentry was prepared to oppose anything written, argued Schultz, and therefore opposition to the governor became far more difficult. It should be noted that the *paşa* residing at Jerusalem at the time for already two years, was described as having a weak personality.[73]

Further, Schultz reported that the members of the *meclis* had the right, or even the duty, to express their opinion on every issue. However, he claims that the people of Jerusalem "lacked moral courage, integrity, and unselfishness, love of justice and other virtues of citizens."[74] The Christian and Jewish members were brought up to fear the Muslims, while the lower Muslims also feared the more-distinguished ones and said yes to everything. To illustrate the servility of the non-Muslim members of the *meclis*, Schultz described the behavior of Ḥayim el-Serish, the Jewish delegate, who did nothing else but kiss the hands of distinguished Muslims on every possible occasion.

Schultz also complained about the corruption of the members of the *meclis*, writing: "With the exception of one member (perhaps) all members of the *Mejlis* can be influenced by money; they have repeatedly committed unlawful acts." Schultz gives examples: The Armenian Patriarchate had built a house contrary to building regulations. After the payment of 25,000 piastres to different members of the *meclis*, and a payment of 4,000 piastres each to the *muftī* and the *naḳīb al-ashrāf*, the permission to construct the building was given.[74]

Schultz, however, does not imply that corruption started or was enhanced with the opening of the *meclis*. He had reported on such tendencies long before. In his report of May 13, 1846, for instance, he mentioned that 20,000 piastres were paid by Antonius Ayyūb to the local *ḳāḍī*, in order to secure the reopening of a liqueur store.[75] In regard to the *meclis*, Schultz reported that most distinguished Muslim families abused the institution to get personal pensions. Others misappropriated, with the help of their position in the *meclis*, the large incomes from the different *awḳāf*.[76]

The Struggle with the Bedouin

The struggle of government against the Bedouin is one of the oldest themes in Middle Eastern life. The Ottoman government almost from the beginning of its rule in the Syrian provinces was on the whole unable to curb the vigorous sons of the desert and to prevent the destruction they inflicted. In the 1840s the Bedouin challenged the rule of the Ottoman authorities, mainly in the coastal districts of Palestine. Bedouins raided villages and levied taxes upon them, surrounded and sometimes besieged towns, as for instance Bethlehem, Jericho and Gaza, and they menaced the roads, pillaged travelers and caravans and often also levied upon the travelers and caravans a "road protection fee."[77] Moreover, they often challenged the Ottoman rule by making coalitions with the local gentry.[78]

In summer 1846 Schultz undertook a trip through southern Palestine, and in his report of August 12, 1846 he dealt quite extensively with the Bedouin question. About the Bedouin threat to the rural population in the coastal areas Schultz wrote the following: "Under the leadership of al-Wuhaidi, the Arab Belad al-Gazzeh and the Tayyahat[79] moved northwards causing immense damage. The inhabitants of the plains simply left the country, as the situation got unbearable."[80] Schultz also mentioned that the inhabitants of Gaza suffered the most from the Bedouin activities.[81]

In his book *Jerusalem*, Schultz wrote some interesting remarks about the Bedouin menace upon the roads: "The Bedouin often rob the travellers, but they look upon it more as a sport than an income. However, many Bedouin often help the traveller and guide him safely for a certain amount of money."[82]

Schultz also reported some negative effects of the Bedouins' economic influence. In the winter 1843-1844, almost no rain fell and locusts destroyed most of the harvest. The Bedouin tribes Banū Ṣakhr and 'Anaza bought grain at prices the local rural population could not afford, thus causing the prices to rise even further, whereupon the famine became even more severe.[83]

Taxation, Justice and the Equality of Non-Muslims

A main task of the Ottoman Empire in any of its provinces was to collect taxes and to preserve law and order. Schultz's description of the local authorities' promotion of these tasks is sometimes lively and interesting. In his very first report, announcing his arrival to Jerusalem, Schultz dealt with tax problems, reporting: "The Turkish authorities demanded besides the taxes for this year all outstanding debts. This causes them to act with armed troops, using two hundred men. The population's feelings are bitter."[84] Similar reports are to be found at later dates. In July 1844, for instance he wrote: "The fact that Mehmet's tax collection was so successful is only to be explained, as all the savings of the last years fell sacrifice to Mehmet's expeditions... the poverty of the population increases steadily."[85]

There are also some interesting remarks about the juridical power and activities of the authorities. In July 1844, Schultz reported the capture of robbers, but indicated that "means of near-torture" were applied.[86] Weber, his assistant, wrote a report in June 1847, describing the means applied by Muṣṭafā Paşa to obtain a confession for the murder of a Greek nun: "After ninety-nine beatings on the soles of the foot, and nine beatings with a heavy whip on the head, the accused confessed the murder."[87]

As far as security within the towns was concerned, Schultz seems to have been used to the bad state of affairs. In the files of the consulate an Arabic decree is to be found, regulating the closure of the town gates of Jerusalem, Nablus and Gaza.[88] Almost gratefully Weber confirmed the effectiveness of this measure: "For me it seems evident, that since the application of this instruction, the security of the town has increased."[89]

Very occasionally Schultz reported about welfare measures in favor of the population adopted by the Ottoman authorities. Once he mentions Ṭayyār Paşa, who ordered the removal of rubbish.[90] Another time he mentions 'Alī Paşa, who used the income of a waḳf in order to restore an old aqueduct.[91] Schultz also mentioned the hospital "al-Takiyya" which was a "monument of Muhammedan building art and Muhammedan welfare."[92]

On the position of non-Muslims, Schultz explained that "Muslims, Christians and Jews are unequal in law."[93] He reported quite frequently about injustices inflicted upon Christians and/or Jews by the local authorities. For instance, there is a detailed report on ways and means applied by Meḥmed Paşa to extort money from the Greek patriarch.[94] Special attention is given in the files of the consulate to the problem of the acquisition of real estate by non-Muslims, for the simple reason that the Prussians wanted to buy a house for their consulate.[95]

Conclusion

The great importance of consular reports for the study of the history of the Middle East during the 19th century is today already beyond discussion. It was mainly the consular reports by British consuls and consular agents which contributed to a much sounder knowledge and a better understanding of the Ottoman history of that time. In studying these reports, it is not only the factual matters which are important. The attitudes of the consular agents towards the Ottoman government, the local authorities and the population and the activities of each of them, are also of interest.

The consular files of the Prussian vice-consulate in Jerusalem at the time of the first Prussian vice-consul Dr. Schultz include a lot of interesting material. However, the reports on many subjects are only sporadic and lack a systematic follow-up.

Studying the files one finds much evidence for the Prussian tendency in Jerusalem to promote the alliance with the British, to recognize and honor the sovereignty and legitimacy of the Ottoman authorities and to foster Protestant missionary activities. Similarly the Prussian-French, and Prussian-Russian rivalry becomes evident. Prussia's nonintervention policy with regard to any affairs of the Ottoman Empire inevitably severely limited Prussian activities in favor of the Protestant missionaries or for Jews under Prussian protection.

From Schultz's reports on local conditions in Palestine a rather sad picture emerges. Reading Schultz's descriptions of abuses by the army, the internecine warfare among local power groups, Bedouin raids, the extortion of taxes, the lack of justice, the use of torture, corruption, security problems and welfare measures as much as of the position of non-Muslims, the impression cannot be avoided that Schultz did not believe change to be possible. Another impression received from Schultz's reports is that he sympathized strongly with the local population of Palestine, because he felt their misery. He clearly thought that

the main aim of European policies was to promote peace and order in the region and he understood that his goal could best be achieved by as little direct intervention as possible.

Seen in the light of these attitudes Schultz's observations are a valuable source for the study of Palestinian history in the 1840s.

Notes

1 Mordechai Eliav, "Das deutsche Konsulat in Jerusalem und die juedische Bevoelkerung in Erez Israel waehrend des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Bulletin des Leo Baeck Institutes*, 43-44, p. 161.

2 E.G. Schultz, *Jerusalem* (Berlin, 1845). On Schultz's scientific activities after his nomination as vice-consul see E.G. Schultz "Aus einem Briefe von Dr. Schultz Koeniglich Preussischen Konsul in Jerusalem, Beirut, den 5 Juli 1844," *ZDMG* (1847), pp. 352-353, and E.G. Schultz "Mittheilung uber eine Reise durch Samaria und Galilaea," *ibid.* (1849), pp. 46-52.

3 Schultz to Wildenbruch, Jerusalem, Nov. 24 1843, A III 1. All documents used are taken from the Collection of Odd Files from the German Consulate in Jerusalem and Jaffa, Israel State Archives, R(ecord) G(roup) 67. Only the file numbers will be indicated hereafter.

4 Schultz to Wildenbruch, Jerusalem, Jan. 8, 1844, A III 1.

5 Schultz to Wildenbruch, Jerusalem, Feb. 4, 1844, A III 1.

6 Schultz, *Jerusalem*, p. 13. It says there: "...das Leben in Jerusalem [ist] ein sehr muehsames und beschwerliches."

7 E.W. Schultz, in *Reise in das Gelobte Land* (Muehlheim an der Ruhr, 1853), p. 103, writes: "[Schultz] ein melancholisch gestimmter Mann auf dessen Gesichtszuegen ein tiefes inneres Leiden zu sehen war." Similar is Strauss' description: "Nach mancherlei schweren Erfahrungen und langjaehrigen koerperlichen Leiden ist Schultz im Oktober 1851 gestorben." See also Friedrich Adolf Strauss, *Sinai und Golgatha — Reise in das Morgenland* (Berlin, 1847), pp. 244-245, and Liebetrut's description: "Der maechtige Eindruck einer persoenlichen Erfahrung zog in den letzten Jahren einen Schleier ueber sein Gemeutsleben... und entfremdete ihn... der Sturz mit dem Pferd schien den Schleier zerrissen zu haben ... jedoch hatte er keine Lebenskraft mehr." Friedrich Liebetrut, *Reise nach dem Morgenlande* (Hamburg, 1858), pp. 64-65.

8 Tobler's diction was: "Schultz starb im Jahre 1851 zu Jerusalem in Folge erlittener gemuetlicher Drangsale." Titus Tobler, *Denkblaetter aus Jerusalem* (Constanz, 1856), p. 392.

9 Eliav, p. 161.

10 Compare with *Treitschkes History of Germany in the 19th Century* (New York, 1968), vol. 6, pp. 438-459.

11 For a very sophisticated analysis of the big power game at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and the repercussions of Prussian-Russian rivalry see Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Gloucester, Mass., 1973). On Prussian policies and diplomacy in the 1840s see Franz Schnabel, *Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert* (Freiburg 1951), vol. 4.

12 *Treitschkes History*, vol. 6, pp. 383-386.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 438-459. See also A.L. Tibawi, *British Interests in Palestine, 1800-1901* (London, 1961), pp. 46-51.

14 For the connection between Russian diplomatic interests in Palestine and the activities of the Greek Orthodox Church see Theofanis G. Stavrou, "Russian Interests in the Levant," *Middle East Journal*, 17 (1963), pp. 91-103 and Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 33-45. For the British point of view on the matter see Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East* (reprint, London, 1964), pp. 282-284.

15 Bunsen advocated throughout his diplomatic career a close alliance between Prussia and Great Britain. Consequently he favored Prussian involvement in the Crimean War on the British side. He went so far as to develop on his own behalf, together with Lord Palmerston a plan for a reorganization of Europe, which would have been to the utter disadvantage of Russia. As this policy did not dovetail or even coordinate with the official Prussian line, King Fredrick Wilhelm IV, who still looked at Bunsen as his close personal friend, sacked Bunsen in spring 1854, not permitting him to return to diplomatic service ever after. Bismarck describes the affair in his memoirs and does not refrain from heavily criticising Bunsen. Otto Fuerst von Bismarck, *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* (Stuttgart, 1920), vol. 1, pp. 125ff. and 128. A more academic description is given in Paul W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert* (Ithaca, 1972), pp. 430-431.

16 See, for instance, Wildenbruch to Schultz, Beirut, August 5, 1843, A III 1, or for a similar remark, Wildenbruch to Schultz, Oct. 21, 1843, A III 1. There are many more examples hereof in the consular files.

17 Schultz Report (without date) but at the time of Consul Young's leave in Sep. 1845. A III 1. Compare with the documents in A.M. Hyamson, *The British Consulate in Jerusalem* (London, 1939), vol. 1, p. 81.

18 Tibawi, p. 123.

19 Eliav, p. 162.

20 James Finn, *Stirring Times* (London, 1878), vol. 2, p. 91.

21 *Ibid.*, and H. Petermann, *Reise im Orient* (Leipzig, 1860), p. 213.

22 Georg Rosen, *Die Geschichte der Tuerkei* (Leipzig, 1866-1867), vol. 2, p. 133.

23 F. Eichmann, *Die Reformen des Osmanischen Reiches* (Berlin, 1858), p. 141.

24 Buelow to Schultz, Berlin, May 25, 1845, A XXX 1.

25 Wildenbruch to Schultz, Beirut, Aug. 5 1843, A III 1.

26 Rosenthal was working at that time for the British consulate as dragoman. Later Finn appointed him to act as consul during a temporary absence of Finn. See Tibawi, p. 134.

27 Schultz to Wildenbruch, Jerusalem, summer 1843 (no exact date is given on the document), A III 1.

28 *Ibid.*

29 Wildenbruch to Schultz, Beirut, August 5, 1843, A III 1.

30 Finn, vol. 1, pp. 85-86.

31 Cf. Schroeder, pp. 1-22.

32 Hopwood, pp. 15 and 44; Schultz to Wildenbruch, May 1843, A III 1. See also Hyamson, vol. 1, p. 63.

33 See e.g., Schultz to Wildenbruch, May 1843, A III 1.

34 Caesar E. Farah, "Protestantism and Politics: the 19th century Dimension in Syria," in this volume.

35 The German-French crisis is described in much detail in *Treitschkes History*, vol. 6, pp. 356-385.

36 Wildenbruch to Schultz, Beirut, March 15, 1846, A III 2.

37 Schultz to Wildenbruch, no date, A III 1. The report is obviously written immediately after the flag incident in April 1843.

38 Auswaertiges Amt (AA) to Schultz, Berlin, March 15, 1846, A III 2, Aktennummer 632.

39 Schultz Report, no date, A XXX 1. Cf. R. Schmidt, who wrote: "Nachdem im Januar 1842 von Bischof der Grundstein gelegt worden war, inhibierte im Januar 1843 der damalige Pascha, nicht ohne Einfluss der roemischen und griechischen Geistlichkeit von Jerusalem, ploetzlich den Weiterbau." R. Schmidt, *Geschichte der Stadt Jerusalem* (Hayerswerden, 1862), p. 296.

40 Schultz to AA, no date, A III 1: "The necessary presents to the local authorities were

made." In a later report Schultz wrote "I have presented the silver chandeliers from Prince Albrecht to the Greek Patriarch," Schultz to AA, Jerusalem, May 27, 1846, A III 2.

41 A copy of a report of the German embassy in Istanbul to von Buelow in Berlin reads: "Stratford Canning is acting for the church and the German consular-building in Jerusalem." Constantinople to Buelow, July 6, 1845.

42 See the file A XXVIII, *Diakonissen Hospital*. Cf. *Das deutsche Kaiserpaar im Heiligen Land* (Berlin 1899), p. 33, and Van der Velde, *Reise durch Syrien und Palaestina* (Leipzig 1855-56), p. 210.

43 For many examples of how and when Schultz overcame legal difficulties for protecting Jews see the two files A XVII, *Pass-Schultz und Matrikelangelegenheiten*, and A XXXIII, *Juedische Angelegenheiten*. As an example, the story of Leon Baruch may be given. Being married to two wives, which was contrary to Prussian law, he was according to the letter of the law, not liable for Prussian protection.

44 H.B. Tristram, *The Land of Israel* (London, 1866), p. 581.

45 Schultz to AA, Jerusalem, Nov. 25, 1843, A III 1. Here Schultz stated that the animosity (*die Erbitterung*) of the Jews against the Protestant mission increased steadily. Liebetrut hinted at the differences between Schultz and the Protestant mission in a more subtle way, writing: "Besonders hatte er Schultz sich der evangelischen Stiftung... angenommen, obwohl es ihm anscheinend nicht gegeben war, mit dem was den inneren Lebensgrund desselben bietet, sich persoenlich recht zu einigen." Liebetrut, vol. 2, p. 68.

46 Eliav, pp. 157-161.

47 Temperly, pp. 282ff. Hopwood, pp. 33-45; F. Eichmann, *Die Reformen des Osmanischen Reiches* (Berlin, 1858), pp. 78-114.

48 See above, p. 266.

49 Wildenbruch to Schultz, Beirut, June 17, 1846, A III 2.

50 For many examples of contradictory reports see the whole files A III 1, and A III 2.

51 M. Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 75-78.

52 Ma'oz wrote in this context: "The measure of authority the *vali* could exercise in his *paşalik* depended, both before 1852, and after, mainly on his personality and the degree of support he possessed in Istanbul. A resolute and energetic Pasha with a strong backing in the *Porte* was in a position to counterbalance his opponents, to make them co-operate with him, or even to overshadow them." *Ibid.*, p. 37.

53 Perhaps Schultz did not mention the difficult question of the relationship of the *paşa* to his superiors, mainly because this was better known to his superiors in Beirut and Istanbul.

54 Schultz report, without date, written at the end of 1844, A III 1. Cf. Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 34-35; Finn, vol. 2, pp. 162-163; and R. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 168-169.

55 See Schultz Report, Jerusalem Sept. 14, 1851, A III 1: "The present governor has many positive features. He is mild, he accepts criticism and opposition if it is done in a polite form. He is no fanatic and he is well disposed towards the Europeans. It is only regrettable, that his mildness often turns into weakness..." In contrast see Schultz's remarks about Mehmed Kıbrıslı Paşa: "The selfish and biased motivations, which guided him during the execution of his policy, annulled every positive effect." Schultz Report, Jerusalem, Oct. 7, 1846, A III 2.

56 See Wildenbruch to Schultz, Beirut, August 18, 1846, A III 2: "I understand that Mehmet K. Pacha used the right means with cleverness and energy. Those means might be able to prepare or create a less lawless situation in the country."

57 See e.g., Schultz Report, Jerusalem, Oct. 7, 1846, A III 2.

58 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, April 1843, A III 1.

59 Schultz Report, Jerusalem May 27 1846, A III 2. On similar reports from other consuls see Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, p. 46, particularly footnotes 4 and 5 there.

60 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, Oct. 7, 1846, A III 2.

61 *Ibid.* The irregulars are also mentioned in Schultz Report, Jerusalem, Sept. 20, 1851, A III 2.

62 Finn, vol. 1, p. 356. See also several of Finn's reports quoted in Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*,

pp. 56-57.

63 Schultz describes the situation in three reports: Jerusalem, March 25, 1846; a report dated simply April 1846; and a third report, May 13, 1846, all in A III 2.

64 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, June 24 1846, A III 2.

65 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, Aug. 12, 1846, A III 2.

66 The struggle over Hebron is also described in Finn, vol. 1, pp. 233 and 237 and Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 118-123. Schultz stopped to report on the matter, but it should be understood that most of the time between 1847 and 1850 Schultz was absent from Jerusalem, replacing for a while Major von Wildenbruch in Beirut, and paying a visit to Berlin.

67 Weber-Report, Schultz in Beirut, Jerusalem, July 1, 1847, A III 2.

68 Schultz to AA (Berlin), Beirut, July 31, 1847, no. 13, A III 2.

69 *Ibid.* Cf. Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 113-123.

70 *Ibid.*, pp. 87-89. See also M. Ma'oz "Syrian Urban Politics in the Tanzimat Period between 1840 and 1861," *BSOAS*, 29, pp. 277-301.

71 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, Sept. 24, 1851, A III 2.

72 Compare Schultz's statement with Ma'oz's article on "Syrian Urban Politics...," p. 285, n. 48. Ma'oz states that there were seven full Muslim members and four to five non-Muslim members in the *meclis*. It therefore appears that the number of Muslims was enlarged somewhere during the 1850s, while the number of non-Muslim deputies to the *meclis* remained the same.

73 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, Sept. 24, 1851, A III 2. This view of Dr. Schultz strongly contradicts the views and analysis of other European observers. For instance, David Urquhart argued: "It will be seen that all power is taken out of the hands of the Pasha. It seems ... that now, the danger lies in the *mejlis*. The system runs two risks: the one of breaking up, by rivalry between the two functionaries, the Pasha and the President, the other, of breaking down under the amount of labour." David Urquhart, *The Lebanon* (London, 1860), vol. 2, pp. 104-105. See also Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 95-97. It should be noted however, that Urquhart and Ma'oz are not speaking as Schultz did on the same *meclis*. They refer to the *meclis* in Beirut, where the *vālī* had not the right to take the chair. Schultz's description solely deals with the matter of affairs in the Jerusalem *meclis*, where the *paşa* was taking the chair.

74 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, Sept. 24, 1851, A III 2.

75 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, May 13, 1840, A III 2.

76 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, Sept. 24, 1851, A III 2.

77 Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 131-134.

78 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, March 25, 1846, A III 2.

79 It is worthwhile to check Schultz's findings with Oppenheim's standard work on the Bedouin. Oppenheim describes a Southern Palestine tribe called "Tiyāha," which might be Schultz's "Tayyahat." The "Arab Belad al-Gazzeh" are not to be found in Oppenheim; therefore this might be a coalition of some Southern Palestinian tribes, which Schultz did not bother to mention in detail. M. Freiherr von Oppenheim, *Die Beduinen* (reprint, Leipzig 1943), vol. 2, pp. 110-122.

80 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, Aug. 12, 1846, no. 15, A III 2. Compare also with *Rambles in the Desert of Syria* (London, 1864), p. 183. Schultz repeats that the areas, which suffered most from nomadic investation were the coastal areas.

81 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, Aug. 12, 1846, no. 15, A III 2.

82 Schultz, *Jerusalem*, pp. 10-11.

83 Schultz, p. 75.

84 Schultz Report, Jerusalem, January 1843, A III 1.

85 Report, Jaffa, 22. July 22, 1844, A III 1.

86 *Ibid.*

87 Weber to Schultz, Jerusalem, June 8, 1847, A III 2.

88 Report, Jerusalem, June 14, 1848, A XXII 10, *Tuerkische Municipalitaetsverordungen, 1848-1874.*

89 Weber to Schultz, Jerusalem, June 19, 1847, A III 2.

90 Schultz, *Jerusalem*, p. 32.

91 Weber to Schultz, Jerusalem, June 19, 1847, A III 2.
92 Schultz, *Jerusalem*, p. 32.
93 "Pas même devant la loi Chrétien, Juif et Musulman n'etaient égaux, comme le Hatti cherif l'avait promit et promulgué." Schultz Report, Jerusalem, March 15, 1844, A III 1. Note that some of Schultz's reports were written in French. Compare also with Schultz, *Jerusalem*, p. 35.
94 Schultz Report, no date, A III 1.
95 Wildenbruch to Schultz, Beirut, Nov. 24, 1845, A III 1. See also *Consulatsgebaeude Jerusalem, 1840-1859*, A XXVI.

The System of Capitulations and its Effects on Turco-Jewish Relations in Palestine, 1856-1897*

ISAIAH FRIEDMAN

The accepted view in historiography is that Ottoman opposition to the Jewish settlement in Palestine began in the early eighties of the nineeenth century following the first *'aliya* of the Ḥibat Tziyon movement.[1] My researches have led me to the conclusion that the Ottoman Empire's attitude was formulated much earlier, more precisely, in the mid-fifties of the century, i.e., several decades before Ḥibat Tziyon and the Zionist movement came into existence. The object of the Ottoman Empire's aversion was the old *yishuv*[2] which, unlike the Zionists, nourished no political ambitions.

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a new group appeared on the Palestinian scene: the Ashkenazim.[3] Unlike the veteran Sephardi community, the Ashkenazim were reluctant to become Ottoman subjects and preferred to acquire foreign protection.[4] They acknowledged that the Ottoman government in Palestine was "one of the most tolerant in the world in matters of religion,"[5] but felt too insecure to submit to Ottoman jurisdiction. The laws, although just and humane, became in the hands of local officials "a dead letter." The *paṣas* were known to be incompetent and corrupt and in the prevailing conditions a foreigner could desire nothing better than protection from his consul. The treaty rights accorded to foreign powers an extraordinary status. They could use force whenever their subjects or protégés were maltreated, but in most cases a warning from a consul had a sobering effect on the local authorities. Consular protection proved an invaluable instrument for securing Christian lives. It was also a source of succor for Jewish protégés.[6]

The Ashkenazim were not the only minority to solicit the protection of foreign powers. The Samaritans and the Copts, though Ottoman subjects, were also eager for a similar privilege.[7] Even Muslim Arabs were reported to be "prepossessed by one idea... the hope of deliverance from the rapacious rule of the Turkish pashas."[8] But the Ashkenazim had additional reasons for sheltering under foreign protection: it noticeably enhanced their status *vis-à-vis* the Sephardim.[9] Since the sixteenth century the latter had been dominant in the Jewish community in Palestine. The Sephardi Chief Rabbi enjoyed considerable executive powers and his verdicts were sanctioned, and often even implemented by the Ottoman government. A special guard enhanced his prestige, whilst his title, "the First in Zion," was one of peculiar dignity. But

the Ashkenazim, with their numbers steadily increasing, challenged the Sephardic supremacy.[10] They resented the commands of the Sephardim to pay a territorial tax for the privilege of living in the Holy Cities, and, with their different religious customs, they were reluctant to place themselves under the Sephardic rabbinical jurisdiction.[11] This, by implication, was tantamount to rejection of Ottoman jurisdiction. The Ashkenazim were disinclined to assimilate to the Oriental way of life and, as British Consul in Jerusalem James Finn rightly observed, the majority of them were and probably would always be Europeans.[12] In the Ottoman state they remained an alien element. This had profound implications; the Ottoman government considered only the Sephardim as "Jews *par excellence*."[13] The Ashkenazi community was never officially recognized. But it was not until the end of the 1850s that the Porte realized that foreign protection of Ashkenazim was harmful to Ottoman interests.

The eagerness of the Ashkenazim to shelter under foreign protection suited admirably the interests of the foreign powers. The consuls vied with each other to protect as many Jews as possible. Even the Spanish consulate, notwithstanding the exclusion of Jews from Spain itself, was said to be glad to have a few under its protection.[14] In the early fifties of the nineteenth century, out of 5,000 Ashkenazim, 3,000 enjoyed Austrian protection, 1,000 were registered with the British consulate, and the remainder with the Prussian, American, Dutch and Russian consulates.[15] Following the Russian government's decision to exclude their Jewish subjects from Russian jurisdiction in Palestine, the great majority of these turned to the British consulate. This arrangement lasted until 1890, when its utility was exhausted, and the Russian government decided to reverse its decision, reclaiming the right of protection.[16]

The Sublime Porte tolerated this long-standing system with remarkable equanimity. It was known as the Capitulations (from the chapters, *capitula*, into which the treaties were divided) and was based on the idea of extra-territoriality. In contrast to the modern concept which relates sovereignty to territory, earlier ideas linked it to persons. A monarch or a state exercised jurisdiction over his or its own nationals and not over aliens, who were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective countries of origin from which, in case of need, they sought protection. This was particularly relevant where law was inextricably interwoven with religion, and where there existed no juridical equality between believers and nonbelievers. In Muslim countries jurisdiction could hardly be applied to non-Muslims and even less to aliens, who were practically outlaws. During the sixteenth century, to resolve the difficulty, France, followed by other powers, concluded a series of treaties with the Ottoman sultans which gave them the right to safeguard the interests of their respective subjects who were visiting or living in the Ottoman Empire.

Initially, the system proved a blessing to all concerned. It spared the Ottoman government the complicated task of administering the affairs of

foreign visitors; on the other hand, it increased their security and stimulated trade. But with the Ottoman Empire's decline, particularly during the nineteenth century, the system degenerated and was blatantly abused. The privilege of extraterritoriality was extended to a sizeable non-Muslim population who misused it, flouted local regulations, and did not hesitate to take advantage of their legal security. Foreign banks, post offices, and commercial houses mushroomed on Ottoman soil and took full advantage of the state's feebleness, while the consuls grew more insolent as they grew more powerful. Protégés of foreign powers claiming partial immunity from the laws and exemption from local taxation, became a scourge to the Empire. But it was not until the late fifties of the nineteenth century that the Ottoman government, becoming more conscious of its own sovereign rights, began to regard the Capitulations as a humiliating encroachment. The turning point came in 1856, when the Ottoman Empire first raised the possibility of the abrogation of Capitulatory rights, regarding them as both harmful and obsolescent; it had been suitable in earlier times under different conditions, when law was personal and not related to territorial sovereignty.[17]

On January 26, 1856, when the Ottoman government published the Edict of Reforms, the *Ḫaṭṭ-ı Humāyūn*, it was confident that the edict would eliminate the need for the European powers to protect their subjects and protégés and facilitate the Ottoman Empire's admission to the community of European nations on an equal footing.[18] But reality did not match their hopes. Article 32 of the Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856 provided that all treaties and conventions which had existed heretofore "were to continue to operate" and that "no change was to be effected without the consent of the powers concerned." The London Conference on January 7, 1871 reaffirmed and extended this principle and the 1878 Treaty of Berlin affixed the final seal.[19] The Capitulations thus assumed a binding character and acquired a valid international status. The nonintervention guarantee was a dead letter. The Ottoman Empire remained, in fact, beyond the pale of international law.

Whatever the rights or wrongs of this policy, it had a profound effect on the Ottoman Empire. It influenced its attitude towards the European powers and foreigners in general. For decades Ottoman diplomacy strove, albeit unsuccessfully, to nullify, or at least to restrict, their excessive prerogatives. The process started in 1856. After the Crimean War, as Consul Finn recorded, the *paşas* found out that revenge could after all be wreaked on the consuls and the old tactics of playing off one consul against the other reasserted itself.[20] Yet, however experienced the Ottomans were in this particular art, they were powerless to affect any change in the legal position; the most that they could expect was to reduce drastically the number of protégés. These people became a permanent target of suspicion as the conscious or unconscious tools of their patrons against Ottoman sovereignty.

The first move was made on July 17, 1869, when a nationality law was introduced. Coinciding with the general upsurge of xenophobia, it decreed that

every resident in Ottoman dominions was an Ottoman subject until he proved the contrary.[21] The Ottoman government, not without reason, suspected the expanding activities of the Christian powers in the Holy Land. The colonies of German Templars, the large caravans of French, Austrian, and Russian pilgrims, the influx of Russian Jews into Jerusalem and Safed were thought to be politically motivated.[22] As a countermeasure, the Ottoman government encouraged the annual Nabī Mūsā procession to overlap with the Easter season.[23] Muslims, fugitives from Algeria, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, were given every facility to settle in Palestine and the adjacent territories; non-Muslims were discouraged, and so strict did the prohibitions against their acquiring land and immovable property become that the consuls wondered whether the sultan's promises, embodied in the 1856 edict, to allow Europeans to purchase land would be fulfilled at all.[24] A typical instance occurred in 1886, when forty American families arrived in Jaffa to establish a colony in that neighborhood. So serious were the objections raised by the Porte that a *démarche* by the American minister in Istanbul proved of little avail.

> The policy of the Turkish Government does not favour the acquisition of real estate by foreigners... If the Porte were to give its consent to the establishment of the colony in question, it would sanction a violation of the standard policy and legislation of the empire and would establish a precedent for the creation of similar settlements by subjects of other countries also.[25]

The Ottoman government's resentment of the Capitulations system affected its attitude towards Jewish settlement. In 1855, when Sir Moses and Lady Montefiore arrived on their fourth visit to Palestine, they were received by the local authorities "amiably and respectfully." Furnished with a firman from the sultan to rebuild an ancient synagogue in Jerusalem, Sir Moses also purchased a tract of land to the west of the Old City, outside its walls; the first Englishman to whom such permission was granted. In 1859, however, the building of the projected almshouses (the Mishkenot Sha'ananim) was suspended, for the Ottomans were no longer willing to classify the project as "business or trade," or even to consider it as philanthropic: it had become a matter of principle. It took a year of considerable efforts to make Foreign Minister Fu'ād Paşa, grant Sir Moses "exceptional permission" to proceed with his project.[26] But this was an exception. In general, the authorities were as obdurate as ever. Even those individual Jews who were born in the country and inherited their properties were told that unless they renounced consular protection their title deeds would be invalidated.[27]

The twin objects of Ottoman policy were to impress upon foreign Jews the necessity of adopting Ottoman nationality and to deny the powers the right of protection. On May 12, 1874 Foreign Minister Reşīd Paşa requested the British embassy in Istanbul to renounce its protection of a certain number of Jews in Syria and Palestine. "Times have changed," he insisted, "protection has

become an obsolescent institution and constituted a fruitful source of trouble and dispute."[28] Soon after, the governor-general in Damascus made it clear that he would treat all persons of "doubtful nationality" as Ottoman subjects. But with the consuls remaining uncooperative the Ottoman authorities had to resort to the unprecedented step of advising the Jewish protégés of foreign powers directly that their certificates of registration with the foreign consulates, ominously referred to as *permis de séjour*, must be countersigned by the local authorities. Failing this, their certificates would become invalid. Despite the ambassadors' protests against the innovation of the term *permis de séjour* as a limitation on the freedom of movement of their respective nationals and protégés, the Porte remained adamant.[29] In its view the promulgation of the Ottoman Law of Nationality in 1869 *ipso facto* terminated the right of Russian Jews to foreign protection after their original nationality had been renounced. That an entire population was subject to alien jurisdiction on the territory of the Empire without the sanction of the Porte and for the "sole object of joining communities which limited the sovereign rights of the Ottoman authorities, was utterly inadmissible."[30]

It is necessary to sketch this background in order to explain why the "back to Palestine" movement of the Ḥibat Tziyon societies, and subsequently of the Zionist Organization, had from the first encountered determined opposition from the Ottoman government. With the French intervention in the Lebanon in 1860 and the Bulgarian situation still fresh in Ottoman memory, the sultan, as an informed agent of Baron de Hirsch testified, was reluctant to burden himself with a Jewish problem.[31] Thirty years later, this view was confirmed by Rabbi Naḥum Efendi, the Chief Rabbi of the Ottoman Empire and an intimate friend of Grand Vezir Ṭal'at Paşa, who thought that the many bitter experiences in other provinces made the Turks fear that the existence of large and cohesive Jewish colonies in Palestine might lead to diplomatic interference by foreign powers, to the detriment of their sovereign rights in that important region.[32]

The Ḥibat Tziyon[33] movement originated in Russia in the wake of anti-Jewish pogroms in 1881-82. So traumatic was the experience that it shattered irreparably the dream of enlightenment and Russification in which some Jewish youth and intelligentsia indulged. Disillusioned and rejected, they sought consolation in rediscovering their national identity. The revival of the Hebrew language and literature received a new boost, and the restoration of a national life in Palestine became the central theme in the new thinking.

Bilu, a group of Jewish students from Russian universities, was one of the most notable societies to act to fulfill this ideal.[34] Imbued with the will to build a model society based on social justice, they set a personal example and a number of them made their way to Palestine, founding there two colonies: Rishon le-Tziyon (1882) and Gedera (1884), south of Jaffa. Other Russian Jews in 1882 restored the settlement of Petaḥ Tiḳva north of Jaffa (founded in 1878 by some Jerusalemite Jews and abandoned following the outbreak of malaria).

In the same year a group of pioneers from Rumania established two colonies: Zamarin (renamed later Zikhron Ya'aḳov) on the way to Haifa, and Rosh Pina, near Safed whilst some immigrants from Poland founded the Yesud ha-Ma'ala near Lake Ḥūla in Upper Galilee. The following year saw the establishment of Nes Tziyona in Judea. In addition, there existed Miḳve Yisra'el, an agricultural school near Jaffa, established in 1870 by Carl Neter on behalf of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and a tiny settlement near Jerusalem, Motza. By 1889 there were twenty-two Jewish rural settlements in Palestine on a land area of 76,000 acres, with a population of about 5,000.[35] The settlements were widely dispersed but they served as a pointer to the direction and districts in which the next colonies were to be founded.

Although enthusiastic, the pioneers were ill equipped for their venture. The difficulties were more formidable than they had anticipated. They were exposed to the dangers of malaria, an unpleasant climate, and raids by Bedouins; they were ignorant of the country and its Arab inhabitants and had little or no experience in agriculture; they were unused to hard physical labor and suffered from lack of funds. Had it not been for the generous financial support afforded by Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris,[36] the infant settlements would soon have foundered. But what seemed an almost insuperable obstacle was the positive discouragement of the Ottoman authorities. Such an unfriendly attitude seemed at first incomprehensible to the colonists. It was certainly inconsistent with the image of the Ottoman Empire, nourished by Jews throughout the centuries, as one of the most hospitable and tolerant in the world.

A Bilu delegation which arrived in Istanbul in 1881 with the intention of winning over the Ottoman government to its project was greatly surprised when its application for the purchase of land in Palestine was rejected.[37] Equally unsuccessful was Jacob Rosenfeld, the editor of the Russian Jewish paper *Razsviet*, when he met Da'ūd Efendi, assistant to the Ottoman foreign minister. For a while it looked as if Rumanian Jews might be more fortunate in their negotiations with the Porte, since De Castro, a Sephardi Jew and an advisor to the sultan, acted as their mediator. Their plea that the Ottoman Empire could not remain indifferent to the plight of Jews in Rumania, because provinces of that country had formerly belonged to the Empire, carried some weight, and negotiations seemed at first to make headway. But the news of Egypt's occupation by the British had such a devastating effect in Istanbul that any overtures were doomed.[38] Laurence Oliphant, writing from Istanbul, listed the occupation of Egypt by the British as one of the reasons for the Ottoman Empire's objection to Jewish immigration; the others he attributed to the sultan's reluctance to allow non-Muslims to settle in Palestine and to the adverse influence of anti-Jewish (Catholic?) circles.[39]

The Porte soon resorted to action. In June 1882 entry to the country was forbidden, purchase of real property was made impossible, and even the building of houses was strictly prohibited; those built without permission were

liable to be demolished.[40] This did not necessarily mean that the Ottoman Empire threw its traditional hospitality overboard. In the following month the Council of Ministers affirmed that Jews from any country were to be allowed to settle in any part of the Empire, except Palestine, and in groups no bigger than a hundred to a hundred and fifty families. The immigrants had to become Ottoman subjects, to take an oath of allegiance to the sultan, and to comply with Ottoman law. In return the Porte offered every facility; the settlers would be given government lands free of charge, exemption from taxation and from military service for a certain period would be granted, and Jews would enjoy the same religious freedom as other subjects.[41] These guidelines were to remain a constant feature in Ottoman policy. Jews were to be treated as benevolently and tolerantly as before but Palestine was to remain out of bounds. No new nationality problem was to be created.

Nelidov, the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, was the first to protest, in 1882, against the prohibition of Jewish immigration to Palestine. Criticism was aired in *Novoye Vremya*, a leading Russian paper, and in August of the following year, Giers, the Russian foreign minister, was reported to have assured a Ḥovevey Tziyon leader of his interest and support.[42] But with Ottoman sensitivity reaching a new pitch, any interference by a foreign power was bound to have an adverse effect. Russia, with its record of pogroms, could only be suspect in Ottoman eyes of harboring ulterior motives when interceding for Russian Jews in Palestine. A characteristic argument was that European governments were deliberately inducing the Jews to emigrate to Palestine "in order to provide themselves with a pretext to annex it."[43] In February 1884, when M. Fernandez, a leader of the Jewish community in Istanbul and head of the Alliance Israélite Universelle Bureau in the Orient, approached the Ottoman minister of interior on Baron Rothschild's behalf, he was told forthrightly that fear that the Jews would create a "second Bulgarian question in Palestine" precluded the Porte from taking a sympathetic interest in his plan. A similar reply was given to Emanuel F. Veneziani, a representative of Baron Hirsch.[44]

In the Ottoman Empire the gap between principle and practice was always wide. Whatever orders might have been issued at Istanbul, "it was always possible," as a Zionist report put it, "to get round the individual official with a little artifice."[45] Ra'ūf Paşa, the *mutaṣarrif* of the *sancak* of Jerusalem (1877-89) was a resolute and incorruptible administrator, but he was a notable exception, who himself used to complain that "almost every official" was taking *bakhshīsh*.[46] "Turkish officials to a man are open to bribery," wrote a contemporary settler, "Money is *the oil that turns the wheels*... and blinds everybody"; local judges and administrators were a law unto themselves, and Jewish immigrants came reluctantly to realize that bribery was an effective means of circumventing prohibitive orders.[47] The settlers of Rosh Pina managed to prevent the destruction of their houses, built illegally, through the intercession of influential Jewish personalities in Damascus and Istanbul, but

those in Zamarin found it more convenient to "soften the heart" of the gendarmes by pecuniary means.[48] Even Baron Rothschild was forced to conclude that better results could be obtained locally by resorting to "good words and some napoleons" than by raising the issue at a diplomatic level in Istanbul:[49] Jewish immigrants infiltrated the country via Syria or Egypt (obvious weak spots in the application of the law), others chose to acquire false passports which were sold freely by Ottoman officials or intermediaries on board ship.[50] Once an individual possessed an American, Austrian, British, or German passport, he was sure of protection.

A typical instance occurred in Petaḥ-Tiḳva in 1882. After having registered part of their land in the name of Yo'el Moses Salomon, a German protégé, the settlers took the risk of building their houses without an official permit. Ra'ūf Paşa promptly instructed the court to order the demolition of the houses and to punish Salomon. When Salomon solicited support from the German consul in Jerusalem, Dr. Reitz lost no time in lodging a strong protest, to which Ra'ūf replied that Petaḥ-Tiḳva was not "a German quarter" but "a Russian colony," and that the treaty rights gave the foreign powers no title to interfere in matters of real property. Reitz still demanded the cancellation of the order, saying that he would summon German colonists from the neighboring village of Sarona to defend Petaḥ Tiḳva if necessary by force. Unwilling to create international complications, Ra'ūf eventually gave way. The feeling among Jewish settlers was that "without ... protection they would not have been able to survive."[51]

Beneficial as the consul's protection was, in the long run it proved a double-edged weapon. It confirmed the Ottoman belief that Jewish settlers were being used as pawns by the powers to weaken Ottoman sovereignty. Thoughtful individuals soon sensed the risks. A letter by El'azar Roḳe'aḥ, a Ḥibat Tziyon public worker dated April 1859 is illuminating:

> The Ottoman administration is impotent and ineffective ... Even a minor official is free to act on his own accord, regardless of authority and law. Witnessing how harshly and arbitrarily the native Muslims were treated, our people desired to escape a similar fate. Protection of the foreign consuls seemed, hence, preferable. But one can visualize that the Ottoman government would not tolerate such a situation for long ... [extraterritoriality] is a running sore in the Ottoman body and undermines its very existence. The government, quite justifiably, loathes the foreigners and the Jewish newcomers, who enjoy the protection of the European powers, are viewed unfavourably.[52]

Eli'ezer Ben-Yehuda, an early immigrant to Palestine and father of the revival of spoken Hebrew, was one of the first to give a personal example by embracing Ottoman nationality. Thereafter he untiringly propagated this idea in his periodical *ha-Or*. Leaders of the Ḥovevey Tziyon societies were fully alive to the importance of the question,[53] and their first conference held in Katowice on November 7, 1884, expressed unanimously its unreserved loyalty

to the sultan. "Our people," the resolution read, "wish to settle in the Promised Land as honest and loyal subjects, imbued with sincere love and obedience to the government of the country... and without any ulterior motives."[54] Baron Rothschild, also endeavored to prevail upon the colonists to adopt Ottoman nationality.[55] However, harsh realities discouraged this process. The local authorities' failure to administer justice and provide security of life and property[56] made the newcomers think twice about the wisdom of surrendering to Ottoman jurisdiction. Moreover, the advantages accruing from consular protection were too tangible to forgo. The protégés felt relatively secure, they were exempt from local taxation, and enjoyed other privileges stemming from their extraterritorial status.

The Porte could not remain indifferent. To show that loyalty paid, the minister of the interior instructed the local authotities to be more forthcoming towards those individuals who embraced Ottoman nationality. It soon became evident that the new nationals were favored whenever they applied for permission to build houses, or plant vineyards and orchards.[57] The *ḳā'imaḳām* of Safed specifically declared that he would not interfere with the colonists if they agreed to adopt Ottoman nationality. "We all know," wrote a Ḥovevey Tziyon leader, "that the government raises no obstacles to the settlement of naturalized persons, particularly in Galilee, where the land is more fertile and the population is scarce; and on political and religious grounds there are fewer objections there than in the *sancak* of Jerusalem."[58]

However, when the inducements failed to persuade more than a section of the immigrants to adopt Ottoman nationality,[59] the stick was applied with greater vigor. By the end of 1885 a Bureau of Nationality was established and those who failed to prove the validity of their claim to foreign protection were liable to expulsion. Oscar Straus, the American minister to Istanbul, managed to frustrate Ra'ūf Paşa's order to deport 400 imprisoned immigrants.[60] But early in 1887 the Porte issued new instructions prohibiting foreign Jews from residing in Jerusalem or in Palestine "generally"; only pilgrims were allowed to stay for a short period.[61] Permission to sell property was consistently refused, and obstructions to colonization became more frequent.[62] Officially these rigorous measures were explained on health and economic grounds, but privately Kāmil Paşa, the grand vezir, told Oscar Straus that the recrudescence of religious fanaticism among both Muslims and Christians impeded protection of the Jewish minority. In addition, rumors had reached the Porte that the Jews throughout the world wished to reestablish their ancient kingdom in Jerusalem. Straus dismissed these arguments out of hand,[63] but what primarily concerned the Ottomans, though they could not admit it officially, was the violation of their own prerogatives and sovereignty.

A year later, when Oscar Straus interceded on behalf of forty five American Jews who had been prevented from landing, Tevfīḳ Paşa, the Ottoman foreign minister, reassured him that the Ottoman Empire had no intention of discriminating against American citizens. Their only object was to prevent the

further colonization of Palestine by Jews, since this might lead to political complications. Straus gained the impression that stricter enforcement of the regulations had followed the founding of the political Zionist Organization in Basel (1897).[64] But it is clear that the Ottoman Empire's attitude towards Jewish settlement in Palestine had been determined earlier than that. At the root of the problem lay the system of Capitulations and the refusal of foreign Jews to adopt Ottoman nationality. As Paul Weitz, the correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in Istanbul, and a well-informed student of Turkish affairs, attested:

> So long as the Capitulations were in force, the Ottoman government was bound to view Jewish immigration with mixed feelings; this in spite of the economic benefits to be gained. The Jewish immigrants from Russia persisted in clinging to their foreign nationality after settling in the country. In any conflict with Ottoman law and the Ottoman authorities, they sought protection from their consuls, who gave it eagerly because increased immigration magnified their powers at the expense of the Ottoman government's prerogatives. It went so far that the Sublime Porte ceased sometimes to be master in its own country. How then could the Turks have sympathized with an immigration that constantly created increasingly an additional source of friction.[65]

When Herzl appeared in Istanbul at the turn of the century he was woefully ignorant of how remote were the chances of making his scheme acceptable to the Sublime Porte.

Notes

* I should like to thank the Oxford University Press for permission to cite my book *Germany, Turkey and Zionism*, 1897-1918 (Oxford, 1977).

1 On Ḥibat Tziyon see below, p. 284.

2 The "Old Settlement," in contrast to the "New *Yishuv*" founded in the 1880s by the Ḥibat Tziyon colonists. For an analysis of the terminology see Yehoshua Kaniel, "The Terms 'Old Yishuv' and 'New Yishuv' in Contemporary and in Historiographicl Usage," *Cathedra*, 6 (December, 1978), pp. 3-19, in Hebrew.

3 "Ashkenaz" in Hebrew means Germany, whence during the Middle Ages Jews migrated to Eastern Europe. The term "Ashkenazim" denotes the Central and East European Jewry and their offshoots in Western Europe and the United States, in contrast to the Sephardi and the Oriental Jewish communities.

4 A. Hyamson (ed.), *The British Consulate in Palestine in Relation to the Jews of Palestine, 1838-1914* (London, 1939), vol. 1, p. 95.

5 Finn to Earl of Malmesbury, April 29, 1852, *ibid.*, p. 191; James Finn, *Stirring Times* (London, 1878), vol. 1, p. 223.

6 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 128, 181, 185, 187, 269, 341; vol. 2, pp. 144, 190, 281. On the sultanic laws (the Edict of Reforms), *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 223; vol. 2, p. 446.
7 Finn to Palmerston, Dec. 29, 1851, Hyamson, vol. 1, p. 185.
8 Finn, vol. 1, p. 226.
9 On Jan. 1, 1858, James Finn reported: "Forty years ago [before the establishment of the consulates, the Ashkenazim] were not recognized in Jerusalem... but now they are rising into importance, under the patronage of their respective Consuls — their political status is greatly improved and their number has been augmented." Hyamson, vol. 1, p. 257.
10 For a description of the Jewish community see Hyamson, vol. 1, p. 257, and contemporary travelers: C.R. Conder, *Tent Work in Palestine* (London, 1878), vol. 1, pp. 293-297; W.H. Bartlett, *Jerusalem Revisited* (London, 1855), pp. 77-83. See also B. Gat, *ha-Yishuv ha-Yehudi be-Eretz-Yisra'el, bi-shnot Ha-Tar-Ha-Tarma (1840-1881)* (Jerusalem, 1963), pp. 10-11, 15, 22-32. Until 1872 the Sephardim were in a majority, but by 1877 the Ashkenazim outstripped them and constituted about 60 percent of the total Jewish population. The Ḥibat Tziyon immigration in the 80s was composed predominantly of Ashkenazim (Gat, pp. 21-22). Shochet's statistics differ slightly from those of Gat. A. Shochet, "The Jews in Jerusalem in the Eighteenth Century," *Zion*, 1, no. 4 (1936), p. 81, in Hebrew. In addition to the Sephardim and Ashkenazim there was also a number of Jews from Morocco (20 percent), from Georgia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Yemen.
11 Finn to Moore, June 27, 1849, Hyamson, vol. 1, p. 127.
12 Finn to Bulwer, May 22, 1862, Hyamson, vol. 2, p. 298.
13 Finn, vol. 1, p. 102.
14 Finn to Earl of Clarendon, Jan. 1, 1858, Hyamson, vol. 1, p. 259. See also Finn, vol. 2, p. 281. The British vice-consulate was established in 1839 and in 1841 was upgraded to the status of consulate. In 1843 the Prussian, Sardinian, and French consulates were established, in 1844 the American, in 1849 the Austrian and in 1854 the Spanish. Palestine lay also within the jurisdiction of the Russian consul-general at Beirut. He had an agent representing him in Jerusalem, a rabbi and a vice-consul in Jaffa. On the activities of the consulates in Palestine see Meir Verete, "Why Was a British Consulate Established in Jerusalem?" *Zion*, 26, nos. 3-4 (1961), pp. 215-237, in Hebrew; Isaiah Friedman, "Lord Palmerston and the Protection of Jews in Palestine, 1839-1851," *Jewish Social Studies*, 30, no. 1 (January 1968), pp. 23-41; idem, *Germany, Turkey and Zionism, 1897-1918* (Oxford, 1977), pp. 165-183, 348-351, 370 and *passim*; Mordechai Eliav, "The German Consulate in Jerusalem and the Jews in Jerusalem in the 19th Century", in Moshe Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 421-423; idem, *ha-Yishuv ha-Yehudi be-Eretz-Yisra'el bi-re'i ha-mediniyut ha-Germanit, 1842-1914. Mivḥar te'udot u-ve'urim*, 2 vols. (Tel Aviv, 1973); idem, "The Austrian Consulate in Jerusalem and the Jewish Community," *Cathedra*, 18 (January 1981), pp. 73-110, in Hebrew; Mark Tennenbaum, "The British Consulate in Jerusalem, 1838-1890," *ibid.*, 5 (September 1978), pp. 83-108; Ron Bartur, "Episodes in the Relations of the American Consulate in Jerusalem with the Jewish Community in the 19th Century (1856-1906)," *ibid.*, pp. 109-143, in Hebrew; Theodore Parfitt, "The French Consulate and the Jewish Community in Eretz Israel in the 19th Century," *ibid.*, pp. 144-161, in Hebrew; Alex Carmel, "The Yishuv, the Ottoman Government and the Foreign Consulates," in M. Eliav (ed.), *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona* (Jerusalem, 1981), vol. 1, pp. 97-116; idem, "Russian Activity in Palestine during the Late Ottoman Period," in E. Shaltiel (ed.), *Praḳim be-toldot Yerushalayim ba-zman he-ḥadash* (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 212-226.
15 Bernhard Neumann, *Die heilige Stadt* (Hamburg, 1877), p. 376; Elizabeth Anne McCaul-Finn, *Reminiscences of Mrs. Finn* (London, 1929), p. 81. The total number of Jews in Palestine in the mid-nineteenth century amounted to approximately 11,000.
16 Isaiah Friedman, "Lord Palmerston and the Protection of Jews in Palestine," pp. 25, 39.
17 See Nasim Sousa, *The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey* (London and Baltimore, 1933), pp. 93-101, and bibliography quoted therein; G.B. Ravdal, "Capitulations," in E.G. Mears (ed.), *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), pp. 430-447; I. Ben-Zvi, *Eretz-Yisra'el ve*

yishuvah bi-yemey ha-shilṭon ha-'Otmani (Jerusalem, 1955), pp. 123-136 and bibliography quoted therein; A.J. Toynbee and K.P. Kirkwood, *Turkey* (London, 1926), pp. 137-140; Finn, vol. 1, p. 91. On the doctrine of extraterritoriality see William Edward Hall, *A Treatise on International Law*, 8th ed. (Oxford, 1924), pp. 217-220; "Capitulations," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. 4 (1963), pp. 813-814, 851-852.

18 Finn, vol. 1, pp. 91, 222-223; vol. 2, p. 445-446; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), p. 114; A.L. Tibawi, *British Interests in Palestine: 1880-1901* (London, 1961), pp. 115, 130, 180; Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 52-80; William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors: 1801-1921* (Cambridge, 1934), pp. 288-289; and for its effect on Jews, Moise Franco, *Essai sur l'histoire des Israélites de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1897), pp. 143-151; Nahum Sokolow, *History of Zionism* (London, 1919), vol. 1, pp. 152-153; vol. 2, p. 412.

19 Sousa, pp. 167-170; Hall, p. 60, n. 1; Davison, pp. 413-414. The protocol is cited in full in Mears, p. 442.

20 Finn, vol. 1, p. 187.

21 Cox (Istanbul) to Bayard (Washington), Jan. 5, 1886, *Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States* (1886), pp. 862-864, (hereafter *F.R.U.S.*). The Law of Nationality of 1869 had no retrospective effect. H.H. Jessup, *Fifty-Three Years in Syria* (New York, 1910), vol. 2, p. 438; also Maynard (Istanbul) to Evarts (Washington), Oct. 15, 1879, *F.R.U.S.* (1879), p. 993; Finn, vol. 1, pp. 253-254, 263, 344; vol. 2, pp. 443-449.

22 Conder, vol. 2, pp. 310-311; Finn to Lord Russell, Jan. 21, 1860, Hyamson, vol. 1, p. 268.

23 Ben-Zvi, p. 337.

24 Finn to Bulwer, August 24, 1859, Public Record Office, London, F.O. 195/604, no. 2. According to Islamic law, foreigners were not allowed to hold real property, except on lease for a short period. However, before 1859 this principle had been "frequently relaxed," *ibid.*

25 'Alī Paşa to Morris (Istanbul), Nov. 28, 1866, *F.R.U.S.* (1865/6), pt. 2, p. 258; Morris to Seward, Nov. 30, 1866, *ibid.* (1866), pp. 257-258.

26 Finn to Lord Stratford, July 24; Aug. 30, 1855, Hyamson, vol. 1, pp. 233-235, 238; same to Bulwer, Aug. 15, 1859; same to same, Feb. 12; April 14; Aug. 15; Nov. 17, 1859, Hyamson, pp. 261-267; Sir Moses H. Montefiore, *Diaries*, ed. by L. Loewe (London, 1890), vol. 2, pp. 44-46, 51, 109-110.

27 Finn to Bulwer, Aug. 24, 1859, Hyamson, vol. 1, p. 266.

28 Locock to Earl of Derby, May 12, 1874, *ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 393.

29 Elliot to Aurifi Pasha, Aug. 4, 1874, *ibid.*, p. 392; Eyres to White, Dec. 27, 1886, encl. in White to Salisbury, April 4, 1887; *ibid.*, pp. 431-432; White to Sublime Porte, Jan. 6, 1887, *ibid.*, pp. 432-439; Porte to White, April 2, 1887, *ibid.*, p. 434.

30 Said to White, Aug. 11, 1887, *ibid.*, p. 438.

31 "weil der Sultan sich kein 'jüdische Frage' auf dem Hals Ziehen wolle." Veneziani to ?, Jan. 1, 1883, in Asher Druyanov (ed.), *Ktavim le-toldot Ḥibat Tziyon ve-Yishuv Eretz-Yisra'el* (Odessa, 1919), vol. 1, p. 77.

32 Friedman, *Germany*, pp. 292-293.

33 Among the voluminous literature on Ḥibat Tziyon and their colonization in Palestine see: Sokolow, vol. 1, pp. 213-227; Adolf Böhm, *Die zionistische Bewegung*, 2nd enlarged ed. (Tel Aviv, 1935), vol. 1, pp. 96-115; Leonard Stein, *Zionism* (London, 1932), pp. 35-36; Israel Cohen, *The Zionist Movement* (London, 1945), pp. 18-19, 54-66; idem: *A Short History of Zionism* (London, 1951), pp. 28-39; Rufus Learsi, *Fulfillment: The Epic Story of Zionism* (New York, 1951), pp. 41-58; Alex Bein, *The Return to the Soil* (Jerusalem, 1952); pp. 4-10; Shmu'el Yavni'eli, *Tḳufat Ḥibat Tziyon*, 2 vols. (Jerusalem, 1961); Israel Klausner, *Be-hitórer 'am* (Jerusalem, 1962); *Hebrew Encyclopaedia*, vol. 6 (1957), pp. 508-512.

34 The name was taken from the book of Isaiah (chap. ii, 5), "Beyt Ya'aḳov lekhu ve-nelkha" (O house of Jacob, come ye and let us go forth), and which also served as their motto.

35 Bein, *The Return*, pp. 4-6; Abraham Revusky, *Jews in Palestine* (London, 1938), pp. 10-12.

36 See David Druck, *Baron Edmound Rothschild: The Story of Practical Idealism* (London, 1928); Israel Margalith, *Baron Edmond de Rothschild et la colonisation juive en Palestine: 1882-1899* (Paris, 1957). The total amount invested by Rothschild in the Jewish settlement in Palestine is estimated at £5.6 millions, of which £1.6 million was spent between 1883-1889. It is worthwhile to compare this sum to that invested by the societies, which did not exceed £87,000. Bein, *The Return*, p. 6, n.; *Hebrew Encyclopaedia*, vol. 6, p. 510.

37 Sokolow, vol. 1, pp. 206-209; vol. 2, pp. 267-269.

38 Klausner, pp. 227-234.

39 Oliphant to David Gordon, June 24, 1882, Druyanov, vol. 1, p. 37. On Oliphant see Sokolow, vol. 1, pp. 207-209, 250, 267-269, 306-307; Albert Hyamson, *British Projects for the Restoration of the Jews* (London, 1917), pp. 31ff.; Philip Henderson, *The Life of Laurence Oliphant* (London, 1956).

40 Druyanov, vol. 1, *passim*; Moshe Smilansky: *Prakim be-toldot ha-yishuv* (Tel Aviv, 1945), vol. 1, pp. 33-34, 38-39, 53, 60, 67-68; Klausner, pp. 300, 342-343; Frank Manuel, *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations* (Washinton, 1949), pp. 55, 56; Neville Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigraton into Palestine: 1882-1914," *St. Antony's Papers*, vol. 17 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 77-108.

41 Wallace to Frelinghüsen, July 11, 1882, *F.R.U.S.* (1882), pp. 516-517, Manuel, pp. 52-53.

42 Klausner, pp. 340-341.

43 *Mevaseret Tziyon*, no. 3 (Jerusalem, 1864); *Kol Kitvey Eli'ezer Ben-Yehuda* (Jerusalem, 1941), vol. 1, p. 165; Klausner, pp. 346-347.

44 Gordon to Rabinowicz, Feb. 25, 1884, Druyanov, vol. 1, pp. 147-148. Veneziani to Pinsker, May 26, 1885, *ibid.*, pp. 522-523; Klausner, p. 343; Manuel, p. 58.

45 Zionist Organization, *Report to the Twelfth Zionist Congress: Palestine Report* (London, 1922), p. 7.

46 Druyanov, vol. 1, pp. 191, 319; Smilansky, vol. 1, p. 26; Klausner, p. 339; B. Dinur (ed.) *Sefer toldot ha-Hagana* (Tel Aviv, 1955), vol. 1, p. 58; Manuel, p. 15.

47 Hirsch to Pinsker, April, 1886, Druyanov, vol. 1, p. 747; Altschuller to Mohliver, February, 1885, *ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 698; Manuel, p. 36.

48 Smilansky, vol. 1, pp. 33-39.

49 Margalith, p. 100. Simon Schama in his book *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel* (London, 1978) does not mention this fact but in connection with Kalvarisky he writes: "*Bakshish* under the Turks he thought no more sinister than golden handshakes or *douceurs* in the world of business. In an Empire where tax-officials, police, even judges, were so miserably paid that they were virtually expected to make a livelihood from irregular perquisites, Kalvarisky used money as public ointment without which there would have been needless friction with those authorities. The JCA recognized this need, however sordid, with an item for *bakshish* specifically designated in their accounts." (p. 169).

50 Klausner, p. 340.

51 Ya'ari Poleskin (ed.), *Sefer ha-yovel shel Petaḥ Tikva* (Petaḥ Tikva, 1929), pp. 227-243.

52 Roḳe'aḥ to Pinsker, April 1886, Druyanov, vol. 1, p. 763. For a biographical sketch see Galia Yardeni, "El'azar Roḳe'aḥ", *Areshet*, 4 (1966), pp. 296-321, in Hebrew.

53 David Gordon to Rabinowicz (1885) and Pinsker to Fein (1885), Druyanov, vol. 1. pp. 215, 492.

54 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 283, 305, where the full text of the resolutions is reproduced.

55 Scheid to Pinsker, Sept. 25, 1886, *ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 1.

56 Blaine to Wallace, June 29, Aug. 8, 1881, *F.R.U.S.* (1881), pp. 1184-1185; also Frelinghüsen to Wallace, Jan. 7, 1882, *ibid.* (1882), p. 498.

57 Scheid to Pinsker, Sept. 25, 1887, Druyanov, vol. 2, p. 385; Erlanger to Pinsker, Dec. 9, 1887, *ibid.*, p. 400; Pines to Pinsker, Feb. 1888, *ibid.*, p. 488; Erlanger to Pinsker, Jan. 3, 1888, *ibid.*, p. 437.

58 Scheid to Pinsker, Sept. 25, 1886, *ibid.*, p. 1. Pinsker to Fein, Feb. 1885, *ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 414; Plaskov to Lilienblum, no date, *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 251-2.

59 No exact statistics are available.

60 *F.R.U.S.* (1885), pp. 862-868, 878; Oscar S. Straus, *Under Four Administrations* (New

York, 1923), pp. 80-84; Druyanov, vol. 2, pp. 350-352; Margalith, p. 188.

61 Moore to White, March 5, 1887, Hyamson, vol. 2, p. 429; Druyanov, vol. 2, pp. 312, 418-421, 438; Margalith, pp. 190-191.

62 Druyanov, vol. 2, pp. 24, 90, 99, 258-260, 334-335 (where the relevant documents are reproduced).

63 Moore to White, March 5, 1887, Hyamson, vol. 2, p. 429; Straus to Bayard, Jan. 28, 1888, *F.R.U.S.* (1888), pt. 2, pp. 1559-1560; Straus, pp. 80-81; Manuel, pp. 61-62; Moshe Medzini, *ha-Mediniyut ha-Tziyonit* (Jerusalem, 1936), p. 59.

64 Porte to Riddle, Aug. 27, 1898, encl. 1, to no. 179; Riddle to Day, Sept. 3, 1898; Strauss to Hay, Nov. 22, 1898; *F.R.U.S.* (1898), pp. 1086-1088; 1092-1093. John Dickson, the British consul in Jerusalem, shared this assumption. Dickson to O'Conor, Feb. 9, 1899, Hyamson, vol. 2, pp. 542-543.

65 *Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 2, 1918.

Capitulations: The Case of the German-Jewish Hilfsverein Schools in Palestine, 1901-1914

MOSHE RINOTT

From the beginning of the 20th century until the end of World War I, a German-Jewish philanthropic society — the Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden (Aid Society of German Jews) — was actively involved in Jewish education in Palestine. These activities brought the Hilfsverein leaders into frequent contact with government offices in Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The quality of these contacts reflected, on a small scale, the general policies of the governments concerned and in particular their policy in the fields of education and culture in the Near East.

With the case of the Hilfsverein we shall attempt to throw further light on two aspects of German-Ottoman relations:

(1) changes in German policy concerning the dissemination of German language and culture in the Ottoman Empire;

(2) the overt and covert struggle over the validity of the Capitulations.[1]

The Hilfsverein was established on May 28, 1901 in Berlin, Germany, by notable, wealthy German Jews who shared "the humanitarian aim to advance the moral, spiritual and economic development of our co-religionists."[2] At the head of this society stood rich and influential philanthropists like Dr. James Simon (1851-1932), who was renowned for his donations to art and archaeology and for his good relations with the German Kaiser Wilhelm II.[3] The honorary secretary of the Hilfsverein and its leading spirit in thought and action was Dr. Paul Nathan (1857-1927).[4] Nathan was politically active in a German liberal party, served as city counsellor of Berlin (1889-1919) and had already devoted much of his time to the fight against anti-Semitism. The Hilfsverein had no intention of working for Jews inside Germany. Its aim was to help needy coreligionists in Eastern Europe and the Near East.

In the field of Jewish philanthropy in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, founded in 1860, preceded the Hilfsverein.[5] Until the establishment of the Hilfsverein German Jews participated actively in the philanthropic work of the Alliance.

However, after the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), German Jews were influenced by the prevailing enmity between France and Germany. In Germany accusations were made in public that the Alliance Israélite Universelle was an agent for the dissemination of French culture and served

French political interests abroad. The founders of the Hilfsverein set up a separate German-Jewish organization on the model of the Alliance, because it offended the patriotic pride of German Jews that their work on behalf of needy and persecuted Jews throughout the world be conducted through a Franco-Jewish organization centered in Paris.[6]

The Hilfsverein's main areas of operation were Eastern Europe and the Near East. After the pogrom in Kishinev (1903) the society directed its attention to the growing mass Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe to the West. At the same time — but on a smaller scale — it began its operations in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire where the Hilfsverein wanted to improve social conditions through the 'productivization' of the Jews through education and vocational training. In the Near East the Hilfsverein concentrated its efforts in Palestine.

Within ten years the Hifsverein had established a small-scale educational network in Palestine but its size was significant relative to the conditions then prevailing. It comprised kindergartens, primary schools, a teachers' college, a commercial high school, a kindergarten teachers' seminar and a rabbinical college. Most of the institutions were located in Jerusalem.

As a German-Jewish aid society the Hilfsverein considered the German language the appropriate instrument for its general educational programs, as the Alliance schools did with French. Hebrew was the language for Jewish studies. The schools were established according to German patterns, with German curricula and books for general education. Most of the schools were bilingual and German and Hebrew served as languages of instruction. Only the kindergartens and a few small institutions were conducted solely in Hebrew. On the eve of World War I, about half of all Jewish children in Palestine who attended 'modern' schools (and not the traditional religious institutions), attended Hilfsverein schools.[7]

The climax of the Hilfsverein's efforts was to be the establishment of a technical college (Technikum) in Haifa. It was designed to further technical development in Palestine and the Ottoman Empire by training technicians and skilled workers. It was scheduled to be opened in April 1914. However, because of the conflict between the Hilfsverein and the Zionist Jews in Palestine about the main language of instruction — which became a struggle for the precedence of Hebrew over German in all the Hilfsverein schools — the opening did not take place before World War I.[8]

From its very inception in 1898, the founding father of the Hilfsverein, Dr. Paul Nathan, sought the protection of the German government for the planned schools in Palestine. On September 21, 1898, Nathan submitted to the German Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt) his plan to establish a Deutscher Schulverein für die Juden des Orients (German School Society for the Jews in the Near East). This society would strengthen the German language and the German spirit (*Gesinnung*) abroad, provide new bases for the growth of German trade and create new links between Germany and the Near East.

Therefore, the humanitarian and patriotic initiative of the planned society merited the German government's protection for its schools and teachers.[9]

Nathan's appeal to the Auswärtiges Amt came at a time when the German government showed great interest in the Ottoman Empire. Wilhelm II displayed his friendship with the Ottoman Empire and the sultan during his visits to Istanbul, Jerusalem and Damascus in the fall of 1898. At about the same time the German-Palestine Bank and the German postal service in Palestine were opened and Germany obtained the concession to build the Anatolian railway line (1899).

In brief, the activities of the Hilfsverein in Palestine were designed to help the poor Jews there by giving them the opportunity to discover European 'enlightenment' and to become productive. At the same time, this humane endeavor gave German Jews the opportunity to display their patriotism and loyalty by harnessing their philanthropy to the German government's policy of "Peaceful Penetration" into the Ottoman Empire through the dissemination of the German language and culture.

The Auswärtiges Amt's response to Dr. Nathan's request was reluctantly given and very cool. It promised no help except consular assistance to the planned schools provided that these would be under the direction of German citizens. The desired official protection was not granted.[10]

By 1904/5 the Hilfsverein had already opened a teachers' college and a few kindergartens and primary schools in Jerusalem and Jaffa. The German consuls residing there reported to their superiors that they had visited the Hilfsverein institutions and thought them worthy of German protection. But they did not think that official recognition would be desirable. Some reports added a caveat that German protection should only be given to the Hilfsverein schools if they had no Zionist tendencies. Eventually, after repeated approaches to the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin and the German embassy in Istanbul in April 1908 the Hilfsverein received the answer that the request for German protection for their schools could not be granted.[11]

Schools (as well as hospitals and other welfare services) under the protection of an European power did not come under the supervision of the local Ottoman authorities and therefore escaped their whims and extortions. They enjoyed educational and administrative autonomy, exemption from taxes and customs and their teachers were excused from military service. The state extending its protection had to obtain the Ottoman government's approval through an *irāde* (decree) from the sultan. Foreign consuls often gave their de facto protection to schools and other institutions even without Ottoman approval. After the 'Young Turks' revolution (July 1908), the Ottoman government started to extend its supervision to foreign institutions.[12] At that time the German embassy in Istanbul justified its negative answers to the Hilfsverein on the grounds that it was inappropriate to open negotiations with the Ottoman authorities because of the political upheavals then taking place in the Ottoman Empire.[13]

In 1908/9 the Hilfsverein started to prepare for the building in Haifa of the Technikum and a Real Schule next to it. This was a major project both in scope and capital investment and the Hilfsverein asked for German protection and release from custom duties and taxes under the Capitulations.[14] The Auswärtiges Amt viewed this project favorably and asked the German ambassador in Istanbul A. Marschall von Bieberstein, to take the necessary steps. However, Marschall was very reserved and answered (November 18, 1909) that the Hilfsverein's request would entail negotiations between the embassy and the Porte and that this was not desirable.[15] Only after further instructions from Berlin did the embassy in Istanbul take the necessary steps and the *irāde* for the Technikum was granted by the end of 1911. It did not include the Hilfsverein schools. Although the German consulates continued to report favorably on the schools and their achievements, formal German protection was not granted.[16]

This ambiguous situation caused difficulties to the Hilfsverein schools and at least two matters were vulnerable to arbitrary decisions: the recognition of the Hilfsverein schools' diplomas by the university in Istanbul and the exemption of teachers from service in the Ottoman army. Furthermore, after the Young Turk revolution, the Ottoman government demanded that schools belonging to foreign religious organizations and philanthropic societies should come under Ottoman supervision. In view of the situation, the director of the Hilfsverein schools in Palestine, Ephraim Cohn-Reiss (1863-1943), reached an agreement with the local authorities and opened the doors to the local Ottoman school inspector. Presumably he took this step with the approval of the Hilfsverein leaders in Berlin. In 1910 Cohn-Reiss received temporary official Ottoman recognition for the Hilfsverein's Teacher's College, Commercial High School and primary schools in Jerusalem, and the teachers were exempted from army service. In 1913 Cohn-Reiss applied in person to the government in Istanbul and finally the Hilfsverein schools became officially recognized Ottoman schools.[17]

This situation embarrassed the German Foreign Ministry and its diplomats in the Ottoman Empire. In the eyes of the public the Hilfsverein schools were under German protection, although formally this was not so. The German consul-general in Jerusalem, Dr. E. Schmidt, and the ambassador in Istanbul (since 1912), H. von Wangenheim, understood the problems confronting the Hilfsverein schools and tacitly approved Cohn-Reiss' appeal to the Ottoman government. In 1913, Cohn-Reiss did not make a move in Istanbul without Wangenheim's knowledge and the German ambassador personally helped in the negotiation with the Ottoman government to obtain full recognition for the Hilfsverein schools.

At the same time Wangenheim wanted to deny any knowledge of the contacts between the Hilfsverein and the Ottomans. In his letter of October 20, 1913 to Consul-General Schmidt in Jerusalem, he expressed himself in the following words:

> Dealing with the affairs of Director Ephraim Cohn, the Imperial Embassy found itself in an embarrassing situation from the beginning. As a point of principle, the Embassy will have to deny before the Turkish government any official knowledge of the steps taken in favor of the justified demands of the Hilfsverein.[18]

The official subjugation of the German Hilfsverein schools to the Ottoman authorities would have been a serious infringement of the possible rights under the Capitulations. It would have meant that Germany had consented to the continuing Ottoman efforts to abrogate the Capitulations and, therefore, it was unacceptable to Germany.

The covert struggle between the Ottoman educational authorities and the European consuls in Jerusalem was not new. On August 22, 1910 the Austrian consul in Jerusalem, Ludwig Ritter von Zepharovich, instructed Cohn-Reiss, who also served as director of the Lämel school, how to act in the event of a visit by the Ottoman school inspector: Cohn-Reiss should receive the inspector in his private home which was adjacent to the school building, but should not let him enter the school.[19]

It was evident that formally the German and Austrian governments did not wish to relinquish their rights under the Capitulations. On the other hand, they were very much aware of the sensitivity of the Ottoman government and tried to avoid a collision with their ally on this subject. At this juncture the German government was certainly not ready to exert pressure on the Ottoman Empire on the Hilfsverein's behalf.

From 1904 the Hilfsverein appealed time and again to the Auswärtiges Amt and its agencies in the Ottoman Empire for protected status, but to no avail except in the case of the Technikum. However, from about 1912 the attitude of the Auswärtiges Amt to the Hilfsverein and its schools in the Near East changed. At that time the German government began to plan projects to disseminate the German language in the Ottoman Empire, as a means of increasing Germany's influence there. One such project was the creation in July 1912, with the backing of the Auswärtiges Amt, of a public committee in Germany for the establishment of a technical college in the Ottoman Empire. The committee was headed by Field-Marshal von der Goltz (1843-1916). Among the signatories on the public appeal were two leaders to the Hilfsverein, James Simon and Paul Nathan.[20]

In April 1913 the German Reichstag decided to collect data about German schools abroad and the Auswärtiges Amt began to gather the necessary information through its embassy in Istanbul and requested its regular (not honorary!) consulates to report on German and foreign schools — and in particular on French and Italian institutions — in their districts. Ambassador Wangenheim added in his letter that in Berlin an increase in support for German schools in the Ottoman Empire had been suggested even though financial resources were very limited.[21]

In another circular, Wangenheim expressed his opinion that as the Ottoman government did not look favorably on schools of foreign powers, Germany should not force upon the Ottoman Empire additional foreign schools. Wangenheim suggested that Germany should open German schools, in co-operation with the Ottomans and should extend instruction in German in existing Ottoman schools.[22]

At about the same time in 1913, the Ottoman prime minister, Maḥmūd Şevket Paşa asked Wangenheim for the German government's assistance to the Ottoman school system. At that time, Germany had already undertaken to reform the Ottoman army. In his report to Berlin, Wangenheim commented favorably on Şevket Paşa's idea. He thought the reform would open new avenues for Germany to disseminate the German spirit amongst the Ottoman people.[23]

Wangenheim wanted to avoid opening new schools under German protection as this would raise the question of their approval by the sultan under the Capitulations. Wangenheim was well aware of the Ottoman sensitivity to everything concerning the Capitulations and feared their reactions which might provoke the German government to strong counterreactions. Such developments might be hindrance to improved Ottoman-German relations.

By June 1914, the memorandum about German schools abroad, requested by the Reichstag, was ready. The secret document was shown to the members of the Reichstag Finance Committee only. The Auswärtiges Amt sent a copy of the memorandum to its diplomatic representatives in the Ottoman Empire. In an accompanying letter the secrecy of the report was underlined stating that if Germany's plans for education and culture in the Ottoman Empire would come to the knowledge of foreign governments no doubt they would put obstacles in Germany's way.[24]

The growing interest in German schools and the dissemination of the German language abroad had its impact on the relationship between the Auswärtiges Amt and the Hilfsverein. From 1912 on the German Foreign Ministry showed a growing interest in the activities of the Hilfsverein in Palestine and the status of German in its schools. By 1913 the question of the role of German as the language of instruction in the Technikum and its Real Schule in Haifa *vis-à-vis* Hebrew had become an acutely serious issue for the Zionist Jewish community in Palestine. The Zionists were adamant in their demand to the Hilfsverein that Hebrew should have the dominant role in the Technikum, which was to open in April 1914.

Not surprisingly the German vice-consul in Haifa, Dr. Julius Löytved-Hardegg, showed a growing interest in the controversy and the Hilfsverein's attitude towards this crucial issue. In his numerous reports to the Auswärtiges Amt, he demonstrated his zeal to further German interests and emphasized the importance that the Technikum would have in relation to the teaching of German in all the schools in Palestine. In his report of August 8, 1913, the vice-consul stated that the language issue would be determined in the coming

session of the Board of Governors of the Technikum.[25] He suggested that the Auswärtiges Amt should exert pressure on the leaders of the Hilfsverein to resist the Zionists' demands. Löytved-Hardegg's report was sent to Dr. James Simon, the chairman of the Hilfsverein (August 23, 1913), with a personal note from Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann. In his note Zimmermann pointed out to Simon that the vice-consul's remarks "deserve serious attention."[26]

Löytved-Hardegg's close attention to the language isssue in the Technikum in Haifa and the Hilfsverein schools, and Zimmermannn's personal remarks were in line with the new German policy concerning the dissemination of German language and culture in the Ottoman Empire. From a cool, neutral attitude towards the Hilfsverein, the Auswärtiges Amt had moved to an active interest in the Hilfsverein's undertakings in Palestine and did not shy away from exerting moral pressure on its leaders.

To sum up, Germany's decision to penetrate the Ottoman Empire peacefully by means of German education was taken relatively late and could not come to fruition before World War I. Other European powers such as Britain, France, Italy and Russia had preceded Germany by many years.

German thinking inclined to the dissemination of German language and culture through Ottoman schools, rather than to the establishment of separate German schools, because the German government was sensitive to internal political developments in the Ottoman Empire. At the same time as a point of principle, Germany was not ready to forgo any of its rights under the Capitulations.

Doubtless, the German and Ottoman governments viewed the Hilfsverein and its schools in Palestine as a very marginal issue; yet their treatment of them vividly reflected the political issues between Germany and the Ottoman Empire.

Notes

1 For further reference see: Moshe Rinnot, *Hevrat ha-'Ezra li-Yehudey Germanya, bi-yetzira u-ve-ma'avak* (Jerusalem, 1971); idem, "The Zionist Organization and the Hilfsverein — Cooperation and Conflict (1901-1914)," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, 11 (London, 1976); Isaiah Friedman, *Germany, Turkey and Zionism, 1897-1918* (Oxford, 1977); idem, "The Hilfsverein der deutchen Juden, The German Foreign Ministry and the Controversy with the Zionists, 1901-1918," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, 24 (London, 1979).

2 *Erster Geschäfstbericht des Hilfsvereins der deutschen Juden 1901-1903* (Berlin, 1903), p. 6.

3 "James Simon, Industrialist, Art Collector, Philanthropist," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, 10 (London, 1965).

4 Ernst Feder, *Politik unter Humanität: Paul Nathan, ein Lebensbild* (Berlin, 1929); idem, "Paul Nathan and his Work for East European and Palestinian Jewry," *Historia Judaica*

(April 1952); idem, "Paul Nathan, the Man and His Work," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, 3 (London, 1958).

5 Narcisse Leven, *Cinquante ans d'histoire*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1911-1920); A. Chouraqui, *Cent ans d'histoire* (Paris, 1960).

6 Z. Sajkowski, "Conflicts in the Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Founding of the Anglo-Jewish Association, The Vienna Allianz and the Hilfsverein," *Jewish Social Studies*, 1-2 (1957).

7 In Hilfsverein schools — 2,624 (44.5%); in Alliance schools — 2,071 (35.1%); in other schools — 1,200 (20.4%), *Educational Encyclopedia*, vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 1964), p. 709, in Hebrew.

8 Rinott, *Hevrat ha-'Ezra*, ch. 15. The Technikum, now the Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, was eventually opened in the original building in Haifa in January 1925.

9 Nathan sent his plan to the German Foreign Office through the good offices of the journalist Arthur von Huhn. For the full text of the letter (in German), see *ibid.*, pp. 254-256; M. Eliav, *Die Juden Palästinas in der deutschen Politik* (Tel Aviv, 1973), pp. 255-257; Auswärtiges Amt, *Juden in der Turkei* (AA/JT), vol. 1, K175925-7.

10 Cf. Secretary of State Richthofen's memorandum, May 5, 1901, AA/JT vol. 1, K176019-22.

11 AA/JT vol. 2, K176197 and see Israel State Archives, German Consulate in Jerusalem (CJ), CJ/A XXVIII 39i, Aug. 31, 1906; May 13, 1908. See also Consul Schmidt, Jerusalem, July 14, 1904, CJ/A XXVII 27ii and other documents in this file.

12 I. Ben-Zvi, *Eretz-Yisra'el ve-yishuvah bi-yemey ha-shilton ha-'Otmani* (Jerusalem, 1955), pp. 123-136, 336. The Ottoman Empire revoked the Capitulations after the outbreak of World War I, on Sept. 11, 1914.

13 CJ/A XXVIII 39i Aug. 29, 1908.

14 Legally the Technikum was established by a separate body "The Jewish Institute for Technical Education in Palestine." In this society the Hilfsverein was one of several partners. However, practically the Technikum affairs were conducted from the Hilfsverein office, and by its leaders and officials in Berlin. Cf. Rinott, *Hevrat ha-'Ezra*, pp. 184ff.; also *Toldot ha-Tekhniyon be-reshito 1908-1925* (Haifa, 1953).

15 CJ/A XXVIII 39i.

16 See exchange of letters in 1911-1912, AA/JT vol. 2.

17 See memorandum of Consul-General Schmidt, Aug. 10, 1913, CJ/A XXVIII 27, vol. 3.

18 *Ibid.*

19 Central Zionist Archives (CZA), CM 46/21. The Lämel school in Jerusalem was founded in 1856 with a donation by Elise Herz-Lämel, Vienna, Austria. In 1888 it passed into the hands of a German-Jewish philanthropic society and eventually was handed over to the Hilfsverein (1910). The Lämel school remained under 'double' patronage of both the Austrian and the German consulates in Jerusalem. The publications on the Lämel school are numerous, cf. I. Press, *Eleh toldot beyt ha-Sefer le-ha-atzil le-beyt Lemel bi-Yerushalayim* (Jerusalem, 1936); N. Vielmetti, "Der Wiener jüdische Publizist L.A. Frankl und die Begründung der Lämelschule in Jerusalem 1856," *Institute for German History Yearbook*, 4 (Tel Aviv, 1975), pp. 167-204.

20 CZA/A 20/55. The circular was signed by Ernst Jäckti who was known for promoting German-Ottoman relations; cf. H.C Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action* 1815-1945 (The Hague, 1955), pp. 99ff.; 218ff.

21 March 19, 1913, CJ/A III 24.

22 May 13, 1913, *ibid.*

23 Wangenheim to Reichskanzler Bethmann-Hollweg, April 26, 1913, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. 38 (1926), pp. 196ff. Şevket was murdered on June 11, 1913.

24 June 15, 1914, CJ/A III 24ii.

25 The decisive session took place on October 26, 1913, in Berlin.

26 AA/JT vol. 3, K176453, K176458; cf. Rinott, *Hevrat ha-'Ezra*, pp. 37ff.

A Note on The Christian Contribution to Palestine's Development in the 19th Century

ALEX CARMEL

It is widely known that during the last decades of Ottoman rule — and after centuries of more or less constant deterioration — there were remarkable changes and improvements in Palestine. This development is generally attributed to the arrival of large numbers of Jews and their achievements in the decades preceding World War I. The Jewish contribution to Palestine's revival in the late Ottoman period has been extensively recorded, mainly in Israel. It was one of several factors which brought forth the Balfour Declaration, itself one of the foundation stones of the State of Israel.

In contrast, the Christians' role in the 19th-century drama in Palestine has been largely neglected by historians in Israel and elsewhere. Although the actual number of Christians who settled in Palestine at the time is very small compared with the number of Jewish immigrants, their contribution should not be underestimated. To mention just one example: the name Moses Montefiore may be better remembered than that of his Christian contemporary Samuel Gobat, but the latter's part in Palestine's revival was not less than the famous Montefiore's.[1]

During the three centuries preceding Napoleon's invasion of Palestine in 1799, Europeans had shown little interest in Palestine. The discovery of the New World and the emergence of the Protestant Church (to whom the Holy Places had little significance), absorbed Europe's attention. Prior to 1799 the Ottoman system of Capitulations had enabled France to extend protection over most of the foreigners and the Catholic institutions in Palestine, but this activity was somewhat limited and the degree of freedom accorded to the French by the local Ottoman officials varied according to the stringency of the central government's control from Istanbul. In 1774 Russia was able to obtain a similar concession with regard to the Greek Orthodox community. Moreover, the chaotic conditions prevailing in the country prior to the 19th century inhibited Christians from traveling to the Holy Land. Those who had the courage to do so recorded their adventures and the perils they encountered, and this copious and detailed literature is an outstanding historical source revealing the decaying conditions in Palestine under Ottoman rule.

The country became a focus of international interest in the spring of 1799

when Napoleon advanced from Egypt into Palestine. His enterprise was brought to a halt at Acre when the French siege of the town failed. But, as Fisher noted long ago in his *History of Europe*, in France itself the French were nevertheless enthusiastic:

> much they might mock at the Pope and the priest, [but] read with a thrill the bulletins of the young French General who had taken Palestine, had set up his quarters in the Monastery of Nazareth and had read the Bible to his officers under a Syrian sky... The recovery of Palestine from the Turks, which appealed even to the Baptist chief of a British Cabinet at the end of the Great War [1914-1918] was an idea which exercised a yet more powerful attraction for the countrymen of St. Louis...[2]

In Palestine itself, the short Napoleonic campaign brought no immediate change. The French left almost as soon as they had arrived and the notorious "*paşas* system" which obstructed foreign activity was reinstated. However, Napoleon's campaign did have a long-term effect in Palestine: France had had a taste of liberating the Holy Land from the "infidel" and found it rather pleasant. It seemed that only a shadow remained of the once mighty Ottoman conqueror — a reality that England and Prussia did not ignore either. Indeed, even the Protestant Church began to accord increasing significance to Palestine in the vision of the Latter Days. Thus, on January 3, 1826 a certain John Nicolayson entered the gates of Jerusalem determined to establish for the Church of England too a permanent seat in the Holy City.[3]

In the fourth decade of the 19th century, when Palestine came under Egyptian rule, there was a crucial decision relating to the status of foreigners. In order to placate the Great Powers, who were dismayed by the disruption to the political status quo, Muḥammad 'Alī (and Ibrāhīm Paşa who represented his father in the conquered areas) adopted an overtly liberal policy towards the foreign and non-Muslim local population in Palestine. So, for the first time, the Egyptians opened up the country to Europeans to prove to the Christian powers that Egyptian rule was so much more tolerant than the previous Ottoman rule. Before the Egyptian conquest, Nicolayson, a subject of a great power as friendly to the Ottomans as Britain, could not overcome all the obstacles in Ottoman-ruled Palestine. "Only when the Egyptian forces headed by Ibrahim Pasha first entered Palestine", he wrote, "could I really settle down in Jerusalem... and therefore the permanent Protestant mission in Jerusalem proper could first be founded only in 1833".[4]

Egypt's tolerant attitude to foreign Christian involvement in Palestine resulted also in an upsurge of French and Russian political activity in the country, which in turn provoked Britain in 1838 to establish the first permanent foreign consulate in Jerusalem.[5] In the same way Nicolayson's lively Anglican activity moved the Catholic and Greek Orthodox Churches to turn their attention to Palestine. Thus it was during the period of Egyptian rule that the country was first exposed to virtually unrestricted European activities

and the foundations were laid for the extensive European involvement in Palestine in modern times.

In their next campaign against Egypt in 1839, the Ottomans suffered such a total defeat that the Empire seemed to be on the verge of collapse. In 1840 England, Russia, Austria and Prussia rallied to the Ottoman cause and, to spite France who was Egypt's ally, chased the Egyptians out of Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine. Not since the Crusades had Christendom had a better chance to impose its rule in the Holy Land. Four European powers had rescued the Ottoman Empire from the brink of disaster and had returned to the sultan's sovereignty territories which had been considered to be irrecoverable. Consequently, the Europeans thought that Palestine would be a reasonable price for the Ottomans to pay for services rendered. However, among the numerous schemes discussed not a single one was acceptable to all the Christian parties involved, let alone to the Ottomans. In these circumstances, Palestine was handed back to the Ottomans and remained theirs for nearly another eighty years. The intractable rivalry among the Great Powers over the country's destiny prevailed over all other considerations.

The Great Powers decision to return Palestine to Ottoman sovereignty had unforeseen repercussions: the proposal by Friedrich Wilhelm IV — Prussia's devout Protestant king — to seize the moment and establish a Protestant bishopric in Jerusalem was supported by Britain.[6] In 1841 the Ottomans reluctantly came to terms with the founding of this new and first Anglo-Prussian institution and acknowledged its legitimacy, in spite of their fears of a violently adverse Muslim reaction. As things turned out, it was "an outstanding sensation that moved not even one leaf in the Syrian forest; not one Muslim noticed that a royal "Prussian bishop" had joined the masses crowding the streets of Jerusalem," as one Württemberg newspaper quipped.[7] But the same innovation that at first rustled no leaves was destined eventually to sway quite a few branches and to shake the entire Palestine forest. To the very same place whence a royal Prussian bishop was hastening (he was the Swiss Samuel Gobat mentioned above) several other Christian bishops were soon to scurry in order to counteract his influence. With clergy from England, Prussia, Russia, Austria and other countries came also the first Latin patriarch to be sent by the Pope since the time of the Crusades, explicitly to neutralize the Protestant activities.[8]

Distinguished clergymen were naturally accompanied by a large clerical and secular entourage. Moreover, communities of foreign residents whether permanent or temporary merited representation and protection by consuls, vice-consuls, consular agents, dragomans, *ḳawwāses* and other functionaries as befitted the Great Powers then basking in their own glory. The prestige of the foreign consuls grew in proportion to the numbers of people under their protection. A power that could increase the number of its protégés might create a position for itself from which it could inherit Palestine whenever the final curtain should fall on the "sick man on the Bosphorus". Consequently, the

powers started competing among themselves for influence in Palestine. The race focused primarily on the new religious establishments in Jerusalem (accounting for the growing centrality of Jerusalem in the life of the country).

Thus Palestine in the mid-19th century had already attracted over one hundred foreign Christian residents, most of them to Jerusalem. The founding of the Anglo-Prussian Bishopric was crucial in creating this new situation and to the major change in Palestine in the second half of the 19th century. The Bishopric served on one hand as the main support and framework for Protestant activity on a scale unprecedented in Palestine, and on the other hand as a challenge to the Catholic and Greek Orthodox Churches (backed by France and Russia) goading them to expand their own activities. The original intention of the Protestant Bishopric had been to seek converts among the Jews, but despite considerable efforts the results were negligible. Missionary work among the Muslim population was extremely difficult, arousing zealous resistance in the Ottoman authorities. So the Protestant mission was driven to offering its services primarily to the Arab members of other Christian Churches, which impinged directly on the vested interests of other powers, impelling them to expand their own activities in Palestine.[9] Because the first Protestant bishop Alexander concentrated his missionary campaign among the Jews, no Latin patriarch was sent to Jerusalem for several years after his arrival. But when his successor Gobat directed his main missionary efforts at Christian Arabs, France pleaded with the Pope to appoint a Latin patriarch to Jerusalem to counter the Protestants' work. It was the same motive which persuaded the Russians to install their first religious delegation in Jerusalem in 1848.

In terms of Palestine's development, the Catholic and Greek Orthodox communities' (to say nothing of the Jews') resentment of the Protestants was a spur to the profound changes taking place in the country. But, from a religious and political viewpoint, the "Christian mission among Christians" caused considerable tension between the Christian communities in Palestine and in the Christian world at large. Missionary and other religious institutions were sprouting and competing ferociously with each other. It was not long before the Greek Orthodox community — the largest but most backward Christian Church in Palestine — became the prime target for the lively efforts of the efficient, sophisticated and rich Catholic and Protestant missionaries.[10] The tensions which had erupted since the 1840s between the missionaries of the various Christian Churches predictably revived the old dispute between Catholics and Greek Orthodox over the Holy Places in Palestine. The Greek Orthodox had acquired control over most of these places, because during the French Revolution the authorities in Paris ceased supporting the Catholic institutions in Palestine and many of them were subsequently seized by the Greek Orthodox. In 1853 the tsar's persistence and arrogance towards the Sublime Porte, in demanding the upholding of his protégés' rights in Palestine, not only stirred the wrath of France but also provoked the suspicion in

England that the Russians intended to use this issue to deal the "sick man" his death blow. Hence the war in Crimea, where Britain and France hoped to cripple the Russian bear most effectively by destroying his naval war fleet.[11]

After the *Ḥaṭṭ-ı Hümāyūn* and the 1856 Paris Treaty,[12] the Ottomans acknowledged the rights of foreigners and non-Muslim subjects in the Empire. Furthermore, far-reaching general reforms in the Ottoman system of government were promised. This encouraged the Great Powers to expand and intensify their activities in Palestine and probably nowhere else in the world were so many missionary institutions built in such a short time over such a small area as in Jerusalem in the second half of the 19th century. The large French, Russian, Prussian and English foundations in Palestine date back to the period of the Crimean war and the years immediately following. The Schneller Orphanage estate in Jerusalem which by 1914 was as large as the area of the Old City,[13] and the monumental compound built by the Russians outside the city walls are evidence of the amazing changes which occurred in Jerusalem after the 1820s when Nicolayson had made his vain and humble attempt to establish a Protestant base in the Holy City.

The vigorous European presence in Palestine, the growing consular corps, improved means of land and sea travel and better local security all contributed to the successful realization of the German Templars' own settlement plan in the late 1860s. In a short time this project had doubled the number of foreign Christian residents in Palestine.[14] Indeed, when the Alliance Israélite Universelle founded the Jewish agricultural school Miḳve Yisra'el near Jaffa, when the first Jewish colony Petaḥ Tiḳva was founded in 1878, and notably when the so-called "first (Jewish) immigration wave" began to arrive in 1882 to initiate the most profound change in the country's history — by this time the Christian world had already been extremely active in Palestine and the rivalry among the Great Powers over Palestine's future was at its height.

A critical look at events from the 1830s onwards shows that until the 1870s the Jewish community did not play a significant role in the changes occurring in Palestine. Its contribution did not compare with that of the European powers, who in general wanted to foster Christian interests. The French, with Russians a close second, had the strongest conviction of their right to determine Palestine's political future, and to this end they sometimes used government resources. In England, however, where the notion of the "restoration of the Jews in Palestine" had played a not insignificant role in public opinion since the late 18th century,[15] it was mainly church societies which engaged in activities in Palestine. In the German states the initiative was also primarily in private hands (such as the Templars or Schneller, previously mentioned), but they, too, did not want to lag behind the other powers. Moreover, the German Catholics aspired to keep up with the German Protestants, and both parties had their eyes on Templars.[16]

Towards the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, Christian enterprise in Palestine became, among other things and sometimes

predominantly, a matter of prestige, not only between the powers but often between rival communities of one power. Thus eventually the whole country — with Jerusalem leading — was dotted with monumental sites (the Protestant Augusta Victoria hospice on Mount Scopus and the Catholic Dormition church and monastery on Mount Zion are German examples). Their practical value was questionable from their inception, since apparently from a certain moment in the late 19th century the provision of Christian religious and other services was catching up with the needs in the country. Yet apart from the services supplied by the Christians, there was the enormous capital invested by Christians in their enterprises, which helped greatly to revive the tottering economy of Ottoman Palestine. Christian activities also motivated the Ottomans to improve and maintain security in the country — a precondition to economic growth. This, in turn, fostered further settlement. The survival of the Templar colonies throughout the country, and not just in towns, had a special significance. The Templars' persistence in the face of all the risks proved to the Jews that European settlement in Palestine was possible.[17] The Jewish people, despite having no consuls of "their own" in Palestine nor an ambassador in Istanbul, found it easier to return to their ancient homeland.

The range and pace of the enterprises of these Jewish "Lovers of Zion" did indeed, from the 1880s onwards, cast a growing shadow over the Christians' activities. Yet the Christians' part in laying the foundation for the remarkable development of Palestine should not be underplayed.[18]

Notes

1 *Samuel Gobat, Bishop of Jerusalem, His Life and Work* (London, 1884); T. Schölly, *Samuel Gobat, evangelischer Bischof von Jerusalem* (Basel, 1900); Friedrich Schick, *Samuel Gobat, der Bischof von Jerusalem* (Giessen und Basel, 1958).

2 H.A.L. Fisher, *A History of Europe* (London, 1960), vol. 2, p. 915.

3 "Mitteilungen für eine Skizze der Geschichte der englischen Mission und des evangelischen Bisthums zu Jerusalem von J. Nikolayson [sic]", *Zions-Bote* 1 (1852), p. 7.

4 *Ibid.*, pp.7-9.

5 M. Vereté, "Why was a British Consulate established in Jerusalem?", *The English Historical Review*, 85 (1970), pp. 316-345.

6 W.H. Hechler, *The Jerusalem Bishopric* (London, 1883); K. Schmidt-Clausen, *Vorweggenommene Einheit — die Gründung des Bistums Jerusalem im Jahre 1841* (Berlin-Hamburg, 1965).

7 As quoted in A. Carmel, *Die Siedlungen der württembergischen Templer in Palästina 1868-1918* (Stuttgart, 1973), p. 13.

8 P. Medebielle, *The Diocese of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem* (Jerusalem, 1963), pp. 26-31.

9 W.T. Gidney, *History of the London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews* (London, 1908).

10 On the Greek Orthodox community see Vasilii Nikolaevich Khitrovo, *Orthodoxy in the Holy Land* (St. Petersburg, 1882), in Russian; Th. G. Stavrou, *Russian Interests in Palestine 1882-1914* (Thessaloniki, 1963); D. Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843-1914* (Oxford, 1969); Medebielle, pp. 26-31.

11 H.W.T. Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea* (London, 1936); Varda Rachelson, "The Holy Places as a Cause of the Crimean War", M.A. Thesis, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan (1972), in Hebrew.

12 J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East; a Documentary Record* (Princeton, 1956), vol. 1, pp. 149-156.

13 Ludwig Schneller, *Tröstet Jerusalem! Tagebuchblätter über eine Inspektionsreise zu den Anstalten des Syrischen Waisenhauses im heiligen Lande im Jahr 1905* (Köln-Marienburg, 1906); Hermann Schneller, *Johann Ludwig Schneller* (Metzingen, 1971).

14 Carmel, *Die Siedlungen*, chapter II.

15 M. Vereté, "The Restoration of the Jews in English Protestant Thought 1790-1840", *Middle Eastern Studies* (1972), pp. 3-50.

16 Erwin Gatz, "Katholische Auslandsarbeit und deutsche Weltpolitik unter Wilhelm II", *Römische Quartalschrft.* 73 (1978), Parts 1-2.

17 A. Carmel, *Christen als Pioniere im Heiligen Land. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Pilgermission und des Wiederaufbaus Palästinas im 19. Jahrhundert* (Basel, 1981).

18 A. Carmel, "The Great Powers and Palestine Until the First World War," in I.Kolatt (ed.), *The History of the Jewish Community in Palestine from the Modern Period of the Nineteenth Century to the Middle of the Twentieth Century*, vol. 1 (forthcoming), in Hebrew.

The "Foreign Relations" of the Governors of Jerusalem Toward the End of the Ottoman Period

DAVID KUSHNER

Although the High Contracting Parties at the Paris Conference of 1856 solemnly agreed to guarantee the independence and integrity of the the Ottoman Empire, this by no means meant a new beginning for the beleaguered and crumbling Empire. The European powers, in their thirst for strategic, political and economic advantages continued to meddle in Ottoman affairs, to seek and secure privileges and concessions for themselves, and to build up economic and political assets in all the remaining territories of the Empire. Armed with the Capitulations granted to them by the sultans, the powers encouraged the influx of their citizens into the Empire, helped them in their pursuits, were they religious, philanthropic or economic, and defended their rights whenever threatened. Similarly, they continued to establish or promote "special relationships" with "protected" local communities, particularly among the non-Muslim population, and to support the local communities against any infringement of their status and well-being. In this the powers were not only motivated by a genuine concern for law and justice, and solidarity with their fellow Christians, but by the hope of gaining a foothold in those areas of the Empire which they coveted for themselves, as well as the desire to establish a claim to these regions if and when the Empire finally collapsed. By the end of the 19th century there was hardly an area in the Ottoman Empire which had escaped penetration by any one or several of the European powers.

There were benefits which the Ottomans could derive from this foreign penetration. Among these was the foreigners' contribution to modernization in all fields, which was considerable, and as the Ottomans themeselves knew, absolutely indispensible. Another was the multinational character of this penetration, acting as a restraint against the ambitions of any one power and so helping the Ottoman Empire in no small way to stand up to covetous enemies. Yet, the adverse implications of the process were obvious too. For one, the intense competition among the powers themselves accounted for many political complications, since favoring one power more than another in any matter would inevitably result in a serious deterioration of relations with the others. Secondly, the increase in the number of foreigners meant, of course, an increase in the number of those enjoying the extraterritorial privileges prescribed by the Capitulations. This, in turn, meant not only an affront to

Ottoman national pride, and an infringement upon Ottoman sovereignty, but constituted a serious obstacle to the development of local commerce and industry and to the stabilization of Ottoman finances, and allowed for further entrenchment of foreign interests in the country. It is no wonder that throughout the last decades of the Empire, the Ottoman government often attempted to circumvent the Capitulations in various ways, if not to abolish them altogether, with the powers zealously resisting any changes in their acnient privileges. The state also sought to maintain and enforce the equal rights granted to the non-Muslim population during the *Tanẓīmāt* period, and to prevent any interference in their favor by the Great Powers. However, infringement upon the rights of the non-Muslims and cases of their maltreatment were still frequent and continued to provide numerous opportunities for intervention by the powers in the affairs of the Empire.

Among the territories of the Ottoman Empire which were the focus of foreign infiltration and ambition Palestine was no exception. Indeed, because of its geopolitical location and its character as the Holy Land, it became one of the most coveted areas in the Empire and one of the most infiltrated. Pilgrims, missionaries, scholars, settlers, and entrepreneurs of all nations were part of the influx into Palestine throughout the 19th century, and there was hardly a foreign power which was not represented there in one way or another. The mere presence of their nationals or institutions attracted the interest of the governments concerned, and the prestige associated with such a presence in the Holy Land only served to reinforce whatever political or economic interests they had in the countly. In addition, since any changes that might affect the status of Palestine were likely to have a bearing upon the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire as a whole, with obvious implications regarding the balance of power in Europe, all European powers deemed it necessary to keep a watchful eye on developments there and to see to it that their own interest were not neglected.

Paramount among the European powers which developed a close interest in Palestine were Britain and France. For Britain a major role was played by economic and strategic interests. Because of its proximity to their main lines of communication with India and the rest of Asia, Palestine had assumed great importance in the eyes of the British, and such events as the opening of the Suez Canal (1869), the purchase of the Egyptian shares in the Canal Company (1875), the occupation of Egypt (1882) and the acquisition of the Iranian oil concession (1901), could only increase it. In addition, a number of religious and philanthropic institutions were established in Palestine by British citizens. There was never a major British, or Protestant, community in Palestine to serve as an instrument for establishing a strong British foothold. But Britain was able to assume the role of the main champion of various other communities (Jews, Druze, etc.), and even of the local population as a whole and was quite successful in increasing her influence upon them. France, on her part, claimed a strong interest in Palestine, mainly by virtue of her historical ties with the

Levant as a whole, and by virtue of her traditional protection over the Holy Places held by the Latin monks and over Catholic institutions in general. Challenged in her role as the chief representative of Catholicism by other nations, France encouraged the establishment of purely French institutions in Palestine, and offered her protection to other communities such as the North African Jews and Muslims.

Russia and Germany were close "runners-up" and their presence in Palestine began to be felt particularly in the second half of the 19th century. Russia had long regarded herself as the protector of the Greek Orthodox Church and went on to set up a great number of religious and educational establishments of her own. In encouraging the establishment of religious and charitable institutions Germany, too, followed the patterm of the other powers, but German penetrations into Palestine also came, and uniquely so, through the colonies established by settling members of the Templar order.

All this presented the Ottomans with the familiar problems which confronted them elsewhere in the Empire, i.e. the application of the Capitulations and the reforms relating to the non-Muslim population, as well as with the fierce rivalry which went on among the powers over their rights in the Holy Places. As in other parts of the Empire (but perhaps more so in Palestine), the problem confronting the Ottomans was really that of keeping control of Palestine firmly in their own hands. As the Crimean War showed, any serious incident between the Ottoman government and a European power could serve as a pretext for a military operation against the Empire. At the same time, the very growth of foreign interest in Palestine could become the reason for an invasion of Palestine itself. Toward the end of the 19th century it was perhaps Britain which seemed to be the greatest threat to Palestine's security. Britain aimed to protect her base in Egypt and possibly to extend her sphere of influence northward, and became very suspicious of German activities in Palestine and of Ottoman designs to displace her from Egypt. It was quite conceivable that she would try to forestall any early entrenchment of rival interests in Palestine, and being strongly based in Egypt, it would be a relatively easy operation. To be sure, other potential aggressors toward Palestine could not be ruled out and at different times during the closing decades of Ottoman rule in Palestine the threat of a French invasion, for example, seemed quite real. Since such an invasion was likely to come from the sea, the coast of Palestine bcecame, in effect, a sensitive border area which the Ottomans could not ignore, much the same as they could not ignore the Sinai Peninsula constituting the land bridge between Palestine and Egypt.

This brief introduction to Palestine's political status during the late Ottoman period, may serve as a background for understanding the very complex relations which existed between the representatives of the Ottoman government and the foreign powers on the scene itself. On the one hand were the Ottoman governors, *mutaṣarrifs,* of the three *sancaks* into which Palestine was divided, and their subordinates, the *ḳā'imaḳāms* in the subdistricts or the

kaẓās. On the other, there were the foreign consuls, appointed by each and every power with some interest in Palestine. Among the governors, the *mutaṣarrif* of Jerusalem was the most important and high ranking by virtue of the independent status accorded to his province (in itself the outcome of this area's special political sensitivity). It was also in Jerusalem, with its large foreign community and concentration of Holy Places and foreign institutions, that the consuls of the powers resided, with vice-consuls or consular agents appointed to other cities. The mutual dealings of consuls and governors were the most intensive in Jerusalem and they covered the whole range of issues which were of mutual interest. Although important matters were naturally discussed and decided upon in the capitals, it was here that the decisions of the higher officials were applied. Reports by the consuls to their superiors the ambassadors or the foreign ministers, on which the following brief survey is based, reveal much which is of interest for the understanding of these micro-level aspects of the relations between the Ottomans and the powers.[1]

* * *

The attempts to circumvent the Capitulations were a recurring issue between the governors and the consuls. Some of them originated in new regulations imposed by the Ottoman government and handed down for implementation by the governors, in apparent contradiction to the Capitulatory rights. There were, for example, measures affecting the free movement of foreigners in the country,[2] and others requiring special permits for the establishment of religious, educational or medical institutions.[3] There were also attempts to impose Ottoman regulations over foreign schools,[4] and to impose certain taxes on the foreign community.[5] Efforts were even made to deny foreign nationality or protection to "unqualified" non-Ottoman residents.[6] Other acts by the authorities, relating to individuals, were the doings of the local officials themselves, who were driven either by overzealousness to subvert foreign interests in the country or by pecuniary motives. Such, for example, were the many cases of violation of domicile,[7] refusal of permits for purchasing or registering land,[8] denial of proper court proceedings,[9] maltreatment at the customs,[10] and exactions of different kinds.[11] Whatever the case, once brought to the attention of the consul it was customary for him to contact the authorities and stand up to what seemed to him an infringement upon the rights and privileges of those whom it was his duty to protect. He would demand full redress in the case of an individual whose rights were affected and he would, usually in concert with his colleagues, express his objection to any changes in custom which were not approved by his superiors. Governors would usually comply, as would the Ottoman government itself. The Ottoman government's attempts to circumvent the Capitulations usually failed, except in minor cases, and it was only at the outbreak of the World War that the government took the opportunity to announce the complete abolition of the Capitulations.

Within the struggle over the application of the Capitulations, it should be noted, no other single issue commanded the attention of the governors and consuls during the last decades of Ottoman rule in Palestine, as much as the question of Jewish immigration. From 1882 onward the Ottoman government kept imposing one regulation after another with the aim of curbing Jewish settlement in the country, affecting not only entry by Jews, but also land purchase by them. These regulations were "supplemented" in Palestine itself by the acts of governors or other officials, who interpreted or misinterpreted the regulations according to their own whims. Behind this policy, to be sure, lay not only Ottoman fears of a drastic increase in the number of foreign citizens in Palestine and the buildup of foreign interests there (British, Russian or otherwise), but also the suspicion that new Jewish immigrants were harboring nationalist goals, afflicting the Empire with one more separatist movement.[12] In any event, the foreign powers could in no way acquiesce to the Ottoman measures, which seemed to them in flagrant violation of the Capitulations. Besides, they had a vested interest in increasing the numbers of their own nationals in Palestine. Under their pressure the Ottoman government was forced frequently to change the regulations although it did not abolish them altogether. The foreign consuls in Palestine did not cooperate with the authorities on the application of these restrictive measures, and regularly protested each and every case when one of their Jewish nationals was denied entry or the right to purchase land. Once again, it was the Capitulations, not the Ottoman regulations, which had the upper hand.[13]

A source of a great many complaints directed by the consuls toward the governors were cases of maltreatment of non-Muslims (citizens and foreigners alike), by officials, or members of the Muslim population. As elsewhere in the Empire, in Palestine too, the formal legal equality introduced by the *Tanẓīmāt* for non-Muslim citizens, did not always positively affect the behavior of lower officials or the population as a whole. On the contrary, it often aroused their jealousies and animosities. Furthermore, there was widespread hostility toward foreigners and their privileges. Consequently sporadic cases of discrimination or injury occurred such as arbitrary exactions and arrests, bodily assaults, insults, and delays and discrimination at court.[14] The consuls, in such cases, invariably demanded full redress, the quick and severe punishment of those responsible and, at times, the dismissal of the officials connected with the affair. Much haggling ensued, with the governors usually conceding, although bureaucratic and other obstacles often delayed quick action.

Among the incidents affecting the security or well-being of the non-Muslims were some serious cases of violence, or even riots. By the end of the 1850s, following the "Stirring Times" of which British Consul James Finn wrote so extensively, public order in Palestine greatly improved. And yet, the authorities were unable, down to the final days of Ottoman rule, to fully restore law and order, so cases of lawlessness and violence were still common. Given the

tensions between the Muslim and non-Muslim population, a provocation of any sort could easily lead to full-scale riots, and apart from the perennial incursions by the Bedouins (much mitigated) it was these outbreaks of lawlessness with which the authorities particularly had to tangle. Times of war between the Ottoman Empire and one of the European powers were particularly dangerous,[15] and mobilization, which naturally affected the Muslim population alone, acted as a further incentive for agitation.[16] The main arena for these incidents were the mixed cities. These cities were the scene of dramatic growth in population, with a sizeable influx by foreigners and non-Muslims arousing resentment and jealousy, particularly among the Muslim lower classes.[17] It is true that in a city like Jerusalem peace was rarely disrupted. This was due in no small measure to the presence of a high-ranking governor, a relatively strong military and police force, and the consuls. But in most other mixed towns, where conditions were different and where deterrents were not as powerful as in Jerusalem, incidents of various kinds became quite frequent at times.

Be it as it may, these incidents or riots were the subject of intensive contacts between the governors and the consuls acting on behalf of their own citizens, their protected communities, or the non-Muslims in general. The consuls would invariably demand the suppression of violence, arrest and trial of the perpetrators, and, at times, the removal of the officials responsible.[18] In times of excitement and restlessness, when such incidents were likely to occur, they would ask for preventive measures, including the reinforcement of the security forces in the area.[19] The impression gained from the sources is that the authorities usually did act with resolution and vigor, suppressing incidents or sending in reinforcements to prevent them. The governor's motivation to act was clear. He was, no doubt, genuinely concerned with the preservation of order and stability within the borders of his district. He was, in addition, fully aware of the political implications which might ensue from the outbreak of disorders in terms of Ottoman relations with the Great Powers. And he was, finally, keenly aware of the implications to himself, personally, should he fail to fulfill his duty. The consuls, as he very well knew, were sending detailed reports of the events to their superiors in Istanbul or the European capitals, and these would include accounts of any negligence or misdeeds on his part.

The rivalry of the Christian communities in Palestine for control over the Holy Places was yet another important issue between the governors and those consuls who found themselves involved. The petty rivalries, at times on such minor issues as the right to clean a certain area, continued down to the end of the Ottoman period and involved virtually all the communities with a foothold in the Holy Places and the powers behind them. These naturally had grave repercussions for relations between the powers themselves as well as between them and the Ottoman Empire. The governor, as the man on the spot, always became involved, was called in to act as arbitrator or, in cases of violence, to calm the excitement, or both. The general rule was for him to act promptly to

contain the incident within limits and open an investigation. At times he would attempt to find a peaceful solution but it was more common to refer the whole matter to the capital.[20] The implications of an all-out clash with any of the guardians of the Holy Places were clear to the governor and it actually suited him to let others pass judgment. This suited the consuls, too, who preferred such matters to be settled by their ambassadors with the Ottoman government.[21] Typical solutions were either a restoration of the status quo or the assumption of multilateral or "neutral" (i.e. Ottoman) responsibility for the site involved.[22] Slight favoritism toward the local communities, such as the Greeks or the Armenians, to the detriment of the foreign, such as the Latin, was common. But this was frequently offset by the pressure that the foreign power could exercise on the Ottoman government.[23]

There was frequent contact between the govérnors and the consuls concerning other issues of mutual interest. The question of protection over the Latin clergy and Latin institutions was a constant bone of contention between the French consuls and the consuls of other Catholic nations, and came to the fore when incidents occurred involving non-French Catholics.[24] The authorities' preference in dealing with one consul or the other was, therefore, of crucial importance to the powers. One other issue, involving the Russians, were the constant intrigues within the Greek Orthodox community between the Greek and the Arab factions, with the Russians lending their support to the latter. These intrigues reached their peak at times when the patriarch of Jerusalem was to be elected.[25] The granting of concessions for surveys or development projects to competing foreign nationals was yet another matter of great interest to the powers concerned. The actual concession was given by Istanbul, but preliminary reports and recommendations were sought from the governors, and the consuls were zealous in their efforts to secure their support.[26]

There were a number of other occasions which led to intensive contacts between governors and consuls, and some had only a marginal relation to the actual status and well-being of foreign citizens or the non-Muslim population. The consuls, for example, were very interested in the improvement of trade facilities, such as the Jaffa port and its customs house.[27] This was partly due, no doubt, to the high proportion of foreigners in the traffic and trade which was carried out through Jaffa, but amounted, in effect, to intervention in the internal affairs of the country. The same was true for matters of public health, such as the frequent cholera epidemics, or economic hardships, such as those resulting from swarms of locusts. The consuls would express their concern, urge the authorities to take the necessary steps, and even offer their assistance.[28] Matters of general public order were also of much concern to the consuls. In the turbulent years of the 1840s and 1850s it had been customary for the consuls (particularly the British and French consuls) to actively meddle in the affairs of the country, maintain contacts with the feuding factions, and give advice to the governors on how best to preserve law and order. At times, it

was the consuls' influence which settled conflicts and restored security.[29] With the stabilization of Palestine and with the somewhat lessened foreign influence upon the Ottoman government during the following decades, this type of foreign involvement decreased significantly, but occasions when formal or informal advice was given to governors by the consuls on matters of government and administration were still not rare.[30]

The foreign consuls were, on many occasions, approached by individuals or groups in the population, to act on their behalf. In one case, for example, the Druze sought the British consul's support in getting an exemption from military service.[31] In another case, a member of the Ḥusaynī family, seeing himself discriminated against by the authorities, complained to the British consul.[32] During the Aqaba crisis, Gaza dignitaries launched their grievances to the British representative and expressed their hopes for a new delineation of the border which would leave them under British rule.[33] Even the Ottoman governor himself would sometimes seek the consul's intervention in order to have them pressure the Ottoman government, through their embassies, to heed his requests.[34]

The personal relations between the governors and the consuls were complex. There is no doubt that governors usually felt very hostile to the consuls who acted as little rulers in what they (the governors) rightly saw as their own domain.[35] They often perceived it as their task to subvert the consuls' power, sometimes attempting to stir up mischief between them. In their attitude they no doubt reflected the general outlook prevailing in the capital and, in fact, when harsher policies toward the foreign presence were prevalent in Istanbul, these were also pursued in the provinces. But of course, a great deal depended on the personality of the governor himself. With little relation to the policy determined in Istanbul, he could be a xenophobe, or a man with little knowledge of European culture, which often adversely affected his dealings with the consuls.[36] He could, on the other hand, be an open and enlightened man willing to befriend and learn from Europe's representatives in his district.

Over and above anything else, however, there was a mutual need the governor and the consul felt for each other. As already mentioned, the consuls needed the governor's support for their schemes or a favorable report or decision. It was also important for them to receive first-hand information from the governor about their rivals' activities.[37] There was, therefore, a systematic effort by the consuls to court the governor's sympathy and this was often done by such "subtle" means as the conferring of orders of merit or sending a favorable report to Istanbul.[38] On his part, the governor needed the consuls' cooperation in matters confronting him, as well as their personal support for him in Istanbul. As he very well knew, a consul's report on his activities could easily bring about his promotion or dismissal, and it was extremely important for the governor to have the consul on his side.[39] The difficulty was, of course, that befriending all the consuls equally was impossible, given the competition which prevailed between the powers represented in Palestine.

It seems that good faith and friendship between the Ottoman Empire and a European power were usually a promising background for the development of close relations between their representatives in Palestine.[40] But no less important than the political standing of the European power at the Porte were the personalities involved.[41] Whatever the reasons, extremely intimate and close relations developed at times between governor and consul,[42] and, in the atmosphere of intrigue prevailing in the center and province alike, the foreign consul could turn out to be the only trusted confidant the governor really had.

To sum up this examination of the relationship between the governors and the consuls in Palestine, it is difficult not to be impressed with the great responsibilities that fell upon the shoulders of the Ottoman governor during the last decades of the Ottoman period. The issues that had to be settled between him and the consuls were many and complex and consumed both his time and energy, making the governor not only a representative of the Ministry of the Interior, responsible for the administration of his province, but in effect a local "foreign minister." The issues themselves were acutely sensitive, and, as the governor very well knew, could drag the Empire itself into a major diplomatic incident, or perhaps worse. Furthermore, the governor had his own fate to contemplate. Given the strong influence of the Great Powers in the Sublime Porte, his deeds or misdeeds could determine his career, bringing about either his promotion, or downfall. The consuls were in a sense one more local group, to be added to the other groups in the population and to the officials themselves, who could pull strings in Istanbul, and over whom the governor had to be ever-watchful. When all this is borne in mind, one can hardly escape the conclusion that the governors of Palestine were simply too busy with diplomatic or "foreign affairs," or with securing their own position, to be able to devote themselves properly and fully to the affairs of the administration. Any fair evaluation of the role of the Ottoman governors in introducing reform and modernization into Palestine must take this factor into consideration. It is a common assumption that foreign interests were the real agents of modernization and development in Palestine of the 19th century. This is no doubt partially true. But considering the hardships and complications that foreign penetration posed to the Ottoman authorities, it also had a negative aspect, inasmuch as it distracted the Ottoman authorities from devoting all their energies toward the country's development.

Notes

1 The article is based in particular on the reports of the British and French consuls in Jerusalem and Beirut from 1860-1914. They are located in the Foreign Office (hereafter F.O.) files at the Public Record Office (London) and the Correspondance Politique (hereafter C.P.) and Correspondance Consulaire at Commerciale (hereafter C.C.C.) files in the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Paris).

2 Eldridge to the Earl of Dufferin, Jan. 1, 1882, F.O. 195/1410 (Beirut); Eyres to Thornton, May 31, 1886, F.O 195/1548 (Beirut).
3 Eldridge to Wyndham, Feb. 9, 1883, F.O. 195/1447 (Beirut); Moore to White, Dec. 12, 1885, F.O. 195/1514 (Jerusalem).
4 McGregor to Currie, Feb. 8, 1895, F.O. 195/1895 (Jerusalem).
5 Eyres to Currie, July 30, 1894, F.O. 195/1843 (Beirut).
6 Eyres to White, Feb. 14, 1887, F.O. 195/1581 (Beirut). A most striking example of the efforts to deny foreign protection to non-Ottoman residents were the constant attempts by the Ottoman authorities to regard the Russian Jews, who were under British protection from the 1840s as Ottoman citizens. On this issue see the correspondence cited in A.M. Hyamson, *The British Consulate in Jerusalem in Relation to the Jews of Palestine, 1838-1914*, vol. 1: *1838-1861* (London, 1939); vol. 2: *1862-1914* (London, 1941), *passim*.
7 Satow to Lowther, June 23, 1910, F.O. 195/2351 (Jerusalem).
8 Dickson to O'Conor, Dec. 15, 1905, F.O. 195/2199 (Jerusalem).
9 Moore to White, April 17, 1889, F.O. 195/1648 (Jerusalem).
10 Dickson to E. Tane, July 30, 1891, F.O. 195/1727 (Jerusalem).
11 Morgan to Lowther, Sept. 11, 1910, F.O. 195/2351 (Jerusalem).
12 On Ottoman policies toward Zionism and Jewish immigration to Palestine see Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976), pp. 1-31.
13 Examples abound in Hyamson, vol. 2, *passim*.
14 Patrimonio to Minister of Foreign Affairs (hereafter Minister), C.C.C. (Jerusalem), 4, Dec. 8, 1883; Eldridge to White, June 15, 1888, F.O. 195/1888 (Beirut); Hay to Currie, April 19, 1895, F.O. 195/1886 (Beirut).
15 For the effects of the Ottoman-Russian war see Eldridge to Jocelyn, April 16, 1887, F.O. 195/1153 (Beirut); and of the Ottoman-Italian war, Satow to Lowther, Oct. 14, 1911, F.O. 195/2377 (Jerusalem).
16 Ledoulx to Minister, Nov. 25, 1895, C.P. (Jerusalem), 27; Eldridge to White, Nov. 14, 1885, F.O. 424/142 (Beirut).
17 Dickson to Goschen, July 3, 1880, F.O. 195/1306 (Jerusalem); Dickson to Currie, Sept. 3, 1895, F.O. 195/1895 (Jerusalem).
18 Langlais to Minister, Aug. 11, 1882; C.P. (Jerusalem), 24.
19 Ledoulx to Minister, Jan. 27, 1895, C.P. (Jerusalem), 27
20 Ledoulx to Minister, April 22, 1895, C.P. (Jerusalem), 27; Dickon to Currie, Jan. 9, 1897, F.O. 195/1984 (Jerusalem).
21 Patrimonio to Minister, Dec. 10, 1874, C.P (Jerusalem), 11; Moore to Elliot, May 17, 1873, F.O. 195/1027 (Jerusalem).
22 de Barrère to Minister, July 29, 1862, C.P. (Jerusalem), 7; Patrimonio to Ambassador, Jan. 2, 1881, C.P. (Jerusalem), 11.
23 Sinkiewicz to Minister, May 22, 1869, C.P. (Jerusalem), 10.
24 Crampon to Minister, May 6, 1873, C.P. (Jerusalem), 11.
25 Moore to Elliot, Jan. 11, 1873, F.O. 195/1027 (Jerusalem). See also Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 180-194.
26 Patrimonio to Minister, Oct. 26, 1879, C.P. (Jerusalem), 14.
27 Falanga to O'Conor, June 9, 1904, F.O. 195/2175 (Jaffa).
28 Moore to Russel, Nov. 13, 1865, F.O 195/808 (Jerusalem); Hay to O'Conor, April 10, 1899, F.O. 195/2056 (Beirut); Belch to O'Conor, July 30, 1907, F.O. 195/2255 (Jerusalem).
29 Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 212-220. There are many examples of such activity in consul James Finn's book, *Stirring Times*, 2 vols. (London, 1878).
30 Moore to Lyons, June 11, 1866, F.O. 195/808 (Jerusalem).
31 Eldridge to Elliot, Jan. 17, 1877, F.O. 195/1153 (Beirut); see also Eldridge to Layard, Dec. 6, 1879, F.O. 424/91 (Beirut).
32 Moore to Jocelyn, April 14, 1877, F.O. 195/1153 (Jerusalem).
33 Dickson to O'Conor, May 16, 1906, F.O. 195/2199 (Jerusalem).

34 Dickson to Currie, April 8, 1897, F.O. 195/1984 (Jerusalem).
35 For Sūreyā Paşa see Finn to Bulwer, March 22, 1860, F.O. 195/604 (Jerusalem); For Kāmil Paşa see Sinkiewicz to Ambassador, March 24, 1870, C.P. (Jerusalem), 10.
36 M.E. Rogers, *Domestic Life in Palestine* (London, 1863), p. 385.
37 Dickson to Currie, May 23, 1895, F.O. 195/1895 (Jerusalem).
38 Moore to Lyons, April 11, 1867, F.O. 195/808 (Jerusalem); Moore to White, Nov. 27, 1889, F.O. 195/1648 (Jerusalem).
39 Souhart to Minister, Aug. 28, 1894, C.P. (Beirut), 38; Souhart to Minister, Jan. 26, 1895, C.P. (Beirut), 39.
40 Sūreyā Paşa commented to Finn that he had received orders to consult the British since they were the Ottomans' best friends. Finn to Russel, July 2, 1860, F.O. 195/604 (Jerusalem).
41 Taillandier to Minister, Jan. 26, 1892, C.P. (Beirut), 37; Taillandier to Minister, Jan. 26, 1895, C.P. (Beirut), 39.
42 Jago to Layard, Dec. 22, 1878, F.O 195/1202 (Damascus).

Protestantism and Politics: The 19th Century Dimension in Syria

CAESAR E. FARAH

The wedding of church to politics is a recurrent phenomenon in the Middle East, encouraged in Ottoman times by the *millet* structure. The patron system tolerated by Ottoman sultans gave "friendly" European powers access to Ottoman Christian subjects, but, as the 19th century approached, this arrangement became increasingly detrimental to Ottoman administrative efforts in the Syrian region. France was closely attached to Uniate Christians and Russia to the Greek Orthodox community. By the fourth decade of the century, Great Britain had become the leading power in the Levant but had no ready-made Christian protégés in that region.

The Anglo-Prussian Entente

It was not long before the leading Protestant powers, Great Britain and Prussia, appreciated the importance of having a Protestant presence in Syria, preferably anchored in Jerusalem. Until this time Great Britain had remained more or less uninvolved in local religious affairs. But in a land where religion and nationality were considered synonymous, political issues could rarely be separated from the religious.

In 1841 the Colonial Bishoprics Fund was established with the blessing of the Archbishop of Canterbury. It authorized a permanent mission in the Mediterranean region, preferably in Jerusalem where Protestant missionary societies had been active for some time.[1]

The Earl of Shaftesbury and King Frederick IV were moved by genuine religious conviction to promote a bishopric in Jerusalem. From his study of the Scriptures, Shaftesbury had concluded that the time was ripe for the Jews to return to Palestine. Palmerston, the foreign secretary at that time, was more a student of *realpolitik* than of religious Zionism and to win support for Shaftesbury's scheme he couched it in financial and commercial terms.[2]

Frederick had a childhood dream of restoring Christian unity with the Holy Land serving as the rallying point. To that end he wished to see a Protestant community emerge in Syria with the same rights and privileges accorded the Uniate and Greek Orthodox Churches and the Jewish community. The king was thinking in terms of a united nondenominational Protestant Church when he dispatched Charles Brunson, an experienced diplomat, to London to promote his idea to both the government and Archbishop of Canterbury. Both

willingly accepted his proposal in July 1841. Little did Brunson know that Palmerston's enthusiasm stemmed from his appreciation of the political advantages that the proposed bishopric for a nonexistent Protestant community would afford Great Britain in Syria.[3]

While still Britain's ambassador to the Sublime Porte, Ponsonby was instructed by Palmerston to seek immediate recognition for the proposed bishopric from the sultan's government, albeit Jerusalem was not then mentioned as the proposed seat for it. Frederick immediately paid £15,000 for Prussia's share of the cost, while the archbishop raised Britain's contribution by public subscription.

The primary mission of the bishopric was to hasten the conversion of the Jews to Christianity, it being the sine qua non for the Lord's return. And to emphasize this purpose it was thought proper that the incumbent should be a "seed of Abraham." Thus, the first choice was Michael Solomon Alexander,[4] a recent convert from Judaism and already a missionary of the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews.

In Jerusalem, meanwhile, John Nicolayson,[5] another missionary of the London Society had been working among the Jews since his arrival in 1826, but without success. The Egyptian occupation of Syria (1831-40) enabled European powers to establish consulates in cities in the interior[6] and the British opened one in Jerusalem. Still there were no converts on the eve of the bishop's arrival nearly a decade later. There was no Protestant community to justify the bishop's presence; the "Hebrew Christian Church in Jerusalem"[7] had not materialized.

There was strong official and communal resistance to the building of a Protestant church in Jerusalem, even more so after Ponsonby had given his go-ahead to the Society's agents without first having obtained the Porte's approval. The sultan's government had already anticipated a strong negative reaction by the native Christian churches to the Protestant undertaking.[8]

Meanwhile Ponsonby was replaced by Canning as ambassador and Palmerston by Aberdeen as foreign secretary. Aberdeen was less enthusiastic than Palmerston to develop a Protestant base in Syria. He announced that it was not Britain's policy to create an "English party" nor to favor one community over another, nor even to encourage any group to look to Great Britain for support and protection.[9] However sincere his pronouncement, subsequent events soon contradicted it.

Resistance to the Scheme

The Sublime Porte was ill-disposed towards the emergence of a new Christian sect in a part of the Empire already rife with sectarian disputes. Maronites and Druzes had been at each other's throats for some time. Greek Orthodox and Uniates failed to support each other in the intersectarian squabbles, which were particularly acute in the south of present-day Lebanon, where the

representatives of such Great Powers as France and Russia were siding with certain local seats if not actually aggravating intercommunity relations. To introduce a new Protestant sect, with new patrons — Great Britain and Prussia, two of the five powers allegedly friendly to the sultan's government — would inevitably increase and exacerbate internal disputes, thus adding to the sultan's problems.

The establishment of such a base augured increased intervention in Syria's internal affairs, a situation the Porte sought strenuously to avoid. Aberdeen tried to reduce Ottoman fears by promising not to grant special protection privileges to Protestants and to instruct the bishop not to interfere in the religious concerns of either Muslim or Christian subjects nor to attempt to proselytize among them.[10]

But the suspicions and fears of church clerics in Syria were not lessened by such assurances[11] because there was one active element over which neither the bishop nor Aberdeen's representatives in Syria had any immediate control. This was the American mission which was also seeking converts to the Congregationalist-Presbyterian brand of Protestantism.

The American Missionary Dimension

Missionary representatives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions — headquartered in Boston and directed by Rufus Anderson, secretary of the Board — were active in south Lebeanon where Druze feudal lords, contemptuous of Maronite clerical efforts to release their communicants from Druze feudal jurisdiction, had accorded them individual protection on a friendly basis. The leading missionaries, Eli Smith and William Thomson mistook Druze friendship for an interest to embrace Protestantism which, if realized, would instantaneously create a powerful political base for the Protestant powers. But the Maronite clergy would not risk the consequences of Protestant missionary activity under the umbrella of Druze protection after the Druze had denied the Americans access to Christian villages outside Druze jurisdiction. The Druze action led to a brief, bitter sectarian war between Maronites and Druzes in October of 1841, which centerd around Dayr al-Ḳamar, capital of the Grand Emirate.

American missionary interests at this time were protected by James Chasseaud, a Levantine serving as American consul in Syria. He explained to the Maronite patriarch that American missionaries were not agents to spread British influence at the expense of France, their protector, but to no avail.[12] The patriarch petitioned the Porte to have their activities curbed, and the grand vezir actually authorized a firman to that effect. The skirmish ended when the central government terminated the Shihāb Grand Emirate and appointed one of their officials, 'Ömer Paşa, as direct ruler of the Mount Lebanon administrative district. To endear himself to the local clergy, 'Ömer promised to curb the activities of the American missionaries and to restrict those of the

recently arrived Protestant bishop in Jerusalem. He suggested to Foreign Minister Şārım Efendi that the Porte should caution foreign embassies to restrain the activities of missionaries in their consular districts so as to avert the likelihood of Ottoman citizens resorting to violence. Şārım obliged 'Ömer with a note[13] to all embassies on 14 June 1842. Porter, the American minister in Istanbul went so far as to recommend to Secretary of State Webster that American citizens replace Levantines as consuls.[14]

Needless to say 'Ömer's strict policy angered the Protestant consuls and incited them to greater efforts to oust him from the governorship of the Mountain. Rose, the British consul-general in Beirut, accused him of encouraging the Maronite patriarch and other disgruntled local clerics to petition the Sublime Porte, denouncing the Protestant bishop and other missionaries active in Syria. Consular representatives of France and Austria, and particularly the Russian consul-general Basily were disturbed by the threat posed to their coreligionists and protégés by the new missionary presence. Ṭayyār Paşa, the Ottoman *mütesellim* of Jerusalem was equally disgruntled because he anticipated problems with both Christians and Jews, not to mention Muslims, who resented such activities anywhere in Syria, but especially in the Holy City.[15]

The Ottomans did not anticipate mass conversion,[16] but were rather anxious about the political implications of a Protestant base in the heart of "Şām-ı Şerīf", as they termed Syria. Such a base would give Britain and Prussia a pretext for intervention in Syrian affairs, just as France and Russia used the interests of their Uniate and Greek Orthodox protégés as a reason to involve themselves in the region. The Ottomans believed that the American Protestant missionaries were paving the way, at grass roots level, for Anglo-Prussian missionary activity.

The Ḥaşbayyā Affair

The so-called "Ḥaşbayyā Affair" is an excellent illustration of precisely the political consequences which the Ottomans feared would result from the intrusion of Protestant interests into Syria. This "Affair" occurred in the region constituting today's southeast Lebanon. The inhabitants of this district, which was administratively part of the Damascus province, were mostly Druze and Greek Orthodox Christians. As early as 1830, American missionaries had attempted to establish a mission post there, but they had been expelled. They did not give up, and fifteen years later, just at the time when the Board was seriously contemplating closing down its Syrian mission because of its lamentable achievements, circumstances arose which gave the missionaries another chance to show some results.

Buzu Ağa, the *mültezim* of the district, was pressing a number of Greek Orthodox families to pay their tax arrears. This they refused to do, asserting that the taxes were excessive and unwarranted. Buzu Ağa then took harsher

steps to collect the money. The Christian families protested to their patriarch in Damascus, who in turn suggested that they appeal to their bishop in Beirut to intercede for them with the *ser'asker* of the Ottoman armies, Meḥmed Muṣṭafā Paşa, who was then visiting Syria to restore peace amongst the local rival sects and the Ottoman authorities. When the families approached the *ser'asker*, he quietly advised them to keep away from the American missionaries. Apparently it had come to his notice that Shāhīn Jibrā'īl, the leader of the Christian families, had approached Bishop Alexander, who in January 1844 was briefly in Beirut on his way to Jerusalem, and offered himself and his followers as converts to Protestantism if the bishop would pay their taxes for them. The new English bishop turned down this offer. But this did not allay the anxieties of the already suspicious authorities and clerics. Shāhīn was then approached by Eli Smith, one of the American missionaries, who purportedly promised to pay their taxes if they agreed to become Protestants. Both Smith and his colleague Thomson were elated at the prospect of being able to prove to the Board that their mission had not been a failure, for they stood to gain about seventy converts in one fell swoop.[17] But most of their fellow missionaries opposed this course because they resented the way that the English missionary Nicolayson had allegedly exploited the American missionaries' contacts with the Druze to serve the aims of the London Society. They did not want to be seen as political agents for the English, and Samuel Wolcott actually expressed the resentment felt by American missionaries towards British efforts to set up a separate Protestant community in Syria.[18]

Prussian agents — more so than the British, with the possible exception of Consul Nevin Moore in Beirut — gave whatever support they could to the American missionary efforts. The setback suffered by the Catholics in their military encounter with the Druzes in 1841 encouraged them to do this. The Prussian agents thought that the established churches no longer threatened the bishopric in Jerusalem,[19] even though the Sublime Porte had already turned down a request by the Prussian emissary, Baron de Königsmark, for permission to build a Protestant center in Jerusalem, just as Ponsonby's similar request had been denied some time earlier. On both occasions Foreign Minister Rif'at had argued that assisting new denominations would only inflame Muslims and native Christians alike.[20] There was no enthusiasm for conversion among the Jews either.[21] Nevertheless, the king of Prussia would not give up, even though some of his cabinet ministers had advised against the whole enterprise from the outset because, they argued, they did not want to upset the friendly relations with the Sublime Porte.[22]

Already mistrustful of the Catholic powers' attitude towards them, the Americans, though certain of Prussian backing, did not trust the British, who, they alleged, had encouraged them to use their contacts with Druze chiefs to intrude an English presence but had dissociated themselves when their activities proved unpopular. Nevertheless Catholic missions in Syria saw the Americans as an instrument to promote British influence in Syria to the

detriment of France, without whose patronage they themselves would be vulnerable. So it was in the interest of Uniates and Catholic missions to support French measures to counter the alleged scheme of the Anglo-American undertaking even to the point of urging a French presence in Ansarite Alawite country in the north of Syria.[23]

American missionaries had been maneuvered into a situation which made it difficult for them to change their image as British agents. On their own admission they were barred from the Christian communities in the north where pure Maronite and Greek Orthodox villages prevailed and were forced to confine their efforts to the mixed villages under Druze jurisdiction whose inhabitants "while not submitting to each other (Greek to Maronite and vice versa)... would look to us..."[24] At the same time Greek Orthodox Christians employed in the British consulates managed to alert their patriarch to the impending arrival of the Protestant bishop and thus gave him ample time to warn Latin and Armenian bishops in Syria of the threat so that they too could warn their communicants against associating with the Protestants. They were supported by the Russian Basily, who alerted the Ottoman authorities in Syria to the inevitable strong negative reaction if Protestant activities were to be countenanced in any form. Basily was now ready to join with the agents of the Catholic powers to restrict and isolate the Anglican bishop. Hitherto Greek Orthodox prelates and British agents had enjoyed cordial relations.[25]

When Rose learned that American missionaries were being mistaken for Englishmen his first impulse was to deny this to the *vālī* of Sidon, Es'ad Paşa.[26] Es'ad had been told by 'Alī, the *vālī* of Damascus, that Protestant instructors were in Ḥaşbayyā to instruct the would-be converts. Most of the inhabitants were angered and mistook them for Englishmen because they had already been told of the new English Protestant bishop's arrival in Jerusalem. Both the patriarch and Basily had registered a strong protest with 'Alī. Rose had told Eli Smith when the latter had approached him for support before leaving for Ḥaşbayyā, that he could not accept the suggestion of "making" [sic] some people abandon their religion and warned Smith that anything Smith wrote to him thereon would be forwarded to Canning and Aberdeen.[27] Smith made it appear that he and his fellow missionaries had been sought out by the would-be Protestants, rather than the other way around; and that his going to Ḥaşbayyā was to arrange instruction for them. Only on his arrival there, he claimed, did he discover that they were at odds with a group in their own Greek Orthodox Church, who were supported by Sa'd al-Dīn Shihāb in their efforts to compel the intending converts not to give up their faith. Smith reported that he told them to rid themselves of "all worldly motives for changing religion" since they are invalid reasons and "never expect to gain protection to escape taxation or gain political advantage" insisting that he "endeavoured to discountenance entirely all their political expectations". "Protection from taxation and the Turkish law I assured them", he wrote, "they could never obtain... I gave them no ground to hope for any special favours from Protestant consuls in

consequence of professing their religion (Protestantism)".[28] And in response to allegations made by others, both Smith and Thomson insisted, "The current reports that we have paid the Kharaj tax and Farda tax and extended [political] protection [*ḥimāya*] to [some of] the people of Hasbayya is absolutely without foundation".[29]

The version Smith and Thomson wanted to circulate was that when the Ḥaṣbayyans approached them they told them to go home and pay their taxes, alleging that at first they even refused their request for teachers, and agreed only after the Ḥaṣbayyans had pleaded for them. Both were somewhat skeptical of the would-be converts' motives, particularly when it was learned that they had offered to remain in their own church if their own bishop would pay the 150,000 piasters owed to the government. And as Rose stated in a dispatch to Canning, "conversions on account of pique or interest or oppression are of frequent occurrence in this country."[30]

But whatever the motive, missionaries Smith, Thomson and Whiting would not give up "before they are firmly grounded in the new faith." To that end they would expand the schedule of instruction and work "to improve on their character and cement friendly relations", and they expected the support of the Prussian and British consuls to deflect anticipated oppression and persecution. They also called on both consuls-general to make "such representations to the Turkish authorities as would persuade them to return, until reports of the true state of the case can be made to the Government, and the question of their toleration be fairly tried — which reports", as they wrote Rose, "we hope you will be willing to make?" [sic].[31]

To dispel notions that the new converts were exceptional George Whiting and Eli Smith in their account of their experiences at Ḥaṣbayyā said that the converts had the support of Greek Catholics "who themselves had broken away and were most tolerant of all Christian sects" and who apparently were respected by the authorities since they had "more men in government positions than any of the other Christian sects."[32]

Rose was not willing to grant their request for support and protection without clear instructions from Aberdeen. He was fully aware of the uproar the conversions had caused in the Greek Patriarchate, to the Russian consul-general, and among the highest Ottoman authorities in Syria, from the Ḳapudan Ḥalīl Paṣa, to the *vālī* of Damascus. Representatives of the Catholic powers and their protégé sects in Syria were equally concerned over the possible influence of these conversions on the Uniates.[33]

There was a swift reaction in Istanbul where the Porte quietly instructed the *vālī* of Damascus to appoint Sa'd al-Dīn governor and to support strong measures to compel the converts to return to their original faith. Basily demanded that the *vālī* of Sidon give no refuge or favor to converts who might flee into his *eyālet* for protection or support.[34] Sa'd al-Dīn openly asserted that the sultan's government had erred in acknowledging the presence of the Anglican Bishopric at Jerusalem, because it was bound to exceed its mandate

(to convert the Jews) with consequent opposition, and its mere presence would encourage missionary activities among non-Jewish communities, particularly among Greek Orthodox who lacked confidence in their clerical leadership and were divided among themselves.[35]

Rose in Beirut and Wood in Damascus outwardly feigned disinterest maintaining a neutral position. The same could not be said for the Prussian Consul-General Wildenbruch who sternly rebuked Governor Sa'd al-Dīn for "siding against the Protestants" and demanded that he desist.[36] Even Chasseaud, the American consul, was not prepared openly to confront the authorities, particularly when current official U.S. policy was to stand aloof from the work of American missionaries in Syria.

The crisis became acute in July of 1844, when a delegation of Greek Orthodox from Zahle, and even the patriarch himself, converged on Ḥāṣbayyā with the intention of forcing the converts back into the Greek faith. Rumor had it that harm would befall the Protestants and their mentors Smith and Whiting, who were in Ḥaṣbayyā urging them to be steadfast in their new faith. An organization called the "Young Men's Party", with both Greek Orthodox and Muslim members, made vociferous demands in the governor's councils to compel the recalcitrants to return to their original faith.

The Protestants and their British friends urged their supporters among the Druze chiefs in the Lebanon to come to the rescue. Wood in Damascus openly called for the dismissal of Sa'd al-Dīn. Wildenbruch assured Sa'd al-Dīn in his letter that, the converts in becoming Protestants had not ceased to be good, loyal subjects of the sultan and he demanded that the campaign of intimidation and terror against them be stopped. He insisted that Christian subjects had the right to change faiths and assured Sa'd al-Dīn that he would not benefit from interfering in a matter that related only to religion and conscience. As if to warn him, Wildenbruch informed the governor that the matter had been reported by the consuls-general of Great Britain and Prussia to their respective governments, whose instructions they were presently awaiting. Meanwhile, he suggested that Sa'd al-Dīn take all steps to maintain order and to free the Protestant community from pressures being exerted on them with his sanction. The matter, he asserted, concerned neither the *vālī* nor the patriarch but the sultan.[37] In his capacity as American consul Chasseaud addressed a similar letter to the governor and demanded freedom for the converts to practise their faith without harassment from *paṣa* or patriarch.[38]

Dilemma for the Authorities

By mid-summer pressure was building up for the removal of both Sa'd al-Dīn, the official *mütesellim* of Ḥaṣbayyā, and 'Alī Paṣa, the *vālī* of Damascus; indeed, even for the removal of the patriarch himself. Consul Richard Wood in Damascus appeared to be leading the movement with tacit endorsement by Rose and Chasseaud and the active support of the Prussian Wildenbruch as

well as Mikhā'īl Mashāḳa, the acting American vice-consul at Damascus.

From the other side the authorities were being pressured by the patriarch and his bishops and their supporter Basily, with the quiet approval of the French and Austrian consular agencies and the clergy of the Uniate churches. They also enjoyed the backing of the Greek Orthodox community in Ḥaṣbayyā and their coreligionists in Syria, particularly among the outspoken boisterous people of Zahle who demanded that the renegades be compelled to return to their church or be "chastised".[39]

Ḥalīl Paṣa, the *ḳapudan* of the Ottoman fleet was in Syria to help resolve administrative problems besetting Mt. Lebanon. He and the *vālīs* were inevitably dragged into the affair and were petitioned by local communities to curb the activities of American and English missionaries, which, they alleged, led to disorder, defiance and discontent and, more importantly for the authorities, to tax evasion.

The authorities were not prepared to alienate the native communities, and therefore approved a policy that would restore the converts to their former faith, by force if necessary.[40] And after a visit by the patriarch many did just that. A few held out, and the Young Men's Party exerted pressure on them. Basily was acknowledged by the authorities as the rightful spokesman for the patriarch and his communicants, a privilege reinforced by his strong condemnation of the Bishopric in Jerusalem, whose presence he was convinced, was responsible directly and indirectly for what had happened in Ḥaṣbayyā. Jews and Uniates agreed with him about the potential threat posed by the Bishopric to their communities. The *vālīs* likewise agreed that only harm could come from its presence. They joined in urging the few recalcitrant converts to return to their original church and while ostensibly tolerant of them, the *kapudan paṣa* secretly instructed the *vālī* of Damascus to order their return. To placate Wood, the *vālī* did have Sa'd al-Dīn replaced by his son Khalīl, who later turned out to be sympathetic to the Young Men's Party but whose association with the feared Druze chief, Shiblī al-'Uryān quickly alienated Uniates, Greek Orthodox and Maronites. Pressures were now exerted from all quarters to oust Khalīl as *mütesellim*, and to expel Protestant missionaries and their accomplice Shāhīn Jibrā'īl.[41]

The affair clearly seemed to be endangering peace in Syria, occurring as it did at a time when the Great Powers were trying to persuade the sultan's government to accept their views for reordering the administration of Mount Lebanon, torn as it was by dissension and strife. The position of Great Britain as "honest broker" was increasingly compromised and her credibility questioned. Druze sympathizers found it prudent to remain neutral. The authorities were most anxious to avoid any action which might provoke new and lasting rivalries. The patriarch had encouraged his communicants to abandon Ḥaṣbayyā and its environs rather than accept a Protestant presence in their midst. A number of them fled to Beirut, to the discomfort of the authorities, if not their embarrassment. The maneuverings of Mashāḳa at

Damascus[42] and British consular dragoman Ḥanā Misk aroused even more resistance. In siding with the opposition the governor elicited further angry responses from the Protestant backers. The Prussian Wildenbruch dispatched his own dragoman to induce him to change his attitude, but to no avail. Sa'īd Janblāṭ, head of the leading Druze faction in Lebanon sent word to his co-religionists in the Ḥaṣbayyā-Rāshayyā area to accept the Protestants.[43] Even the *vālī*, 'Alī Paṣa, came in for strong criticism for unilaterally issuing assurances of religious freedom to the beleaguered Protestant community from all the other high officials in Syria, including his own *defterdār*. Wood acknowledged this in a confidential dispatch to Rose, explaining that the authorities had sided with Basily, "not because of a Russian tendency on part of authorities, but because they don't want an active Russian intervention on behalf of their co-religionists". Privately Basily indicated to Rose that he would settle for nothing less than his disclaiming any ties to the American missionaries.[44] Moreover, Basily made it clear that no Greek Orthodox who had left Ḥaṣbayyā as a protest would be encouraged to return, as requested by the authorities, before the *mütesellim* was replaced.[45]

Rose was in a dilemma; events had tied him inextricably into the affair once he had told Es'ad Paṣa that he should not confuse American missionaries with Englishmen,[46] and had been assured by the *vālī* that the latter did not for a moment question the consul-general's detachment from a situation that only concerned the sultan's subjects.[47] But as pressures increased and with them the pleas of the beleagured Americans in Ḥaṣbayyā, he could no longer remain neutral. He wrote to Wood in Damascus asking him to persuade the *vālī* there to instruct his governor to leave the Protestants alone.

This preceded a change of policy, supported by Aberdeen himself, namely that while the British would not encourage proselytizing, they would take steps to protect converts from persecution and forced reconversion.[48] Rose had earlier informed Aberdeen that although he denied openly supporting the missionaries since he could not approve their views on conversion, he would not stand aside and see what he termed "religious freedom" violated. Nor was he willing to remain passive any longer in the light of the many calumnies heaped upon the British throughout the affair. He was concerned about a possible rapprochement between Greek Orthodox, Maronites and Druzes, which would only enhance French influence and seriously damage Britain's position regarding the administrative restructuring of Mount Lebanon, and which, furthermore, would allow the Russian Basily to pose as the champion of majority opinion against the Protestant threat.[49]

But for all practical purposes the British were never truly neutral, given their intention to derive political gain from the establishment of a secure Protestant base. Nor did they doubt the disinclination of locals to change faiths solely from spiritual dissatisfaction. Rose admitted that Syrians were too practical for that. Thus the Catholic faction was justifiably suspicious of British motives, guessing that they aimed to construct a base of support in the anti-Lebanon by

encouraging a "Druze nationality" and creating a Protestant community which would turn to Britain and sympathetic Protestant powers for support.

The French were particularly concerned because the establishment of such a base would destroy the dominant position of the Muslim branch of the Shihāb family in the Ḥaṣbayyā region, a clear signal of a decline in French influence. So it was in the French interest to encourage resistance to whatever promoted a position of greater influence for their archrivals in Syria — the British.[50]

Even the Spanish minister plenipotentiary, who had been sent by his government on a fact-finding tour, was quick to condemn the Anglo-Prussian policy to foster a Protestant base for political purposes, but he placed the greater blame on the American missionaries whom he accused of paving the way for the realization of British aims.[51] In case Aberdeen misunderstood local policy, Rose wrote to assure him that Bishop Alexander would not be involved in any attempts to convert Christians, and reaffirmed the mission's original aim, namely the conversion of Jews. Exasperated by the Americans he lashed out against them saying "I cannot altogether approve the spirit which actuates the American missionaries. They rather lean to a theory of a sect (Druze) to which they profess great repugnance. They follow a course which they secretly wish and expect will produce a certain result although publicly they disavow that their object is to cause that result."[52]

The new circumstances unwittingly created by the confrontation at Ḥaṣbayyā left American Minister Porter little alternative but to openly espouse the cause of the oppressed Protestants before the Porte. He pleaded for tolerance and their protection, not only for those in Ḥaṣbayyā, but for others elsewhere in Ottoman Asiatic territories. The Sublime Porte was less than pleased with Porter's behavior, for as Canning soon learned, "the Turkish Government would be glad to have them dismissed from the country" were it not for the fact that "their character and proceedings don't warrant so harsh a measure".[53]

In addition to the pressures exerted by the Protestant powers the sultan's government had to contend with a much more serious threat to Ottoman interests coming from Russia, the official protector of the largest single Christian denomination in the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Orthodox. Basily accused the missionaries of being devious and Wildenbruch of encouraging them by chiding the governor for not tolerating the converts and for setting aside the legitimate complaints of patriarch and *paṣa* alike. He had asked Rose to disclaim connections with the Americans, but was not satisfied with the former's response nor with his answer that his involvement was strictly humanitarian, having allegedly had no knowledge whatever of the Americans' conversion activities.[54] Now he was reproving Basily for his alleged co-operation with the patriarch in the plan to provoke Istanbul's involvement by encouraging mass emigration of Greek Orthodox in response to the *vālī's* acceding to the request to tolerate the Protestants under pressure from Wood.[55] Wood had notified Rose that the *kapudan paṣa*, the *vālī* of Sidon and the

defterdār of Damascus had indeed taken 'Alī to task for his willingness to countenance the Protestants, and for dismissing Sa'd al-Dīn.[56] This had come on the heels of the patriarch's instructions to his communicants to abandon Ḥaṣbayyā,[57] and 'Alī's strong counterthreats to those who might respond.[58]

But as indicated earlier, Khalīl, Sa'd al-Dīn's replacement, was far from persona grata with the majority of the inhabitants, particularly for his lack of response to the demands submitted to him by the Young Men's Party, namely: to banish Shāhīn, the original initiator of conversion in order to elude tax payments; dismissal of the *ḳāḍī* for failing to act vigorously; the cessation of tax collection through the aegis of *ḥawālīs* (police functionaries); no imprisonment without trial, and close supervision of the district treasury by honest men, preferably by one of their own members.

Meanwhile Smith and Whiting had been besieged in their homes; some Protestants had escaped escorted by sympathetic Druze chiefs sent by Sa'īd Jānbulāṭ; and under pressure exerted by Richard Wood, "the nominal Catholic" as Thomson described him, 'Alī had unilaterally issued the order for tolerance which he now wished he could retract. The situation appeared to have calmed down by October,[59] albeit maneuverings continued on all sides. As far as Basily was concerned, the *mütesellim* had contributed to the uproar by using irregular cavalry (the *ḥawālīs*) to enforce his decisions; by his ruthless exactions which contributed to the issuing by the Greek Orthodox prelate of instructions to his communicants to leave their homes in protest, and by his acceptance of the converts. But as far as Rose was concerned, the upheaval was the result of the machinations of his Russian colleague who "is not only wrong, but wicket [sic]."[60]

Rose was less than honest in his assessment of responsibility. For on his own admission he had withheld information from the *vālī* lest the latter pass it on to the Russian consul-general, on whose efforts the authorities had now come to depend. Basily was convinced that the British were maneuvering to expand their influence at Russian and, if possible, at French expense. Indeed, in a fit of anger he told Rose that Britain might as well conquer Syria so that he, Rose, and his underling at Damascus, Wood, could rule Syria openly instead of indirectly. It would appear that Wood had written to Sa'd al-Dīn while he was still governor actually threatening to have him banished if he did not safeguard the well-being of the Protestants. Wood even asked Rose to send a warning letter to the patriarch himself, and, through Ambassador Canning, to say a good word for 'Alī to the Sublime Porte because of the isolated position into which he had been cast by succumbing to Wood's demands.[61]

The harassment did not stop, although it had slackened by the fall of 1844. The converts, greatly reduced in number, were still isolated and unable to practise their faith openly. Khalīl was replaced by his kinsman Aḥmad Shihāb as *mütesellim*, but the resentment of Americans and British alike had become even stronger, particularly in official Ottoman circles. Rose was angered by what he termed the circulation of scandalous reports "only known [sic] by the

Captain Pasha [Kapudan Ḫalil], Asaad Pasha [the *vālī* of Sidon] and Mr. Basily [sic]... that the English, or the English Govert. [sic] supported the present form of Govert. [sic]."[62] Rose interpreted this as a thinly disguised attempt to discredit British policy and attitudes towards Syria, by blaming Britain for the efforts "to convert the Christians by means of or thro' [sic] the Druzes." He accused senior Ottoman officials of "spreading the most disgraceful untruth" and asked Aberdeen to register a formal complaint against the conduct of Basily before the Russian government.[63]

Kḥalīl's resignation from his Ḥaṣbayyā post was because he had failed to effect the reconversion of the handful of recalcitrants as he had been instructed to do by the *kapudan*. Rose was shocked to learn that the *kapudan* had not even been the one to cause 'Alī's change of attitude at Damascus as he had thought. Realizing the long odds against the remaining Protestants holding out in the face of opposition from all quarters, Rose suggested to Wood that they might leave Ḥaṣbayyā and settle in Beirut.[64]

Thus by December 1844, the Austrian Internuncio at Istanbul could announce to Metternich's government that the Russian Basily had succeeded in dealing the Protestant undertaking a severe blow, notwithstanding the efforts of the American emissary Carr to soften the attitude of the Sublime Porte and his strenuous protests to the Russian Chargé Totov, who set them aside.[65]

Nor was Rose pleased with the overzealous tactics of the Prussian Wildenbruch who pushed the Protestant issue at Ḥaṣbayyā to breaking point making "improper use", as Rose put it, "of the British name" in so doing.[66]

While slow to react, Aberdeen eventually sent instructions to his consular agents in Syria enjoining them not to interfere in religious matters or in the internal affairs of the districts where they were employed. He made it clear that his instructions were partly in response to representations made to him on behalf of the Russian government because of Consul Wood's undue interference in the religious affairs of Ḥaṣbayyā. Henceforth English authorities were to avoid any activity intended to convert members of the Greek Orthodox Church to the Protestant faith. And while also conveying these assurances to the Russian government, Aberdeen suggested to Russian Ambassador Brunnow that his government should instruct their own representative in Syria (Basily) to curb his excessive efforts on behalf of his co-religionists in Syria.[67]

Thus, through mutual forbearance the agitation excited by injudicious zeal on both sides was to be allayed and harmony restored between the consular agents in Syria so as to inspire respect and confidence amongst Ottoman authorities and the native population.[68]

But the lot of the Protestants did not improve in the next few years in spite of the continued efforts to win acceptance and security.[69] Meanwhile, Sa'd al-Dīn was restored to the post of *mütesellim* and Basily maintained his vigil. The bishop at Jerusalem perceived only too well how futile it was for the Protestant Church to work outside its original mandate. A few years later Richard Wood

even asserted to his government that he himself had not encouraged either directly or indirectly conversion to Protestantism. His support of American and British missionaries was "only out of humanity" and to shield converts from oppression. While denying that his conduct constituted interference in Ottoman internal affairs, still he could not resist admitting that

> the undersigned cannot altogether divest himself [of] the conviction that the development of Protestantism in Turkey is a matter of no little political interest to Her Majesty's Government. Of the 23 millions that are said to comprise the population of the Sultan's Dominions about 11 millions are reported members of the Greek or Roman Church, and as Russia assumes the right of protecting the former and France the latter, they have thereby appropriated to themselves elements of influence in the Levant which England does not possess. Whatever may be their ulterior object in this, the immediate effect is the partial subversion of British influence both in Roumelia and Syria.[70]

The Ḥaṣbayyā affair was not looked upon as an unmitigated disaster, for as Wood reported to Palmerston, it "could serve as a nucleus of a Protestant community in Syria."[71] In 1847 Palmerston authorized Wood to extend unofficial protection to the remaining Protestants. Under British government pressure the Sublime Porte authorized a veziral letter to the *vālī* at Damascus, Ṣafvetī Paṣa, placing the *iḥtisāb nāẓiri* in charge of the Protestant community's affairs.[72] When notifying Rose of this, Cowley interpreted the letter as "a complete recognition by the Porte of the Protestants as a separate community" and tantamount to granting consular posts licence to intervene on behalf of the community's interest.[73]

The *vālī's* order issued as a result of the veziral letter called upon the governor of Ḥaṣbayyā to protect "Christians" without any specific reference to the Protestants per se; and declared that this protection was simply a reaffirmation of the government's obligations towards *re'āyā* (protected subjects) generally. Rose attributed this not only to Ṣafvetī being ill but to his being "Russian in the Hasbeya matter".

In 1843, Basily had insisted that the Ottoman government should declare its responsibility for protecting the integrity of the Greek Church, to stop apostasy therefrom, and to put an end to all proselytizing attempts at its expense. The tsar's government endorsed these initiatives and agreed with Basily that British declarations that they were merely protecting American missionaries as individuals and were not endorsing their missionary activities were duplicitous.

Basily's hostility nullified the combined efforts of the representatives of the Great Powers to set up a stable administration in the whole of Syria. Indeed, Basily is quoted as saying that he opposed a system of government that would make the Porte's control less direct, when the Russian government insisted on holding the sultan directly responsible for the integrity of the Greek Orthodox

Church. Representatives of the other Eastern Churches echoed Basily's sentiments.[74]

The grave implications of this lack of cooperation must also be judged by its results, for according to Protestant accounts, the nucleus of the community in 1847 consisted of "some fifty souls, twenty of whom are children."[75] Moreover, it was not until 1850 that an independent Protestant *millet* was finally recognized by the sultan's government.[76] But the intended role for this community as a base for furthering the political interests of the Protestant powers remained largely an unfulfilled dream.

Epilogue

As indicated earlier, the British were under pressure from Church Societies at home and their Prussian allies to promote Protestantism in the Holy Land. The Jews were the initial target of the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews, which commenced its labors in 1809 and had opened a mission in Jerusalem in 1820. In 1837 the Society appointed as its head a man specially appointed by the bishop of London to give stability to the mission. In 1841 the Archbishop of Canterbury ordained Michael Solomon Alexander as a bishop and appointed him to Jerusalem to further education towards Christianity among the Jews which included the task of establishing a college. He had the full support of Prussian agents in Syria and enjoyed all the protection afforded British subjects by their own diplomatic and consular representatives in the Syrian region.

But the timeless pursuit for recognition by Protestant missions and their political supporters did not materialize because of the hostility their activities engendered among representatives of the local churches and their Great Power patrons, namely Russia, Austria and France. Nevertheless, the Anglo-Prussian missions policy to establish their Protestant base with Jewish converts continued. Indeed, when in 1840 the Great Powers were putting their alliance together for the purpose of unifying their policies towards the Ottoman Empire, there appeared in print a pamphlet entitled *Settlement of the Jewish People in Palestine*.[77] German and French newspaper articles alleged that the Jews were seeking to go back to Palestine and that they were hoping that this desire would become an element in the deliberations of those Great Powers which had an interest in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. It was further alleged that something like a pledge had been made at the Congress of Aix-la-Chappelle to look into this aspiration, and that Tsar Alexander wanted to integrate that "pledge" with the protocol to ameliorate the condition of Jews in Russia, particularly after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. But the "pledge" came closest to realization in the Ukase of Easter Sunday 1817 when it was proclaimed that the Hebrews were being convinced of the truth, and were thus embracing Christianity, and for this they were to be treated like other Christians.

It was a tempting situation for many Jews who until then had not enjoyed the rights and privileges extended to the Christian subjects of the tsar. Those who converted were accorded special imperial protection and patronage and were exempted from many obligations and customs duties for twenty years after embracing the Christian religion and joining the Christian Israelite Society.[78]

What about the Russian and Austrian Jews who chose to go to Palestine? Following the Ḥaṣbayyā affair they found themselves caught up in the squabbles between the British and the Prussians on one hand and the Russians on the other. The British and Prussian missions saw these Jews as an excellent source of converts. Many had come on visits and outstayed their passport time limit. By converting to either Greek or Protestant Christianity they would acquire the status of protégés and thereby the official protection of one or other of the Great Powers. Basily would not forego the right to protect Jews so long as they remained Russian citizens. The British were approached for protection by both Austrian and Russian Jews. Basily's reply to this was that, while he would prefer Russian Jews to espouse Greek Christianity he would not object to their becoming Protestant for the purpose of their gaining British protection. He suggested that Rose approach Count Nesselrode for official approval to protect Russian Jews. Austrian Consul-General von Adelburg was confronted with the same request from Jews who had come on pilgrimages but who refused to return, namely that the time had come for Jews to return to Palestine. The Ottoman government was not pressing Jews who had overstayed the time limit to leave, particularly if they had expressed the desire to die in the Holy Land. But since the feelings among Eastern Christians ran high against the Jews, Basily did not want to risk his status with his own co-religionists by affording protection to them and did not mind the responsibility being transferred to the British.[79]

For many Jews it was a matter of shifting from what Consul Finn described as one form of oppression to another. Thus Basily could argue that only two out of a hundred Jews who came to Jerusalem stayed behind, and this in spite of the excommunication by their rabbis of those who left.[80] Besides, Rose did not respond positively to Basily's suggestion, but left it to Palmerston to seek Nesselrode's permission to protect Russian Jews. Palmerston feared that such a request to Nesselrode might be misconstrued by the tsar's government. He wrote back to Rose stating that if any European Jew should be denied the protection of his own consul he could ask the British for it.[81] Basily meanwhile informed Rose that since Russian Jews had asked him to arrange for British protection he would now take the matter up directly with the tsar's government.

Protestant missions and their consular supporters anticipated that their benevolent patronage would influence European Jews to turn in gratitude to the Protestant Church. They were particularly hopeful when after sounding out Ottoman authorities, Palmerston reported to Consul Finn at Jerusalem that

the "Porte does not appear opposed to efforts to convert Jewish raiya subjects to Christianity."[82]

Again, in spite of approaching the matter of conversion through various official and unofficial channels, the end result of Protestant labors among the Jews was no better for them than it had been among the Greek Orthodox Christians. Nevertheless, with the official recognition of the Protestant *millet* in 1850 by the sultan's government, it must be admitted that Protestant efforts did result in the establishment of the base they had sought all along, however weak it turned out to be.

Notes

Bibliographical References

ABC-FM	American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Diaries, correspondences, annual reports and private papers in the Houghton Library of Harvard University.
AMAE	Archive, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (Paris). Mémoires, correspondances, et documents.
F.O.	Great Britain. Public Records Office (Kew). Archives of the Foreign Office. Diplomatic and consular dispatches from Constantinople, Beirut, Damascus.
Finnie, D.H.	*Pioneers East* (Harvard University Press, 1967).
Hodder, E.	*The Life and Work of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury.* vol. 1 (London, 1886).
Rep. 81	Prussische Archiv (Merseburg). Deutsche Demokratische Republik. *Acta des Gesandschafts zu Konstantinopel.*
Scrit. Rif.	Archivio, Sacra Congregazaione dell Propaganda Fide. *Scritture Riferite nei Congressi* (Rome).
Syri	Archives of the Society of Jesus (Rome). Dispatches from Field representatives.
Tibawi, A.L.	*American Interests in Syria, 1800-1901* (Oxford University Press, 1966). *British Interests in Palestine, 1880-1901* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961).
Türkei, 6	Haus-, Hof- un Staatsarchiv (Vienna). Diplomatic and Consular correspondences from Constantinople and Beirut.
Turquia	Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Madrid). *Correspondencia y Legaciones: Turquia*, 1771 (1841-49).
U.S.	National Archives (Washington). Department of State Records. Dispatches and Correspondences.

1 The two principal societies committed to promoting Protestantism in the Syrian region were the Church Missionary Society established in 1799 and the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews founded in 1809. See Tibawi, *British Interests*, p. 5.
2 Hodder, p. 310.
3 It is worth noting in this regard how quickly British attitudes changed from strict neutrality to commitment due to the efforts of American Protestant missionaries in Syria. The Jesuit resident at Beirut wrote his superior in Rome that France had been scrupulously aloof, to the point of arousing resentment for the Catholic Church and France amongst the Uniate Maronites and Greek Catholics who saw in such manifestations of alleged prudence signs of weakness and failure to live up to her role as official protectress of Catholic interests in Syria, encouraging some Maronite bishop to look to the British consul for protection. He did state, however, that their overtures were rejected on grounds that they were political not religious in purport. See de Bertou's letter to Roothan of Dec. 4, 1840, in *Syri* 2-III, 2.
4 Originally from Scholake in the Duchy of Posen, from the Wolf family, in England since 1820 and converting from Judaism in 1826. He worked at first as a missionary in Danzig, then in London for ten years before being selected for the mission east. See Tibawi, *British Interests*, p. 50.
5 He hailed from Schleswig, of Danish background. See the London Society's *General Committee Minutes*, vol. 'M', Minute 1080, cited in Tibawi, *British Interests*, p. 13, note 2.
6 M. Kurd 'Alī, *Khiṭaṭ al-Shām* (Damascus, 1343/1925), vol. 3, pp. 55ff.
7 See Whiting to Rufus Anderson, *Journal* of Oct. 2, 1835 from Jerusalem. ABC-FM, 16:8.1.
8 See a deciphered dispatch of Bardon de Werther to the Count de Königsmark of Oct. 7, 1841 from Berlin reporting that Ambassador Brünow had reported from London Ponsonby's promise to press the Sublime Porte on the matter of the bishopric. Rep. 81, *Konstantinopel*, 2/98.
9 Aberdeen to Chargé Bankhead of June 22, 1842. F.O. 78/473.
10 Draft of instructions reflecting what Aberdeen stated to the chargé of the Ottoman embassy in London, dated May 3, 1842, F.O. 78/501.
11 It took considerable pleading by Rose with Ser'asker Muṣṭafā to issue a *buyuruldu* (order) granting safety of passage to Jerusalem from Beirut for Bishop Alexander. See Austrian Consul-General Ed von Adelburg's dispatch to Internunicio Stürmer at Istanbul of Feb. 13, 1842. *Türkei*, 6.
12 See letter to Minister Porter at Istanbul of Aug. 1, 1841 and letter from missionaries Smith, Thomson, Wolcott and Keyes forwarded by Consul Chasseaud to Porter in his dispatch of July 20, 1841. U.S., Department of State, M46-11.
13 See a translation of Ṣārım's note to the embassies of the powers in Istanbul; copy in Porter's dispatch to Webster from San Stefano of July 16, 1842. U.S., Department of State, M46-11.
14 *Ibid.*
15 Von Adelburg to Stürmer of Feb. 13, 1842, *Türkei*, 6.
16 While claiming up to 150 at one time, the figure given by a historian of the missions in the east registered no more than ten converts net after the dust settled on the 1844 Ḥaṣbayyā episode, claiming that as late as "1856 there were thirty American led Protestant communicants at Beirut, but none elsewhere in Syria or Palestine." Finnie, *Pioneers*, p. 134.
17 The figures reported were not all reliable, ranging anywhere from 38 to one-third of the Greek Orthodox community. See copy of Smith & Whiting's letter to Rose of May 3, 1844. Incl. in no. 25 to Aberdeen of June 10. F.O. 195/234.
18 Confidential from Beirut, June 1, 1842, ABC-FM, 16.5, vol. 3.
19 From Chasseaud (who doubled as U.S. consul and Prussian vice-consul) to Wagner (counsellor at Istanbul), Berlin, Nov. 30, 1841. Rep. 81, *Konstantinople*, 4/8.
20 See report from the Prussian emissary at Istanbul to the king of Prussia, Pera, Dec. 2, 1841. *Ibid.*

21 In Jerusalem Nicolayson claimed it cost 10,000 piasters for each convert. In a decade of effort there were no native Protestants at Beirut, only 10 American and 20 English who with their families totalled 40; add 4 American and 2 English at Jerusalem, and 2 at Aleppo. The whole native Protestant count for Syria was 20; there were no separate churches or chapels for any, services being held in private homes, mostly in the English language, periodically in Arabic for the benefit of visitors, and according to the Congregational and Presbyterian form except in Jerusalem where service was held according to the Anglican rite. From a report prepared by Eli Smith and forwarded by Chasseaud to the king of Prussia, Dec. 20, 1841; see also Chargé Wagner's dispatch of Chasseaud's status report of Dec. 27. Rep. 81, *Konstantinopel*, 4/8.

22 This is one of the reasons he decided to be cautious and share with Great Britain the task and cost of establishing the bishopric. Somehow he felt that if France could have ties with the Catholics of the east, the king of Prussia should develop ties with the Protestants even if they did not exist yet. See his Projection of Instructions to Chargé Stiepovich, at Pera ca. February of 1842. Rep. 81, *Konstantinopel*, 4/5.

23 From "Mémoire sur la Syrie" (author unknown) ca. 1844. No. 19 in vol. 50, *Mémoires et Études*, AMAE. See also copy of the dispatch from the head of the Jesuit order at Beirut, B. Planchet to the French consul of Jan. 25, 1844. *Scrit. Rif.* (Siri), vol. 15, fols. pp. 365-66; also Planchet to Roothan of May 2, 1844. *Syri*, 2-III, 4.

24 Committee Report, George B. Whiting and William M. Thomson from Beirut, April 8, 1844. ABC-FM, 16:8.1 (1844-46), no. 15.

25 Copy, no. 31, Rose to Canning. Beirut, April 27, 1842. F.O. 195/194.

26 See his reply to Es'ad of March 20, 1844. F.O. 226/18.

27 See Inc. in no. 25, Rose to Aberdeen of June 10, 1844, copy of Rose's reply to Eli Smith, Beirut, May 16, 1844. F.O. 195/234.

28 Eli Smith to Rufus Anderson, Secretary of the Board, published in *The Missionary Herald*, 41 (1845), pp. 14-15.

29 Cited by Tibawi in *American Interests*, p. 110 (Letter addressed to al-Mu'allim Abū Naṣr Ḥannā al-Ḥaddād at Nazareth, Oct. 1, 1844).

30 Dated April 2, 1844. no. 18. F.O. 226/35, copy in 195/234.

31 Whiting & Smith from Ḥaṣbayyā, May 13, 1844, incl. in no. 25 to Aberdeen. F.O. 195/234.

32 See Eli Smith's "Review of Missionary Labors in Mt. Lebanon", prepared for the *New Yorker Observer*. ABC-FM, 16:8.1, vol. 5.

33 Austrian Internuncio Stürmer was upset over von Adelburg's failure to notify him of the Ḥaṣbayyā conversions, demanding to know whether it was the work of the English or Americans. See Private & Confidential, Rose to Canning, May 4, 1844. F.O. 226/40.

34 See Incl. 1 in no. 665, von Adelburg's "Mémoire sur l'état général de la Syrie, Juin et Juillet, 1884", Stürmer to Metternich, July 17, 1844. *Türkei*, 6.

35 See dispatch of Consul Poujade to Foreign Minister Guizot at Paris. Nov. 18, 1844. Directions Commerciale, no. 23 in *Correspondance Commerciale*, Beyrouth, 4 (For fuller details including copies of correspondences by British & American agents besides Russian and French see fols. 488-92).

36 See Poujade to Guizot, Direction Politique, no. 21 of Oct. 19, 1844 from Beirut, *Turquie 1844-45*, Beyrouth, 5.

37 Translation of a letter dated June 14, 1844. Incl. 1 in Poujade's dispatch to Guizot of Nov. 18 from Beirut. Direction Commerciale et du Contentieux, no. 23, Beyrouth, 4, fols. 487-89.

38 Dated June 18. Incl. 2 in Poujade to Guizot, Beyrouth, 4, fols. 490-91.

39 See their August 28, 1844 appeal. Incl. in no. 408, von Adelburg to Stürmer of October 20. *Türkei*, 6.

40 See an unsigned and undated translation of a petition from the Ḥaṣbayyā Protestants to the Sublime Porte protesting their lot and asking for directives to restrain both the *vālī* and his *mütesellim*. Incl. 3 in Wellesley's no. 5 to Col. Rose of Aug. 27, 1847. F.O. 226/98.

41 See "Review of Missionary Labors...", ABC-FM, 16:8.1, vol. 5, fols. 490-92, Beyrouth, 4; also an analysis of the supplication presented by the inhabitants of Ḥaṣbayyā to the

kapudan and Es'ad Paşa of 3 Shawwāl 1260/Oct. 14, 1844. Incl. 3 in Poujade's no. 23 to Guizot of Nov. 18. Beyrouth, 4.

42 Mashāḳa was supposedly the American vice-consul at Damascus, but in his conduct he was not a diplomat, let alone objective. He shared the zeal of the American missionaries, though himself a Greek Catholic originally, and was earmarked for slaughter in the 1860 Muslim uprising against the Uniates and Greeks in Damascus but managed to escape with only injuries. He was the one who served as intelligence reporter for the missionaries, also as liaison with the Prussian consulate at Damascus, alleging that the *vālī* might have appeared to issue orders countenancing the community at Ḥaṣbayyā but was countermanding the orders with slips in the same dispatch to the governor. When Alison, secretary of embassy at Istanbul arrived on a mission to keep an eye on the *kapudan* for Canning, it was Mashāḳa who prevailed upon him to journey to Ḥaṣbayyā, hopefully to intimidate the *mütesellim* against continuing his policy of repressing the Protestant converts. See a diary kept by Eli Smith, entry for July 17 and 19, in "Diary of Experiences at Hasbaya". ABC-FM, 16:8.1, vol. 3, no. 95. For Mashāḳa's misleading report concerning the alleged deposition of the patriarch and his supposed exile to the Palamand monastery, see Lebanon. National Archives, *Political* 12881 (dispatch in Arabic to Eli Smith at Beirut of 13 Sh. Ch. [sic], 1845).

43 Smith's diary, entry of July 15 & 16. ABC-FM, 16:8.1, vol. 3, no. 95.

44 Dated Nov. 7, 1844. F.O. 226/37.

45 Ḥalīl had reportedly ill used Christians during the 1841 civil strife in southern Lebanon. See Rose to Wood, Nov. 3, 1844. F.O. 226/37.

46 Copy of translation of Es'ad's letter to Rose of 26 Ṣafar 1360 received March 16, 1844 and copy of his reply to the *vālī* of March 17. F.O. 226/18.

47 Letter of 28 Ṣafar 1260 received March 19. F.O. 226/18.

48 See no. 37, Rose to Canning of July 25 & Inc., extract of Smith's letter to Thompson of July 11 for Ḥaṣbayyā. F.O. 226/41, copy in 195/234. See also Smith's diary, July 11 entry.

49 Confidential, to Wood, Nov. 23, 1844. F.O. 226/37.

50 Poujade to Guizot, Direction Commerciale et du Contentieux, no. 23, Beirut, Nov. 18, 1844, Beyrouth, 4, fols. 480-86 (details).

51 See Lopez de Cordoba to El Primero Secretario Castro of the Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores at Madrid, dispatch-report of Sept. 8, 1844, no. 1265 in *Turquía*, 1771.

52 Copy, no. 45, Rose to Aberdeen, Oct. 28, 1844. F.O. 195/235.

53 To lend muscle to his discussions with the Porte, the American minister at Istanbul ordered a corvette detached from its squadron in the Sea of Marmara and anchored within sight of the government. See no. 161, Canning to Aberdeen, Büyükdere, July 31, 1844. F.O. 78/559.

54 Letter to Basily of Aug. 8 in reply to Basily's of the 7th, also Rose's to Basily of Aug. 22 wherein he expresses regrets over his falling out with Wildenbruch. Copies, F.O. 195/235.

55 See no. 58, Rose to Canning of October 16; also Thomson's letter to Rose concerning the Young Men's Party and their Zahle backers putting pressure on the converts of Aug. 27, in Rose's no. 42 to Aberdeen of October 7. F.O. 195/235.

56 Express to Rose. Incl. 7 in his no. 58 to Canning. F.O. 195/236.

57 No. 8 Incl., Rose to Aberdeen, Confidential of Oct. 14. F.O. 195/236.

58 Incl. 9 in no. 42, Rose to Aberdeen of Oct. 7. F.O. 195/236.

59 See Thomson to Anderson from Beirut of Aug. 8; also no. 130 of September 8 from 'Abayh and no. 131 of October 9, both to Anderson. ABC-FM, 16:8.1, vol. 3.

60 Rose to Wood, Oct. 17. F.O. 226/37.

61 *Ibid.*

62 Reference here is to the dual subgovernorship in Mt. Lebanon, with a Druze deputy governor administering the southern and a Maronite the northern regions.

63 See his Confidential to Wood of Dec. 16. F.O. 226/37.

64 Rose's Most Confidential to Wood of Dec. 19, and another of Dec. 23. F.O. 226/37.

65 Stürmer's no. 687, Lit. A-B of Dec. 11. *Türkei*, 6.

66 See no. 176 from Aberdeen to Canning of Nov. 20. F.O. 78/553.

67 No 193. Foreign Office to Canning from the Earl of Aberdeen of Dec. 20, 1844. F.O. 78/553.

68 *Ibid.*

69 See translation of an official dispatch, grand vezir to the *vālī* of Damascus of 20 Ramaḍān 1263/Apr. 6, 1847. F.O. 226/98.

70 Wood to Palmerston of July 1, 1847, from 8 Dorchester Place, Oxford Sq., London. F.O. 226/98.

71 *Ibid.*

72 The *iḥtisāb nāẓiri's* responsibility included collecting their taxes, keeping a separate register of births and deaths in the bureau (as already afforded the Latin community), issuing passports and permits of marriage, and allowing the Protestants to choose a person of good character to serve as their agent before the Sublime Porte. He was duty bound to protect them against the pressures of the patriarch and his priests. See translation of the vezirial letter (no date) Incl. in Lord Cowley's no. 25 to Col. Rose from Constantinople, Nov. 27, 1847. F.O. 226/98.

73 *Ibid.*

74 See Incl. in Rose's no. 63 (Confidential) of Nov. 18, 1847 to Palmerston, from Beirut in which he refers to the translation of the order issued Aug. 28, 1847, F.O. 78/713.

75 See extract from a "Memorandum Respecting the Persecution of Hasbayya Protestants" (February, 1847). F.O. 226/98.

76 Dated 1 Muḥarrom 1267/Nov. 6, 1850. *Umur-ı Mühimme Defteri*, 3. See Tibawi, *American Interests*, p. 109.

77 For full text see F.O. 78/421.

78 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

79 See no. 18. Rose to Palmerston of March 27, 1847. F.O. 78/2068.

80 See no. 16. Finn to Palmerston from Jerusalem, April 2, 1847. F.O. 78/2068.

81 See draft of a dispatch from Palmerston to Rose from the Foreign Office, May 14, 1847. F.O. 78/2068.

82 See no. 1. Palmerston to Finn from the Foreign Office, May 19, 1847. F.O. 78/2068.

The Entente's Secret Agreements in World War I: Loyalty to an Obsolescing Ethos

J.C. HUREWITZ

This study considers, not the secret plans of the Entente powers in World War I to dismember the Ottoman Empire, but the origins of the rationale that guided that decision. In a word, I shall adduce evidence of an earlier period to analyze the state of mind of the concerned European diplomats and statesmen. The perspective is European, not Ottoman. As an analyst, rather than an advocate, I do not fault the imperialists for immorality, or even unwisdom. The partition planners in London, Paris, St. Petersburg, and Rome might properly be criticized for lack of familiarity with Islamic political culture.

The secret agreements of the Entente powers in World War I for the postwar division of the Ottoman Empire have commonly been evaluated in the context of the war itself. This is, no doubt, an acceptable mode of evaluation. The three original members of the Entente (Britain, France, and Russia), later joined by Italy, were allies, the Ottoman Empire an adversary. The secret agreements were designed to enable the Entente powers to fulfill certain territorial aspirations and thereby penalize the Sublime Porte for entering the war on the enemy side. If the Entente held together, the victors might have been expected to impose their will on the vanquished. In the event, the Bolsheviks, who had replaced the tsars in 1917, promptly repudiated the secret instruments: the Constantinople agreement (4 March-10 April 1915), the London agreement (26 April 1915), the Sykes-Picot agreement (April-October 1916), and the Saint-Jean de Maurienne agreement (April-August 1917). Nonetheless Britain, France, and Italy, despite postwar differences, helped bring about the end of the Ottoman Empire, though not exactly as planned.

For another perspective, instead of resting the analysis wholly on the horizontal evidence of World War I, one might examine the vertical evidence. This might entail, for example, a study of the unfolding diplomatic strategies of the Entente powers in the nineteenth century in the context of the evolving European imperial ethos as applied to the Ottoman Empire. Such an exercise should enable us to escape the anachronism and moralism of hindsight that often bind the evaluators of European imperial behavior toward the Ottoman Empire between the Congress of Vienna of 1814-15 and the Lausanne conference of 1922-23. Imperial expansion into the Ottoman area, if investigated on its own terms, cannot fail to yield fresh insights. All too often the expansive process, particularly as it accelerated in the scramble for Africa

in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, has been viewed as a random — almost anarchic — activity, one in which the concerned European powers moved as far and as fast as they could, ignoring the risks of collision inherent in an unbridled drive for new territories. This popular judgment, however, scarcely conforms to the realities. Between 1815 and 1914, only in the mid-1850s did the powers resort to war over an Ottoman issue. Even then, only three of the five major powers of the day became belligerents and a fourth served as mediator. It should be noted that this did not eliminate wars by individual European powers against the Ottoman Empire. Only rarely — as, for example, in the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 — did the European conquest of Ottoman territory occur without violent resistance, either by the Sublime Porte itself or by one of its viceroys.

The Congress of Vienna brought to a formal end the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars which had engulfed Europe for nearly a quarter-century. The four powers (Austria, Britain, Prussia and Russia) which had convened the Congress restored the balance of power in the continent and constituted themselves as the guardians of the new equilibrium. In 1818 the Concert of Europe, as the directorate came to be known, admitted France to full membership and institutionalized great-power conference diplomacy to reduce the risk of international crises in Europe and to prevent such crises from erupting into great-power wars. The Concert brought into being in 1840-41 a subsidiary political system expressly to defuse crises on the continent arising from European expansion rivalry in the Ottoman Empire. For nearly forty years the Concert, with the participation of the Sublime Porte, met five times — in London (1840-41 and 1871), in Paris (1856 and 1860-61), and Berlin (1878) — and framed instruments that laid down comprehensive guidelines on imperial policies toward the Ottoman Empire. Most of the doctrines that appear in these multilateral instruments were understandably drawn from major-power usage in interstate relations in Europe. Others related expressly to the Asian and African aspects of the Eastern Question, as the European repercussions of the progressive contraction of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century had come to be titled.

This study is suggestive only, not definitive. I have not streamlined the evidence in order to fit it to the theory, but rather to keep the analysis to a suitable length. The object of the exercise is to demonstrate that the Entente diplomats in World War I subscribed without reservation to the rules of European imperial expansion into the Ottoman Empire that the major powers had framed by the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Honoring the rules had become the accepted mode of European expansion.

In 1914 Russia, France, and Britain for the only time in history were simultaneously at war with the Sublime Porte.[1] The three powers in the nineteenth century had either annexed or detached territories belonging to the Ottoman Empire and had enlarged their own interests in its remaining non-European provinces. For the protection of those interests, they had developed

varying diplomatic strategies. Italy, soon after its creation on the merger of the city-states in 1861, became an imperial contender in the Ottoman area. Thereafter, the Quirinal lost little time in pursuing the status symbols of great-powerhood, especially the primary symbol of overseas possessions. Before we turn to Entente diplomacy toward the Ottoman Empire in 1915-17, let us first consider the prior conditioning.

Ever since the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca had established Russia as a Black Sea power in 1774, the tsars and their advisors recognized the strategic need to control the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, for otherwise the Black Sea would remain closed to Russian naval power and would thus expose the tsardom to possible attack by hostile maritime powers. After Russia had failed to gain control of the strategic waterway in the Napoleonic wars, a new opportunity did not arise until the 1830s, and recurrent efforts thereafter to win the straits by conquest or diplomacy ended in failure. As the decades rolled by, the unrequited aspiration grew into an obsession. Meanwhile, Russian territorial conquests included the Crimea, the Ottoman districts in the Caucasus, and the northeast corner of Anatolia (the last as recently as 1878). The Russian and Ottoman economies were competitive, so that commerce did not figure prominently in their relations. On the other hand, a relatively large segment of the Ottoman population, especially in Anatolia, and to a lesser degree in Syria, and Palestine, adhered to the Greek Orthodox Church. For three quarters of a century after Küçük Kaynarca Russia slowly amassed precedents to support its claim as patron and protector of the *pādiṣāh's* Greek Orthodox subjects. Even after 'Abdülmecīd's *Iṣlāḥāt Fīrmānı* and article 9 of the Treaty of Paris in 1856 repudiated this claim, Russia reasserted its earlier position.

France also accumulated multiple interests in the Ottoman Empire. By 1914 it had assimilated Algeria and Tunisia into the French empire, although the Sublime Porte had not yet legally recognized the French protectorate in Tunisia. But in Egypt, Britain, which eventually occupied the province in 1882, outwitted and angered France time and again. Of the surviving Ottoman provinces in Asia, France focused on Lebanon and Syria. It also resuscitated in the 1840s, after a lapse of about a century, treaty rights going back to 1673 to act as custodian of papal institutions, those of the eastern Uniate Churches included, and their adherents. Finally, the French financial community had invested heavily in railroad and other concessions and became the dominant shareholder in the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the Sublime Porte's official banker and the largest bank in the Empire.

The East India Company experimented with the reopening of the Mediterranean route in the 1770s, and unexpectedly put it to effective use in the first phase of the war with France in 1778-83. Admiral Nelson reconfirmed the value of the short passage by promptly sending word to Bombay of his destruction of the French fleet at Abuqir Bay in August 1798. In the circumstances, it is remarkable that Whitehall did not start to promote the use of the Mediterranean and Red Seas as a principal imperial artery until the

1830s. Even then it collected a string of bases on both sides of Egypt, and sponsored the building of a trans-Egyptian railroad from Alexandria to Suez in the 1850s. But it vigorously opposed the construction of the Suez Canal, which alone made possible uninterrupted sea travel from England to the subcontinent. Once the canal was completed by French entrepreneurship in 1869 over stubborn British resistance, Britain could not, in an age of European imperial expansion, allow the country through which the waterway coursed to fall into the hands of a rival power. However, the way Whitehall accomplished the seizure of Egypt in 1882 without precipitating a war in Europe testified less to the diplomatic skill of the government than to the discomfort of the remaining imperial powers. Strategy apart, Britains's most valuable interest was commerce. Starting with the industrial revolution in the last third of the eighteenth century, Britain speedily moved into first place in the foreign commerce of the Ottoman Empire, which had become England's third-best customer by 1850. Britain clung to its commercial lead up to the outbreak of war in 1914. Financial investment lagged far behind. The interest in the possibilities of oil strikes in the Ottoman Arab provinces picked up only after the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's discovery of commercial quantities in Persia in May 1908, too late to become practicable before the outbreak of war. Still, the oil potential of the Ottoman Arab provinces stirred the minds of the young bureaucrats in Whitehall who placed high value in World War I on the Sublime Porte's promise of a concession in June 1914.

An imperial latecomer, Italy in effect acquired Ottoman territory by European default. After having failed to take over nearby Tunisia, on which Italy had set its eye for expected development as a settlement dependency, it waited four decades before occupying Libya and the Dodecanese Islands in a lackluster war with the Sublime Porte in 1911-12. Italy's position in both, after its entry into World War I in 1915 continued tenuous and one of its chief aims was thus to convert the de facto titles into legal ones.

The European imperial powers in the nineteenth century agreed on criteria and priorities to shore up their claims to Ottoman territories. Highest priority went to territories of strategic importance. In the eastern Mediterranean, only Russia and Britain developed such interests: Russia at the Ottoman Straits and Britain at the Suez Canal. Next in rank came custodianship of religious communities concentrated in particular localities. Russia faced no competition in demanding the guardianship of the sultan's Greek Orthodox subjects and although the other powers questioned the basis of its demands in 1856, they did not interfere with St. Petersburg's later reassertion of its position. The powers had traditionally recognized France's role as protector of the Catholic communities — Roman and Uniate — but as the nineteenth century wore on it began to encounter the rivalry of other states, notably Austria-Hungary and even Germany. Indeed, Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1898 proclaimed himself guardian of the German Catholic and Protestant interests, and also of Islam; he was even prepared to take the Zionist enterprise into his custodianship but was

deterred from doing so by the objection of Sultan 'Abdülḥamīd. Furthermore, the concerned European governments subsidized a wide range of charitable, educational, medical, and religious institutions run by missionaries. In economic relations with the Ottoman Empire, commerce was the hallmark of Britain, and financial investment of France. The varieties of interest — strategy, communal protection, and economic ties — were not mutually exclusive. In combination they reinforced the claims within the concert of each imperial power.

To safeguard their interests and pave the way for the eventual acquisition of the desired territory, the imperial powers preferred to institutionalize a mutually recognized presence. A zone of interest (or influence) which assured the imperial power priority in economic and financial investment and commercial activity constituted the least radical change, since it did not formally abridge local sovereignty. Such zones usually came in pairs, and sometimes in clusters, when two or more powers concluded a deal for the division of a country or a province into respective spheres. Once installed, the imperial powers were prone to enlarge their zones. Recognizing the destabilizing implications of such imperial tendencies, the powers sometimes took the precaution of separating rival zones by a buffer, as Russia and Britain had done in Persia in 1907. Palmerston once defined a buffer as "a non-conducting body" that separates the rivals "by a considerable interval of space." The Entente powers did not enter into such arrangements in the Ottoman Empire before 1914. As the de Bunsen Committee report of June 1915 and the tripartite — Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 amply reveal, however, the bureaucrats of Whitehall and their Entente colleagues were planning to put these principles to work in Ottoman Asia after the war. Also requiring no formal abandonment of sovereignty by the Ottoman Empire was the resort to military occupation without fixed term, a diplomatic device that Britain chose in Cyprus and Egypt (to accommodate the vigorous protest of France and Russia as well as the Sublime Porte) and Italy in Libya and the Dodecanese Islands (to acquiesce in the Porte's absolute refusal to surrender its legal titles).

In a protectorate, the imperial powers assimilated the external sovereignty of the conquered territory, leaving — legally at least — the domestic sovereignty to the local population but extinguishing all Ottoman claims to possession, as in the French protectorate of Tunisia. The European powers recognized the protectorate, the Sublime Porte did not; the legal issue was thus not finally resolved until ratificaton of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1924. The European powers denied Britain formal acknowledgment of its exercise of the external sovereignty of the mini-states along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, and for that reason the status of the shaykhdoms might best be described as quasi-protectorates, a system erected between 1880 and 1916. The only shaykhdoms in dispute with the Ottoman Empire were Kuwayt and Najd. Nevertheless, Britain's exclusive position in the Gulf weighed heavily in Whitehall's scales as

it pursued the negotiations with its Entente partners in World War I. Incidentally, before 1914 Britain viewed the Persian Gulf as a zone of strategic — not economic — interest in defense of India and therefore at the time established the quasi-protectorates as a preclusive presence designed to keep rivals out. Only after the interwar discovery of oil in the area did the mini-states become developmental dependencies. Finally, the European powers might annex Ottoman territory by unconditional integration into their empires, as France had done in Algeria.

All these forms of institutionalized presence came under purview in the Entente negotiations. So, too, did the practice of territorial compensation, which was intended to salve the sensitivity of the imperial powers as they sought to preserve the perceived balance of power on the continent. Thus, in anticipation of Russia's annexation in 1878 of the Ottoman districts of Batum, Ardahan, and Kars in Anatolia's northeast corner, Britain "persuaded" the Sublime Porte to allow it to occupy and administer the island of Cyprus under the guise of a convention of defensive alliance. In an annex to the convention, Whitehall pledged to evacuate Cyprus, "if Russia restores to Turkey Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war [of 1877-78]" — manifestly not much of a gamble. At the same time, Britain and Germany gave France a free hand in Tunisia, inducing Sir Charles Dilke to note that the "labours of the Berlin Congress, or its festivities, so confused the minds of the plenipotentiaries that they have never been clear who offered what to whom; but it at least seems plain... that a great deal of offering of other people's property took place."

The Constantinople agreement admirably exemplifies the application of the principle of compensation. In the opening aide-mémoire, the Russian foreign minister informed the British and French ambassadors "that the questions of Constantinople and the Straits must be definitively solved, according to the time-honored aspiration of Russia" by assimilation into its empire. In return, Britain and France were assured "similar understanding... for the realization of plans which they may frame with reference to other regions of the Ottoman Empire or elsewhere." This led step by step to the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, which provided for the allocation to the Entente allies of zones of annexation and of influence. When Italy joined the Entente in 1915, it exacted from its partners a formal pledge of postwar territorial compensation (articles 9 and 13) as well as "entire sovereignty" over Libya and the Dodecanese Islands (articles 8 and 10). The agreement of Saint Jean de Maruienne in 1917 confirmed the provisions for territorial compensation to Italy, but the agreement itself was never ratified.

The package deal that David Lloyd George concluded with Georges Clemenceau less than a month after the armistice with Germany in 1918 illustrates even more vividly the practice of compensation. Lloyd George proposed to the French president that Britain be assigned exclusive tutelage over Palestine instead of creating an international regime in which France

would have had a voice. As a further modification of the Sykes-Picot agreement, the British prime minister suggested that the *vilâyet* of Mosul — originally percieved as a French buffer between the proposed Russian and British zones and no longer needed after the Bolshevik repudiation of the plans — be transferred from the projected (French) Area A to the (British) Red Area. Clemenceau agreed on condition that France be given a free hand (*i.e.*, direct rather than indirect rule) in Area A and that France also be assigned the Deutsche Bank, 25 percent interest in the Turkish Petroleum Company (as originally structured in 1911 and modified in 1914). This brought Britain into difficulties because alone among the Entente allies in World War I it pursued a two-track diplomatic strategy: negotiations with fellow imperialists and with potential subject nationalists.

In the light of past experience, British courtship of the Arab nationalists and Zionists need not have seriously interfered with the achievement of imperial goals. After all according to the prevailing imperial ethos, the European powers were so far superior in military, economic, and social as well as political organization, that it would take generations, if not centuries for the "backward" peoples to catch up. The technical expertise of the imperial powers would therefore be indispensable "until such time as they [the subject nationalists] are able to stand alone." When the bureaucrats of Whitehall became familiar with their prime minister's package deal, they persuaded him to resist the French counterdemands, which he managed to do until early in the spring of 1920, when he finally consented to put the compensatory terms to paper for the first time for incorporation into the San Remo treaty.

In negotiating the secret agreements of World War I, the Entente diplomats set about to identify, safeguard, and promote their national interests and aspirations in the Ottoman Empire by the application of the inherited rules of European imperial expansion. These rules the major powers had tested and proved in the subsidiary political system that they had fashioned expressly for managing their relations with the Sublime Porte. To this imperial state of mind, mostly of nineteenth century origin, the Entente negotiators in 1915-17 had been socialized. They introduced no novel diplomatic principles into the secret plans for the postwar partition of the Ottoman Asian provinces. Meanwhile, during and immediately after the war, new doctrines that did not find their way into the secret agreements were taking shape alongside the inherited ones. They became enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations, largely owing to the crusading efforts of President Woodrow Wilson. Article 22 creating the mandates system blended the old imperial beliefs with the new principle of national self-determination. Two sets of norms, symbolized by imperialism and nationalism, were thus pitted against each other in the successor states of the Ottoman Empire. The interpretation of the wartime secret agreements by the nationalists and their supporters goes far to account for the moralism that has suffused the relevant literature.

Note

1 The joint naval action at Navarino in October 1827 was a punitive action resulting from the Sublime Porte's rejection of a demand from the three powers for an end to the Ottoman efforts to suppress the Greek rebellion. Later in April 1828 Russia alone declared war against the Ottoman Empire.

Sources for the History of Ottoman Palestine

The *Sijill* as Source for the Study of Palestine During the Ottoman Period, with Special Reference to the French Invasion

'ĀDEL MANNĀ'

Sijill: The Term and the Institution

The word *sijill* is derived from the Arabic word *sajjala*, which means to write in a book, to register or to note. It is from this definition that the term *sijill* (plural *sijillāt*) came to be used with reference to a registry or an archive connected with the *Sharī'a* courts. The term underwent many changes over hundreds of years, and in the Middle Ages was used to refer to all things that were listed, including a document which was issued by the *ḳāḍī* or another clerical officer. It is well known, of course, that a similar term, *isjāl* (plural *isjālāt*), was widely used in the same connection.

At the end of the second century of the Hijra, there was a development in Islamic law leading to a better understanding of the importance of written testimony. Consequently, the Ḥanafī legal literature is seen to expand along with the literature relating to legacies, written judgment (*sijill*) of the *ḳāḍīs* and the duties of the *ḳāḍī (adab al-ḳaḍā)* in general.[1]

There is conclusive evidence of the existence of written judgments from early in the second century of the Hijra. One such piece of evidence records the compulsory removal from office of the *ḳāḍī* of Ḳayrawān, "for failure to keep the records of his court in a proper manner."[2] This persuaded Ebied that the keeping of such records had already become a normal judicial practice.[3] He has produced a second source for this incident[4] which confirms that the dismissal of the *ḳāḍī* was related to the mismanagement of the *ḳāḍī's* records (*dīwān*), which had been entrusted to a shop-keeper. Al-Malikī, when recounting the story makes use of the term *sijill* not, however, necessarily with reference to the *ḳāḍī's* records, but rather to the letter of appointment which had been sent by the governor to the last *ḳāḍī* to be appointed in Ḳayrawān. This leads me to conclude that the term *sijill* existed as early as the second century of the Hijra, that the *ḳāḍī* possessed some kind of records which he utilized during his term of office and that there was some system for recording cases and judgments even in those days. But it cannot be established for certain that the institution of *sijill* functioned in a systematic way — preserving a copy or summary of written judgments in a record book or the *ḳāḍī's* archives.

Mandaville, a pioneer among those showing an interest in the *sijillāt* of Syria and Jordan, claims that "certainly the practice [keeping formal and organized

sijill] dates from as early as the 9th century... There is every reason to suppose that maintenance of written records was standard judicial procedure for the courts of every Islamic government that had some established form of administration, and for perhaps a few that did not."[5] I do not think that this claim and its suggestion that the formal institution of *sijill* was similar to that in the later Ottoman period is adequately grounded. First it does not necessarily reflect the practice of the times, because according to Islamic law, the act of judgment is not based on precedents, but rather on oral testimony. Furthermore, in none of the available sources, including the *inshā'* literature *adab al-ḳaḍā* collections,[6] is there conclusive evidence of the existence of a formal institution of *sijill*, as it existed in later periods.

If, for the moment, Ebied's and Mandaville's assumption that the institution of *sijill* did exist in Islamic countries prior to the Ottoman period is accepted, then it becomes necessary to account for the disappearance of this historical source, particularly because other sources from the same periods have survived. The accepted explanation that the disappearance of the source is linked to wars and natural catastrophes is not persuasive. Therefore, I judge that the *sijill*, in the form of an archive into which the *ḳāḍīs* were expected to note all copies of the written judgment, as well as other documents, was an Ottoman innovation. Any earlier attempts by individual *ḳāḍīs* to keep records systematically was idiosyncratic, haphazard and fundamentally different from the Ottoman *sijill*. The basis for my conclusion is as follows:

1. There is no conclusive evidence, prior to Ottoman times, of the *sijill's* existence as a formal institution. It is not just that extensive parts of such documentation have not been found, there is not even a mention of its existence in other surviving historical sources. But there is considerable evidence that the term *sijill*, used in reference to listings of the *ḳāḍī* did exist, and some of these, particularly *waḳfiyyāt*, were to be found throughout Egypt and other areas.

2. Mujīr al-Dīn al-Ḥanbalī's book on the history of Jerusalem and Hebron, offers some reinforcement for my hypothesis.[7] Even this great historian, himself a *ḳāḍī*, does not hint that the *sijill*, as a formal institution, was kept by the *ḳāḍī*. Furthermore, in the biographical chapter of the Shāfi'ī *ḳāḍīs* of Jerusalem, the author has to resort to documents (*isjālāt*) written by these *ḳāḍīs* to justify their inclusion in the list of Jerusalem *ḳāḍīs*. If, in his day, an archive of *sijill* had existed, it would have been much simpler to get permission to look through such a reference work to obtain the names of *ḳāḍīs*.

In his long list of *ḳāḍīs* there seem to be serious omissions. Moreover, in certain places he cites names of *ḳāḍīs* which were obtained from the *waḳfiyyāt* of religious seminaries or other *isjālāt* which were in the possession of various associated institutes or individuals, but never in the *sijill*.[8] Mujīr al-Dīn al Ḥanbalī was himself present at many important meetings of the *ḳāḍīs*, and his writings reveal that there was no permanent place where these meetings were held. Such conventions, which were prompted by an order from Cairo, or the

obligation to hear important cases, took place in mosques, schools and in the area of al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf and its two mosques.[9] When no permanent place of judgment exists, it is difficult, however good the intentions, to keep an archive over a long period of time.

3. The only remaining *sijillāt* in the period prior to the 16th century are from the previous century and relate to regions under Ottoman rule. The most ancient of these is for the city Bursa. The Ottomans excelled in their handling of various archives, and more or less conquered the Fertile Crescent and Egypt without undue destruction. The Turks were fervent Muslims and respected their religion, the holy places and other religious institutions. Since there is no evidence that the Ottomans initiated the destruction of the *sijillāt* for that period, it is not reasonable to assume that they did. If the *sijillāt* of Bursa, some Eastern European regions, and later Syria and Egypt, remained intact over hundreds of years under the Ottomans, one must ask the question: how did the *sijillāt* of the Mamluks and their antecedents disappear?

4. The Mamluks did not excel in the art of keeping archives of any kind, as did the Islamic regimes which preceeded them. The Ottomans, on the other hand, initiated the practice of keeping government archives, particularly Selīm I (1512-1520) and Süleymān I (1520-1566) who were more intent even than the first Abbasids to be pious rulers. They endowed Islamic law in its Ḥanafī form, with more practical significance than at any period since early Abbasid times.[10] That was an important victory for Islamic law, represented by the *ḳāḍīs* and the *'ulemā*. The Ottoman sultans based the whole civil administration on co-existence with the *ḳażā (ḳaḍā)*, the district in which a *ḳāḍī* had jurisdiction. This policy was the background to the changes and developments in the status of the *ḳāḍīs* and the institution of the *sijill*, which was in their charge at the beginning of the 16th century. Before being dispatched, every firman, order and document of importance was to be listed and copied into the *sijill* of the *ḳāḍī*.

The Sijillāt in the Middle East

Turkish and Eastern European historians began to study the history of their countries during the Ottoman era, long before their Arab counterparts showed a similar interest. They were also the first to discover the importance of the *sijillāt*, and to use systematically *Shar'ī* court records as an historical source.[11] Arab historians concentrated primarily on the Golden Ages of Islam, and later on the period of modern revival in the 19th century. Little attention was given to the Ottoman period the result being that the *sijill* was overlooked for many years and there was little awareness of its importance as a valid historical source. In recent years, there has been a change of attitude in a number of Arab countries. As well as Western scholars, Arab historians and researchers have begun to utilize the *sijill* in a systematic manner.[12] In Egypt, the *sijill* was discovered as early as the 1930s, since when, much use has been made of this

source, although its full potential as a reference has yet to be realized.[13]

Historians in the Fertile Crescent countries have also used the *sijillāt* as an historical source in a similar way. Asad Rustum, of the American University of Beirut, took a first step when he introduced the importance of the *sijillāt* as an historical source in the first volume of his book *al-Uṣūl al-'Arabiyya* in 1930.[14] In his book, Rustum compiled many important documents pertaining to the history of Syria and Palestine under Egyptian rule. These were collected from the *Shari'a* court records in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine Although the *sijillāt* of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine have been known to the scholarly community since 1930, until recently little use has been made of them.

In Syria, efforts have been made over the past few years to gather together the collections of the *sijillāt* from Aleppo and Hama, as well as other cities. These *sijillāt* have gradually been assembled in the Directorate of Historical Documents attached to the general Directorate of Antiquities and Museums in Damascus,[15] and now constitute a valuable asset for researchers and historians. The two largest collections which have been compiled in Damascus are the *sijillāt* of Aleppo and Damascus. Rafeq notes that 731 volumes from the *sijill* of Aleppo were numbered, the first dating back to the year 962/1555. The *sijillāt* of Damascus number many more, the total being 1685 volumes, the earliest of which dates back to 991/1583.[16] The details included in the various *sijillāt* of the Middle East are not elaborated here, but the interested reader may refer to the literature cited here.

The Sijill of Jerusalem

The *sijill* of Jerusalem, which is still kept in the storeroom of the *Shar'i* courts is one of the best to be found in the region, even when compared to the *sijillāt* of Syria and Egypt. In certain respects, it may even surpass those of Aleppo and Damascus. The first volume begins in the year 936/1529-30, preceeding the first volumes of Aleppo and Damascus by several decades. The first volume of the *awāmir* collection includes firmans from the year 945/1538-39. This is very significant when it is remembered that the first volume of the *Mühimme* series, which remained in Istanbul, dates back to the year 1544, followed by the volume relating to 1552-53, from which the late Heyd extracted the first documents for his book.[17] The material in this *sijill* is diverse and extends to the end of the Ottoman era. It includes raw material which relates to socio-economic history as well as to the political-administrative history of Palestine in general and the *sancak* of Jerusalem in particular. This is a major, valuable source for the history of Palestine and its surroundings, not only when compared with chronicles and travelers' literature, but even when compared with the Ottoman archives in Istanbul.

The writing of the *sijill* continues to this day. Although the *ḳāḍīs'* authority has been greatly decreased in those areas which have yet to be removed from religious jurisdiction, a daily listing continues. Today, the *sijill* consists of 605

volumes. The period of the Ottomans until the end of World War I covers 414 volumes in all,[18] among them are more than 80 volumes dealing with the 16th century.[19] The internal division of the Jerusalem *sijill* is as follows:

1. 1 volume of legacies (*matrūkāt*), no. 50.
2. 1 volume of *defter-i mufaṣṣal*, no. 70.
3. 13 volumes of *awāmir*.[20]
4. 65 volumes of the regular *sijill*.

The last two series are the most important among the *sijill* archives, both in terms of quantity and quality. The regular *sijillāt* series is the most consistent, and is still being maintained. The *awāmir* series is somewhat more problematic. During the 17th century, there seems to have been a regular procedure for listing, but during the following century, it was gradually condensed and the firmans began to be listed in the regular *sijill*.

The volumes of the 19th century *sijill* are in better condition than earlier ones. The quality of the paper and the script are superior, especially to the first volumes of the 16th century *sijill*. The material itself, however, is organized or copied according to the same chronological order, with neither an index nor a system of classification. Towards the end of the century, there was an attempt to remedy this, and alongside original documents there are titles and short summaries. The limitations placed upon the authority of the *ḳāḍī* during the *Tanẓīmāt* period, influenced the type of material included in the *sijill*. For example, although there is only one *sijill* of *awāmir* for this period, there are only a few firmans in the regular *sijillāt* because they are recorded elsewhere.

The 19th century extends to 111 volumes of the four series described above. On average, each year is represented by slightly more than one *sijill*. The internal division of these volumes is as follows:

1. 1 volume, no. 389, *ḳassām tarikāt*.
2. 1 volume, no. 348, of *awāmir*.
3. 9 volumes of trusteeships, and powers of attorney (*wikālāt*).
4. 100 volumes consisting of the regular *sijill* series.

It is important to note that volume 352 is included in the number cited above, this book being different from the others both in context and size. A quick glance through the pages reveals the fact that this volume is probably a sole remnant of the *Shar'ī* courts of Bethlehem. The material covered is similar in content to that of a regular *sijill*, and spans the years 1282/1866 and 1290-91/1873-74. It should also be noted that the two *ḳāḍīs* of those years were Mūsā and Sulaymān al-Khālidī, both of whom were appointed by the *ḳāḍī* of Jerusalem to preside over the *ḳażā* of Bethlehem.

Only the regular series of the *sijill* is represented in the first half of the century. All those documents, such as firmans, legacies and powers of attorney, which in different periods were included in separate sets of series were registered in the regular *sijill*. Furthermore, during the second half of the century, many volumes produced were of larger dimensions (an average of 55 × 36 cm), in comparison to the approximate 40-50 × 18 cm volumes produced

in the first part of the century. In addition, there seems to be a general, though inconsistent trend, towards an increase in the number of pages per volume. Generally, the books number 150-300 pages, with some shorter and longer exceptions. It is difficult to calculate the average number of documents on each page. This depends largely on the type of documents referred to and its content. For example, listings of weddings and obligations amount to a few lines, while firmans and important summaries of judgments may spread over several pages.

The first page of each volume is dedicated to a standard formal introduction which notes the name of the *ḳāḍī* and the date when he first presided. In addition, there is usually a listing of the name of the *başkātib* of the court. The first pages of the 19th century *sijill* confirm that most of the Jerusalem *ḳāḍīs* were appointed and sent from Istanbul. On the other hand, the *başkātib* who fulfilled the duties of the *ḳāḍī* in his absence was almost always a member of the local al-Khālidī family.

For the most part, the material is written in a reasonably legible Arabic script. Several exceptions to this are the firmans, orders, *berāts* and a small number of other documents all of which are written in Turkish. Once the problem of deciphering the script has been overcome one finds a wealth of information in this source, which reveals much about the socioeconomic as well as the political-administrative history of Palestine in general and the Jerusalem *sancak* in particular. Details of these subject areas have already been provided by researchers and historians referring to the *sijillāt* of their various countries. Finally, it is worth mentioning that relatively easy access is available to this archive. The *sijill* is to be found in the *Shar'ī* court of Jerusalem. This is not an ideal place for a researcher, but one must praise the *maḥkama* staff for their hospitality and the help they extend to their guests. The writings of Mandaville during the 1960s reveal only a small aspect of this hospitable treatment. "While the offices are small, personnel are willing to share the desk space available."

The French Invasion According to the Sijill

The sources available to unravel the history of Palestine between the periods of the French and Egyptian invasions are poor both qualitatively and quantitatively when compared to the sources of the second half of the 19th century. This fact emphasizes the importance and value of the *sijill* as a basic source to be used in the writing of the history of this period. When choosing a subject which would best exemplify the potential of the *sijill* in providing us with a deeper and better understanding of this period, I considered several subjects. I finally decided upon the French invasion, which seems to have been so thoroughly dealt with by historians that nothing new remains to be said. Syria and Palestine, however, were not fortunate to have had such a talented historian as al-Jabartī to write about the events and history of the period.

Many of the other sources relevant to the subject concentrated on a description of the military and political history of the area. Almost no attention is given to the population's involvement and reactions to the military campaign which took place over a period of many months.

In the Jerusalem *sijill* I found many documents which deal directly with the French invasion.[21] From these one may learn much, beginning with the landing at Alexandria and ending with the retreat from Egypt. The present discussion is limited to the involvement of the local population and their reactions to the struggle wich took place between the Ottomans and the French. A new historical perspective of the invasion, namely the role of the local population in the campaign waged against the French and its effect on their lives, can be elicited from the documents of the *sijill*. I shall present the contents of several relevant documents, without embarking upon a deeper analysis of their significance.

As early as the 15 of Ṣafar, 1213/July 29, 1799, a letter was sent by the Damascus *vālī* to the *ḳāḍī*, *muftī*, *naḳīb al-ashrāf* and *mütesellim* of Jerusalem, *'ulemā*, officers and notables of the city.[22] The *vālī* confirms in his letter that he has received their petition, in which they had requested a shipment of arms, ammunition and gunners (*topçuye*) to be sent to them. The *vālī* grants this request and appoints Aḥmed Ağa to lead a group of soldiers, gunners and supply men (*'arabaciye*), all of whom would shortly be arriving in Jerusalem. The appropriate officials in Jerusalem were asked for permission to allow the men to enter the citadel so that they might organize the defense of the city. In his letter the governor of Damascus promises shortly to lead his forces into the area so that he may take part in the events.

In addition, the *vālī* of Damascus writes: "The heads of monasteries in Jerusalem have sent me a petition, in which they have claimed that since the rumors of the occurrences in Alexandria had reached the city, they have been harassed by the masses and their monasteries have been plundered, the monks having been taken hostage.... My order is that if they have plans of treason which are neither overt or under-cover and are known to you, check the matter. If there is truth in it, write a brief report and send it to us."[23] The monks, he continues, will be kept under guard and supervision until we have received orders from the Sublime Porte which will decide the manner in which the hostages will be treated. In the meantime, until further orders arrive from Istanbul, one should not allow the hostages to be harassed by the public, or to be mistreated (illegally).

The above order by the governor of Damascus was listed in the Jerusalem *sijill* on 23 Ṣafar, 1213/August 6, 1798, that is eight days after it was written in Damascus. Examination of the orders reveals that a week was the usual time necessary for an order from Damascus to reach Jerusalem. If it is taken into account that the letter sent by the Damascus *vālī* was in response to petitions by Jerusalemites, it is a reasonable surmise that the inhabitants of the city were aware of the events taking place in Egypt, and were relatively quick to react.

This is not surprising in view of the economic ties existing between southern Palestine and Egypt on the one hand, and the extent to which an invasion by non-Muslims of an Islamic country could arouse people, on the other. Such an event had not happened since the days of the Crusaders.

The arms, ammunition and troops promised by the governor of Damascus were delayed in reaching Jerusalem. The *'ulemā* and city notables sent a reminder to the *vālī* so as to speed up the shipment. They also noted rumors which had reached their ears, that the "enemies of the religion" had approached the area of al-'Arīsh.[24] In his reply, the governor manages to avoid the major immediate questions and expounds upon the great dangers facing Islam and the Muslims, thus emphasizing the duty of each Muslim to join in the battle against the invaders. In addition, the governor of Damascus draws the attention of those responsible for Jerusalem to the appointment of the *vālī* of Sidon, Aḥmed Paşa Jezzār Paşa, as a commander in chief (*ser'asker*) of the coastal region and its surroundings. He advises them to refer to this man "in case of peril, when in need of military aid." This order was written on the 3rd of Rabī' al-awwal, 1213/Aug. 15, 1798, two weeks after the one previously cited.

When the regime in Istanbul became aware of Bonaparte's intention to expand his invasion to include both Syria and Palestine, efforts were made to recruit the local population to wage a holy war alongside the sultan's army. From firmans and orders which passed between Istanbul and Damascus, one can detect a general emphasis on the danger to the religious and holy places in the event of a French victory.[25] There is a repeated call to join the *jihād* against the oppressors.

On the 23rd of Rabī' al-awwal, 1213/Sept. 9, 1798, a new order was transmitted to Jerusalem from the governor of Damascus.[26] He notes that he has heard of various communications which have been sent to Jerusalem by the French. He expresses great wonder, as he writes, "that you did not see fit to inform us of the content of this correspondence, so that we may pass this knowledge on to the Ottoman government. We demand that upon your receipt of this order (*marsūmunā*), you compile all correspondence which has arrived from the French and send us translations of these in the Arabic language. In addition, relay, in detail, all that is known to you of these oppressors, their activities and their progress in this campaign. In the future know that part of your role and your duty is to relay to us, immediately upon receipt, any letters from the French."[27]

The growing fear that Palestine and Syria would be invaded, led to increased efforts by the Ottomans to recruit citizens both ideologically and practically into the campaign against the French. Ibrāhīm Paşa was appointed *vālī* of Damascus and was given charge over the *sancak* of Gaza and the role of *ser'asker* of Egypt.[28] He promptly sent a letter to the *mütesellim* of Jerusalem, the *ḳāḍī* and all others concerned informing them of his new appointment. He wrote that on the basis of the information he had received, the sultan was

mounting the greatest efforts to expel the French, exhorting every Muslim to join the struggle. Obviously all French consuls were expelled from Ottoman territories and all contacts with the French were broken off. The sultan was informed according to the *vālī's* letter, that the number of "potential men and war heroes" in the *sancaks* of Jerusalem, Nablus, Jenin and their environs was some 100,000 — all Muslim fighters. Their religious sentiments and their deep belief in the cause cannot be doubted, and they are, therefore, requested to join the sultan's army promptly so as to stop the onslaught of the oppressors. These orders by the governor of Damascus were written on the 13th of Rabī' al-thānī, 1213/Sept. 24, 1798.[29]

The political and military events taking place in an atmosphere of heightened religious propaganda brought about a growing sense of excitement among the population. Naturally, the wrath of the Muslims was turned against the local Christians, particularly against monks. The Sublime Porte as well as the governor of Damascus attempted to quieten the growing unrest. Many firmans and orders mention requests for tolerance towards the Christians under protection *(ahl al-dhimma)*, "for as long as they pay the *jizya* and do not show signs of treason, they and their monasteries are to be protected from the harassments of the people."[30]

After the French armies had penetrated southern Palestine, at the beginning of 1799, there was a change in attitude towards the Christians, both by the authorities and populace. An interesting document from the 29th of Ramaḍān 1213/March 6, 1799, shows that according to a firman from the sultan, a count was made of the monks being held hostage in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and a detailed listing revealed that 52 monks from monasteries in the areas of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ramle, etc.... were accounted for.[31]

Other firmans, orders and various documents found in the *sijill* provide further interesting and important information concerning the French invasion, until the final retreat from Egypt. It should be noted that for the two or three months when the city of Acre was besieged, there is very little information available. A dual explanation may be offered. First, attention was probably concentrated on defending the city, and secondly, communications between the central authorities in Istanbul, the *vālīs* and southern Palestine must have been very difficult.

I shall conclude with an account of the practical steps taken to recruit the population to the war effort. At the end of Jamādā al-ūlā, 1214/October 29, 1800, the *mashāyikhs* of the *nāḥiyes* of Jerusalem and Hebron arrived one after the other and undertook to recruit a specified number of fighters from their respective districts. This act took place in the *Sharī'a* court, in the presence of a representative of Meḥmed Paşa (Abū Maraḳ), the governor (*mutaşarrıf*) of the Jerusalem *sancak*. The aforementioned *mashāyikhs* agreed that if they broke their commitment, or any of their recruits deserted during the battle then they would pay a large sum of money to Meḥmed Paşa's treasury. This is in keeping with Abū Maraḳ's and Ottoman policy in the area. The Ottomans were

encouraged by Bonaparte's defeat and retreat from Palestine and thought fit to drive the French out of Egypt as well. The presence of large numbers of Ottoman soldiers in the area, enabled the authorities forcibly to recruit the local population to the holy war, or in lieu, to collect large amounts of money from the population.

The following is a list of the *nāḥiyes* whose *mashāyikh* came to the *Sharī'a* court in Jerusalem, and committed themselves before the *ḳāḍī* and the representative of Maḥmūd Paşa to recruit fighters. A breach of this commitment meant payment of a high fine as listed in the table.[32]

Name of the *nāḥiye*	No. of fighters	Amount of fine in 'lion' piasters (*in ḳurūş esedī*)
1. Jabal el-Ḳuds	500	30.000
2. Wādī al-Ṣarār	500	40.000
3. Banī Zayd	400	30.000
4. Banī Murra	400	25.000
5. Banī Mālik	500	40.000
6. Banī Ḥasan	500	40.000
7. al-Wādiya (Bayt Sāḥūr)	500	40.000
8. Banī Salīm	200	20.000
9. Banī Ḥārith	500	40.000
10. al-Khalaṣīa	300	30.000
11. al-'Arḳūb	200	25.000
12. Banī Ḥimār	700	30.000
13. al-Khalīl town and its *nāḥiyes* and villages	3000	150.000
Total Sum:	8200	540.000

Conclusion

I have used only a few of the many examples which offer a new vantage point from which to view the French invasion of Egypt and southern Palestine. Put together, all the examples show that the invasion shook the region severely and provoked the large number of documents and reactions on the subject listed in the *sijill*. These documents also demonstrate the vast importance of the *sijill* volumes and the wealth of information to be gleaned from them. An additional benefit is that they tell much about the common people, who comprise the great majority of the population, which is not true of most other historical sources. A systematic investigation of the *sijill* will enable historians to write a more comprehensive history of Palestine during the Ottoman period. Indeed, today any documentation of the socioeconomic or even political-administrative history of Palestine in general, and Jerusalem in particular, which does not make use of this central historical source, would be inadequate.

Notes

1 Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 82-92.
2 Recorded by Ibrāhīm al-Raḳīk al-Ḳayrawānī in his *Tarīkh Ifrīḳiya wa'l-Maghrib*, ed. by al-Munjī al-Ka'bī (Tunis, 1968), p. 168 in R.Y. Ebied, *Some Arabic Legal Documents of the Ottoman Period from the Leads Manuscript Collection* (Leiden, 1976), p. 1.
3 *Ibid.*
4 Abū-Bakr al-Malikī, *Riyāḍ al-nufūs*, ed. by Ḥusayn Mu'nis, vol. 1 (Cairo, 1951), p. 111.
5 J. Mandaville, "The Ottoman Court Records of Syria and Jordan," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 80 (1966), p. 311.
6 See, for example, al-Ḳalḳashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā fī kitābat al-inshā'* (Cairo, 1913-1919); al-Nuwayrī (d. 732/1332), *Nihāyat al-'Arab fī funūn al-adab* (Cairo, 1924-1926); *Fatāwā Ālamgiri* (Kanfur, 1349-1350 H.), vol. 4, which contains numerous extracts in two chapters: *Kitāb al-maḥākim wa'l-sijillāt*, pp. 260-305 and *Kitāb al-shurūṭ*, pp. 305-376.
7 al-Ḥanbalī, Mujīr al-Dīn, *al-Uns al-jalīl fī tarīkh al-Ḳuds wa'l-Khalīl* (Amman, 1973).
8 *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 129, 129-130, 245.
9 *Ibid.*, pp. 300, 305, 312, 347, 348.
10 Schacht, pp. 89-91. See also "*Ḳāḍī*", EI, new edition (Leiden, 1954), vol. 4, p. 345.
11 A full bibliography of their publications on the subject, and a list of all the records available in Turkey and East European countries are found in references which Mandaville notes in his article, pp. 310-313.
12 See, for example, M. Bakhit, "The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the 16th Century", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University of London (1972); 'Abd al-Wadūd (Yūsuf) Barghūth, "Liwā' Ḥamā fī al-ḳarn al-sādis 'ashar", unpublished M.A. thesis, the University of 'Ayn-Shams, Cairo (1970); 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Awaḍ, *al-'Idāra al-'Uthmāniyya fī wilāyat Sūriyya* (Cairo, 1969); Bahjat Ṣabrī, "Liwā' al-Ḳuds taḥt al-ḥukm al-'Uthmānī, 1840-1873", unpublished M.A. thesis, 1973.
13 For more details about the *Shari'a* court records of Cairo see Stanford Shaw, "Cairo's Archives and the History of Ottoman Egypt", *Report on Current Research* (Washington: The M.E. Institute, 1956), pp. 66-67, and Hasanein Rabie', *The Financial System of Egypt, 564-741 (1169-1341)* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 6-8.
14 Asad Rustum. *al-Uṣūl al-'Arabiyya fī-tarīkh Sūriyya fī 'ahd Muḥammad 'Alī*, vol. 1 (Beirut, 1930).
15 Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "The Law Court of Damascus, with Special Reference to the Craft-corporations during the First Half of the Eighteenth Century", in *Les Arabes par leurs archives* (Paris, 1976), pp. 141-159.
16 For more information about the *sijillāt* of Aleppo, Damascus and Hama, see *ibid.*, pp. 142-146.
17 Uriel Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615* (Oxford, 1960).
18 Mandaville (p. 318, n. 16) notes that the total number of the *sijill's* volumes is 562 as was reported to him by the late 'Ārif al-'Ārif. This information was valid at the time. However, because of the dynamic nature of the *sijill* which is continually being added to, the last volume is presently no. 605.
19 Amnon Cohen in his book *Yehudey Yerushalayim ba me'a ha-shesh 'esre* (Jerusalem, 1976), p. 11, talks about 82 volumes in the 16th century from amongst a total number of 562 which Mandaville mentions. As I mentioned above, there are only 80 volumes on the 16th century. Vol. 80 covers the years 1599-1600.
20 For more details about the *sijill* of Jerusalem in the 16th century, particularly on the *awāmir* series see *ibid.*, pp. 9-13 and Heyd, pp. 3-31.
21 Aharon Layish, "The Sijill of the Jaffa and Nazareth Shari'a Courts as a Source for the Political and Social History of Ottoman Palestine", in M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 525-532. He found only few documents on the French invasion in the *sijill* of Jaffa and this is probably for the simple reason that it was partially lost during those years. Generally, the *sijill* of Jerusalem is richer in documents, possibly due to the higher position held by the *ḳāḍī* of this city. (Most of the correspondence with the central government passed through his office rather than through offices of other *ḳāḍīs* in the neighboring *sancaks*).

22 *Sijill*, vol. 280, p. 4.
23 *Ibid.*
24 *Sijill*, vol. 280, p. 18.
25 *Sijill*, vol. 280, p. 20(A). See also *ibid.*, pp. 22-23, 23-24, 24, 25-27.
26 *Ibid.*, p. 31.
27 *Ibid.*
28 *Ibid.*, p. 32-33.
29 *Ibid.*
30 *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 62, 62-63, 63-65, 65-66, 69, 80-81, 81-82.
31 *Ibid.*
32 The material in the following table is extracted from 13 documents in vol. 281, pp. 130-136, each of which is related to a group of *mashāyikh* of the *nāḥiyes* and regions listed below.

Demographic Research of the Jerusalem and Hebron Regions Towards the End of the Ottoman Period

U.O. SCHMELZ

PREVIOUS AND CURRENT RESEARCH

There is no sufficiently clear picture of the demography of Palestine in the 19th century and up to World War I. This is due to the dearth of sources and the low quality of most of the available ones, and to the so far prevailing paucity of interest in this topic by researchers with demographic training.

For the city of Jerusalem a multitude of population estimates are extant, which usually distinguish the main religious groups. There is a most disconcerting inconsistency between these estimates, but a rising trend of population growth is evident. Y. Ben-Arieh has tried to establish a time series of population size figures.[1] Also for Hebron and the townlets around Jerusalem various and again rather inconsistent population estimates from the late Ottoman period are available in writings of that time. For the villages of the Jerusalem and Hebron regions three lists were published in the *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästinavereins* towards the end of the 19th century.[2]

R. Bachi has recently attempted to give a demographer's assessment of the evolution of population in Palestine in the 19th and early 20th centuries as part of his overview of the country's demographic history throughout the ages and as a prologue to the periods of the British Mandate and of Israel's independence, with their extended statistical documentation.[3]

This writer did some research long ago on the demography of the Jews in Jerusalem city in the mid-19th century.[4] That research centered on the utilization of the primary material of two of the censuses of Jerusalem's Jews undertaken on the initiative of Moses Montefiore, namely those in 1839 and 1866. The original census records have been preserved, and photocopies thereof were statistically processed and analyzed. The salient finding was the enormous mortality among the Jews of Jerusalem at that time, which caused a marked deficit in their natural rate of increase notwithstanding high nuptiality and, apparently, great fertility. Under these circumstances, the maintenance and gradual increase of the numbers of Jews in Jerusalem were entirely due to migratory reinforcements, i.e. to *'aliya*. The excessive mortality revealed itself, in the data derived from the Montefiore censuses, through very low survival, strikingly high frequency of widows and orphans, and diminutive yet very

consistent numbers of living children per family. Of course, such a situation is demographically most unusual, because a population with a heavy deficit in its natural movement cannot persist on its own, and if conditions are so bad it is unlikely to get the necessary reinforcements from abroad unless a very special appeal is at work — such as the religious-national appeal of Jerusalem for Jews.

From the viewpoint of research methodology, it was fortunate that explicit confirmation for these striking findings of the analysis of the Montefiore census data could be discovered in some writings by well-informed contemporary observers, among them several physicians who described in detail the health hazards in Jerusalem and characterized the demographic situation of the Jews there. Thus a double substantiation of those findings was attained.

However, it ought to be emphasized that no rash generalizations must be made from the above-mentioned findings on the very high mortality in mid-19th century Jerusalem. It is characteristic for bad health conditions that considerable variability exists in a country or even in a city, because of local health risks or such as are specific to certain subpopulations.

This writer is now engaged in research into the population of Jerusalem city and of the entire Jerusalem region as well as of the Hebron region in the late Ottoman period. This is being done with the intention of utilizing two available but so far neglected major sources of primary information, and of applying certain modern methods of analysis which hold out prospects of determining the demographic conditions of the then relatively stable Arab village population.

The sources in question are additional censuses of Jews conducted on the initiative of Montefiore around the middle of the 19th century and the Ottoman *Nüfūs* registers extant from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. In both cases only raw material in the shape of population listings is available. These listings contain large quantities of entries — of course, handwritten and in Hebrew or Turkish, respectively — and must in the first place be laboriously processed so as to become amenable to computerized tabulation and demographic analysis.

Recently an interest has arisen in the censuses conducted and the system of population registration instituted by the Ottoman authorities in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Two important articles have been published dealing with these activities in the whole of the large Ottoman Empire as it then was, and incidentally providing also some data for Palestine.[5] However, these studies rely on the utilization of available and published Ottoman statistics which have so far been disregarded and give no breakdown except for administrative-geographical divisions and major religious denominations. Our research, on the other hand, resorts to primary material and will therefore be able to study a variety of population characteristics and hopefully disclose some information on demographic dynamics (see below).

THE MONTEFIORE CENSUSES

It is now known that on the initiative of Sir Moses Montefiore five censuses were held among the Jews in Jerusalem and other localities of Palestine. These censuses were taken in 1839, 1849, 1855, 1866 and 1875. The original census lists have been preserved in England and a microfilm copy is available at the National and Hebrew University Library in Jerusalem. The lists were kept by Montefiore in strict confidentiality and — this is a revealing feature — no counts based on them were ever released in his lifetime and for many decades later.[6] The censuses, some of which contained information not only on the Jewish population but also on synagogues, schools etc., served as factual basis for Montefiore's philanthropic activities on the occasion of his various visits to Palestine.

The Montefiore censuses of Jerusalem's Jews are arranged by Jewish communal organizations (*'edot* and *kolelim*). For each of such groups lists were compiled of the men and their nuclear family (wife and unmarried children); of the widows; and of the orphans. For each man the following particulars were to be reported: name, age, place of birth, year of immigration to Palestine (or of taking up residence in Jerusalem), occupation, marital status, name of wife, number of children and their ages. But there are marked differences in the filling in of these particulars between the various groups in the censuses which spread over 36 years. No particulars except their names were recorded for married women.

The attractive features of the Montefiore censuses for demographic research are inter alia:

a) Their early date — the first ones going back to the period before modernization.
b) The inclusion, in principle, of all Jews and not of Ottoman subjects only (as in the *Nüfūs* registers, see below).
c) The very fact that there are five censuses available, which affords opportunities for comparisons between them.
d) Particularly the possibility of determining in the later censuses which persons survived and remained in Jerusalem from the time of previous censuses. This can be done individually, or aggregatively according to immigration year of the foreign-born and age of the locally-born.

His previous investigations led this writer to the tentative conclusion that the two Montefiore censuses of Jerusalem's Jews which were then studied by him can be considered as fairly complete.[7] Of course, there are no perfect censuses — not even under modern conditions and with elaborate procedures. The evaluative issue will be taken up again in the current research — with the additional opportunities provided through the comparisons between no fewer than five successive censuses which were roughly but a decade apart from one another.

At any rate, a kind of permanent population registration was in existence at

that time among the Jews of Jerusalem, especially the Ashkenazim, for the implementation of the *ḥaluḳa* (the distribution of the per capita money allocations to the local residents from the donations collected in the Jewish diaspora). Nor was this a minor matter, since the very subsistence of many families depended on this money. It may be conjectured that the compilation of the Montefiore censuses was largely based on these existing registers.

The main substantive objectives of the demographic study of the Montefiore censuses are as follows:

a) Tracing the changes in Jewish population size, distingishing *'edot* (especially Sephardim and Mughrabim, on the one hand, and Ashkenazim, on the other).

b) Investigating the structure of the Jewish population in regard to all recorded characteristics.

c) Clarifying some aspects of demographic dynamics, particularly the level of mortality and the changes in mortality which took place among the Jews over the decades covered by these censuses.

THE *NŪFŪS* REGISTERS

While Ottoman *defters* from 16th century Palestine have been intensively studied by scholars, nothing has been done so far with respect to the late Ottoman *Nūfūs* registers, except for a couple of descriptive notes by archivists.[8]

In the State Archives of Israel several hundred *Nūfūs* volumes are kept, dated approximately between 1880 and World War I. About 240 volumes, i.e., slightly more than half of all the extant volumes, relate to the Jerusalem and Hebron regions, while the other parts of Palestine are relatively less well represented.

About 210 of these volumes are population registers of the Jerusalem and Hebron regions. These registers fall into four very unequally divided categories:

a) The bulk is formed by the volumes of a population registration conducted in 1905 (Ottoman fiscal year 1321). These volumes belong to either of two versions:

> (i) "Draft register" (*mūsvedde defter*), i.e., primary recordings of the registration;
> (ii) "Basic register" (*esāsī defter*), into which the lists of the primary registration were copied and which were intended for updating through entries about subsequently occurring changes in the population.

The "basic registers" are more fully preserved. Together with the draft volumes in case the basic version is lacking, the localities of the Jerusalem and Hebron regions are almost completely represented in the 1905 material.

b) Most volumes for the Jerusalem region from an earlier registration

conducted in the mid-1880s (the corresponding records are lacking for most of the Hebron region).

c) A few somewhat earlier and differently compiled volumes, which we shall not describe here.

d) Several new registers from the period of World War I, nearly all confined to Jews living in the city of Jerusalem.

Besides the population registers there are also volumes recording specific types of events — births, deaths, marriages, etc. — but their coverage is obviously incomplete. Another type of register, which is extant from the Hebron region alone, is lists of men liable for conscription, dating mainly from World War I.

The 1905 registers which supply the principal material for this research were compiled according to a law of 1902,[9] but there existed previous legal provisions for the *Nūfūs* system.[10] We shall not enter here upon the administrative arrangements nor upon the current updating procedures of what was intended to be a permanent system of population registration according to certain European models. The demographic value of the *Nūfūs* materials, at any rate for Palestine, seems to lie primarily in the basic recording of the population, which was a census-like operation and whose degree of completeness seems to have been far superior to the subsequent updating entries.

The population registers were compiled according to localities, where appropriate according to religio-ethnic communities also, and within cities according to urban quarters.[11]

The religio-ethnic groups distinguished in the two regions under study were:

a) Muslims.

b) Jews — Ashkenazim and Sephardim separately, and in Jerusalem city the Mughrabim also.

c) Christians — distinguishing some nine sects.

The original compilation of the population registers was undertaken by the *mukhtārs* of the localities or by the representatives of the religious communities concerned. Interestingly, some internal population registers kept by Jewish *mukhtārs* and corresponding to the official ones, have also survived — several of them in Hebrew.

According to contemporary sources and to the evidence of the register material itself, the ordinary population registers contained only Ottoman subjects and of those only the persons who were local residents living in private households. Separate lists were kept of persons who were not local residents, among them the Ottoman officials, and of representatives of institutions. Bedouin tribes are not found in the registers.

The register for every locality or urban quarter and, where appropriate, for any one of the existing religio-ethnic communities living there, consists of a list of households with a separate entry for each person in the "household".[12] The

entries for the individuals contain, inter alia, the following demographically relevant particulars:

a) For each person: sex, year of birth, marital status, relationship to household head, place of birth.

b) For many men: their occupation.

Hence the *Nüfūs* registers are unlike all published locality lists with population data from Ottoman Palestine in two respects, which are important for demographic study:

a) The units of registration or counting are not households or selected males (e.g., taxpayers or those liable to socage) but all individuals — including the old men, women and children.

b) The same fundamental demographic characteristics are recorded for virtually all individuals.

What we call here the Jerusalem and Hebron regions comprise essentially the late Ottoman *ḳażās* of Jerusalem and Hebron.[13] For purposes of geographical analysis we have divided these comparatively large territories, outside the cities of Jerusalem and Hebron, into the previously existing 11 *nāḥiyes* according to Hartmann's village lists,[14] which are taken from the Syrian official almanac (*Sālnāme-i Sūriye*) for 1871. Altogether some 170 localities were included in the regions studied.

The lists under study from 1905 comprise the recordings of about 165,000 different[15] individuals in 23,500 households. The lists for the Jerusalem region extant from the mid-1880s include about 73,000 individuals in 10,500 households.

Evaluation of the completeness of the *Nüfūs* registrations and of the quality of recording the personal particulars is an obvious research objective, but will be thoroughly possible only after computer tabulations come in. With regard to the 1905 material, first impressions are relatively favorable, especially when one bears in mind the conditions of the time. The population totals which we have obtained for 1905 from the *Nüfūs* registers compare fairly well, on the one hand with published Ottoman statistics for 1914[16] and, on the other hand, with the Mandatory census of 1922 (allowance being made for some differences in the definition of the target population).[17] The demographically relevant personal characteristics are recorded in the *Nüfūs* registers with remarkable completeness, except for occupations, and with apparent consistency between the various characteristics of the same person, of different persons in the same household etc.

As already mentioned, altogether 165,000 records of individuals, furnishing demographic particulars, are available from the Jerusalem and Hebron regions in 1905, according to an orderly arrangement by localities, urban quarters and religious communities. This is an impressive body of information extant from that otherwise demographically scarcely documented period.

Experience with population registers indicates that it is easier to undertake a massive one-time operation initiated by the authorities, like the registration of

1905, rather than to run an ongoing system which requires continual initiative and vigilance on the part of the population and of the authorities in getting changes reported. This also appears to have been the case with the late Ottoman *Nūfūs* system in Palestine. Therefore, deliberately, the material for our demographic research is that of the original registrations only.

In order to get a census-like synchronous picture, since the "basic registers" contain updatings also, it has been necessary to eliminate the subsequently registered households and the individuals added to existing households (through birth, marriage etc.), but to include the persons originally recorded who were later reported as dead or departed.

Because of the limitation to Ottoman subjects, the *Nūfūs* registers are only of very partial validity, with probable biases, for the Jewish population. Yet they are the only so far known source which gives demographic characteristics for at least considerable numbers of Jews in the regions considered, between the Montefiore censuses of the mid-19th century and the wartime censuses from 1916 onwards.[18] In 1905, more than 13,000 Jews were recorded in Jerusalem and about 700 in Hebron. The principal interest of the *Nūfūs* registers as a demographic source lies in their potentialities for the study of the Arab population in towns and villages alike.

Our substantive research objectives are primarily the study of the following topics, in every case according to the geographical and religious divisions of the population:

Population Size and its Changes

(a) Comparing population size with earlier and later sources, e.g., the extant *Nūfūs* registers of the mid-1880s; the available population estimates for individual towns and villages or for larger territories from late Ottoman times; the Mandatory censuses of 1922 and 1931.

(b) Investigating the magnitude of previous and subsequent changes in population size through the above-mentioned comparisons as well as from relevant indicators of demographic dynamics which can be estimated from the particulars indicated in the *Nūfūs* registers.

Composition of the Population

(a) by sex, age, marital status.

(b) by place of birth which, if different from place of residence, is indicative of migration.

(c) by occupations of men, as far as recorded.

Natural Movement

(a) Studying some aspects of marriage customs, e.g., age at first marriage (insofar as inferrable from age-specific percents of single persons); age difference between spouses; husband's and wife's places of birth; polygamy among Muslims.

(b) Estimation of main parameters of demographic dynamics (e.g., rates of births, deaths, and natural increase, average length of life) for the Muslim population, especially in the villages, from recorded age composition and

through resort to model tables for (quasi-)stable populations. Modern demographic research, striving to ascertain the demographic situation of populations in the less-developed countries with deficient data has developed techniques to supplement the missing information through use of model tables, based on sets of mathematical relations between the various demographic indicators. It is intended to put these methods — as well as birth-cohort-specific comparisons between *Nūfūs* registers of the mid-1880s and of 1905 — to use for conjecturing, inter alia, the rate of growth among the village population of the Jerusalem and Hebron regions at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. The underlying assumption for use of these methods is that the Muslim village population was comparatively stable — both in having rather constant fertility and mortality and in being little affected by migrations at that time.[19]

Households

(a) Composition of households and coresidence of relatives.

(b) Size of households. Historians know that in old sources on populations, whether they give detailed lists or report only totals, often the unit of registration or counting is not the individual but the household or the man liable (unless exempted) for tax paying, or socage. The *Nūfūs* registers, as stated, indicate for each household all the included persons, by sex, age and marital status. This makes it possible to establish empirically the average number of persons per household as well as the ratio between the number of men of a certain age and marital status and between the population total.[20]

Our demographic study of the 1905 *Nūfūs* population of the Jerusalem and Hebron regions proceeds on two levels:

a) Totals for villages, urban quarters and religious communities are being compiled from the entire available material.

b) The detailed tabulations by demographic characteristics will be carried out for a systematic random sample of 20 percent of the households, i.e., for more than 30,000 individuals from 1905 and nearly 15,000 from the mid-1880s.

Notes

1 Y. Ben-Arieh, *A City Reflected in its Times*, vol. 1, *Jerusalem in the 19th Century* (Jerusalem, 1977); vol. 2, *New Jerusalem, the Beginnings* (Jerusalem, 1979), in Hebrew.

2 A. Socin, "Alphabetisches Verzeichniss von Ortschaften des Paschalik Jerusalem." *ZPDV*, 2 (1879); M. Hartmann, "Die Ortschaftenliste des Liwa Jerusalem in dem tuerkischen Staatskalender fuer Syrien auf das Jahr 1288 der Flucht (1871)." *ZDPV*, 6 (1883); C. Schick, "Zur Einwohnerzahl des Bezirks Jerusalem." *ZDPV*, 19 (1896). Information on individual villages is also found in the standard works by Robinson, Guerin and the PEF Survey of Western Palestine.

3 R. Bachi, *The Population of Israel*, in CICRED series for 1974 World Population Year. Israeli edition by the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, and Demographic Center, Prime Minister's Office, 1977.

4 U.O. Schmelz. "Some Demographic Peculiarities of the Jews of Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century," in M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerualem, 1975), pp. 119-141. This article contained some of the findings of research carried out in the 1950s.

5 K.H. Karpat, "Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82-1893," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 9 (1978), pp. 237-274; S.S. Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914," *ibid.*, pp. 325-338.

6 The historian J. Meisl was the first to study any of these censuses (that of 1839). A fraction of his transcript and counts was published posthumously: "List of Jews in Safed and Vicinity," *Sefunot*, 6 (1962), in Hebrew. This writer subjected Montefiore censuses to demographic analysis for the first time in the 1950s (see note 4 above).

7 The argumentation is too detailed to be presented here.

8 Especially P. Alsberg, "Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages in European Jewish Communities in Palestine and in Israel," *Archivum*, 9 (1959).

9 French translation in G. Young's *Corps de droit ottoman*, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1905).

10 See note 5.

11 Jerusalem's new quarters outside the walls of the Old City were indicated by special, later disused names.

12 Termed *maskan* in the registers of 1905 and *ḥâne* in those of the mid-1880s.

13 Or the following subdistricts of the Mandatory census of 1922: Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Jericho, Hebron.

14 See note 2.

15 Counting only once the individuals recorded both in the "basic registers" and in the available "draft registers."

16 The 1914 statistics did not reflect a new registration, but only reported the results of the — presumably deficient — updating of the 1905 registration.

17 De jure or de facto approach; inclusion or exclusion of foreign nationals, Bedouin, etc.

18 *Enumeration of the Jews of Eretz Yisra'el*, vol. 1 (Jaffa, Zionist Office in Eretz Yisra'el, 1918), in Hebrew.

19 In fact, in the villages nearly all men had been born in the locality of residence and most of the in-married women came from nearby localities (though this does not preclude out-migration from the studied regions as a whole). Regretfully, the stable population technique cannot be used for the Jews and various Christian sects, because they were too unstable. Many of the adult Jews, also of those recorded in the *Nüfüs* registers, had been born abroad. The Christians, too, though to a lesser degree, showed considerable migratory mobility as well as shifts from one sect to another.

20 While the results will be directly valid for the studied *Nüfüs* material, they do not preclude the possibility that "households" may have been differently defined, or that age-sex ratios may have differed, at other places or times.

The German and Austrian Consular Archives in Jerusalem as a Source for the History of Palestine and its Population in the Late Ottoman Period

MORDECHAI ELIAV

One of the results of the renewed activity by the European powers in Palestine after the Egyptian occupation was the establishment of consulates in Jerusalem. The powers considered the founding of those consulates to be the most effective way of protecting the Christian minority against harassment and persecution, which were expected anew with the return of Ottoman rule in 1840. Six consulates were established in Jerusalem over a short time: the British in 1839, the Prussian in 1842, the French and Sardinian in 1843, the American in 1844 (a third Protestant consulate), and the Austrian in 1849. Russia was then the only great power limited to a consulate in Jaffa, and it opened a Jerusalem consulate only in the early sixties.

The establishment of six consulates in ten years was of great significance, and thenceforth Muslims were wary of harming religious minorities; even the authorities were obliged to take into account the radical change in the status of those minorities, apprehensive of retaliation by the consulates, which were vigilant and quick to take up any incident of harassment. The consulates operated according to the Capitulation agreements, and vigorously defended their protégés. Indeed, the consulates attained a very influential position, thereby compelling the rulers to treat them with respect. The standing of resident aliens changed completely.

Just as Istanbul was the center for ambassadors and senior diplomats to the Empire as a whole, Jerusalem became the center of activity for consuls who served their countries' interests, and who set their minds to the strengthening of their countries' diplomatic and commercial footholds in the region as part of the European powers' efforts to realize their political and commercial ambitions in the Middle East. In the course of time, Christian religious and charitable institutions, serving chiefly the local Arab population, expanded greatly. For the Jewish community too, which included a significant number of resident aliens, the establishment of the consulates was a crucial turning point, permitting the expansion of the community and the entrenchment of its institutions. Thus there was a mutual interest in the strengthening of ties: the Jews took care to maintain their foreign citizenship, which afforded them

special advantages, and those without de jure foreign citizenship strove for de facto consular protection. Most of the consulates were interested in increasing the number of those under their protection, often even without closely checking the documents attesting to the applicant's origins.[1]

The consuls took an interest in all aspects of life in Palestine. Their reports reflect the political, economic, religious, and social situation among the various elements of the population. They encouraged trade with their countries, strove for the improvement of services they controlled (such as banking, mail, and sea transport), and showed exceptional interest in the daily life of Palestine. Consequently, the consular archives, to the extent that they have survived, are a first-class historical source for events and development in that region. There is a vast unexplored treasure of information, evaluations, reports and documents; and there was scarcely a single matter which did not attract a consul's attention. For the most part, the archives preserved copies of the consuls' reports to the embassies in Istanbul and to their foreign ministries. Original correspondence between the consulates and their local protégés as well as with various governmental institutions is also preserved because consuls were careful to file original documents that came into their hands, whether in Arabic from the Ottoman authorities, or in Hebrew and various European languages from various parts of the Jewish community. The consular archives are an invaluable historical source, since they are a primary source, putting before us a wide tapestry of life and settlement in Palestine from the mid-19th century to the end of World War I, in fact until the beginning of British rule (which brought about a thorough change in the status of the consulates, which by 1914 had already declined in prestige after the unilateral abrogation of the capitulations). For all that, over many years researchers in the history of Palestine failed to evaluate the depths of the consular archives and even to appreciate their historical significance. The first important pioneering work in this field was by Albert M. Hyamson, a senior clerk in the Mandatory government in Palestine who between 1939 and 1941 published in London the first selection of documents from the consular archive, under the title *The British Consulate in Jerusalem, in Relation to the Jews of Palestine*, vol. 1: *1838-1861*; vol. 2: *1862-1914*. Though the editor chose mainly documents relating to the Jewish community, many others also reflect events of general interest, revealing the country's history. Unfortunately, the editor added no introduction or comments but there is no doubt that those two volumes do not exhaust the riches of the archives as preserved today in London, in the consular archives and in the Public Record Office.

The German Consular Archive

The Prussian consulate, as already noted, was the second to be established in Jerusalem. Over the years this consulate, which was founded in 1842, increased its scope and authority. From a Prussian consulate, it changed in 1868 to a

general consulate for "the Northern/German Alliance," expanded to become a consulate of the German Reich in 1871, and was finally raised to the status of a general consulate early in 1914. In practice, from its inception this consulate represented the interests of other Protestant states of Germany, as well as the interests of Dutch citizens until the opening of the Dutch consulate in Jerusalem in 1876.

The German consular archive passed through many stages, and until after World War II its location was unknown. It was discovered by chance in Israel about twenty years ago. Since then, it has been preserved in Israel's State Archives. Unfortunately, some parts of the German archive have been lost over the years, perhaps including important papers. Be that as it may, it seems most of the material has been preserved, and certainly more than two-thirds of the original archive. Dr. A. Alsberg, the state archivist, has described the surviving files, emphasizing their vital historical importance.[2] Two hundred and thirteen documents from those files, chiefly concerned with the history of the Jewish community, were published in the original language, with Hebrew summaries, introductions, and commentaries, in my *The Jews of Palestine in German Policy: Selected Documents from the Archives of the German Consulate in Jerusalem, 1842-1914* (Tel Aviv, 1973). This selection of documents illustrates a variety of spheres of activity and interest, reflecting particularly relations with the Jewish community in Palestine and the consulate's activities on its behalf. Prussia, and later Germany, excelled in the selection of consuls. Almost all of them were well-known orientalists who were familiar with Near Eastern countries and had published important scholarly works. But in addition to their familiarity with oriental life, language, and customs, they displayed an interest in the Jewish community and its problems, particularly in Jewish families of German origin, and strove to help them as best they could. A large number of files at the consulate concern Jewish affairs, and they bear witness to energetic and wide-ranging activities — granted, not always equally so — and reflect each consul's interest and attitude to and relationship with the Jewish community. The outstanding consuls from this point of view were the second consul, Dr. Georg Rosen (1852-1867); the fourth, Karl Victor von Alten (1869-1873); the seventh, Dr. Paul von Tischendorf (1886-1896); and the last, Edmund Schmidt (1901-1916).[3]

The files reveal three policy phases in the Jerusalem consulate. During the first phase, the consulate was primarily concerned to further Protestant interests and to enlarge Protestant influence, both in cooperation with Britain on the basis of the agreement known for initiating a joint Protestant episcopate as a counterweight to the Catholic and Orthodox Churches which dominated Christian life in Palestine. However, the local Protestant community remained quite small despite all the missionary efforts, and accordingly, the first consuls saw the Jews under their protection as their main constituency, and were quite liberal in granting protection to foreign Jews, even, on occasions, to Jews of dubious origin. Concurrently, from the start of consular activity they strove to

found German Christian institutions such as a hospital, a pilgrims' hospice, and various institutions for welfare, health, and education.

With the beginnings of Templar settlement in Palestine in 1868, the consulate's primary concern became the defense of the Christian settlers. It also assisted them to develop their urban and agricultural settlements. True, it did not decrease its consular activities in the encouragement and defense of Jewish settlement but it also had a local constituency of its own citizens. It should be noted that only the Germans succeeded in establishing in Palestine a Christian settlement project that greatly increased their influence. At the start of the 20th century, the German Christian community in Palestine numbered over two thousand souls, a well-organized community boasting significant achievements in agriculture, industry, crafts, trade, and communications. They pioneered many fields in Palestine, contributing greatly to the modernization of agriculture and the economy.[4]

Over the years, the German consulate achieved a highly respected position in Palestine, largely because of its activities during the third phase after the Berlin Congress of 1878 and the coming to power of Wilhelm II in 1888. Germany then increased its involvement in the Ottoman Empire, and the German consuls brought about the penetration of German influence into all spheres of life.

Besides the abundant material dealing with the life of the Jewish community represented in the selection of documents published in 1973, the files of the German consular archives contain a wealth of material on other areas connected with the history of Palestine and its population. The files contain many political reports on events in the various communities, on conflicts between churches, public demonstrations and disturbances, changes in positions of authority, economic problems, and even censuses and demographic matters. The files contain orders and instructions from the Ottoman authorities which may possibly be preserved nowhere else, as well as important documents originating in Jerusalem and the offices of the governor of Jerusalem, who in fact ruled much of Palestine, excepting chiefly the Galilee, which was in the sphere of the Beirut consulate.

In addition to the political and administrative reports, the files also contain much material regarding taxation and funds, exchange rates, and land purchase, judicial matters that were brought before the consular court, and wills and problems of inheritance, both Christian and Jewish. The records of those under consular protection (the Matrikel Register), though not as well kept as they might have been, are nonetheless also of great importance.

The Austrian Consular Archive

The Austrian consular archive is located in the Austrian National Archive in Vienna (Staatsarchiv). It is abundant and comprehensive, and to this day virtually unexplored. After the consulate of the Austrian Empire in Jerusalem

was closed down at the end of the World War I, 27 bundles of files of the consular archive were moved to the National Archive in 1921, and their contents were briefly listed. The rest of the files found their way to the Italian consulate in Jerusalem, and were moved to Vienna only in 1939. This portion is comprehensive, and includes more than 150 filing units, dating from 1843 through 1917. The range and quantity of the material are far greater than those of the German consular material, and apparently most material has been preserved, though here too many documents are missing. However, there is a significant difference between the two sections of the archive. While an attempt has been made to arrange the first section material according to subjects (as all existing files from the German consulate are arranged), the second part is in great disorder, most of the files being arranged only chronologically with no internal subclassification. It seems that these files have lain thus in basements for more than twenty years. A large number of papers has been damaged by water and gnawed by mice; and only parts of some pages and some scarcely legible pages exist. The disorder is great, and the damage is very apparent. Consequently, it is difficult to deal with the files. Alongside original documents are drafts, random notes, envelopes, copies, and above all many routine documents of little historical interest. Within this huge archive lies material of great value, shedding light on the history of Palestine and its settlement, and clarifying the involvement of this consulate in all manner of activities in Palestine during a period of almost seventy years. There is no doubt that this archive, too, is a valuable treasure of historical material, sometimes unique, and certainly no less important than the material in the German consular archive. The two collections already mentioned are augmented by twenty-six bundles of files from the vice-consulate in Jaffa. In short, there is a valuable archive for historical research, containing very important material on almost all aspects of life in Palestine.[5]

The Austrian consulate in Jerusalem (from 1867, the Austro-Hungarian consulate) opened on March 1, 1849, but preparations for its opening had been in progress for some years. As early as January 1843, the consul-general for Austria in Syria, E. von Adelburg, who was stationed in Beirut, suggested to the ambassador in Istanbul that a consulate be established in Jerusalem, as England, France, Sardinia and Prussia had already done so. The suggestion was considered for some years by the Vienna authorities and the embassy, until on February 24, 1846 Foreign Minister Metternich made an official recommendation on the subject to the Kaiser. The importance of the consulate was justified by a number of factors:

a. There was an evident increase in the influence of the Orthodox Church in the local community.

b. The other powers had strengthened their standing in Jerusalem by opening consulates, and among them France was setting itself up as the exclusive champion of Catholic interests in Palestine.

c. Despite the paucity of commercial interest the future would bring rewards in that area as well.[6]

After further consideration, it was decided at the end of 1847 to set up a vice-consulate in Jerusalem, and the appointment went to Count Josef Pizzamano, a professional diplomat from Austrian north Italy. The date of his departure for Palestine was, in fact, planned for the beginning of 1848, but because of the stormy events of that year the opening of the vice-consulate was postponed, and it was only on the first day of 1849 that Pizzamano reached his post. In 1852 he was promoted to the rank of consul, and the vice-consulate became a full consulate.

The instructions he received from the Austrian ambassador in Istanbul enumerated the following duties:

a. The defense of Austrian Catholic interests, similarly to France, "which strives to rank first, and particularly in Palestine." The intent was not to compete, but rather to protect those Austrian citizens who were previously unprotected.

b. The protection of pilgrims and tourists.

c. The implementation of a judicial structure for citizens and others under consular protection.

d. To report on political matters, church conflicts, and other incidents.

e. To observe the activities of the Latin patriarch, and to defend him when necessary.[7]

f. To supervise the many contributions sent for the Holy Sepulchre.

g. To supervise the activities of the Anglo-Prussian bishop and of the British mission.[8]

h. To maintain ties with the authorities, other consuls, and the clergy.

It should be noted that these charter duties, which indeed signaled the working methods of the consulate, included no mention of the Jewish community or of the need to defend Jews under consular protection. In a few months' time, the consul had come face to face with the reality obtaining in Jerusalem. While there were hardly any Christians under consular protection, Jerusalem had many Jews who had come from different parts of the Austrian Empire: from Galicia, from Hungary, from Bohemia, from Moravia, and in time from Austria itself (Vienna); and they asked for their consul's protection. Pizzamano soon realized that the Jews under his protection constituted the main constituency for the consulate's activities and for the securing of its position; and indeed over the years the Austrian consulate surpassed all other consulates in the number of Jews brought under its protection in Jerusalem and in other settlements in Palestine — 400 Jews by the end of the 19th century. The various consuls devoted a significant part of their activities to the affairs of the Jewish community and assisted it when necessary; and this sphere of activity is clearly reflected in the files of the archive.

Between 1849 and 1917, fourteen consuls served in Jerusalem, nearly all of them senior professional diplomats who had already served elsewhere in various capacities. Many of them had been students at the "Oriental Academy," the academy for training diplomatic personnel; were fluent in a number of languages; and were familiar with the customs of the Orient. In their origins, the consuls formed a mosaic of the Empire's territories. They included natives of Italy, Bohemia, Croatia, Austria, and Poland. But it seems there was not a Hungarian among them. As for their attitude toward the Jewish community, there was no consistent policy, though all the consuls tried to fill their office faithfully and without prejudice. They did include some philo-Semites (such as the first consul, already mentioned, and the last one, Friedrich Kraus), and they included some whose letters show distinct hostility and occasionally even anti-Semitism.

Certain characteristics of the consular archive should be noted. There is no consistency as regards language. While in the German archive most of the documents are written in German and only a few, in particular those regarding relations with the Ottoman authorities and correspondence with other consulates, are in French, here German and Italian are intermingled. During the 19th century, until the eighties at least, Italian served as the Austrian diplomatic language in the nations of the Levant, evidently because a significant number of the officials were native Italian speakers. In the files in question, too, many of the documents are in Italian: the main part of the correspondence between Jerusalem and Jaffa, and even many letters sent to Istanbul and to Vienna, though residents in those cities wrote mostly in German. Some letters from Sephardic Jews were also written in Italian. From the end of the 19th century and thereafter the number of letters in Hungarian increases though it remains relatively small. It should be added that there was correspondence in French with the Ottoman authorities and the other consulates (that being the international diplomatic language), and not a negligible number of documents are in Turkish.

As to the content of the documents, the consulate's interest in Christian affairs stands out, particularly its following of the development of the various sects and their mutual relations, as viewed, naturally, in the light of Catholic interests. Despite the relations between this consulate and the German consulate, church interests had their own influence. Usually, there was cooperation between the two consulates, but the Austrians were wary of increasing Protestant influence and at the beginning of the 20th century they displayed bitterness over German attempts to appear as protectors of Catholic interests as well.

Commerce was an important area of interest for the consulate. From the end of the 19th century, and particularly from the beginning of the 20th, the consulate showed great interest in encouraging trade links and safeguarded the import of goods from the Austrian Empire to Palestine. Trade correspondence is abundant in the files. In hundreds of letters from the Austrian trade office,

the consulate is asked to supply information on the quality and reliability of traders and commercial houses in Jaffa and Jerusalem, and particularly how much credit they might safely be granted as well as what goods might be marketable in Palestine. Particularly interesting are the evaluations of people and various firms, as well as trade projections. The consulate was also in the practice of sending detailed economic reports to the embassy and to the Trade Ministry in Vienna — reports containing minute details of import and export via various traders, shipping activities in Jaffa, news of harvests of various crops, the economic condition of settlements, and the development of trade with Austria and other countries. This is a first-class source for information and research regarding the economic history of Palestine.

There was much paper work in the consulate. The files contain hundreds and thousands of travel permits, passports, and registrations of personal status for those under consular protection. Each death is recorded in a number of documents, including printed forms, some of which include questions of inheritance and division of "property" (for the most part, a few pieces of furniture and a few household effects). Each year has many files dealing with deceased citizens, most of which concern Jews. There is also a great deal of documentation about those residents under consular protection reporting for military service, hundreds of people who reported for medical examination, etc. These documents take up much of the files, and the consuls' frustration can be pictured as, despite their efforts to fill places in the Austrian army with those liable to serve, practically no one was found qualified. The candidates for enlistment were found unfit for medical or other reasons, or just "disappeared" after being sent call-up notice. A number of the consuls described this situation, emphasizing that not one Jew could be found fit for service to be sent to Austria to serve in the Kaiser's army.

Recognition of citizenship and the granting of consular protection also involved a great deal of correspondence with the place of origin, checking the reliability of the applicant's documents or the records at his place of birth, and more than once after a lengthy correspondence it turned out that doubts predominated as to the propriety of papers and the reliability of claims to citizenship or protection.

Another area of consular activity dealt with people who had come to Palestine from various places in the Empire, but had failed to settle down and who sought the consulate's help to fund their return home. Among the thousands of immigrants who came to Palestine from 1882 onwards, a substantial number failed to integrate and found no means of subsistence, and consequently they went to the consulate for help. Their great number is witnessed by the simple fact that in time the consulate printed special forms for dealing with returnees, including a declaration by the returnee that he had received financial aid from the consulate. It will be noted that while most of those who signed such forms were Jews there were also Christians whose travels had brought them to Palestine, either for work or for adventure.

Besides all these matters, the files contain many documents of a consular-judicial nature: civil claims by those under consular protection, conflicts between citizens, claims by other citizens against Austrian citizens and the reverse. Moreover, whenever a resident under consular protection felt himself wronged or harmed by the authorities, he would complain to the consul; and had the consul wished to devote himself exclusively to such complaints he could have filled his every working hour.

Regarding the number of Christian institutions and non-Jews under its protection, the Austrian consulate lagged behind other consulates, and that situation remained unchanged up to the end of the period covered.[9] The main institution was the hospice, the construction of which started in 1856 though it was opened only in 1863. It was for some years among the most impressive buildings in the Old City of Jerusalem and the Austrians took pride in it. The building had 40 rooms for 120 pilgrims, as well as various public rooms. The house, which was built near the Austrian consulate, was intended to play an important role in the development of Austrian pilgrimages to Jerusalem. The building stands to this day, serving as a governmental hospital.

North of Bayt Jālā, the consul Count Caboga erected a hospital, named the "Tantur", in the early seventies. In 1876, it opened its doors to the local community. Vineyards and olives were planted around it, and a little church was erected close by. This institution was founded jointly with the Knights of Malta, of which the consul was a member. Around the same time, a mission was opened in Gaza, under the leadership of Georg Gatt, and it continued to function for some decades.

The Austrian mail service was doubtless a source of pride, the first mail to be established in the Holy Land (1854). Though other powers followed Austria, setting up their own mail services, the Austrian mail outstripped the others in the quality of service, and kept its primacy, with most Jews and Christians among its customers. Ships of the Austrian Lloyd filled a central role in sea transport, both for passengers and cargo. Matters concerning mail and transport are also thoroughly reflected in the consulate files.

As to the Jewish community, homes for needy families funded in 1858 in the Old City by the "Kolel Hod" (German-Dutch Jewish community) and Rabbi Israel Hildesheimer came under Austrian protection, as did the Lämel school, the first modern school in Jerusalem, founded in 1856 by a special emissary, the poet Ludwig August Frankl; the Rothschild hospital; and Rothschild-founded charitable institutions. All those institutions demanded much attention, as numerous documents in the consular archives attest.

The Jewish community, the prime base for the Austrian presence, demanded a wide range of activities. The consulate was asked to deal with *kolelim*[10] and the disbursement of contributions, to license the building of institutions under its protection, to deal with intercommunity relations, and even with grave political matters such as the restriction and prohibition of immigration and attempts to help immigrants harassed by officials, as well as efforts to buy land

despite obstruction by the authorities. The documents show wide-ranging activity on all these issues, including petitions to the governor of Jerusalem and efforts through the ambassador in Istanbul. The Austrian consulate played a central role during World War I, and documents show consular efforts on behalf of the Jewish population which was then isolated and short of food. The consulate is in great part responsible for the survival of the Jewish community through those perilous days.

In 1979 I had the chance to examine the files of the Austrian consulate in Vienna, and to photocopy a large number of documents dealing with the Jewish community and Palestine. I hope before long to be able to publish a significant selection of those documents, which reflect the important role of the Austrian consulate in Jerusalem in the development of the country and the well-being of its population.

Notes

1 On the activities of the consulates in Jerusalem see M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), pt. 4; On foreign activities see M. Eliav, *Eretz Yisra'el and its Yishuv in the 19th Century* (Jerusalem, 1978), pp. 49-60, in Hebrew; M. Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861* (Oxford, 1968); E. Roth, *Preussens Gloria im Heiligen Land* (München, 1973); N. Verney & N. Dambmann, *Les Puissances étrangères dans le Levant, en Syrie et en Palestine* (Paris, 1900).

2 P.A. Alsberg, "The Israel State Archives as a Source for the History of Palestine during the Period of Ottoman Rule", in Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine*, pp. 538-543.

3 See details in M. Eliav, *The Jews of Palestine in the Mirror of German Policy* (Tel-Aviv, 1973), Introduction, in Hebrew.

4 Alex Carmel, "The German Settlers in Palestine etc.", in M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine*, pp. 442-465.

5 The history of the Austrian consulate is briefly described in my article: "The Austrian Consulate in Jerusalem and the Yishuv", *Cathedra*, 18 (January, 1981), in Hebrew.

6 File F8/6, Austrian National Archive, Vienna.

7 The Latin patriarch Joseph Valerga was appointed in 1847 and held his office till 1872. The Patriarchate was established by the Pope on the initiative of France, but against the wishes of the Franciscans who till then were the dominant Catholic faction in Palestine.

8 The increased Protestant activities aroused the resentment of the Catholic powers, and Pizzamano expressed several times his displeasure about the missionaries' actions.

9 On the consulate's activities regarding Catholic interests, see especially, A. Breycha-Vauthier, *Österreich in der Levante* (Wien, 1972).

10 Organizations of immigrants according to the countries of origin.

Itineraries by Pilgrims and Travelers as Source Material for the History of Palestine in the Ottoman Period

NATHAN SCHUR

There have been pilgrims to the Holy Land whose accounts survive from the 4th century AD. But their interest was limited mainly to the Holy Places and their accounts are usually little more than lists of locations visited and of indulgences granted. It is only late in the 15th century on the eve of Ottoman conquest, with Felix Fabri's *Evagatorium*[1] that a different type of itinerary comes into use. For the next four hundred years there are the published impressions of some one thousand pilgrims and travelers worth looking at. No other type of source material for Palestine in the Ottoman period reaches a similar scope and volume.

Even so it has to be remembered that most of the pre-19th century itineraries were written for a different purpose from ours: they try to record the impression made by the Holy Places and the more amibitious ones try to locate and identify them. Descriptions of the country itself, its inhabitants, their way of life, the government, the economy of the country, social conditions etc. are usually related only as a by-product, and have first to be located and extracted from lengthy texts, many parts of which are often of little interest today. However, since Fabri the number of really interesting descriptions has increased sharply.

In the 15th and 16th centuries most of the travel books were authored by Italians and Germans. Many were priests or monks, and among the latter there are more Franciscans than members of all other orders combined, the reason being that the Franciscan order was the official custodian of the Holy Places on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church. The Reformation in Europe brought with it a drastic decline in the number of German travelers. In the 17th century the Counter-Reformation caused a surge of Catholic, and especially French pilgrims, many of them again monks and priests, some of whom wrote excellent and detailed accounts. Especially worthy of mention are the Frenchmen de Brèves,[2] Des Hayes[3] (ambassadors), Bremond,[4] d'Arvieux[5] (traders), Nau[6] (a Jesuit), Doubdan (Canon of St. Denis),[7] and the Franciscans Boucher,[8] Roger,[9] and Surius[10] and also the Italian Franciscans Quaresmio,[11] and especially Mariano Morone de Maleo,[12] and the Roman nobleman Pietro della Valle.[13]

In the 18th century religious interest in Europe abated and as a result the

number of visitors decreased sharply. A few monks and priests of the earlier type of pilgrims still came from the Iberian peninsula, but from Western Europe there arrived quite a few travelers motivated by their interest in history and ancient remains, such as Thomas Shaw,[14] Richard Pococke[15] and Giovanni Mariti[16] or by an interest in geography and current affairs, such as the Frenchman Volney.[17]

All that went before, however, pales into insignificance compared to the sheer quantity of the output by 19th century travelers. Probably twice as many books were written by them than by travelers during all the preceding centuries combined. Also as regards quality the work done in the 19th century is far superior to that of previous ages. There are the great explorers, from Seetzen[18] and Burckhardt[19] early in the century to Edward Robinson[20] and Lych[21] in midcentury, and Warren[22] and Conder,[23] as its close; the scientists in all fields, the diplomats and soldiers, merchants and monks, map makers, illustrators and photographers, in astounding profusion.

There are many excellent writers, from literary giants like Thackeray,[24] Melville,[25] and Flaubert[26] to specialists in travel literature, like Kinglake,[27] Haggard[28] and Loti.[29] But in the 19th century many unknowns too produced books which it is still a pleasure to read. Especially worth mentioning are many of the women writers, such as Sarah Johnson-Barclay,[30] Mary Eliza Rogers,[31] Elizabeth Ann Finn,[32] and Isabel Burton,[33] all of whom could far outwrite their more famous brothers, fathers and husbands. As a group perhaps none are more important than the Anglo-Saxon Missionaries, who, between 1820 and 1850, wrote descriptions of unrivaled excellence on the Jewish and Samaritan communities.

But in the second half of the 19th century a sharp decline took place. Though travel descriptions were more popular than ever, many of them became repetitive, poorly written and just boring. The important work was done increasingly by newspapers, diplomats, scientists and specialists and the day of the all-purpose travel book was over.

But what a wide scope the itineraries covered in the 400 years of their greatness!

The following is just a lightning-quick survey of the 30 main topics covered by them without really doing more than just touching on a few of their aspects:

1. *The Government*

The Ottoman authorities are treated very differently in different periods, with awe and respect in the 16th century, with criticism and abuse in the 19th; mostly with little real insight. Only very few Christians enjoyed access to governing circles and even fewer were initially equipped to evaluate what they were seeing. Still, there were for instance French envoys such as Francois de Brèves[34] in 1604 who went to call on the very important *paşa* of Gaza; or Louis des Hayes[35] who was sent to establish a French consulate at Jerusalem in 1621

and encountered both the *paşa* of Gaza and Jerusalem and who also gives us information about the Ṭurābāys, Fakhr al-Dīn and Ibn Farrūkh; or the British consul Finn in the middle of the 19th century who acquired during sixteen years of service in Jerusalem an intimate insight into the workings of local government and has left us its record in his *Stirring Times*;[36] or the Franciscan monk Eugene Roger[37] in the early 17th century who served as physician to Fakhr al-Dīn. It is however only fair to stress that such Muslim visitors as Evliyā Çelebi[38] and 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulsī[39] in the 17th century usually enjoyed much easier access to the local rulers and had a better understanding of the workings of local government.

2. *The Muslims*

Here too Christian pilgrims and travelers showed a great change of attitude: in the early years of Ottoman rule they were referred to as "Moors" or "Saracenes" and were regarded as barbarians and as enemies. The word "Arab" was used till the mid-19th century for Bedouins only. There was little interest in the customs, way of life etc. of the Muslims till the 19th century. Seetzen and Burckhardt were probably the first western travelers who were really interested in this subject and have given us detailed information. During the later 19th century and early 20th century complete books were written on the subject of the Muslim population and their way of life such as Baldensperger's *The Immovable East*,[40] Goodrich Freer's *Inner Jerusalem* and *In a Syrian Saddle*,[41] Hanauer's *Folklore of the Holy Land*,[42] and Jaussen's *Coutumes des Arabes*.[43]

Such factions as Ḳays and Yaman were "covered" in the mid-19th century by such diverse authors as the Piemontese engineer Pierotti,[44] the English consul Finn,[45] the American Samuel Ireneus Prime[46] and the German Moritz Busch.[47] The latter gives us a very detailed picture of the warring factions in Samaria before the pacification in 1858. In addition to such detailed coverage there are some quite haphazard bits of information which are still important. Thus in 1828 the French artist and explorer de Laborde[48] by pure chance spent a night in the village of 'Arrāba in northern Samaria and as a result wrote the only good description we have of the court of one of the local chieftains, in this case of the 'Abd al-Hādī faction.

3. *The Jews*

This is the subject for which Christian travel books are perhaps of the greatest interest to modern Israeli scholars, and the amount of information to be gained is truly staggering and this in spite of the antagonistic attitude of many early writers, especially of the Franciscan monks. And yet Franciscans' writings are the only source on such matters as the expulsion of the Jews from Jerusalem in 1636;[49] the long drawn-out conflict in the 17th century about the rights to parts

of the Mount of Olives where Jewish and Franciscan interests clashed,[50] or the late 16th century riots between Jews and Catholics in the Via Dolorosa as a result of which forty Jews were executed by the authorities.[51]

The high point of Christian sources for Jewish affairs is reached between 1820 and 1850 in the books by Anglo-Saxon missionaries such as Connor,[52] Jowett,[53] the Scotsmen Bonar and McCheyne,[54] the Englishman John Wilson,[55] the American Sarah Johnson-Barclay,[56] the converted German Jews Ewald[57] and Joseph Wolff[58] and the anonymous members of the Maltese delegation,[59] not to mention such names as Edward Robinson,[60] Olin[61] or W.M. Thomson,[62] all of whom have provided a wealth of information on every aspect of Jewish life, unequaled before or since, from attendance numbers at synagogues to the titles of all the Hebrew books in a library.[63]

4. *The Christians*

Obviously Christian travelers were most knowledgeable on all aspects of the various Christian sects resident in Palestine. Consequently, much more is known about the few Franciscan monks living in the country than about the many Muslim peasants, because of the great number of Franciscan travel descriptions and chronicles. They are however anything but impartial when they write about their long drawn-out struggle with the Greek Orthodox Church over rights in the Holy Places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

Also such small sects and groups as Armenians, Georgians, or Russian pilgrims, American settlers in Jaffa, or the American-Swedish group called "The Overcomers" or "American Colony" are described in very many travel books. An Italian scholar, Enrico Cerulli,[64] has collected for instance from travel books all references to such a minor group as the Abyssinians residents in Jerusalem and his compilation fills two substantial volumes.

5. *Other Ethnic Sects and Religious Groups*

About the Samaritans, for instance, Christian travel descriptions contain data about their numbers and location from Crusader times to the 20th century. In the mid-19th century some very detailed specific descriptions were prepared about them by the German Petermann,[65] the Englishman John Wilson,[66] the French Abbé Barges[67] and the Englishman John Mills,[68] all of whom stayed some time in Nablus in order to study them. The special Samaritan script and Pentateuch aroused the interest of European scholars from the 16th century onwards. The Roman aristocrat Pietro della Valle[69] was the first, in 1616, who managed to purchase two copies of the Pentateuch and bring them to Europe, where they were first published in France.

Travelers give us details also about such other sect as the Bahais, whose center was moved late in the 19th century from Persia to Acre and Haifa; the Druze community in northern Palestine and various other sects and splinter groups.

6. *Historical Events*

Historical events are covered very unevenly. While there are a host of books by Frenchmen who participated in Napoleon's invasion of 1799[70] or by Englishmen from Allenby's campaign of 1917-1918,[71] there is very little about the Ottoman conquest in 1516, Fakhr al-Dīn's wars in Galilee between 1602 and 1610 or Ibrāhīm Paşa's siege of Acre in 1831/2. On the other hand, such an obscure event as the 1822 siege of Acre, after Ḥayim Farḥi had been murdered by 'Abdullāh Paşa, is by pure chance covered by an equally obscure German traveler named Kronecker,[72] who gives us a lively and vivid picture of the siege. Most of the eyewitness accounts of the 1837 earthquake are supplied by travelers who interviewed survivors, such as the Bavarian Visino[73] in Tiberias and the Dutch naval officer Van de Velde[74] in Safed; but the best description is still that furnished by the missionary Thomson[75] who reached Safed with a rescue mission eighteen days after the event.

There is no Christian account of such important events in Jewish history as the immigration to Galilee by the Hasidim in 1777 or the Perushim in 1809. But later on the missionary Joseph Wolff[76] was on friendly terms with one of the leaders of the Perushim, Rabbi Menaḥem Mendel of Shklov, after he had moved on to Jerusalem, and gives us a very lively description of the man and his associates and the discussions he had with them.

7. *Historical Personages*

These again are covered very unevently by Christian travelers. It is perhaps not surprising that none was at hand to give us an impression of Sultan Selīm's entry into Jerusalem, but it is gratifying that there are so many details about Ibn Farrūkh from Franciscan sources,[77] and that so many travelers have given us their impressions of 'Alī Bey and Ḍāhir al-'Umar from Van Egmont[78] in 1722 to Mariti[79] who published two complete volumes on this subject, Lusignan[80] who published one, and the Frenchmen Volney[81] and Savary,[82] the Catalan Lopez,[83] and the Russian Pleshtshejev.[84]

Other historical figures, such as Aḥmed Jezzār, Ḥayim Farḥi, the Latin patriarch Valerga, the Protestant bishops Alexander and Gobat, the Bedouin chieftain 'Aḳīlī Aġa, the American Warder Cresson (by no less a writer than Thackeray[85]), Meshulam who founded an agricultural settlement at Arṭās — all were mentioned in great detail by numerous travelers. None however could perhaps equal Lady Hester Stanhope,[86] who, in the early 19th century became something of a tourist attraction, rivaling everything except a visit to Jerusalem itself.

8. *Statistical Information*

There is a great deal of information in travel books about numbers of inhabitants. About Jerusalem alone I have so far found more than 300 entries

on this topic, and even about remote Safed there are nearly one hundred such items. None can compete perhaps with the Ottoman fiscal *defters*, of the 16th century,[87] in interest. However, such evaluations of the number of inhabitants of Jerusalem as those given by Van Egmont,[88] Spilsbury[89] and Seetzen[90] are literally invaluable. Some give not just totals but distinguish between Christians, Jews and Muslims, or even between Ashkenazim and Sephardim or between Greeks and Armenians. Some are of course wildly inexact, but a few are surprisingly accurate. In Safed, in the 16th century, for instance, we can compare the numbers given by three Iberian travellers — Tenreyro,[91] Aranda,[92] and Juan Perera[93] — with the numbers obtained from the Ottoman *defters*, and they match very closely when evaluated correctly. Some of the most accurate numbers for Jews and Samaritans are available in works from the early 19th century by Anglo-Saxon missionaries.

Other statistical information, too, is vouchsafed by travelers, though rarely in a systematic way: figures for trade, prices, the sums paid for a bride, for a slave, for a horse, or for instance the rate of interest.

9. *Descriptions of Specific Places*

Often the only available descriptions are by travelers. No other type of material answers the questions: How did Gaza look in the 17th century, were the streets of Jerusalem in 1800 paved or not, what did the bazaars of Nablus look like in the 16th century, and how did Haifa appear from the sea in the early 19th century. There is a wealth of material available on this subject. So far I have come across well over 700 descriptions of Jaffa, for instance. Generally coastal towns are covered in greater detail than the cities of the interior. In some cases, such as 16th century Safed, travel descriptions are of marginal interest only, as so many other sources have survived, but they tend to become of the greatest importance in periods when towns decayed (such as Safed from 1600 to 1820 or Acre from 1300 to 1750) and nearly no other sources are available.

While other sources have their ups and downs, with some periods and places being covered in great detail and others not at all, travel descriptions tend to be very consistent. Travelers in all periods visited all the main towns, perhaps not as often, as, say the 19th century Jerusalem, but then even half a dozen descriptions can make all the difference between utter ignorance and an acceptable level of knowledge.

10. *Social Conditions*

Even early travelers mention here and there in some detail weddings, burials, religious beliefs, specific superstitions or the position of women in society. In the 19th century many such descriptions become more systematic, a few of the many women authors enable us to take a closer look at what was going on

inside an eastern harem, and complete books were written on the customs of the local population.

11. *The Economy*

Some haphazard information on this subject is given by nearly every pilgrim and traveler: what could be bought in the bazaars, were prices cheap or expensive, was this or that place apparently poor or prosperous. Even in early times such experienced traders and manufacturers as d'Arvieux,[94] Bremond[95] and Mariti[96] went much farther and recorded detailed descriptions of the economy of certain areas, from the cotton-growing hinterland of Acre to soap manufacturing in Nablus, the glass industry in Hebron, the weaving industry in Majdal and the manufacture of rosaries and other religious items, in Bethlehem, together with Bethlehem's literally worldwide marketing organization.[97] In the 19th century such accounts became much more detailed and systematic, covering additional fields, from taxes to rates of exchange and from data about imports and shipping to surveys of local agriculture.

12. *Transport*

Nearly all travelers report the state of the roads they traveled and how the local population solved its transport problems. Till 1869 this was, of course, by means of camels and donkeys, while ladies used to travel by palanquin and gentlemen on horseback. But in the last third of the 19th century we get detailed information about the new roads that were being built, their subsequent maintenance, and descriptions of rides in local carriages, and after 1892 on railways. On the eve of World War I the first motorcars were being mentioned and during the war airplanes made their debut.

13. *Tourism*

Obviously this subject is covered very thoroughly by the tourists themselves. Local accommodation in monasteries is discussed at some length, and, starting in the second half of the 19th century, hotels are mentioned and their merits compared. Many travelers are guided around the country by Thomas Cook and give detailed accounts of their arrangements; others are herded around by private dragomans and are increasingly surprised by the luxury which could be enjoyed on such a trip. There are details in all ages of the expense involved in traveling around the country, and of its pitfalls and humorous aspects.

Of great interest are the accounts in the 19th century of visits by crowned heads and VIPs to Jerusalem and elsewhere. The visit by the German Emperor Wilhelm II was covered in 50 books and detailed articles, for instance.[98] Some other "royals" were Caroline, wife of George IV of Great Britain, who

proceeded to divorce her on her return because of some escapades en route;[99] or Crown Prince Rudolf of Austria who gained equal notoriety by committing suicide after his return with his mistress to Mayerling; or his uncle, the Emperor Maximilian of Mexico, who has left an altar as a memento to his visit in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, but was executed nonetheless by his Mexican subjects.

14. *Techniques and Technology*

From travel descriptions we know how butter was prepared, wheat ground, bread baked, doors locked with wooden locks, how orange groves were watered or fields ploughed. Later in the 19th century we learn of the advent of western technology, and the appearance of oil-driven pumps, print, steamships, clocks, pianos, bicycles, matches, mirrors, billiard tables, the telegraph, telephone, and finally, electric light.

15. *Daily Life*

How did the local population dress, what cosmetics, tattoos or even nose rings did women use, what food did people eat, how did they sleep, how did they spend their working days — in travel books there are thousands of references to these and many similar aspects of life.

16. *Recreation*

Many visitors mentioned that the real *kayf* in the eyes of the local population was neither strenuous work, nor strenuous play, but just sitting in the shade doing nothing. However, travelers also mentioned hunting, public festivities, performances by jugglers and magicians, and the pleasures of public baths.

17. *State of Security*

This is covered at great length by the people whose actual chance to visit Jerusalem or Nazareth depended on roads being secure or on the prevalence of robbers or some local revolt making it too risky to attempt. However, many of the reports on this subjects are very misleading. Dragomen and Bedouin watchmen habitually made the country appear much more insecure than it really was, so as to solicit a larger *bakhshīsh* for their own efforts. Really experienced travelers seem to have coped very well however, and they remarked even in the early 19th century when the state of security was particularly bad, that the situation was no worse than, say, in the Abbruzzi region of contemporary Italy.

18. *Epidemics and State of Health*

Lamartine did not dare visit Jerusalem because of an outbreak of the plague there,[100] and the physician of Duke Maximilian of Bavaria died of cholera in Nazareth.[101] Many less important visitors experienced the unpleasantness of an Ottoman quarantine and had a lot to report about other illnesses such as malaria and leprosy.

Surprisingly, numerous physicians were among the travelers and some of them, such as Tobler,[102] MacGowan,[103] Neumann,[104] Masterman[105] and others left exhaustive reports on the state of health of the local population and the illnesses afflicting it and also on the state of local medicine.

19. *Crime and Crime Prevention*

While there are many reports by western travellers about local law courts and their procedures — a few critical, but many laudatory — there is only a little about local police forces and their activities. Neither is much reported about serious crime in towns, the main exception being Mrs. Finn's *A Third Year in Jerusalem*[106] which records in a slightly fictionalized way the success of the chief of police of Jerusalem in organizing local crime. On the other hand, there is no end of reports about highway robbery — many of them undoubtedly exaggerated.

20. *Education*

While very little was reported on this subject in the early Ottoman period, there are some detailed reports — mainly by missionaries[107] — on Jewish educational institutions in Jerusalem, Tiberias and Safed in the first half of the 19th century. Reports on Muslim schools, however, remain rare. One of the best early records of Christian education is by Asaad Kayat,[108] who can best be termed a "tourist in reverse", being of Lebanese origin he had visited England, liked western ways and served for many years as the English consular agent in Jaffa.

21. *Exploration*

There is no sharp demarcation between mere travel and real exploration. However Niebuhr,[109] Seetzen,[110] Burckhardt,[111] Buckingham[112] and others are explorers of great importance by any standards. They traveled, usually dressed as Arabs, in regions unvisited by westerners since the Crusades, and did so at great inconvenience and danger and incidentally produced some of the most interesting books written about the Negev, Sinai and Transjordan.

Historical exploration might also be included under this heading and if so I

would include Jacob Spafford's finding the Siloam inscriptions,[113] Klein's the Stone of Mesha,[114] Tischendorf's the Codex Sinaiticus[115] and Clermont-Ganneau's the Gezer boundary inscriptions.[116]

22. *Firsts*

Who was first where? Only travel books give us the answers: Warburton[117] was the first westerner in the 19th century to scale Mount Hermon, Rueppel[118] was the first to reach Aqaba, de Laborde[119] was the first to set foot on the Jazīrat Far'ūn, Musil[120] was the first to reach Ḳuṣayr 'Amra, Lt. Wellsted[121] first navigated the Gulf of Eilat, Burckhardt[122] was first on Mount Umm Shamar and in Petra, while Seetzen[123] was first in most other places — from Mount Gilboa to Gerasa, from Amman to Kurnub, from 'Abda to Dahab and furthermore he was the first to travel round the Dead Sea and did this not just once but (nearly) three times.

Also: Who first identified what? Finn[124] the ruins of 'Ai, Schubert,[125] Beke and Moore[126] the Jordan Depression, and Edward Robinson[127] more places than anybody else, from Eleutheropolis (Beyt Guvrin) to Kedesh Naftali and from the synagogue at Capernaum to Massada. Sometimes there are surprises: It was not Charles Wilson who first discovered Wilson's arch in Jerusalem but Titus Tobler,[128] and Sarabīt al-Khādim was not first visited by Niebuhr, as is generally supposed, but by Van Egmont[129] in 1722.

23. *Fauna and Flora*

Travelers mentioned mammals, birds, flowers and fruit trees in many of their descriptions. I have found for instance, bananas mentioned by 40 travelers, water melons by 100 and oranges by over 200, going back all the way to the Crusades; and on another aspect 40 mention crocodiles and over 100 locusts. Vegetables mentioned include tomatoes and aubergines; wild animals include boars, tigers and wolves. Prince Rudolf of Austria[130] mentions 120 types of birds which he had actually killed.

Palestine was also visited by professional naturalists such as Pierre Belon[131] and Rauchwolff[132] in the 16th century, Hasselquist[133] in the 18th, Tristram,[134] Post,[135] Chichester Hart[136] and many others in the 19th. The great naturalist Linneus himself edited Hasselquist's[137] lists after he had died, and enumerates the types of plants seen by his pupil in each part of the country. Tristram identified nearly 350 types of birds and Chichester Hart nearly 600 plants in Sinai alone.

24. *Geology, Mineralogy*

As early as the 16th century travelers remarked on the curious stones found on Mount Carmel, which looked like pears or apples on the outside and, when

broken open, showed inside a profusion of mineral forms. In the 19th and early 20th centuries professional geologists like Russegger,[138] Fraas,[139] Lartet,[140] Hull[141] and Blanckenhorn[142] visited the country, clarified its geological problems and mapped its mineral deposits. As early as 1834 there were speculations by Napoleon's old comrade Marmont[143] about the possiblity (then still little appreciated) of striking oil near the Dead Sea.

25. *Dominant Colors, Smells, Noises*

What color was the landscape?[144] What were the smells which assailed one's nostrils in the crowded streets of the cities?[145] What noises were heard?[146] Only travelers have answered these questions and in their books we can read about the call of the muezzin (then not yet recorded on tape) or the noise made by gongs in eastern monasteries or the ceaseless barking of dogs at night.

26. *Songs and Musical Instruments*

Travelers have not only mentioned the types of oriental musical instruments which they saw but from 1840 onwards have occasionally recorded the words of songs and here and there they even added the notes of the music itself.[147]

27. *Holy Places*

No other topic is covered in such detail in every single travel description as this one. I have seen the Tomb of Rachel mentioned by over 400 pilgrims and travelers and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre by about double this number. Most of them are simple repetitions but there also exist interesting descriptions which are especially thorough or which cover the subject from an unusual angle. Curzon,[148] in 1834, for instance, gives a detailed account of the panic and ensuing loss of hundreds of lives that year in the Greek ceremony of the Holy Fire; Warren[149] explains the mechanics of exactly how this fire was lighted; Sieber,[150] Wotruba[151] and others give an interesting account of actual battles between Greek, Franciscan and Armenian monks. Others, such as Clarke[152] or Fergusson,[153] voiced such revolutionary theories about some of these locations that they served as subjects for discussions for tens of years afterwards. Eneman,[154] Mariti,[155] Tobler,[156] Williams,[157] Gatt[158] did perhaps the most difficult thing of all: they gave such exhaustive and interesting accounts of some of these locations that it is a pleasure to read them even today.

28. *The Influence of Foreign Powers*

In the 19th century very many travelers mentioned the influence of the Great Powers, their local activities and rivalries. Talks with local inhabitants are mentioned on these subjects, and oriental good manners being what they are,

Englishmen often report afterwards that England was much preferred by the local population to the contemporary Ottoman rule; Germans report the same about Germany and Frenchmen about France. However, there are also many serious and detailed descriptions of the increase of Western influence in the *Tanẓīmāt* period and its temporary decline afterwards, perhaps the best is once more to be found in Finn's *Stirring Times*.

29. *Visual Records*

Nothing is as popular today as old pictures of the Holy Land. Pinup girls have virtually been replaced on calendars in Israel by color reproductions of pictures by David Roberts.[159] However, such illustrations were produced long before Roberts — by Erhard Reuwich who accompained Breydenbach in 1483, by Antonio degli Angeli[160] who apparently furnished the illustrations used by Zuellart,[161] Cotovicus[162] and Sandys,[163] the Dutchman Cornelius de Bruyn[164] in 1687, the English naval surgeon Spillsbury in 1799, and by literally hundreds of artists in the 19th century.

In 1839 Goupil Fesquet[165] was the first to bring photographic equipment to Palestine but apparently none of his pictures have survived. The daguerrotypes by Keith from 1847 have, however, been published,[166] and so have the photographs by Salzmann[167] in 1851 and many, many others since. Probably in no other field have the publications by travelers had such a strong impact on so many people.

30. *Maps and Map Making*

One of the best maps of Palestine was already furnished in 1321 by the Venetian nobleman Marino Sanuto,[168] but many of the later maps were products more of fantasy than of fact or research. Sometimes even fashions in art seem to have influenced the way they look: hence the wild baroque curvatures of the coastline and the river Jordan in 18th century maps. But in the same century such travelers as Pococke and Niebuhr started to draw realistic though crude maps of Jerusalem, Acre, etc. In 1818 Sieber made the first really serious effort at a map of Jerusalem. Sometimes fantasy still had the upper hand: D'Anville[169] and Napoleon's map makers[170] showed a sizeable peninsula between Akaba and Eilat, which would nowadays come in handy for tourists, if Rueppell[171] had not demolished it in 1822. Exact readings of geographical altitudes had already been taken by Niebuhr.[172] As a result of Edward Robinson's[173] diary notations Kiepert was able in 1841 to produce a map which shows the country very much as we know it. This was further improved by Van de Velde[174] (perhaps the most versatile of travelers — he produced also a readable account of his trip and one of the most beautiful volumes of paintings of the country) in 1851/2. Charles Wilson[175] made a detailed survey of Jerusalem in 1864 and the Palestine Exploration Fund[176] a

detailed map of the whole country (the Negev[177] being added later) based on actual survey work.

If these are the 30 most important subjects covered by western travelers and pilgrims there are of course innumerable others, from archaeological excavations (initiated by Lady Hester Stanhope in Ashkelon in 1814,[178]) to the manufacture of bogus antiquities (such as the "Moabite Pottery"[179] of the 1870s), from Bedouin raids (in one of which Musil[180] managed to participate) to horse breeding (discussed very professionally by such early specialists as Damoiseau[181]), from weather reports to the workings of the local mail service, from local legends and fables to visiting religious cranks of all denominations, from spies to whores and from the foibles of local *paşas* to the appearance of beggars and the prevalence of hashish smokers.

* * *

Summing up, it can be claimed that travel books and itineraries are, in spite of their many limitations and shortcomings, potentially the most important type of source material we have at our disposal on the history of Palestine in the Ottoman period. It is all the more surprising that they are not being used more by modern scholars, many of whom seem unwilling to invest the many years of sheer hard work needed to utilize this type of source material, or find that they are too limited in their knowledge of languages to cope with them (Titus Tobler mastered no less than 11 languages to be able to do so!)[182] or are daunted by the gothic script prevalent in some of the older books.

The emphasis in recent years has been more on work in Turkish archives or on delving in the Hebrew *responsa* literature. However, there is actually more material to be found in these itineraries and travel descriptions than in all other types of source material combined, and very much of it still awaits utilization. The scholar who is not afraid of the dust of old tomes and the literally back-breaking labor of poring over them, will find here a veritable treasure trove of information, unavailable elsewhere.

He will be faced, however, by one very real problem when trying to utilize them: where can the necessary books be found? Public libraries in Israel are disappointing. Travel books are almost nonexistent on the shelves of all university libraries except the National Library in Jerusalem. But even there the extant selection is very uneven. There are too many unimportant books from the late 19th century, and far too few important earlier books.

However, the stock in the National Library can be supplemented by books in some of the big private collections in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and by the fine collections in the Rockefeller Museum, in the Dominican École Pratique d'Études Bibliques (in their St. Etienne Monastery), the Biblioteca Flagellationis in the Studium Biblicum Franciscanium, and the separate library in the Franciscan San Salvadore monastery, now newly renovated, and the library of the Jesuit Pontifical Bible Institute, all in Jerusalem. In spite of their

shortcomings libraries and collections in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are probably the greatest center for travel books to the Holy Land anywhere.

Another important center is in London, which houses the British Library (in the British Museum), the Library of the Palestine Exploration Fund, the library of the Royal Geographical Society and some private collections. Other important public libraries and private collections are in Washington DC and New York. Public libraries in Italy and Germany are rather disappointing.[183]

The following libraries are, however, of great interest:

1. The Gennadeion Library, Athens, Greece.
2. The Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, France.
3. The Züricher Zentralbibliothek in Zürich, Switzerland.
4. The Royal Library in Stockholm, Sweden.

But important books can also be found in many, many other places.

Notes

1 Felix Fabri, *Evagatorium in Terram Sanctam. Eigentliche Beschreibung der hin und wider Fahrt zu dem Heyligen Landt gen Jerusalem* (Ulm, 1556). Reinhold Roehricht, *Bibliotheca Geographica Palaestinae* (Jerusalem, 1963), no. 395.

2 Francois Savary de Brèves, *Relation des voyages tant en Gréce, Turquie et Egypte... faict en l'an 1604* (Paris, 1628). Roehricht, no. 899.

3 Louis des Hayes, baron de Courmenin, *Voiage de Levant Fait par le Commandement du Roy en l'anneé 1621...* (Paris, 1624). Roehricht, no. 969.

4 Gabriel Bremond, *Viaggi fatti nell' Egitto Superiore ed Inferiore e luoghi piu conspicui di quella Regione; in Gerusalemme, Giudea, Sammaria, Palestina...* (Roma, 1679). Roehricht, no. 1134.

5 Laurens d'Arvieux, *Memoirs du Chevalier d'Arvieux (Jean Baptiste Labat)* (Paris, 1735), 6 vols. Roehricht, no. 1113.

6 Michael Nau, *Voyage nouveau de la Terre Sainte* (Paris, 1679). Roehricht, no. 1138.

7 Jean Doubdan, *Le Voyage de la Terre Sainte* (Paris, 1657). Roehricht, no. 1079.

8 Jean Boucher, *Le Bouquet Sacré* (Nancy, 1615). Roehricht, no. 925.

9 Eugène Roger, *La Terre Saincte* (Paris, 1646). Roehricht, no. 1012.

10 Bernadin Surius, *Le pieux Pelerin ou Voyage de Jerusalem* (Bruxelles, 1664). Roehricht, no. 1054.

11 Francesco Quaresmio, *Elucidatio Terrae Sanctae historica, theologica, moralis* (Antverpiae, 1639), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 948.

12 Mariano Morone de Maleo, *Terra Santa Nouvamente Illustrata...* (Piacenza, 1669). Roehricht, no. 1083.

13 Pietro della Valle, *Viaggi...* (Bologna, 1672), 4 vols. Roehricht, no. 947.

14 Thomas Shaw, *Travels, or Geographical, Physical and Miscellaneus Observations Relating to Several Parts of Barbary and the Levant* (Oxford, 1738). Roehricht, no. 1352.

15 Richard Pococke, *Description of the East and Some Other Countries* (London, 1743-1745), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 1396.

16 Giovanni Filippo Mariti, *Viaggi per l'isola di Cipro e per la Soria e Palestina* (Lucca, Firenze, 1769-1776), 9 vols. Roehricht, no. 1485.

17 Constantin François Chasseboeuf comte de Volney, *Voyage en Syrie et en Egypte pendant les années 1783, 1784 et 1785* (Paris, 1787), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 1523.

18 Ulrich Jaspar Seetzen, *Reisen durch Syrien Palaestina, Phoenicien, die Transjordanischen Laender, Arabia Petrea und Unter-Aegypten*, ed. by Fr. Kruse (Berlin, 1854-9), 4 vols. Roehricht, no. 1615.
19 Johannes Ludwig Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land*, ed. by W.M. Leake (London, 1822). Roehricht, no. 1627.
20 Edward Robinson, *Biblical Researches in Palestine, Mount Sinai and Arabia Petrea in 1838* (London, 1841), 3 vols. Roehricht, no. 1887.
21 F.W. Lynch, *Narrative of the United States Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea* (Philadelphia, 1849). Roehricht, no. 2175.
22 Charles Warren. See Roehricht, no. 2973.
23 Claude Regnier Conder. See Roehricht, no. 3242.
24 William Makepeace Thackeray ("Titmarsh"), *Notes of a Journey from Cornhill to Grand Cairo by Way of Lisboa, Athens, Constantinople and Jerusalem* (London, 1845). Roehricht, no. 2068.
25 Herman Melville, *Journal of a Visit to Europe and the Levant* (Princeton, 1855). Not mentioned in Roehricht.
26 Gustave Flaubert, *Voyage en Orient* (Paris, 1925). Not mentioned in Roehricht.
27 Alexander William Kinglake, *Eothen* (London, 1845). Roehricht, no. 1817.
28 H. Rider Haggard, *A Winter Pilgrimage* (London, 1904).
29 Pierre Loti, *Jerusalem* (Paris, 1895); *La Galilée* (Paris, 1896).
30 Sarah Johnson Barclay, *Hadji in Syria, or Three Years in Jerusalem* (Philadelphia, 1858). Roehricht, no. 2448.
31 Mary Eliza Rogers, *Domestic Life in Palestine* (London, 1862). Roehricht, no. 2450.
32 Elizabeth Ann Finn, *Home in the Holy Land* (London, 1866). Roehricht, no. 2897.
33 Isabel Burton, *The Inner Life of Syria, Palestine and the Holy Land* (London, 1875), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 3323.
34 See note 2.
35 See note 3.
36 James Finn, *Stirring Times*, ed. by E.A. Finn (London, 1878), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 2987.
37 See note 9.
38 Evliya Tshelebi, "Travels in Palestine, ed. by St. H. Stephan," *Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine*, vols. 4 to 9 (Jerusalem, 1938-39).
39 Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi, *Reise von Damascus nach Jerusalem*, ed. by I. Gildemeister, from unidentified scientific journal of about 1908, in Zuericher Zentralbibliothek; "The Journeys of Abd Al-Ghani Al-Nabulusi in Palestine," ed. by Elizabeth Shirriyyah, *Journal of Semitic Studies*, 24, no. 1 (spring 1979).
40 Philip J. Baldensperger, *The Immovable East* (London, 1913).
41 Ada M. Goodrich Freer, *Inner Jerusalem* (London, 1904); *In a Syrian Saddle* (London, 1905).
42 J.E. Hanauer, *Folklore of the Holy Land* (London, 1907).
43 Antonin Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab* (Paris, 1908).
44 Ermete Pierotti, *Les Partis Rouge et Blanc depuis Abraham jusqu'à nos jours* (Lausanne, 1869). Roehricht, no. 2406.
45 See note 36.
46 Samuel Irenaeus Prime, *Travels in Europe and the East* (New York, 1855), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 2429.
47 Moritz Busch, *Eine Wallfahrt nach Jerusalem. Bilder ohne Heiligenschein* (Leipzig, 1861), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 2595.
48 Comte Leon E. S.J. de Laborde, *Voyage en Orient* (Paris, 1837-1862), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 1731.
49 Pietro Verniero di Montepeloso, "Croniche o Annali di Terra Santa," ed. by Girolamo Golubovich, *Biblioteca Bio Bibliografica della Terra Santa* (Quaracchi, 1930), 3, pp. 281-282.
50 Nathan Schur, "The Jewish Community of Jerusalem in the 16th-18th Centuries According to Christian Chronicles and Travel Descriptions," in Amnon Cohen (ed.), *Jerusalem in the Early Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1979), pp. 391-394, in Hebrew.

51 a. Joao Bautista de S. Antonio, *Paraiso Serafico, I Lisboa 1734*, p. 549. Roehricht, no. 1384. b. *Relacam Summaria e Noticiosa, dos Lugares santos de Jerusalem*, imprimir par gloria de Deos, o M.R.P. Fr. Joseph da Trinidade (Lisboa 1709), p. 6. Roehricht, no. 1306. c. Juan Ceverio de Vera, *Viaje de la Tierra Sancta* (La Laguna, 1964), pp. 78-80. Roehricht, no. 830.

52 James Connor, "Particulars Relating to Jerusalem, the Druses etc.," in William Jowett, *Christian Researches in the Mediterranean from 1815 to 1820* (London, 1822). Roehricht, no. 1679.

53 William Jowett, *Christian Researches in Syria and the Holy Land* (London, 1826). Roehricht, no. 1649.

54 Andrew A. Bonar and Robert Murray McCheyne, *Narrative of a Mission of Inquiry to the Jews from the Church of Scotland in 1839* (Edinburgh, 1843). Not in Roehricht.

55 John Wilson, *The Lands of the Bible* (Edinburgh, 1847), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 2029.

56 See note 30.

57 F.C. Ewald, *Journal of Missionary Labours in the City of Jerusalem during the Years 1842-4* (London, 1845). Roehricht, no. 1998.

58 Joseph Wolff, *Missionary Journal and Memoir (1827)*, 3 vols. Misquoted by Roehricht under no. 1699.

59 *Journal of a Deputation Sent to the East by the Committee of the Malta Protestant College in 1849* (London, 1854). Not in Roehricht.

60 See note 20.

61 Stephen Olin, *Travels in Egypt, Arabia Petrea and the Holy Land* (New York, 1843), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 1930.

62 William MacClure Thomson *The Land and the Book* (New York, 1859), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 1813.

63 John Wilson. See note 55, vol. 2, pp. 617-625.

64 Enrico Cerulli, *Etiopi in Palestina* (Roma, 1943-7), 2 vols.

65 H. Peterman, *Reisen im Orient* (Leipzig, 1860-1), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 2331.

66 See note 55.

67 Jean Joseph Leandre Barges, *Les Samaritains* (Paris, 1855). Roehricht, no. 2409.

68 John Mills, *Three Months Residence at Nablus and an Account of the Modern Samaritans* (London, 1864). Roehricht, no. 2710.

69 See note 13.

70 a. Louis Alexandre Berthier, *Relations des Campagnes du général Bonaparte en Egypte et en Syrie* (Paris an VIII). b. L.A.F. de Bourienne, *Mémoires* (Paris, n.d), 5 vols. c. François Bernoyer, *Avec Bonaparte en Egypte et en Syrie 1798-1800*, ed. by Christian Tortel (Abbeville Cédex, 1976). d. Napoleon, *Der Aegyptisch-Syrische Feldzug*, ed. by Heinrich Conrad (Stuttgart, 1911). e. Jean Pierre Doguereau, *Journal de l'expédition d'Egypte* (Paris, 1904). f. *Journal du Capitaine François, dit le Dromedaire d'Egypte* (Paris, 1905), 2 vols. g. Dominique-Jean Larrey, *Mémoires de chirurgie militaire et campagnes* (Paris, 1812-17), 4 vols. h. Jaques-François Miot, *Mémoires pour servir a l'histoire des expéditions en Egypte et en Syrie* (Paris, 1814).

71 Peter Thomsen, *Die Palaestinaliteratur, Vierter Band 1915-1924* (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 454-472.

72 F. Kronecker, *Reise aus Stubenberg bei Braunau nach dem gelobten Lande* (Muenchen, 1825). Roehricht, no. 1684.

73 J.N. Visino, *Meine Wanderung nach Palaestina* (Passau, 1840). Roehricht, no. 1860.

74 C.W.M. van de Velde, *Narrative of a Journey through Syria and Palestine in 1851-2.* (Edinburgh and London, 1854), 2 vols. Roehricht no. 2275.

75 W.M. Thomson, "Journal of a visit to Safet and Tiberias," in Edward Robinson's *Biblical Researches*, vol. 3, pp. 471-475.

76 See note 58.

77 a. Verniero. See note 49, vols. 2 and 3. b. Giovanni Calaorra, *Historia Cronologica della Provincia di Syria e Terra Santa di Gerusalemme* (Venetia, 1694). Roehricht, no. 1198. c. Antonio del Castillo; *El devoto Peregrino y viage de Tierra Santa* (Madrid, 1654). Roehricht, no. 989. d. Wadding, "Annales Minorum, continuati a Aniceto Chiappini," 26 (Quaracchi, 1933), p. 325. Not in Roehricht. e. Francisco Jesus Maria de San Juan

del Puerto, *Patrimonio Seraphico de Tierra Santa* (Madrid, 1724). pp. 296, 297, 335-342. Roehricht, no. 1360.

78 Joh. Aegidius van Egmont and Joh. Wilhelm Heymann, *Voyages... through,... Palestine, Egypt, Mount Sinai...* (London, 1758-9), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 1252.

79 Giovanni Mariti, *Istoria della Guerra Accesa Nella Soria l'Anno 1771* (Firenze, 1772). Roehricht, no. 1492. An unrecorded second volume, dated Firenze 1774 is to be found in my library.

80 Salvator Lusignan, *History of the Revolt of Ali Bey* (London, 1783). Roehricht, no. 1448.

81 See note 17.

82 Savary, *Letters on Egypt* (London, 1786), 2 vols. Not in Roehricht.

83 Joan Lopez, *Relacio de la peregrinacio d Jerusalem y Palestina*, ed. by Jaume Collell, (Barcelona, 1900). Not in Roehricht.

84 Sergei S. Pleshtshejew, *Tagebuecher einer Reise... nach Syrien... nebst einer kurzen Geschichte Ali Beys* (1773). Roehricht, no. 1497.

85 See note 24.

86 a. *Memoirs of the Lady Hester Stanhope*, ed. by Dr Meryon (London, 1845), 3 vols. Roehricht, no. 1648. b. Duchess of Cleveland, *The Life and Letters of Lady Hester Stanhope* (London, 1897). c. Martin Armstrong, *Lady Hester Stanhope* (London, 1927). d. M.J. Krueck von Poturzyn, *Lady Hester Stanhope* (Stuttgart, 1936). e. Joan Haslip, *Lady Hester Stanhope* (London, 1934). f. Paule Henry-Bordeaux, *The Circe of the Deserts* (London, n.d). g. Ian Bruce, *The Nun of Lebanon* (London, 1951).

87 a. Amnon Cohen and Bernard Lewis, *Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the Sixteenth Century* (Princeton, 1978). b. Wold-Dieter Huetteroth and Kamal Abdulfattah, *Historical Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the late 16th Century* (Erlangen, 1977).

88 See note 78.

89 J.B. Spilsbury, *Picturesque Scenery in the Holy Land and Syria* (London, 1803). Roehricht, no. 1562.

90 See note 18.

91 Antonio Tenreyro, *Itinerario* (Lisboa, 1560). Roehricht no. 693.

92 Antonio de Aranda, *Verdadera informacion de la Tierra Sancta* (Alcala, 1531). Roehricht, no. 649.

93 Juan Perera, "Camino y peregrinacion que hizo el Canonigo J.P. mi tio, desde Roma á Jerusalem, y toda la Siria hasta Egypto," in Iosepe de Sesse, *Libro de la Cosmographia universal del Mundo* (Caragoca, 1619). Roehricht mentions Sessa (no. 958), not, however, Perera.

94 See note 5.

95 See note 4.

96 See note 16.

97 a. Belarmino Bagatti, *L'industria della Madreperle a Betlemme* (Gerusalemme, 1954). b. Nathan Schur, "The Mother of Pearl and Souvenir Industry of Betlehem from the Middle Ages to Modern Times," in *Bethlehem and the Church of the Nativity*, ed. by Eli Schiller (Jerusalem, 1980), in Hebrew.

98 For detailed list see Peter Thomsen, *Die Palaestina-Literatur*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1911), pp. 169-172.

99 Sir Edward Parry, *Queen Caroline* (London, 1930).

100 Oeuvres complètes de M. de Lamartine, *Voyage en Orient* (Paris, 1842), 6, p. 424. Roehricht, no. 1777.

101 Herzog Maximilian in Bayern, *Wanderung nach dem Orient* (Muenchen, 1839), pp. 234, 235, 243, 244. Roehricht, no. 1871.

102 Dr Titus Tobler, *Beitraege zur medizinischen Topographie von Jerusalem* (Berlin, 1855). Roehricht, no. 1824.

103 See Dr med. Sandler, "Medizinizche Bibliographie fuer Syrien Palaestina, und Cypern," *ZDPV* (1905, 1909).

104 Dr Bernhard Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt und deren Bewohner* (Hamburg, 1877). Not in Roehricht.

105 E.W.G. Masterman, M.D., *Hygiene and Disease in Palestine, P.E.F.* (London, n.d).

106 Elizabeth Ann Finn, *A Third Year in Jerusalem* (London, 1869). Roehricht, no. 2897.
107 See notes 54, 55, 57, 58 and 59.
108 Asaad Y. Kayat, *A Voice from Lebanon* (London, 1847). Roehricht mentions the author (no. 1902), not, however, the work.
109 Carsten Niebuhr, *Reisen durch Syrien und Palaestina* (Hamburg, 1837). Roehricht, no. 1484.
110 See note 18.
111 See note 19.
112 James Silk Buckingham, *Travels in Palestine through the Countries of Bashan and Gilead...* (London, 1821), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 1650.
113 a. Bertha Spafford Vester, *Our Jerusalem, an American Family in the Holy City* (Garden City, 1950), pp. 91-93. b. Nathan Schur, "Masa' el tokh ha-nikba", *'Et-Mol*, 25 (May 1979).
114 a. *P.E.F.Q.* 1870, pp. 168-183; 1871, pp. 70, 135-139; 1874, p. 2; 1876, pp. 181, 182; 1889, pp. 150-152; 1899, p. 284. b. Charles Warren, *Underground Jerusalem* (London, 1876), pp. 536-546. c. Richard F. Burton and Charles F. Tyrwitt Drake, *Unexplored Syria* (London, 1872), vol. 2, pp. 317-344.
115 a. Frid. Const. Tischendorf, *Novum Testamentum Graece, ex Sinaitico Codice* (Lipsiae, 1865). b. Ludwig Schneller, *Tischendorf Erinnerungen* (Leipzig, 1929). c. *Codex Sinaiticus — Tischendorf's Story* (London, n.d.).
116 Charles Clermont-Ganneau, *Archeological Researches in Palestine* (London, 1896), vol. 2, pp. 6-8, 86, 87, 224-275.
117 Bartholomew George Warburton, *The Crescent and the Cross* (London, 1844). Roehricht, no. 2028.
118 Eduard Rueppell, *Reisen in Nubien, Kordofan und dem petraeischen Arabien* (Frankfurt, 1829). Not in Roehricht. However, Joseph Pitts already reached it around 1685; see Sir William Foster, *The Red Sea and Adjacent Countries* (London, 1947), p. 48. Not in Roehricht.
119 Comte Leon E.S.J. de Laborde, *Voyage de l'Arabie Petrée* (Paris, 1830-33). Roehricht, no. 1731.
120 Alois Musil, *Kusejr 'Amra* (Wien, 1907), 2 vols.
121 Lieut. J.R. Wellsted, *Travels in Arabia* (London, 1838). 2 vols. Not in Roehricht.
122 See note 19.
123 See note 18.
124 James Finn, *Byways in Palestine* (London, 1868), p. 204. Roehricht, no. 2987.
125 Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert, *Reise in das Morgenland* (Erlangen, 1838-9), 3 vols. Roehricht, no. 1857.
126 W. George Beke and G. Henry Moore, *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London*, 7 (1837), p. 456. Roehricht, no. 1854.
127 See no. 20.
128 Dr Titus Tobler, *Denkblaetter aus Jerusalem* (Constanz, 1856), pp. 42, 43. Roehricht, no. 1824.
129 See note 78, vol. 2, p. 152.
130 Rudolf, Kronprinz von Oesterreich, *Eine Orientreise vom Jahre 1881* (Wien, 1885).
131 Pierre Belon, *Les observations de plusieurs singularités et choses memorables trouvées en Grece, Asie, Judée, Egypte, Arabie at autres pays estranges* (Paris, 1553). Roehricht, no. 678.
132 Leonhard Rauchwolff, ... *Aigentliche Beschreibung der Rais, so er vor dieser Zeit gegen Aufgang inn die Morgenlaender... selbst vollbracht...* (Langingen, 1583). Roehricht, no. 758.
133 Frederick Hasselquist, *Voyages and Travels in the Levant* (London, 1766). Roehricht, no. 1435.
134 H.B. Tristram, *The Land of Israel* (London, 1865). Roehricht, no. 2798.
135 George E. Post, *Flora of Syria and Palestine* (Beirut, 1890). Roehricht, no. 3084.
136 Henry Chichester Hart, *Some Account of the Fauna and Flora of Sinai, Petra, and Wadi 'Arabah* (London, 1891).
137 See note 133.

138 Joseph Russegger, *Reisen in Europe, Asien und Afrika...* (Stuttgart, 1841-9), 4 vols. Roehricht, no. 1825.
139 Oscar Fraas, *Aus dem Orient* (Stuttgart, 1867), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 2900.
140 Louis Lartet, *Essai sur la géologie de la Palestine...* (Paris, 1870). Roehricht, no. 2822.
141 Edward Hull, *Memoir on the Geology and Geography of Arabia Petrea, Palestine and Adjoining Districts* (London, 1889).
142 Max Blanckenhorn, *Naturwissenschaftliche Studien am Toten Meer und im Jordantal* (Berlin, 1912).
143 A.F.L. Viesse de Marmont, duc de Raguse, *Voyage,... en Syrie, en Palestine et en Egypte* (Bruxelles, 1841), 5 vols. See vol. 4, p. 121. Roehricht, no. 1802.
144 For instance: a. John Kelman, *The Holy Land* (London, 1904), pp. 9-21. b. Henry Light, *Travels in Egypt, Nubia, Holy Land...* (London, 1818), p. 202. Roehricht, no. 1641. c. William Rae Wilson, *Travels in the Holy Land, Egypt...* (London, 1831), vol. 1, p. 159. Roehricht. no. 1676. d. Anton Prokesch, Ritter von Osten, *Reise ins heilige Land* (Wien, 1831), p. 44. Roehricht, no. 1736.
145 For instance: a. Otto Friedrich von Groeben, *Orientalische Reise-Beschreibung* (Marienwerder, 1694), p. 85. Roehricht no. 1166. b. See no. 47, vol. 1, p. 238. c. J. Ross Browne, *Yusef, or the Journey of the Frangi* (New York, 1858). p. 347. Roehricht, no. 2312. d. Edouard Schure, *Sanctuaires d'Orient* (Paris, 1907), p. 312.
146 For instance: a. August M. Jahn, *Reise von Mainz nach Aegypten, Jerusalem und Constantinopol* (Mainz, 1828-30), vol. 3, p. 357. Roehricht, no. 1721. b. W.R. Wilde, *Narrative of a Voyage to Madeira* (Dublin-London, 1840), vol. 2, pp. 371, 372. Roehricht, no. 1890. c. M.A.F. Didot, *Notes d'un voyage fait dans le Levant en 1816 et 1817* (Paris, 1821), pp. 249, 250, 267. Roehricht, no. 1652. d. I.N. Craigher, *Erinnerungen aus dem Orient* (Triest, 1847), pp. 121, 129, 145. Roehricht, no. 2005.
147 For instance: a. Moses Margoliouth, *A Pilgrimage to the Land of My Fathers* (London, 1850), vol. 2, pp. 147-149, 280-285. Roehricht, no. 2229. b. Sepp, *Meerfahrt nach Tyrus* (Leipzig, 1879), p. 308. Roehricht no. 2019. c. Joseph Schiferle, *Reise in das heilige Land* (Augsburg, 1852), vol. 2, 12 last pages. Roehricht, no. 2259. d. Christian Richardt, *Det hellige Land* (Kjobenhavn, 1889), p. 36.
148 Robert Curzon, *Visits to the Monasteries of the Levant* (London, 1851), pp. 197-211. Roehricht, no. 1800.
149 See note 114, b, pp. 436, 437.
150 F.W. Sieber, *Reise von Cairo nach Jerusalem* (Prag, 1823), p. 97. Roehricht, no. 1669.
151 C. Wotruba, *Eine Orientfahrt* (Theux, 1911), pp. 459-466.
152 Edward Daniel Clarke, *Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia and Africa* (London, 1816-1824), 11 vols. Roehricht, no. 1600.
153 James Fergusson, *An Essay on the Ancient Topography of Jerusalem* (London, 1847). Roehricht, no. 2138.
154 Michael Eneman, *Resa i Orienten 1711-1712* (Uppsala, 1889). Roehricht, no. 1321.
155 See note 16.
156 See note 128.
157 George Williams, *The Holy City; or Historical and Topographical Notices of Jerusalem* (London, 1849), 2 vols. Roehricht, no. 2036.
158 Georg Gatt, *Beschreibung ueber Jerusalem und seine Umgebung* (Waltsee-Leutkirch, 1877). Roehricht, no. 3284.
159 David Roberts, *The Holy Land from Drawings Made on the Spot* (London, 1842-9), 6 vols. Roehricht, no. 1984.
160 Bellarmino Bagatti, *Fra Bernardino Amico, Plans of the Sacred Edifices of the Holy Land* (Jerusalem, 1953), p. 20.
161 Giovanni Zuallardo, *Il devotissimo Viaggio di Gerusalemme* (Roma, 1587), Roehricht, no. 797.
162 Joanne Cotovicus, *Itinerarium Hierosolymitanum et Syriacum* (Antverpiae, 1619). Roehricht, no. 839.
163 George Sandys, *A Relation of a Journey Begun Anno Domini 1610* (London, 1627). Roehricht, no. 923.
164 Cornelius de Bruyn, *Reyzen... mitsgaders de voornaamste steden van Aegypten, Syrien en*

Palestine (Delft, 1698). Roehricht, no. 1184.

165 Goupil Fesquet, *Voyage d'Horace Vernet en Orient* (Paris, 1839). Roehricht, no. 1907.

166 Alexander Keith, *Evidence of the Truth of the Christian Religion* (Edinburgh, 1848). Other editions of this book have simple woodcuts and not the daguerrotypes. Keith is mentioned by Roehricht (no. 2058) but not this work.

167 August Salzmann, *Jerusalem* (Paris, 1856). Roehricht, no. 2244.

168 Marino Sanuto Torselli, "Liber secretorum fidelium crucis," in Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos* (Hannover, 1611), vol. 2. Roehricht, no. 179.

169 J.B. Bourguignon, sieur d'Anville. Roehricht (maps) no. 259.

170 Jacotin Roehricht (maps), no. 323; Charles Paultre, no. 308.

171 See note 118.

172 See note 109.

173 See note 20.

174 See note 74.

175 Charles Wilson, *The Ordinance Survey of Jerusalem Made in the Years 1864 to 1865* (London, n.d.), 3 vols. Roehricht, no. 2891.

176 Palestine Exploration Fund, The Map of Western Palestine, on the scale of 1 inch to the British mile (1880), 26 sheets.

177 Palestine Exploration Fund, The Negeb or Desert south of Beersheba; surveyed 1913-14, and printed 1921, scale 1 inch to 3.93 miles.

178 Merion, *The Seven Years Travels of Lady Hester Stanhope* (London, 1846), 3 vols. Roehricht, no. 1648.

179 For instance: a. Selah Merrill, *East of the Jordan* (New York, 1881), p. 414. Roehricht, no. 3318. b. H.B. Tristram, *The Land of Moab* (London, 1873), pp. 165, 166. Roehricht, no. 2798. c. E. Kautzsch und A. Socin, *Die Aechtheit der Moabitischen Alterthuemer geprueft* (Strassburg, 1876). d. *P.E.F.Q.* 1872, pp. 152, 156, 157; 1873, pp. 13-17, 79, 80, 82, 88-90; 1874, pp. 90, 114-124, 201-207; 1876, pp. 99-103; 1878, pp. 41-45, 88-102.

180 Dr Alois Musil, *Kusejr 'Amra und andere Schloesser oestlich von Moab* (Wien, 1902), vol. 1, pp. 8-24.

181 Louis Damoiseau, *Voyage en Syrie et dans le Desert* (Paris, 1833). Roehricht, no. 1680.

182 Notice sur le Docteur Titus Tobler, Société de l'Orient Latin (Geneve, 1877).

183 The ones I have consulted so far are:
Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Piazza Pio XI, 2, Milano.
Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense (in Brera Museum), Milano.
Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Piazetta San Marco 7, Venezia.
Library of the Archives of the Propaganda, near the Spanish Steps, Rome.
Biblioteca del Pontifico Istituto Orientale, opposite the church of St Maria Maggiore, Roma.
(I have not yet been able to consult the Vatican Library, however).
Frankfurt a.M. — Stadt und Universitaetsbibliothek.
Niedersaechsische Staatsbibliothek, Hannover.
Heidelberg Universitaetsbibliothek (my thanks are due there to the librarians for their kind help beyond the normal call of duty).
Staatliche Bibliothek, Regensburg, Gesandtenstrasse 13.
Bayrische Staatsbibliothek, Muenchen (the registry there is completely misleading, as the many important books destroyed during World War II have not been deleted).

An Ottoman Officer in Palestine, 1914-1918

GEOFFREY LEWIS

Falih Rifki [Atay] was born in Istanbul in 1894. He graduated from the Faculty of Letters in 1913 and worked for a little while as a journalist on the daily *Ṭanīn*, then in the Grand Vezir's office and the Ministry of the Interior. At the end of 1914, as a reserve officer, he joined the army and left almost immediately for Jerusalem, to be Cemāl Paşa's private secretary. He was also given charge of the Second Branch of HQ, which looked after political and administrative matters. When Cemāl resigned his command at the end of 1917, Falih Rifki went back with him. He sold a house left to him by his father for five hundred liras, with which, in partnership with two friends, he founded the newspaper *Akşam*. His support for Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists led to his being brought before a court-martial by the sultan's government, with a recommendation from the Ministry of War that he be executed 'for disturbing the peace of the east of the country'. After his trial had been going on for some days, news of the Nationalist victory at the first battle of Inönü (10 January 1921) scared his judges into releasing him. He was elected to the Grand National Assembly as deputy for Bolu in 1922, but grew unpopular with his constituents because he protected trees. There were frequent complaints about him, on the lines of 'This man represents the forests, not us.' So Mustafa Kemal said, 'We'll make him deputy for somewhere where there are no trees', and thereafter he served as deputy for Ankara. But it was as a writer that he made his name, and as an editor: of Atatürk's own newspaper *Ḥākimiyet-i Milliye*, later renamed *Ulus*, of *Milliyet* and, from 1952 until his death in 1971, of *Dünya*.

As a writer of articles he was admirable; he was an excellent observer and had a fine sense of language. But when it came to collecting his articles into books he could be slipshod, so that one may find two different descriptions of the same event thirty pages apart, and he was casual about inserting dates. His *Zeytindağı*, 'Mount of Olives', on which the present study is based, exhibits these faults.[1]

He was an honest man and a brave man. Even as a boy he was courageous and resourceful (though it could be said that the following anecdote does not bear witness to his honesty). One day at primary school he was told to learn *Sūrat Yā Sīn* by heart. He didn't feel like doing so, so he tore that *sūra* out of his Koran. Next day, when his teacher asked him to recite it, he said, 'I have

not learned it because there's no such *sūra* in my Koran.' That was the first time he was beaten at school.

He had his share of the bloody battles in the desert and was twice wounded.[2] The war taught him three lessons, which reinforced his natural sensitivity and thoughtfulness. The first was that in four centuries of Empire the Turks had not won the allegiance, much less the affection, of the Arabs. The second was the evanescence of human power and glory. The third was that one should never mistake violence for strength. From 1922 until 1938 he was the friend and confidant of Mustafa Kemal, who proved a far worthier object of admiration than Cemāl Paşa had ever been.

Cemāl Paşa needs little introduction. He was one of the three men, the others being Enver and Ṭal'at, who were the effective rulers of the Ottoman Empire from mid-1913 until its defeat in the war into which Enver had dragged it. This was Falih Rifki's comment on the Ottoman entry into that war:

> Three things had been exercising the mind of Istanbul: The hostility of Russia, the might of Germany and the invincibility of Britain. No one doubted that if it were not for Britain, Germany could easily rout the French and Russians. Then we entered the war, on the German side. Some friends and I, our call-up papers in our hands, were on our way to the Tepebaşı Garden for one last party. We ran into another friend, a man older than we were, just back from Europe.
> 'We're done for!,' he said.
> 'What do you mean?'
> 'You'll see!'[3]

At the outbreak of war, on November 1, 1914, Cemāl was minister for the navy. He went almost immediately to command the Fourth Army in Syria, with the declared intention of seizing the Canal and driving the British out of Egypt. This may seem an odd assignment for a minister for the navy, but it is clear that he was very much the junior partner in the triumvirate (he had no advance knowledge of the secret treaty of August 2, 1914, which committed Turkey to fight on the side of the Central Powers) and that Enver and Ṭal'at preferred to have him out of the way. They did not really think he could conquer Egypt; he was not even the best available general. He himself said of his half-witted attack on the Canal in February 1915, that he undertook it for show, to demonstrate to the British that they would not be left in peace on the Canal.

> I never seriously imagined that we would cross and seize the Canal, but so thoroughly did I convince HQ and the units under my command, no-one had any notion that this was a demonstration and no-one held back for a moment from displaying the utmost self-sacrifice.

Even according to his own figures, that demonstration cost the Turks nine hundred and nineteen dead and missing.[4] But he was a competent administrator and a totally ruthless disciplinarian, and Falih Rifki was

manifestly torn between loathing and admiration. Something of this ambivalence is discernible in the following paragraph:

> Though Cemal was the most European in his thinking of all the war-time government, he never forgot his own factional politics. During the war one could never say of anybody, 'He s a member of the CUP,' except for the most obscure and insignificant individuals. The label one attached to people in those days was the word 'man': Cemal Paşa's man, Enver Paşa's man, Talat Paşa's man. I don't know if anyone was his own man. And every man had his own men... On the Mount of Olives there were two distinct groups, the officers of Fourth Army HQ and Cemal Paşa's men. You could tell the latter because they had an importance disproportionate to their rank and job... And, though that was the thing I most hated, in the years following the armistice the only label attached to me was 'Cemal Paşa's man.'[5]

You will notice he does not explicitly disavow the label. He was abruptly initiated into Cemāl's doctrine of government in his first few minutes at Fourth Army HQ in the German Sanatorium on the Mount of Olives. On his arrival, he found some twenty respectable-looking civilians in the anteroom. He was shown into the inner office where Cemāl sat at his desk, signing papers which were being handed to him by three officers.

> He turned his head and his eye slid over me to settle on the second officer. In a sour voice he said, 'Tell my ADC to bring in the *eşraf* of Nablus.' As they came in, it was obvious they had been praying, for each one paused in the doorway and wiped his hands down over his face. Cemāl went on signing papers and asking questions and giving orders, while the twenty men grew paler and paler. Eventually he closed the last file and said in a hectoring voice, 'Do you appreciate the gravity of the crimes you have committed against the state whose subjects you are?' They tried to answer—'Astaghfiru Allāh!, Asta'īdhu bi-llāh!'—but he cut them short. 'Silence! Do you know what the punishment is for these crimes? Execution! Execution! But you may thank God for the sublime mercy of the Ottoman state. For the moment I shall content myself with exiling you and your families to Anatolia.' When they had thanked him profusely and gone out, Cemal turned to me and said with a smile, 'What can one do? That's how we get things done here.'[6]

The author does not comment, but from his subsequent remarks about bureaucracy we may judge that he saw merit in the military ways of dealing with recalcitrant civilians. Cemāl tells in his memoirs of his road-building program. 'Thanks to a quantity of tools provided by the army, as well as to labor battalions detached from the army, these roads were opened to motor traffic in December 1915.' He mentions that he entrusted the Damascus-Ḳunaytra section to Ḥulūşī Bey, governor of Damascus.[7] Falih Rifki tells the story in rather more detail:

> Cemal Paşa gave his orders to governor of Damascus Hulusi Bey, who was a former minister of works and an engineer. He wrote back to say that the task was technically impossible and that he was sending his chief engineer with the necessary proof. When the man arrived he had an armful of brief-cases and files. There were mounds of paper, solely to prove that the road the army needed could not be built in the time within which the army required it. I myself escorted him to Cemal Paşa. He was very self-confident. But the moment he came in at the door, Cemal scowled at him and said, 'Drop it all on that table. And you stand there in front of me.' The bespectacled engineer stood to attention. 'Here are your orders. You will tell my staff how much money, how many laborers, how many picks and shovels you need to finish the road by the date you've been given. Then you will go straight back to Damascus. If the road is not finished on time, I shall have you executed at the point where the last stones have been laid.' You can of course be sure that the chief engineer was not executed. The road was finished exactly on time.
>
> Present-day readers will be surprised at this talk of execution. In the Great War, the words 'kill,' 'hang,' 'shoot' had become devalued to the level of a five-lira fine. One day at Beirut I saw a telegraphist with a great sheaf of telegrams stacked in front of him, each one marked 'Anyone delaying this by one minute will be executed.' That man should have been torn into a thousand pieces. Leaving aside the excesses, I approve of any kind of severe treatment for bureaucracy. Bureaucracy, especially among us Turks, has come to mean giving the force of law to laziness, indecision, stupidity, malevolence and ignorance.[8]

But his admiration for Cemāl's methods did not extend to approval of the hanging, in August 1915, of eleven of the prominent Syrians incriminated in the documents seized in the French consulate in Beirut at the beginning of the war. He rejects, however, the view that Cemāls' brutal policy (a) led to the revolt of the Hijaz, (b) contributed to the loss of Syria or (c) prevented revolt in Syria.[9] On (a) he was right. On (b) he was wrong. Cemāl's policy certainly fueled Syrian hatred of the Ottomans, though Falih Rifki would probably have argued that this made only a quantitative difference. On (c) he was probably right; in Syria the ground had not been prepared for revolt as it had been in the Hijaz.

Elsewhere, however, he seems to imply that Cemāl's policy had worked in Syria:

> For Palestine we used deportation; for Syria, terrorization; for the Hijaz, the army. The circumspect Jews, waiting on the coast at Jaffa for the Balfour Declaration, lost no lives for its sake; not so much as an orange. The Hijaz rose in revolt, but Syria was quiet.[10]

He records that those who were hanged in Beirut went to their deaths bravely,

singing Arab marching songs. They were mostly young patriots, he says, *milliyetperverler*.[11] But he cannot refrain from recording also that the day after the executions, as he was passing the open door of Nuşret's office (Nuşret was Cemāl's ADC), he saw two young women in there, who looked to be somewhat flirtatious. Later that day, Nuşret said to him, 'You'll never guess who those two girls were. They're the daughters of so-and-so, who was executed. It seems they and their mother are being exiled to Bursa. And they'll do anything to be allowed to go to Istanbul instead. They were complaining, "How can we live in a provincial place like Bursa?"' Now one can see the young women's point. But clearly the twenty year old Falih Rifki was deeply shocked by what he regarded as their callousness.[12]

He was even more shocked by a glimpse of Cemāl's nature which he was afforded when a telegram arrived from a political exile asking Cemāl to use his influence to get him pardoned.

> I remember that when I handed the telegram to Cemal Paşa a smile played over his face and he said, 'Everywhere there are people groaning because of me!' I can still see him trying to hide that smile and turn his words into a sigh.[13]

Nor did the CUP leaders' attitude to the law appeal to him. Cemāl Paşa had given orders about how to settle some problem or other. Falih Rifki went back to him with a copy of the relevant law and said, 'I'm sorry, Sir, but the law is quite unambiguous and the matter cannot be settled as you have ordered.' Cemāl turned to his ADC and told him to bring some rough paper, on which he at once drafted an urgent telegram to the War Ministry, reading: 'Change Law No. so-and-so as follows and telegraph new text to me immediately.' Falih Rifki comments: 'You couldn't even order a suit length that easily.' He continues:

> After the war he said to me, not long before he left Turkey for the last time, 'I want to do something and the law gets in my way. What are laws? I've made them and I can unmake them.' His words reminded me of what Enver used to say: 'Laws? Now you see 'em, now you don't.' Then he would explain for the benefit of anyone who didn't understand: 'I make them, and the thing's possible. I unmake them, and it's not.'[14]

His views about the various non-Turkish peoples in the area are much what one would expect of an intelligent and observant but very young man on his first trip away from home.

> The only religion of the Bedouin was gold. They would steal horses from the British lines and sell them to us, then they would steal them from us and sell them back to the British.[15]

That, mutatis mutandis, could have been said by any of my contemporaries in the Middle East Command during World War II. But he does tell a good story.

> The shaykhs of the Hauran who come to visit our HQ have one fault. No room they enter will be free of the pungent smell of their beards for about a week. The color of Druze beards is like henna and the smell of them is like cinnamon marinaded in vinegar. One day we invited two shaykhs, brothers, to come and be given gold and decorations. After they had left, the elder brother came back and said in my ear, 'It would be all right to give him less; his influence is very limited.' When he had gone out, his brother came back in and said, even closer to my ear, 'It would be all right not to give him anything; he has no influence at all.'[16]

He devotes a chapter to a visit he paid to Medina in company with Cemāl and Enver Paşas, a few staff officers, some Mevlevīs in their tall hats and an Armenian waiter. The Armenian went with them on the train from Amman as far as Madā'in Ṣāliḥ. There he had to leave the train, Christians not being allowed in Medina. For reasons unstated the dining-car was also removed; perhaps it was assumed to contain unclean food. But you would have thought someone would have foreseen this and found a Muslim waiter.

> I am in the City of the Prophet, the Prophet whose name I have not been able to speak since my childhood without fear and trembling, without adding a *Hazret,* an *Aleyhisselam.* I keep trying, in vain, to recapture the old formless feeling of the immanence of the next world. This feeling totally disappears in Medina. Medina is a nest of vulgar and unscrupulous brokers, trading on the Prophet's corpse. Every Medinan is ready to sell to the simple people coming from afar the stones and earth and well-water of this ruinous and filthy desert village, first making them kiss it all forty times...
>
> It was at Medina that I realized fully that the true Muslim city, the city where religion is respected, the city which gives art and nobility to religion, is Istanbul. At Medina, the tomb of the Prophet's father has become the water-carriers' hut, and over his coffin water-skins are hung. While we were praying, an Arab carrying a pitcher passed in front of us. Although it was my understanding that if anyone passes in front of you during prayer your prayer is invalidated, I supposed this was not so at Medina and, forgetting that Zamzam was in Mecca, I thought the man was bringing Zamzam water for us. He gave me a cup of water. Bewildered, I unclasped my hands and drank. Then I clasped my hands again, but the Arab grabbed my arm. 'Money!' he said. It seems the fellow was *selling* water. I fumbled in my pockets but couldn't find any change. I asked Enver's ADC, who was next to me. He must have been devout, for he gave the Arab first a word of greeting and then a few coins.[17]

Back in Jerusalem, he visited the Christian holy places.

> The pilgrims in Jerusalem are no happier than the pilgrims at Medina.

> The people of Jesus are as hungry as the people of Muḥammad and are equally doomed to live in misery. The only difference is the majestic decor of the beggar in Jerusalem. Medina was an Asiatic bazaar which has turned religion into trade-goods. Jerusalem is a Western theatre which has turned religion into a play... I thought the priests of the Holy Sepulchre were wearing false beards. When they bend down, one can see the bulge of their pistol-holsters beneath their robes.

He then goes on to make the familiar point about the jealous way in which the various sects guard their own segments.

> If the broom of one touches the stone of another there's murder, and blood spurts onto the tomb of Jesus in place of tears. Just as there are some walking-sticks that have swords inside, so in Jerusalem there are idols with daggers inside.[18]

About the Jews of Palestine he has quite a lot to say, of the immigrant Jews, that is; he never speaks of non-European Jews.

> There is no problem of Christianity in Jerusalem or Palestine. The Christianity of Jerusalem is a political question belonging to Orthodox St. Petersburg, Protestant Berlin, atheistic Paris, Catholic Rome and Anglican London. The local problem of Jerusalem is the Jew-Arab problem; a handful of Jews and six hundred thousand Arabs. I toured Jewish Palestine several times, from Jaffa to Jerusalem. The new towns and villages of Palestine are the work of the Jews. This is not just a new Palestine but a staggeringly new Palestine. In the village, the headman is an English Jew who puts on a dinner jacket in the evening. Rosy-cheeked German Jewish girls ride home to the village from the vineyard in carriages, singing. The Muslim Arab serves these masters; the Arab laborer squeezes the grapes and the plump Jew drinks the wine. In the old Palestine, the Arab village is a heap of earth, the gardens ruined, the people naked, the eyes diseased. In Jewish Palestine the towns are filled with the scent of oranges, and the well-maintained roads are lined with prickly pears. Women in low-cut dresses in February are waiting for the end of the war in rich hotel lounges decorated with strongly-perfumed roses and ripe oranges.
>
> To see the futility of tears visit the Wailing Wall, which weeping Jews have pressed their heads against for hundreds of years; hundreds of years of tears have not worn the stone away by one centimetre. To see the power of money, visit the coasts and the interior and see the Zionist colonialism that is driving numerous Arabs into the desert. Centuries of tears aren't worth one gold ingot. One speech by Balfour is more effective than all the Psalms of David.
>
> The Jews left nothing undone to avert the whirlwind of terrorization. In their villages they always offered us the ripest of oranges, the oldest of

> wines... One day a Jewish village headman, dinner-jacketed, who had dressed his beautiful twin children, a boy and a girl, in red and white, the Turkish colors, said to me, 'We want to get the *paşa* to recite some poetry this evening. What do you think he'd like to recite?'
>
> German, English, French—all languages are spoken in the new Palestine. Except the Jewish language, Hebrew; the state language, Turkish; and the majority language, Arabic. The villages are full of couples who look as if they'd come out of a respectable middle class dance hall. And the naked Arab at the threshold forever chews scraps of food and half-eaten oranges.[19]

All rather superficial, you may say, particularly the obsession with oranges. Yet he obviously tried to keep an open mind. He even tells of one occasion when he made a conscious effort to find out what motivated a young Zionist. He describes a train journey he made in the same compartment as

> a thin, pale young Jew of middle height, with reddish hair, who talked and talked about the Zionist cause and the difference between the Jew of Balat [the poor Jewish quarter of Istanbul] and the ideal Jew. I put up with his peculiar odor and his excitability... in the hope of learning something new, of finding a way to a spirit that had been closed and obscure to me till that day... The trains used to wait for hours at Wadi Sarar station, where the desert line branches off from the Palestine line. There's nothing there, no trees, no buildings, and never a cool moment... We stayed there for six hours. There was no end to the stifling heat of the sun, or of the young man's slow, long and detailed questions, which made one forget even the sun. As we started off again and climbed the first hills... he looked around with joyful eyes and said, 'You are wrong to fight against Zionism. No one can cultivate this land as well as we can, because no one can love it as much as we do.' I loathed him. I wanted to say, 'If, instead of coming north at Wadi Sarar, you'd turned east, in an hour or two you'd have heard the guns. You are planting wheat in this land, but we are burying our blood and our bones in it.'[20]

'I wanted to say.' But he didn't, because inside the officer's uniform was an intellectual. And we cannot blame him for failing, over sixty years ago, to see the other man's point of view; all credit to him for trying.

Cemāl Paşa, in the Turkish version of his memoirs, makes only one reference to the presence of Jews in Palestine; it does not appear in the English version. Describing his attempts to do something for the country, including the laying-out of public gardens, woods and experimental fields at Beersheba, which, he says, rather touchingly, 'were truly worth seeing', he adds:

> The agricultural adviser, who was one of the teachers from the Jewish agricultural school of Rishon le-Tziyon at Jaffa and a number of Jewish

> agricultural officials, graduates of the same school, who worked alongside him, expended very great efforts in this.[21]

Falih Rifki doesn't seem to have known about this or didn't think it worth mentioning. On the other hand, he does have something to say about Cemāl Paşa's removing from their homes the Jews of Tel-Aviv and Jaffa, which Cemāl does not mention. Here is his account of the episode, a somewhat disjointed account, as if he were using notes made at the time, which his memory was not clear enough to supplement:

> The wheat was coming from northern Syria. Palestine was the consumer. There was the battle front, the first and foremost consumer. In order to prevent famine and hunger, it was necessary to send the Jews of Palestine to the producing region and settle them there until the end of the war. Was this the real reason, I wonder, or were the Jews of Palestine being deported?... As soon as word was received of a deportation of Jews, the warring states suddenly united against us. The very next day, not just the Paris and London newspapers but even the Vienna and Berlin newspapers answered with one voice: 'Never!' The Jewish bankers who set all the Christians, Protestant, Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox, fighting each other, and who kneaded the unleavened bread of 1914-1918 with Christian blood, succeeded in turning the entire church against the mosque in the interests of the synagogue.

If, by the way, you find that metaphor surprisingly medieval, worse nonsense than that was believed in those days by people more mature than Falih Rifki. In his *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies* (London, 1974), Elie Kedourie gives the text of a letter dated May 29, 1910 from Sir Gerald Lowther, British ambassador in Istanbul, to the Foreign Office in London, containing, among other gems, "The Oriental Jew is an adept at manipulating occult forces" (p. 257), which suggests that the student of politics should never overlook the role of stupidity in policy making. But to let Falih Rifki resume his story:

> To abandon the mansions, the hotels and orange groves of Jaffa and the Jewish homeland *(Yahudi yurdu)* that had been so many years in the making, and to be thrown into the sun-dried bricks and the wheatfields of Homs and Hama—never! But Cemal Paşa was a wily politician. He knew who the chief Zionists were. He summoned the leaders and said, 'You can choose. I am prepared to deport you as was done with the Armenians. Or I can appoint some of your number to look after your homes and orchards and gardens, and I can place gendarmes and soldiers under their orders. Anyone who lays a finger on a single orange I shall execute. And I shall send you on your way by train. But if you want the second option the entire Vienna and Berlin press must be silent, tomorrow morning.' They certainly were not waiting for an opportunity

to prove that Jews were unintelligent. They went to the HQ telegraph-office. With two lines of writing they silenced those two great cities, and London and Paris too. In fact, they evacuated Jaffa and went to Hama and Homs without anyone's being hurt, and the Arabs when they had gone did not manage to eat a single orange of theirs; at least, if they did, they didn't enjoy it.

One reason for the deportations was that Jewish Palestine was a perfect nest for spies. To supply GHQ Baghdad with facts and figures across the desert by camel from Hama did not prove as simple as sending messages by boat from the coast of Palestine to British torpedo boats.[22]

After this article first appeared in print, I read the following lines in Cevdet's *History*: 'One of the curious consequences of the French Revolution was that a Jewish manifesto was written, printed and published, in which Jews everywhere were called to combine in order to form a Jewish government in Jerusalem. What vain imagining! What impossible fantasy!'[23]

The young Falih Rifki's biggest eye-opener was the realization that the Ottoman Empire, which he had been brought up to believe was the most important institution in the world, did not command the allegiance of its non-Turkish subjects. What made the First deep impression on him was that no one wanted Turkish paper money. It had not been so at the beginning; he had arrived in Syria with paper money only, and at first found it cheaper to live there, even in big cities like Damascus, than in a small town in Anatolia. But then, one day, all post offices in the province were ordered to collect silver and other coins. The news was spread by Arab postal officials, and Turkish paper suddenly lost its value. Some officers had been sent to the Ḥawrān to buy wheat. As soon as the local shaykhs understood that payment would be made in paper, they asked leave to withdraw for consultation among themselves.

When they came back they said, 'We are the sultan-caliph's slaves, so we don't want to refuse the paper money. We'll accept it if you give us a lira-note for every hundred *paras*' i.e. they would accept paper money at one-fortieth of its face value. People would travel with just enough paper money to buy their train tickets; for other purchases they carried silver and gold. The army and officials were paid part of their salaries in gold.

One day, Cemal Paşa issued an order that anyone who refused to accept paper money at its face value would be punished, with anything from exile to hanging, according to the scale of the offence. The people of Syria accepted that paper was no different from gold or silver, only they just stopped doing business with the government. Contractors would no longer supply the wood that kept the trains running. Then the government had to announce two different prices for wood: one if paid in paper and a totally different one if paid in gold.[24]

But it wasn't only Turkish money that wasn't acceptable past Aleppo;

it was Turks and Turkish. Jerusalem was no more ours than Florence. We wander the streets like tourists. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre is symbolic; every piece belongs to a different religious community and we hold the keys. Everything in these parts belongs to the Arabs or to foreign powers. Only the gendarmes are ours: not even the gendarmes, just the uniforms. The Ottoman Sultanate is solidly bureaucratic, but the bureaucracy here is at least half Arab. I have not seen a single turkicized Arab, and I have seen precious few Turks who were not arabicized... We have neither colonized this region nor made it part of our own land. The Ottoman Empire here is the unpaid watchman of the fields and streets. The two finest buildings in Jerusalem were German, the biggest was Russian, and all the rest belonged to the English or French or other foreigners. While the Turkish army was marching towards Egypt, the Druze with their spice-scented bushy beards, the plaited-haired Jews and leather-skinned Arabs, naked or in nightshirts, lined up on both sides and said, 'Go on, you brave fellows!'...

We were driving ourselves on, not because of a sense of reality but because of a sense of history. What ought to have happened was that the Turks should become completely westernized and then, and only then, spill out past Aleppo towards the Red Sea with people, technology and capital. But when we crossed the borders of Anatolia and knocked at the gate of Aleppo we began to see prosperity and bustle. Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem, were all great cities. The atmosphere of Lebanon was more alien to us than that of Dobruja. Yet everywhere we went we told ourselves, 'It is ours!'... Naked Jesus was a carpenter's apprentice in Nazareth. But when he passed over the Mount of Olives he rode his own ass. We are just lodgers in Jerusalem... As all the minorities in the Ottoman Empire had privileges, while the Turks had none, it was more advantageous to belong to any Muslim minority than to be a Turk... One day we went to greet some troops just arrived from Turkey on their way to Aden. Some three thousand Turkish boys, thin, pallid and in rags, marched past us, bone-weary. There was the railway, of course, but they had walked all the way from Adana.[25]

Don't think there was an 'Arab problem' in that huge land stretching from Aleppo to Aden; what there was was anti-Turkish feeling. Take that away and the Arabs would have collapsed into disunity. Among the Muslim Arabs were those who wanted a government headed by an Arab caliph. The Christians were even more anti-Turkish than the Muslims, but believed they were better off under Ottoman rule because it gave them privileges which would certainly disappear under Arab domination. Besides, the Turks were no rivals for them in business and trade. The Maronite patriarch knew the French would never let him retain his privileged status. What he wanted was to live under French protection and Ottoman sovereignty. At the begining of the war Lebanon was

> virtually independent. The Ottoman government had not confirmed the Maronite patriarch's appointment, but he ruled, thanks to the French, and his community worshipped him like a god. One-third of Lebanon was Maronite religious endowment. They are bitter enemies of Islam. They have a class there called 'Holy Warriors' (*mukaddes mücahit*). Anyone who kills a Muslim is a Holy Warrior. The Holy Warriors are salaried: four liras if they are bachelors, eight if they are married. The Protestants were pro-British, the Orthodox pro-Russian. In Palestine the Zionists had set up what was practically a secret government. They had their own flag and their own postal service, with their own postage stamps.[26]

There is no need to recount the political and military mistakes of the unloved Ottoman authorities. For Cemāl and his private secretary, the end came late in 1917, when General von Falkenhayn was appointed supreme commander. Falih Rifki's comment was this:

> Cemal Paşa was unwilling to give up his Syrian dream; he wanted to return to Istanbul at the end of the war bearing the gift of a Syria preserved. Perhaps they took advantage of his weakness for pomp and circumstance; he was appointed commanding general of Syria and Western Arabia. A sort of commander-in-chief, second class. The artillery, the machine guns, the rifles and the swords were put under the German's orders, while Cemal Paşa's share was that grand title to put over his signature... It was like the honorary rank of *paşa* which we used to give to Bedouin shaykhs in the empty desert. One day we heard that one of von Falkenhayn's junior officers had commandeered a building in Damascus which had taken his fancy. Cemal Paşa, that man of limitless influence, accustomed to lining up patriarchs, princes and shaykhs in rows in front of him, and to hanging notables and deputies, was helpless to explain to that junior officer what was upsetting him. That vast power and pride, which we had thought made of eternal marble, cracked like plaster at one flick of the finger of a German subaltern...
>
> It wasn't Cemal Paşa that was falling, it was the province of Syria. But because it was a country with an excessive regard for rank, decorations and gold braid,[27] it fell not as Anatolian villages fall, in silence and loneliness, but more showily and magnificently, wrapped in the uniforms of commanders-in-chief, marshals and ministers.[28]

Cemāl resigned his command and went back to his Naval Ministry, taking Falih Rifki with him. Immediately after the armistice he fled to Berlin with the other triumvirs. He died in Tiflis in 1922, shot by an unknown assailant, believed to be an Armenian.

In June 1956, Falih Rifki visited Jerusalem once more. On his return home,

he wrote, for a new edition of his book, a short introduction entitled Ölberg from which I quote:

> 'Ölberg' is the German for Mount of Olives. 'Jabal al-Zaytūn' is the Arabic. And 'Zeytindağı?' 'Zeytindağı' is just the name I gave my book. There never was a Turkish Jerusalem.

It is because of my feeling that one has a duty to record such of one's experiences as may interest the historians that I add the following, as a small footnote to the story of what went on in Palestine and the desert between 1914 and 1918.

In 1960 I was living in Turkey when the veterans of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps came to make their annual pilgrimage to the battlefields and cemeteries of Gallipoli on Anzac Day, 25 April. Three days before, as a loyal though temporary member of the Istanbul branch of the British Legion, I attended the party given for them and the Turkish veterans of the campaign. While I am recording, I should record that it was a most memorable party, which began with an opened bottle of Scotch at each person's place. Late in the evening, a very elderly and shrunken Australian advanced to the middle of the floor and said, in a surprisingly loud voice, 'Everybody here keeps talking about Gallipoli. I wasn't at Gallipoli. Is there anybody here besides me who was in the Palestine campaign?' The Turks consulted among themselves and eventually produced a Turk who could have been the Australian's twin brother. The two old men stood and looked at each other, and then the Australian said,

> 'Were you at Gaza?'
> 'Oh yes,' replied the Turk, 'I was at Gaza.'
> 'Did you ever get to Jerusalem?'
> 'Yes, I was at Jerusalem.'
> 'How about Ramle? Do you remember Ramle?'
> 'Oh yes, I was at Ramle.'

The Australian was silent for a moment. Then he cried out, 'They were *good* old days!'

Notes

1 First published in Istanbul, 1932. Page references in what follows are, unless otherwise indicated, to the enlarged third edition of 1943, which I have in some places collated with the revised fifth edition of 1964. In the interests of clarity, here and there in the citations I have taken some liberties with the author's arrangement of his material.

2 The wording of his reference to the second occasion is such as to give the reader the impression that it had left him crippled: 'From the murmurings of the doctors I sensed

that I was finished not just with the war but with my foot too' (p. 156). Professor Selim Ilkin, who knew him well, having informed me that he had never noticed any sign of a limp in Falih Rıfkı, was kind enough to inquire of his widow about the matter. She replied with some indignation, 'He was perfectly sound. He was a very fit man.' (Letter from Selim Ilkin dated March 27, 1980.)

3 p. 31.
4 *Hatıralar: Cemal Paşa Bahriye Nazırı ve 4. Ordu Kumandanı*, edited by Behçet Cemal (Istanbul, 1959), pp. 171, 176. There is also a shorter English version: Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919* (London, n.d.).
5 pp. 39-40.
6 pp. 10-11.
7 *Hatıralar*, p. 320.
8 pp. 94-6.
9 pp. 50-51.
10 p. 48.
11 p. 52.
12 pp. 57-58.
13 p. 52.
14 pp. 97-98.
15 p. 89.
16 p. 103.
17 pp. 64-65.
18 p. 70.
19 pp. 73-74.
20 pp. 162-163.
21 *Hatıralar*, p. 323.
22 He must have known about Nili but does not mention it apart from this oblique reference, and he was apparently unaware of the use of carrier pigeons. On Nili, see Anita Engle, *The Nili Spies* (London, 1959) and Eli'ezer Livneh et al. (eds.), *Nili: Toldoteha shel ha'aza medinit* (Jerusalem, 1961). For these two references my thanks are due to Dr David Patterson and Dr Gad G. Gilbar respectively.
23 pp. 74-76, collated with 1964 edition, p. 82.
24 pp. 87-88.
25 pp. 41-43.
26 pp. 45-46.
27 Reading *sırmaya* for *semaya*, an emendation I owe to Mr John Walsh.
28 pp. 115-116.

Contributors

Butrus Abu-Manneh, Dept. of Middle East History, University of Haifa.

Engin D. Akarli, Faculty of Humanities, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul.

Shmuel Avitsur, Avshalom Institute, Tel Aviv University.

Gabriel Baer, Dept. of the History of Muslim Countries, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Alex Carmel, Dept. of Eretz Yisra'el Studies, University of Haifa.

Daniel Crecelius, Dept. of History, California State University, Los Angeles.

C. Ernest Dawn, Dept. of History, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Robert Eisenman, Dept. of Religious Studies, California State University, Long Beach.

Mordechai Eliav, Dept. of Jewish History, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan.

Caesar E. Farah, Dept. of History, University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, Minneapolis.

Carter V. Findley, Dept. of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus.

Isaiah Friedman, The Ben Gurion Research Institute and Archives, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beersheba.

Haim Gerber, Dept. of the History of Muslim Countries, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Gad G. Gilbar, Dept. of Middle East History, University of Haifa.

Fred M. Gottheil, Dept. of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Yair Hirschfeld, Dept. of Middle East History, University of Haifa.

J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Institute, Columbia University, New York.

Ruth Kark, Dept. of Geography, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Uri M. Kupferschmidt, Dept. of Middle East History, University of Haifa.

David Kushner, Dept. of Middle East History, University of Haifa.

Geoffrey Lewis, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

'Ādel Mannā', Dept. of the History of Muslim Countries, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

MOSHE RINOTT, Dept. of Education, University of Haifa.

RUTH RODED, Dept. of the History of Muslim Countries, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

U.O. SCHMELZ, The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

ALEXANDER SCHÖLCH, Institut für politische Wissenschaft, Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg.

NATHAN SCHUR, Zahala, Tel Aviv.

Index *

Aaronsohn, A., 241
'Abadiyya, 217
'Abd al-Ghanī family, 126
'Abd al-Hādī, Maḥmūd, 271
'Abd al-Nabī, Muḥammad, 270
'Abd al-Raḥmān Aġa, 253
'Abd al-Raḥmān family, 270
'Abda, 391
'Abdallāh (*sharīf* of Mecca 1770), 250-251
'Abdülḥamīd I, Sultan, 258
'Abdülḥamīd II, Sultan, 9, 13, 15, 18, 74-86, 101, 124, 147-148, 150, 153-160, 167(38), 169(62), 175, 177, 179, 184, 345
'Abdullāh Paşa, 386
'Abdullāh Efendi, Ṭaylasānīzāde, 100
'Abdülmecīd, Sultan, 343
Aberdeen, Earl of, 321-322, 325-326, 329-330, 332
al-'Ābid, Aḥmad 'Izzat ('Izzet) Paşa, 78, 154-158, 175-176, 179
al-'Ābid family, 155-156
al-'Ābid, Muḥammad 'Alī Bey, 156
al-'Ābid, Muḥī al-Dīn (Hōlū) Paşa, 155, 157
'Ābidīn, 'Alā al-Dīn, 149
'Ābidīn family, 126
Abū 'Asalī family, 184
Abū Dīs, 220
Abū-Ghūsh family, 270
Abu-Manneh, B., 81
Abū Nakad(s), 137
Abū Shūsha, 225
Abū al-Su'ūd family, 112, 117, 120
Abuqir Bay, 343
Abyssinians, 385
Acre, 98, 125-127, 129(25), 231-232, 252-253, 257-259, 261(10), 262(39), 303, 359, 385-386, 388, 393
— *sancak* of, 8, 13, 123
Adana, 75, 125, 412
Adelburg, E. von, 335, 338(33), 376
Aden, 412
administrative council(s) — see: *meclis-i idāre*
'Aflaḳ, M., 184
'Afula, 243
Agricultural Bank, 20, 28(57)
al-Aḥmadiyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 168(47) (49)
Aḥmed Aġa, 357
al-'Ajlānī, Darwīsh Efendi Manjak, 150
al-'Ajlānī family, 150
al-'Ajlānī, Muḥammad, 150
'Aḳīlī Aġa, 386
al-Aḳṣā mosque, 94
— waḳf of, 112, 117
Akşam, 402
al-'Alamī, 'Abd al-Ṣamad, 110
al-'Alamī, Abū'l-Faḍl, 110
al-'Alamī family, 111, 114, 119-120, 121(13)
al-'Alamī, Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān,
— waḳf of, 115
al-'Alamī, Wafā, 111, 114
'Alawi(s), Alawite, 183-184, 325
alay beyi, 9
Albanian(s), 77, 250, 255
Aleppo. Aleppine(s), 75, 79, 124, 146ff., 175-176, 180-181, 184, 249, 253, 338(21), 354, 411-412
Aleppo College, 166(19)
Alexander, Tsar, 334
Alexander, M.S., Protestant bishop, 305, 321, 324, 330, 334, 386
Alexandretta, 125, 183-184
Alexandria, 252, 344, 357
Algeria, Algerian(s), 81-82, 131, 157, 283, 343, 346
'Alī (*vālī* of Damascus), 325-329, 331-332
'Alī Aġa, 117
'Alī Bey al-Kabīr, 247ff., 386
'Allār, 112
Allenby, E., 63, 68, 386
Alliance Israélite Universelle, 285-286, 294-295, 306
Alsberg, A., 374
Alten, K.V. von, 374
America — see: United States of America
American University of Beirut, 147, 354
s.a. Syrian Protestant College
Amin, Samir, 141
amīr al-ḥajj, 123, 176
al-Amīrī family, 157(40)
Amman, 391, 407

* Parenthesis in the index indicate references to notes.

'Amwās (Emmaus), 112
'Anata, 217
Anatolia, Anatolian, 29(63), 75, 81, 124-125, 135, 164, 178, 188, 343, 346, 404, 411-413
— railway, 296
s.a. Asia Minor
'Anaza, 273
Anderson, P., 133
Anderson, R., 322
Angeli, Antonio degli, 393
Anglican(s), 325-326, 338(21), 408, 410
s.a. Protestant(s)
Anglo Palestine Company, 205
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 344
Ankara, 402
antilia(s), 239-241
Antioch, 183
Anville, Sieur d', 393
Aqaba 391, 393
— crisis (1906), 316
Arab(s) Arabic, 24, 32-34, 50, 55, 74-86, 124, 147-148, 153-154, 156-158, 164, 172-173, 175, 177, 188, 193, 196-197, 201, 203, 206, 216-217, 219, 247, 259, 280, 285, 305, 315, 344, 353, 364, 369, 372, 384, 390, 403, 406-409, 411-412
— Congress in Paris, 1913, 157
— nationalism, 78, 156-159, 171(96) (97), 180-181, 347
— Revolt 1916, 24
'Arab al-Faḍl, 218
Arabian Peninsula, 71(4), 87(18), 135, 251-252, 345, 413
Arabic, 24, 77, 80, 125, 147, 157, 178, 263, 273, 338(21), 351, 356, 358, 409, 414
Ardahan, 346
al-Arḍī, Y'aḳūb, 271
al-'Arīsh, 358
al-'Arḳūb, 216, 360
Armenia, Armenian(s), 16, 29(63), 232-233, 239, 271-272, 315, 330, 346, 385, 387, 392, 407, 410, 413
Arnadas, A. de, 387
'Arrāba, 384
al-Arsūzī, Najīb, 183
al-Arsūzī, Zakī, 183-185
Arṭās, 216, 386
Arvieux, L. d', 382, 388
As'ad Efendi, 271
al-Asad, Ḥāfiẓ, 183
al-'Asalī family, 146
al-'Asalī, Ṣabrī, 183
a'shār, 219-220
'Āshir Efendi, Muṣṭafā, 99
Ashkelon, 394
Asia Minor 141, 252, 304
s.a. Anatolia
'Āṣim family, 126
Asir, 79
'Aṣīret Mektebi, 80, 88(33)
al-Aṣrūniyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), waḳf of, 151
'Aṭā'llāh Efendi — see: 'Aṭāullāh Efendi
al-Atāsī, Abū l'Hudā, 167(26)
al-Atāsī family, 146, 159-160, 166(26), 171(97)
al-Atāsī, Fikrī, 183
al-Atāsī, Ḥilmī, 183
al-Atāsī, Ṭāhir, 171(97)
al-Atāsī, Ẓāfir, 166(21)
Atatürk, 59, 402-403
'Aṭā'ullāh Efendi, Şerīfzāde [al-Ḥusaynī], 100, 102-103
'Atlīt, 242
al-Aṭrash family, 184
Augusta Victoria hospice, 307
Austria, Austrian, 266-267, 281-282, 286, 290(14), 298, 301(19), 304, 323, 327, 332, 334-335, 338(33), 372, 375-381, 389, 391
Austro-Hungary, Austro-Hungarian(s), 264, 266, 344, 376
— Post 203, 380
a'yān, 42, 93-94, 107(34), 109, 141, 169(50), 247
'Ayn 'Arīk, 232
'Ayntāb, 166(19)
al-'ayntābī, Maḥmūd Kāmil Paşa, 159
al-'Aysāmī family, 184
Ayyūb, Antonius, 270, 272
al-Ayyūbī, Aḥmad Mahdī, 149
al-Ayyūbī, 'Alī Jawdat, 171(96)
al-Ayyūbī family, 149, 171(96)
al-Ayyūbī, Ibrāhīm Khalīl Efendi, 149
al-Ayyūbī, Muḥammad 'Alī Efendi, 149
al-Ayyūbī, Muḥammad Sa'īd Efendi, 149
al-Ayyūbī, Shukrī Paşa, 158
'Azāzmeh, 34
al-Azhar, 126
al-'Aẓm, Aḥmad, 183
al-'Aẓm family 156-158, 182-183
al-'Aẓm, Ghālib, 182-183
al-'Aẓm, Ḥaḳḳī Bey, 171(96)
al-'Aẓm, Muḥammad Paşa, 254
al-'Aẓm, Muḥammad Fawzī Paşa, 156, 158
al-'Aẓm, Rafīḳ Bey, 171(96)
al-'Aẓma family, 146, 159
al-'Aẓma, Nabīh Bey, 159
al-'Aẓma, Yūsuf Bey, 159

Baalbek, 160
Bachi, R., 363
Baedeker, K., 218, 235
Baer, G., 14, 32

Baghdad, 78-79, 124, 154, 252, 411
Bahais, 385
al-Bahansī family, 146
al-Bahramiyya mosque (Aleppo), 167(40)
Bakhshā family, 146
al-Bakrī, As'ad, 161
al-Baladiyya (*medrese*, Jerusalem), 116
Baldensperger, P.J., 34, 384
Balfour Declaration, 63, 68, 302, 405, 408
Balḳā', *sancak* of, 8, 13
Balkans, 141, 159, 164, 267, 283, 295
Balta Liman, commercial convention of (1838), 5
Banī Ḥārith, 360
Banī Ḥimār, 360
Banī Mālik, 360
Banī Murra, 360
Banī Ṣa'b (Tulkarm), 126
Banī Salīm, 360
Banī Zayd, 360
Banque Impériale Ottomane, 196
Banū Ḥasan, 97
Banū Ṣakhr, 273
Banū Ṣaḳr, 217
al-Barāzī family, 181
al-Barāzī, Ḥusnī, 181-182
al-Barāzī, Najīb, 181-182, 184
al-Barāzī, Rāshid, 181
Barges, J.J.L., 385
Basel, 289
Basily, K., 267, 323, 325-326, 328-335
al-Bāsiṭiyya (*medrese*, Jerusalem), wakf of, 112
baṣkātib, 126-127, 129(15), 286, 356
Basra, 79, 252
Ba'th, Ba'thist, 172, 183-185
Batum, 346
Bavaria, Bavarian, 386, 390
Bayt Jālā, 280
Bayt Jubrīn, 216, 270, 391
Bayt Nūba, 112
Beardsley, A., 216, 221
Bedouin(s), 4, 32-35, 81, 141, 158-159, 214-219, 222-223, 226, 248, 250, 253-254, 271-272, 274, 278(79), 285, 314, 367, 384, 386, 389, 394, 406, 413
Beersheba, 33-34, 40, 44-45(45), 409
Beirut, 78-79, 83, 85, 89(64), 129(25), 147, 189-190, 195, 255, 257, 263, 265, 267, 269, 290(14), 323-324, 327-328, 332, 337(3), 338(21), 375-376, 405, 412
— *vilāyet* of, 7, 8, 42, 80, 123, 177
Beisan plain, 33
Beke, W.G., 391
Belon, P., 391
Ben-Arieh, Y., 363
Ben-Yehuda, E., 287
Benghazi, 79
Bergheim, S., 220, 225, 240
Berlin, 263-264, 266, 269, 294, 296-299, 342, 408, 410, 413
— Congress of 1878, 346, 375
— Treaty of 1878, 282
Bethlehem, 34-35, 126, 202, 218-219, 224, 271, 355, 359, 385, 388
Beyt Guvrin — see: Bayt Jubrīn
Bieberstein, A.M. von, 297
Bilu, 241, 284-285
al-Bīmāristān al-Ṣalāḥī, wakf of, 110
binbaṣı, 271
al-Bīra, 232
al-Bīṭār, 'Abd al-Razzāḳ, 93
al-Bīṭār family, 184
al-Bīṭār, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, 184
Bittīr, 112
Black Sea, 343
Blanckenhorn, M., 392
Bliss, F.J., 154-155
Bodrum, 125
Bohemia, 377-378
Bolu, 402
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 302-303, 358, 386, 392-393
— Napoleonic wars, 342-343
Bonar, A.A., 385
Bosnian(s), 77
Boucher, J., 382
Bovet, F., 217
Bremond, G., 382, 388
Brèves, F. de, 383
Brèves, S. de, 382
Breydenbach, B. von, 393
Brill, I., 241
Britain, British — see: Great Britain, British
Bruce, J., 251
Brunnow, Baron, 332
Brunson, C., 320-321
Bruyn, C. de, 393
Buckingham, J.S., 390
Budayr, Shaykh Muḥammad, 94
al-Budayrī family, 114, 119-120
al-Budayrī, Muḥammad, 115, 119
Buelow, H. von, 264-265
Bulgaria, Bulgarian(s), 284
Bunsen, Baron von, 263-265, 268, 276(15)
de Bunsen Committee, 345
Burckhardt, J.L., 383-384, 390-391
Bursa, 169(50), 353, 410
Burton, I., 383
Busch, M., 384
Buzu Aġa (*mültezim* of Ḥaṣbayyā), 323

Caboga, Count, 380
Caesarea, 220

Cahen, C., 130-132
Cairo, 126, 140, 252-254, 256, 352
Caliphate, 76-77, 99
Canning, S., 265, 268, 277(41), 321, 325-326, 330-331
Canterbury, Archbishop of, 320, 334
Capernaum, 391
Capitulations, 51, 62, 64, 71(23), 80, 280ff., 294ff., 302, 309-313, 372
Carmelite(s), 258
Catalan, 386
Catholic(s), Catholicism, 76, 285, 302-307, 311, 315, 324-326, 329, 331, 333-336, 384-386, 407-408, 410,
s.a. Latin(s)
Caucasus, 159, 283, 343
çavuş, 14
Cebel-i Lübnān, 80, 89(54)(64), 135-136, 138-142, 322-323, 328-329
Cemāl Paşa, 24-25, 169, 171(97), 402-407, 409-410, 413
Cemīl Paşa, 150-151, 168(49), 169(50)
cem'iyet-i belediye, 14
Cerulli, E., 385
Çeşme, 252
Cevdet Paşa, Aḥmed, 75, 77-78, 82, 411
Chasseaud, J., 322, 327
Chevallier, D., 130-131, 139
Christian(s), Christianity, 4, 49-51, 64, 66, 74, 76, 85, 147, 150, 173, 177-178, 188, 202, 205, 216, 221, 259, 252, 257-258, 265, 267-269, 271-272, 274, 280, 283, 288, 302-307, 309, 329ff., 359, 367, 372, 374-375, 377-380, 382-387, 390, 407-408, 410, 412
s.a. various denominations
Christian Israelite Society, 335
Circassian(s), 77, 242, 249
Civil Procedure, Code of, 61-62, 64-65, 67
Clarke, E.D., 392
Clemenceau, G., 346-347
Clermont-Ganneau, C, 391
Cleveland, W., 180
Codex Sinaiticus, 391
Cohen, A., 35
Cohn-Reiss, E., 297-298
çoḳadār, 117
Commercial Code, 62
Commercial Courts, 10
Committee of Union and Progress, 59, 86, 179-180, 404, 406
Conder, C.R., 218, 220-222, 225, 383
Connor, J., 385
Cook, T., 388
Constantinople — see: Istanbul
Constantinople Agreement, April 1915, 341, 346
Constitution of 1876, 15, 30
— 1908, 179
Copt(s), 254, 280
Cotovicus, J., 393
Council of State, 22-23
Court of Cassation, 64-65, 180
Cowley, Lord, 333
Crédit Lyonnais, 205
Cresson, W., 386
Crete, 16, 57(18), 242
Crimea, 343
Crimean War, 265, 269, 276(15), 282, 306, 311
Croatia, 378
Crusader, Crusades, 135, 304, 358, 385, 390-391
Cuinet, V., 8
Curzon, R., 392
Cyprus, 242, 261(13), 342, 345-346

Dahab, 391
Ḍāhir, 'Alī, 257
Ḍāhir, Karīm, 255-256
Ḍāhir, Salīḥī, 255-256
Ḍāhir al-'Umar, 36, 141, 232, 247-250, 252-259, 261(10), 386
Dajānī, 'Abdallāh, 110
al-Dajānī, Darwīsh b. Sulaymān, 112
al-Dajānī family, 94, 110-111, 113, 119-120
— waḳf of, 110
al-Dajānī, Muḥammad Wafā, 112
al-Dajānī, Shākir b. Khalīl, 111
al-Daḳḳāḳ family, 112, 117, 119-121
al-Daḳḳāḳ, Khadīja, 110
al-Daḳḳāḳ, Muḥammad, 110
Dāliya, 221
Dalman, G., 234
Damascus, Damascenes, 57(12), 75, 77-79, 82-83, 93-98, 100, 106(16), 123-127, 140, 146-150, 154-158, 160-161, 166(26), 175-179, 181, 183-185, 247, 249-250, 252-253, 256, 258-259, 284, 286, 296, 323-332, 339(53), 354, 357-359, 404-405, 411-413
Damietta, 253-256
Damoiseau, L., 394
al-Danaf, Dāwūd b. Muḥammad waḳf of, 114
al-Danaf (Anṣārī) family, 112, 115, 119-120
al-Danaf, Ṣāliḥ, 110
al-Dandashī, 'Abd al-Razzāḳ, 183
Daniel, Archimandrite, 235
Darwīsh Efendi, Muḥammad, 271
Dā'ūd Efendi, 285
Dawn, C.E., 157-158
al-Dāwūdī family, 111
Dayr al-Ḳamar, 137, 322
Dayr al-Zūr, 184
De Castro, 285

Dead Sea, 218, 239, 391-392
defter-i ḥâkânî müdîri, 9
defterdâr, 5, 9
derebey(s), 141
Deutsches Bank, 347
Deutsche-Palästina Bank, 205, 296
devlet, 172, 175
Dilke, C., 346
al-Dîwâtiyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 168(46)
Dodecanese Islands, 344-345
Dome of the Rock, 94, 100, 112, 115, 119
— waḳf of, 93, 112-113, 116-117
Doubdan, J., 382
Drake, C.F.T., 216
Druze(s), 83-84, 89(54), 184, 250, 256, 310, 316, 321-325, 327-332, 385, 407, 412
Dünya, 402
al-Durûbî, 'Abd al-Ḥamîd Paşa, 160
al-Durûbî, 'Alâ al-Dîn Paşa, 160
al-Durûbî family, 146, 160
Düstûr, 3, 4, 60
Dutch, 239, 281, 374, 380, 386, 393

East India Company, 343
Eastern Question, 264
Ebied, R.Y., 351-352
Edhem Paşa, 270
Edirne, event of, 1806, 100
Egmont, J.A. van, 386-387, 391
Egypt, Egyptian(s), 4-5, 8, 40, 74-75, 100, 136, 155-156, 199, 221, 224, 232, 247ff., 262(39), 264, 285, 287, 303-304, 310-311, 321, 343-345, 352-354, 356-360, 372, 403, 412
Eichman, F., 265
Eilat, 393
— Gulf of, 391
Eisenstadt, S.N., 39
Ekrem Bey, 36
Emlâk ve Nüfûs İdâreleri, 9
Encümen-i Müdîrân, 19
encümen-i muḫtelif, 22-23
encümen-i vilâyet, 19, 20, 22-23, 149, 170(67),
Eneman, M., 392
England, English, 67, 69, 226-227, 231, 239, 257, 265-266, 268, 283, 303-306, 324-325, 328-329, 332-333, 338(21) (33), 344, 365, 376, 384-386, 390, 393, 408, 412
s.a. Great Britain
English, 240, 338(21), 404
Entente powers, 341-347
Enver Paşa, 158-159, 403-404, 406-407,
Es'ad Paşa, 325-326, 328-330, 332
Esdraelon, plain of, 33, 252-257, 224-225, 243
Europe, European(s), 10, 13, 33, 39, 40, 50-51, 55, 59, 61, 66, 81, 86, 130-133, 136, 139, 142-143, 147, 158, 188-189, 198, 202-203, 205, 224, 226-227, 231, 233, 237-238, 241, 249-252, 255, 258, 260, 264-266, 275, 281-283, 286-287, 294-296, 298, 290, 302-304, 306-307, 309-311, 314, 316-317, 320-321, 335, 341-347, 353, 372-373, 382-383, 385, 403-404
evḳâf, minister of, 158, 167(38), 179
evḳâf müdîrleri, 10
Evliyâ Çelebi, 384
Ewald, F.C. 385
eyâlât-i mümtâze, muḫtâre, 8
eyâlet(s), 5, 7, 269
'Eyn Sheva', 242
Fabri, F., 382
al-Fâhûm family, 125-126
Fakhr al-Dîn, 384, 386
Falaşṭîn (Jaffa), 55
Falkenhayn, General von, 413
Family Rights, Law of (1917), 59, 62-67
farda, 326
Farḥi, Ḥayim, 386
al-Fatât, 171(96)
Fayṣal, King, 181
Feinberg, J., 241
Fergusson, J., 392
Fernandez, M., 286
Fesquet, G., 393
Feudalism, 130-145
Fifth Army Corps, 83
fıḳh, 62, 67
Finn, E.A., 383, 390
Finn, J., 55, 216-220, 223, 226-227, 265, 267, 270, 281-282, 313, 335, 384, 391, 393
Fisher, H.A.L., 303
Flaubert, G., 383
Fraas, O., 392
France, French, 8-9, 64, 74, 81-82, 85, 133, 138, 146-150, 157, 181, 213, 231, 250-252, 255-258, 260, 261(10)(13), 264, 267-270, 274, 281-282, 284, 290(14), 294-295, 298, 300, 302-303, 305-306, 310-311, 315, 320, 322-323, 325, 328, 330-331, 333-334, 337(3), 338(22), 341-347, 336-340, 372, 376-377, 381(7), 382-386, 393, 403, 405, 411-413
Franciscan(s), 381(7), 382, 384-386, 392
Frankfurter Zeitung, 289
Frankl, L.A., 380
Fredrick Wilhelm III, King, 267
Frederick Wilhelm IV, King, 263-264, 267-268, 276(15), 304, 320-321, 324
French, 154, 295, 378, 409
Fu'âd Paşa, 283

Galatasaray School, 78
Galicia, 377

Galilee, 203, 242, 247, 249, 285, 288, 375, 386
Gallipoli, 414
Gatt, G., 380, 392
Gaza, 8, 32, 97, 101, 123, 126-127, 189, 199, 201, 216, 218-219, 226, 232, 253-257, 262(39), 271-273, 316, 380, 383-384, 387, 414
— *sancak* of, 110, 358
Gedera, 284
general assembly — see: *meclis-i 'umūmī*
George IV, King, 388
Georgian(s), 385
Gerasa, 391
Gerber, H., 11
Germany, German, 60-62, 68, 133, 235-236, 238, 240, 242-243, 264-265, 267, 283, 287, 294-300, 301(19), 306-307, 311, 334, 344, 346, 372-376, 375, 378, 382, 384-386, 388-393, 395, 403-404, 408, 412-413
— nationalism, 267
— postal service in Palestine, 296
German, 295-296, 298-300, 378, 409, 414
German-Palestine Bank — see: Deutsche Palästina Bank
Gezer inscriptions, 391
al-Ghānim family, 183
al-Ghānim, Wahīb, 183
al-Ghazzī family, 98, 145
al-Ghazzī, Ḥusayn, 168(48)(49)
Giers, N., 286
Gilboa, Mount, 391
Gobat, S., bishop, 302, 304-305, 386
Golan, 218, 221, 242
Goltz Field-Marshal von der, 298
Goodrich-Freer, A.M., 384
Graevsky, P., 236
Great Britain, British, 55, 59, 63-69, 71(23), 73(51), 74, 83, 125, 127, 142, 156, 179, 193, 216, 233, 237, 239, 242, 251, 264-268, 274, 276(15), 281, 283, 287, 290(14), 300, 303, 306, 310-311, 313, 315-316, 318(6), 341-347, 363, 368-369, 372-374, 377, 384, 388, 395, 403, 406, 410-411, 413
Greece, Greek(s), 232, 252
Greek Orthodox, 56(5), 177, 180, 235-237, 264, 267-268, 271, 273-274, 276(40), 302-303, 305, 311, 315, 320-321, 323, 325-333, 335-336, 339(53), 343-344, 385, 387, 392
Grupper, S., 238
Gülḫāne, Decree of 1839, 4, 30, 37, 76

Haggard, H.R., 383
Haifa, 124, 126-127, 166(25), 189, 203, 205, 236-238, 242-243, 257, 285, 295, 297, 299-300, 385, 387
ḥajj, 141, 156
Ḥājj Mūsā mosque (Aleppo), waḳf of, 167(40), 168(47)
ḥākim, ḥukkām — see: *ḳāḍī*(s)
al-Ḥakīm family, 177-178
al-Ḥakīm, Yūsuf, 174-181
Ḥākimiyet-i Milliye, 401
Halevy, Rabbi Yehuda of Dubrovnik, 239-240
Ḥalīl Aġa, 99
Ḥalīl Paşa, Kapudan, 326, 328, 330, 332
al-Ḥallawiyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 168(46)
ḥaluḳa, 50, 366
Hama, 148, 155-156, 168(49), 169(63), 181-184, 354, 410-411
Ḥamdī Paşa, 81-84
Ḥamīdiye Kurdish regiments, 89(54)
ḥammām al-'ayn, 113
Ḥamza Paşa, 250
al-Ḥanābila mosque (Jerusalem), 107(34)
Ḥanafī, 62, 95, 100, 127, 351, 353
Hanauer, J.E., 384
Ḥanbalī, 62
al-Ḥanbalī, Mujīr al-Dīn, 352
Ḥaram al-Sharīf, 353
al-Ḥaramayn, waḳf of, 111, 119
Harik, I.F., 130
Hart, H.C., 391
Hartmann, M., 368
Hārūn family, 178, 180-181, 183-184
Ḥasan Bey, 251
Ḥaşbayyā affair 1844, 267, 323-333, 335, 337(16)
al-Hāshimī family, 250
Ḥaşşekī Sulṭan, waḳf of, 112
Hasselquist, F., 391
Hassidim, 386
Ḥaṭṭ-ı Humāyūn of 1856, 30, 282-283, 306, 343
al-Ḥāṭūm family, 184
Ḥawrān 82-84, 89(54), 137, 177, 184-185, 224, 407, 411
al-Ḥawrānī, Akram, 182-185
al-Ḥawrānī, Muṣṭafā, 181-182
al-Ḥawrānī, 'Uthmān, 181-182
Hawwāra, 250
Hawwāsh, Mufīd, 184
Hayes, L. des, 382-383
Ḥayreddīn Paşa, 77
Ḥayrī, Muṣṭafā, 178-180
Hebrew, 263, 284, 287, 295, 299, 364, 367, 373, 385, 394, 409
Hebron, 47, 50, 112, 123, 126-127, 216, 218, 224, 270, 352, 360, 363-370, 388
— *ḳażā* of, 368
— *nāḥiye* of, 359
Heidborn, M., 12
Hermon, Mount, 391
Herzl, T., 289

Heyd, U., 354
Ḥibat-Tziyon, 280, 284, 286-288, 289(2), 290(10), 306
Ḥijaz, 24, 72, 79, 81, 149, 156, 158, 251-252, 260(6), 405
— railroad, 78, 85, 156, 242-243
Ḥikmat, 'Abd al-Ḳādir, 126
ḥikr, 113-117, 168(46)
Hildesheimer, I., 380
Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden, 294-300
al-Ḥināwī, Sāmī, 184
Hintze, O., 133-134
Hirsch, Baron de, 284, 286
al-Ḥisāmiyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 168(47)
Ḥisin, H., 33, 241
Holland — see: Dutch
Holy Cities — see: Mecca; see: Medina
Holy Sepulchre, Church of, 359, 377, 389, 392, 408, 412,
Homs, 124-125, 146, 148, 159-160, 166(26), 171(97), 183, 410-411
Hourani, A., 125, 146, 154-155
Ḥovevey Tziyon — see: Ḥibat-Tziyon
Ḥūla Lake, 224, 285
Hull, E., 392
Ḥulūṣī Bey, 404-405
al-Hunaydī, Ḳāsim, 184
Hungary, Hungarian(s), 377-378
al-Ḥusaynī, Sayyid 'Abd al-Laṭīf b. 'Abdallāh b. 'Abd al-Laṭīf, 94-95, 97-101, 104, 106(7)(16)
— waḳf of, 110, 115
al-Ḥusaynī, 'Abd al-Laṭīf b. 'Abdallāh (grandson of above), 97, 102
al-Ḥusaynī, 'Abd al-Salām b. 'Abdallāh, 95-96, 102
al-Ḥusaynī, 'Abd al-Salām b. 'Umar, 107(40)
al-Ḥusaynī, 'Abd al-Ṣamad, 95
al-Ḥusaynī, 'Abdallāh b. 'Abd al Laṭīf, 95, 97
al-Ḥusaynī, Ḥājj Amīn, 128
al-Ḥusaynī, Badr, 113
al-Ḥusaynī family, 41, 93-106, 112-114, 116-117, 119-120, 146, 183, 316
— waḳf of, 110, 116
al-Ḥusaynī Ḥasan b. 'Abd al-Laṭīf, 94-96, 98-100, 107(57)
al-Ḥusaynī, Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, waḳf of, 111, 115
al-Ḥusaynī, Muḥammad Ṭāhir, 110, 115, 127
al-Ḥusaynī, Muṣṭafā, 95
al-Ḥusaynī, Ṭahīr b. 'Abd al-Ṣamad, 98, 100
al-Ḥusaynī, 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Salām, 95, 97, 99-100, 103, 107(40)(57), 112, 115
al-Ḥuṣrī, Sāṭi' Bey, 78, 180
Hyamson, A.M., 373
Iberian, Iberian Peninsula, 383, 387
Ibn Farrūkh, 384, 386
Ibn Samḥān, Shaykh, 270
Ibn al-Wardī, 173
Ibrāhīm Paşa, 4, 100, 168(47), 232-233, 303, 386
Ibrāhīm Paşa (*vālī* of Damascus), 358
Ibrāhīm Paşa family, 146
iḥtisāb nāẓiri, 333, 340(72)
iḥtiyār meclisi, 14
ijāra ṭawīla, 113-114
ijāratayn, 116
'ilmiye — see: *'ulemā*
iltizām(s), 37, 250, 256-257
s.a. *mültezim*
al-Imām family, 112
imām(s), 112, 117, 154
Imperial Ottoman Bank, 343
India, Indian, 249-251
Iran, Iranian(s), 188, 310
s.a. Persia
Iraq, 85, 88(29), 172, 252
Ireland, 226
isjāl, isjālāt, 351-352
s.a. *sijill, sijillāt*
Iskenderun — see: Alexandretta
Işlāḥāt Firmānı — see: *Ḫaṭṭ-ı Humāyūn* of 1856
Islam, Islamic, Muslim(s), 38-42, 49-50, 59, 62-63, 66ff., 74ff., 93-94, 99, 109, 113, 117, 123ff., 147, 150-152, 154-155, 172, 188, 199, 221, 223, 266-268, 271-272, 274, 280-281, 283, 287-288, 304-305, 311, 313-314, 321, 323-324, 327, 330, 344, 351-353, 358-359, 367, 369-370, 372, 384-385, 387, 390, 407-408, 412-413
— Law 19, 38-39, 60-64, 149, 199
s.a. *Sharī'a*
Ismā'īl Aġa, 262(39)
Ismā'īl Bey, 253-254
Israel, 8, 30, 59, 60, 62-63, 65, 67-70, 72(38), 302, 363, 366, 374, 384, 393-394
Istanbul, 4-6, 8, 12-15, 17-18, 22-23, 64, 78-80, 82, 88(33), 94-100, 119, 124-126, 137, 139, 147-149, 152-160, 177-178, 203, 247, 250, 256-258, 266, 269, 283, 285-289, 296-298, 302, 307, 314-316, 323, 326, 332, 354, 356, 358-359, 372-373, 376-378, 381, 402-403, 406-407, 409-410, 413-414
istibdāl, 114-115, 122(23)
Italy, Italian(s), 231, 298, 300, 341, 344-346, 376-378, 389, 385, 389
Italian, 378
'Izzet Paşa — see: al-'Ābid, Aḥmad 'Izzat ('Izzet) Paşa

Jabal Druze — see: Cebel-i Drūz

Jabal al-Ḳuds, 360
al-Jabartī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, 100, 248, 257-259, 356
al-Jābirī, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, 149
al-Jābirī, 'Abd al-Ḳādir, 149
al-Jābirī family, 146, 159, 171(97), 176
al-Jābirī, Iḥsān, 180-181
al-Jābirī, M. As'ad Paşa, 168(46)
Jadīd, Ṣalāḥ, 183
Jaffa, 8, 15, 39, 46-58, 94, 96-97, 100, 102-103 110, 115, 123, 126, 189-197, 201-206, 224, 226-227, 233-235, 239-240, 253-257, 270, 283-285, 290(14), 296, 306, 315, 372, 376, 378-379, 385, 387, 390, 405, 408-411
al-Jammā'ī family, 98
Jānbulāṭ, Sa'īd, 329, 331
Jānbulāṭ family, 139
Janissaries, 100
Japan, Japanese, 131-132, 139-140
Jārallāh Efendi, 114
Jārallāh family, 114, 119-120
al-Jardikiyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 167(40)
al-Jā'ūnī, 'Abd al-Badī', 112
al-Jā'ūnī, 'Abd al-Raḥīm, 112
al-Jā'ūnī, Bashīr, 110
al-Jā'ūnī family, 99, 117, 119-120
— waḳf of, 110
al-Jā'ūnī, Ḥasan, waḳf of, 110
al-Jā'ūnī, Ḥasan (grandson of the above), 110
al-Jā'ūnī, Mūsā, 112
al-Jā'ūnī, Muṣṭafa, 112
al-Jā'ūnī, Yūsuf, 117
Jaussen, A., 384
Jawdat Efendi, Aḥmad, 169(50)
al-Jawharī, Na'mān, 126
Jāwīsh, Muṣṭafā Bey, 254
al-Jazā'irī, 'Abd al-Ḳādir, 81-82, 156-157
al-Jazā'irī, 'Abd al-Ḳādir Bey, 158
al-Jazā'irī, 'Alī Paşa, 156-158
al-Jazā'irī family, 157-158
al-Jazā'irī, Muḥī al-Dīn Paşa, 156-157
al-Jazā'irī, Salīm Bey, 171(96)
al-Jazā'irī, 'Umar, 171(96)
Jazīrat Far'ūn, 391
al-Jazzār family, 126
Jenin, 97, 101, 271
— *sancak* of, 359
Jericho, 47, 217, 271
Jerusalem, 8, 15, 24, 30ff., 46ff., 63-65, 79, 93ff., 109ff., 123-125, 128, 129(24), 135, 202-203, 205, 216, 218, 221-223, 231ff., 253, 263ff., 283-288, 295-298, 303-307, 309ff., 320-326, 328, 332, 335, 352, 354, 356-360, 363-369, 372-381, 383-395, 402, 407-408, 411-414
— *ḳaḍa* of, 368
— *nāḥiye* of, 359
— province of — see: *sancak* of
— *sancak* of, 8, 11, 13, 37, 42-43, 286, 288, 354, 356, 359
— *sijill*, 109-110, 112-114, 119-120, 354-360
Jew(s), Jewish, 4, 32, 40-41, 49-51, 57(22), 64, 66, 112, 188, 193, 196-197, 202-203, 205, 233, 238, 241-243, 264, 266-268, 270-272, 274, 280-289, 294-300, 299, 302, 305-307, 310-311, 313, 318(6) 320-321, 323-324, 326-8, 330, 334-336, 363-367, 369, 372-387, 390, 408-412
— Ashkenazim, 280-281, 289(3), 290(10), 366-367, 387
— Mughrabim, 366-367
— Sephardi(m), 280-281, 285, 366-367, 378, 387
Jewett, W. 385
Jewish Settlement Organization (YICA), 242
Jezreel Plain — see: Esdraelon, plain of
Jezzār Paşa, Aḥmed, 36, 98, 141, 260, 358 386
Jibrā'īl, Shāhīn, 324, 328, 331
Jidda, 125, 249-251
jihād, 358
jizya, 97, 359
Johnson-Barclay, S., 383, 385
Jordan, 351
Jordan River, 33
Jordan Valley, 216-217, 391
Judea, 285
Judean desert, 34
Jukhdār, Sulaymān, 160
Juluf, Shammās, 271
Jundār, Aḥmad Aġa, 270
al-Jundī, Adham, 160

al-Ḳabbānī family, 183
al-Ḳaḍamānī, Aḥmad, 181
ḳāḍī(s), 10, 38-39, 65, 96-98, 101-102, 109-110, 112-115, 117-119, 124-127, 149, 174-178, 271-272, 331, 351-360
Ḳāḍīs' College (Istanbul), 124-125
Ḳādiriyya, 169(63)
Ḳadrī Paşa, 63
ḳā'imaḳām(s), 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 101-102, 123, 127, 164, 271, 288, 311
al-Kallās, Bahīj, 183
al-Kallās, Khalīl, 183
Kalvarisky, Ḥ., 292(49)
Kāmil Paşa, 288
Kanj Paşa, Yūsuf, 98, 100
Ḳānṣūh al-Ghūrī, 253
Ḳanṭara, 242
Ḳānūn, 38
Kapı Kāḥyası, 6
Karam family, 177
Ḳarāwa, 221

Karīm Khan, 252
Kark, R., 15
Kars, 346
ḳarye(s), 7ff.
kātib, 117, 126
Katinka, B., 243
al-Kawākibī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, 170(67), 176
al-Kawākibī, Aḥmad Bahā' al-Dīn, 170(67)
al-Kawākibī family, 170(67)
al-Kawākibī, Mas'ūd, 170(67)
Kayat, Asaad, 390
al-Kaylānī family — see: al-Kīlānī family
Ḳayrawān, 351
Ḳays, Ḳaysī, 137, 270-271, 384
al-Kayyālī, Yaḥyā Efendi, 152
ḳaẓa(s), 5, 7-8, 10-13, 15-17, 19, 21-23, 42, 164, 174, 311, 353
Ḳazdughlī amirs, 247, 259
Kedesh Naftali, 391
Kedourie, E. 410
Keith, A., 393
Kemal, Mustafa — see: Atatürk
al-Khalaṣla, 360
al-Khālidī, 'Alī, 112
al-Khālidī, Asmā, 117
al-Khālidī family, 41, 95, 100, 110, 112-115, 117, 119-120, 126, 129(15), 146, 356
— waḳf of, 116
al-Khālidī, Khalīl, 125
al-Khālidī, Maḥbūba, waḳf of, 115
al-Khālidī, Muḥammad Efendi, 271
al-Khālidī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn, 110, 115
al-Khālidī, Mūsā (beginning of 19th century) 100, 115, 117
al-Khālidī, Mūsā (second half of 19th century), 355
al-Khālidī, Muṣṭafā, 116
al-Khālidī, Sulaymān, 355
al-Khālidī, Yāsīn Efendi, 41
al-Khalīl — see: Hebron
Khalīl al-Raḥmān, waḳf of, 112
al-Khalīlī, Muḥammad, waḳf of, 116
khān(s), 47, 114
Khān al-Zayt, 114
kharāj, 326
al-Khaṭīb, Abū al-Naṣr Efendi, 166(25)
al-Khaṭīb, Sayf al-Dīn, 166(25)
al-Khayrī family, 125-126
al-Khayyāṭ, Jiryes, 271
Khums (Libya), 125
al-Khusrawiyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 151, 166(24), 168(46)
khuwwa, 217
Kiepert, O.H., 393
al-Kīlānī, 'Abd al-Ḳādir, 181-182, 169(63)
al-Kīlānī family, 156, 169(63), 181, 183
al-Kīlānī, Nawras, 181-184
al-Kīlānī, Riyāḍ, 183
Kinglake, A.W., 383
Kisrawān, 138
Kitchener, H., 217-218, 220
Klein, S.A., 391
Kolel Hod, 398
kolelim, 365, 380
Königsmark, Baron de, 324
Koran — see Ḳur'ān
Kraus, F., 378
Kronecker, F., 386
Küçük Kaynarca, Treaty of, 343
al-Ḳudsī, 'Abd al-Ḳādir, 78, 155
al-Ḳudsī, 'Abdallāh [al-Ḥusaynī], 95
al-Ḳudsī, Bahā' al-Dīn, 168(47), 170(67)
al-Ḳudsī family, 155, 170(67), 175
Ḳunayṭra, 242, 404
Ḳunbāz, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, 181
Ḳur'ān, 112, 402-403
al-Ḳūrānī family, 176
al-Ḳūrānī, Ḥusnī, 180
al-Ḳūrānī, Shafīḳ, 78, 175-176, 178-180
Kurd(s), Kurdish, 77, 88(33), 89(54), 156
Kurdaneh water mills, 238
al-Kurnāṣiyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 168(46)
Kurnub, 391
al-Ḳurrā'al-Salāmīyya (*medrese*, Jerusalem), waḳf of, 112
Ḳuṣayr 'Amra, 391
Kushnir, S., 241
kūsūrāt, 21
Ḳuṭayna family, 110, 117, 119-120
Ḳuṭayna, Sulaymān, 113
— waḳf of, 111
Kuwayt, 345
al-Ḳuwwatlī family, 145

al-Labābīdī family, 126
Laborde, Comte Leon E.S.J. de, 384, 391
Lamartine, M. de,.390
Lämel School (Jerusalem), 298, 301(19), 380
Land Code, 62, 65-66
Lartet, L., 392
Latakia, 124-125, 176-181, 183-185
Latin(s), 304-305, 311, 315, 325, 340(72), 377, 386
s.a. Catholic(s)
Lausanne, Treaty of 1923, 71(23), 341, 345
Law School (Istanbul), 148-149, 178
Lazarine College (Damascus), 147, 166(8)
League of National Action, 182-183, 185
League of Nations, 65, 69, 347
Lebanon, Lebanese, 6, 63, 130-145, 177, 180, 250, 267, 284, 321-323, 327, 329, 343, 354, 390, 412-413
— amīr, Emirate of, 136-142, 322
Lebanon, Mount — see: Cabel-i Lübnān

Lewis, B., 60
Lewis, G., 24
Libya, 344-345
livā(s), 5, 7-8, 12, 16-17, 153, 164, 174, 178 s.a. *sancak*(s)
Lloyd George, D., 346
London, 216, 264-265, 282, 320, 341-342, 373, 395, 408, 410-411
London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews, 321, 324, 334
Lopez, J., 386
Loti, P., 383
Louis Phillipe, King, 267
Lovers of Zion — see: Ḥibat Tziyon
Lowther, G., 410
Löytved-Hardegg, J., 299-300
Luncz, A.M., 234, 236
Lusignan, S.K. 255-256, 386
Lydda 95-96, 102-103, 194
Lynch, W.F., 239, 383

Ma'agan Mikha'el, 238
Ma'ān, *sancak* of, 8
Macedonia, 179
MacGowan, Dr., 390
Madā'in Ṣāliḥ, 407
Maghribī, 256, 258
maḥalle, 7, 14
Maḥāmīd family, 184
maḥlūl, 68
Maḥmūd II, Sultan, 4, 100
Majdal, 199, 388
Malḥame — see: Melḥame
de Maleo, M.M., 382
al-Malikī, Abū Bakr, 351
al-Mālikī family, 183-184
al-Mallāḥ, 'Abdallāh, 93
al-Mallāḥ, Muḥyī al-Dīn, 126-127
Malta, Maltese, 385
Malthus, T.R., 226
Mamluk(s), 136, 247-259, 353
Mandaville, J., 351-352, 356
al-Manṣūriyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 151
Ma'oz, M., 147
Mardam family, 146
Mariti, G. 231, 383, 386, 388, 392
Marmont, A.F.L. Viesse de, 392
Maronite(s), 89(64), 261, 321-323, 325, 328-329, 337(3), 412-413
Marseilles Chamber of Commerce, 231, 261(10)
al-Martīnī family, 146
al-Martīnī, Ṣāliḥ, 168(48)(49)
Marx, Karl, 131, 212
Marxist, 132-133
Mashāka, Mikhā'īl, 328, 339(42)
Massada, 391
Masterman, E.W.G., 390
Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, 390
Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, 389
McCheyne, R.M., 385
Mecca, 77, 81, 88(33), 111, 125, 156, 248-251, 253, 407
Mecelle, 61-62, 67, 70, 71(3), 149
Meclis-i A'yān, 77
meclis-i belediye, 7, 14, 39-40, 51, 53, 55
meclis-i idāre, 10-13, 19, 23, 30, 32-35, 37-38, 40-41, 44(45), 271-272, 278(72)(73)
meclis-i 'umūmī, 10, 12, 20-23
Meclis-i Vālā-yı Aḥkām-ı 'Adliye, 6
Medina, 77, 111, 156, 242, 248, 251, 407-408
medrese(s) 148-153, 167(38), 168(46)(47)(49), 169(50)
Meḥmed Ağa, 98, 103-104
Mehmed Ḳıbrıslı Paşa, 268-271, 273-274, 277(55)(56)
Meḥmed Paşa (Abū Maraḳ), 359-360
Mekkī Efendi, 99
mektūbcu, 9
Melbourne, Lord, 264
Melḥame, Najīb, 78
Melḥame, Salīm, 78
Melville, H., 383
memleket meclisleri, 5, 10
Menaḥem Mendel of Shklov, Rabbi, 386
Merḥavya, 243
Merowich, M., 241
Mesha, Stone of, 391
Meshulam, J., 386
Mes'ūd Bey, 98
Metternich, Prince C.W.L., 332, 376
Metula, 242
mevḳūfe, 71(12)
Mevlevīs, 407
Mexico, Mexican(s), 389
Midḥat Paşa, 6, 9, 26(19), 82-83, 88(44), 150
Miḳdād family, 184
Miḳve Yisra'el, 241, 285, 306
millet, 50, 64, 66, 320, 334, 336
Milliyet, 402
Mills, J., 385
mi'mār başı, 110, 113, 117
Mīr, 'Alī Efendi, 127
mīrī, 60-61, 68-70, 71(3)(4)(12), 138, 206, 219, 225
Mishkenot Sha'ananim, 234-235, 283
Misk, Ḥannā, 329
Mixed council — see: *encümen-i muḫteliṭ*
Mocha, 249, 251
Monastir, 179-180
Montefiori, Moses, 233-235, 237, 240, 283, 302, 363-366
Moore, G.H., 391
Moore, N., 324

Moravia, 377
Morris, R., 221
Mosque of 'Umar, waḳf of, 112
Mosul, 79
— *vilâyet* of, 347
Motza, 285
Mount Carmel, 258, 391
Mount Hope, 240
Mount of Olives, 112, 231, 385, 404, 412, 414
— German, Sanatorium on, 404
Mount Scopus, 231, 307
Mount Zion, 232, 307
mu'âmalât, 61
mu'âvin (to the *vâlî*), 9
Mu'ayyad Paşa, Aḥmad, 156-157
al-Mu'ayyad family, 157-158
s.a. al-'Aẓm family
al-Mu'ayyad, Ṣâdiḳ Paşa, 156, 158
al-Mu'ayyad, Shafîḳ Bey, 171(96)
Mudarris, Ḥâjj 'Aṭâllâh Efendi, 151
Mudarris family, 168(49)
Mudarris, Taḳî al-Dîn, 151
müdîr, 5, 8, 13-14, 31
müfettiş-i ḥükkâm-ı şer'iye, 9
mufti(s), 94-100, 106(3), 110, 115, 117, 123, 125-128, 129(24)(25), 149, 151, 155, 160, 168(46)(49), 169(50), 170(67), 171(97), 271-272, 357
Muḥammad, the Prophet, 94, 96, 99, 154, 407-408
Muḥammad 'Alî, 100, 232, 238, 252, 260, 264, 267, 303
Muḥammad Bey Abû al-Dhahab, 247ff.
muḥaṣṣıl(s), 5
muḥḍir, 117
muḫtâr(s), 5, 8, 14, 31-32
Muḫtâr Paşa, Aḥmed, 158
muḳâṭa'a, muḳaṭa'ât, 44(33), 137-139, 141
mukhtâr(s), 367
s.a. *muḫtâr*(s)
mülk, 60-61, 68-70, 71(3)(4), 219, 225
al-Mulkî, Ra'îf, 181-182
Mülkiye, 148-149, 159-160
mültezim(s), 139, 248
s.a. *iltizâm*
municipal council(s) — see: *meclis-i belediye*
Murâd Bey 251, 259
al-Murâdî, 'Alî, 106(16)
al-Murâdî family, 98
al-Murâdî, Khalîl, 94-95, 100, 119, 121, 146
Murtaḍâ, 'Alî, 126
mushâ', 141-142
Musil, A. 391, 394
al-Musrawiyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 168(46)
Muṣṭafâ III, Sultan, 150
Muṣṭafâ Paşa, Meḥmed, 324
Muṣṭafâ, Ẓarîf, 270-271, 273
mutaṣarrıf(s), 8, 10, 17, 18, 82, 159, 164, 178-179, 286, 310ff.
Mutawalli(s), 250
mutawallî(s), 93, 110-112, 114-120, 168(46)
mütesellim, 96-97, 112
al-Muwâhibî family, 146

Na'aman River, 238
Nabî Mûsâ, 283
— waḳf of, 112
Nablus, 8, 42, 47, 97-98, 101, 107(40), 124, 126-127, 199, 201-202, 224, 256, 270-271, 273, 385, 387-388, 404
— *sancak* of, 123, 359
al-Nâbulsî, 'Abd al-Ghanî, 384
Nâfiẓ Paşa, 84
Naḥal Ayalon, 240
Naḥal Taninim, 238
nâḥiye(s), 5, 7-8, 13, 15-18, 31, 35, 42, 360, 368
nâḥiye meclisi, 13-14
Naḥum Efendi, Rabbi, 284
al-Naḥwî family, 126
nâ'ib(s), 10, 123, 125-127, 129(24)
nâ'ib al-âmm, 177-178
Najd, 345
naḳîb al-ashrâf, niḳâba, 94-98, 100, 102-103, 106(3), 108(62), 110, 113, 115-116, 119, 123, 126, 150, 155, 175-176, 170(67)(68), 271-272, 357
al-Nashâshîbî family, 120, 146, 165(3)
Nâṣid Paşa, Râṣid, 84
Nathan, P., 294-296, 298
National Bloc, 182, 184
nationalism, 24, 347
— Arab, 78, 156-159, 171(26)(27), 180-189, 347
—German, 267
Nationality, Law of (1869), 284
Nau, M., 382
Nazareth, 125-126, 257, 303, 389-390, 412
nâẓır, 110-111, 117
Negev, 8, 35, 390, 394
Neil, J., 223
Nelidov, 286
Nelson, Admiral, 343
Neophytos, Monk of Cyprus, 232
Nes Tziyona, 285
Nesselrode, Count, 335
Neter, C., 285
Neumann, B., 390
Nicholas, Tsar, 267
Nicolayson, J., 303, 306, 321, 324, 338(21)
Niebuhr C., 390-391, 393
Niğde, 179
Nile, 249, 251
— Valley, 135

Nili, 415(22)
al-Nimrī family, 113, 117, 120
— waḳf of, 110
al-Nimrī, Yūsuf, 113
Nish, 6
Niẓām al-Dīn family, 183
niẓāmī, niẓāmiye courts, 10, 27(24), 38-39, 44-45(45), 149, 161-164
Novoye Vremya, 286
Nüfūs registers, 364-370
Nusayba family, 113, 117, 119-120
Nusayba, Sayyid [Infuf], 271

Official Gazette (Palestine), 65
Olin, S., 385
Oliphant, L., 32-33, 222, 285
'Ömer Paşa, 322-323
ha-Or, 287
Orlov, Count A., 252, 254-255
'Oşmān Paşa, 252-254, 256, 258, 261(30)

Palestine Exploration Fund, 393, 395
Palestine War 1948, 185
Palmerston, Lord, 276(15), 320-321, 333, 335
Paris, 285, 295, 305, 341-342, 408, 410-411
— Treaty of 1856, 282, 306, 309, 343
Penal Code, 62, 65-66
Perera, J., 387
Persia, 231, 252, 344-345, 385
s.a. Iran
Persian Gulf, 252, 345-346
Perushim, 386
Petaḥ Tiḳva, 240-241, 284, 287, 306
Petermann, H., 385
Petersburg — see: St. Petersburg
Petra, 391
Pierotti, E., 384
Piezzamano, J., 377, 381(8)
Pleshtshejev, S.S., 386
Pococke, R., 231, 383, 393
Poland, Polish, 131, 264, 285, 378
Ponsonby, Vicount, 321, 324
Porath, Y., 127, 140
Porter, American Minister, 330
Post, G.E., 391
Presbyterian(s), 322, 338(21)
s.a. Protestant(s)
Prime, S.I., 384
Protestant(s), Protestantism, 76, 264, 267-268, 302-304, 310, 337(3), 338(21), 344, 372-374, 378, 408, 410
— Anglo-Prussian bishopric in Jerusalem, 264, 267, 304-305, 320-324, 326, 328, 332, 334, 338(22), 377
— mission, missionaries in Palestine, 264, 274, 277(45), 303-307, 320ff., 377(45), 381(3), 383, 387, 390
— mission, missionaries in Syria, 320ff.
s.a. Anglican(s)
s.a. Presbyterian(s)
provincial council — see: *encümen-i vilāyet*
Provincial administration, laws on 1864, 3-4, 6-8, 10, 12-15, 18, 23
1871, 3-4, 6-19, 23
1913, 3-4, 6, 9, 12, 16-17, 19, 21-24
Provisional Land Laws 1913-1914, 59-61, 67-70
Prussia, Prussian(s), 263-274, 276(15), 281, 290(14), 294, 303-306, 320-323, 326-327, 329-330, 334-335, 338(22), 342, 372-374, 376-377

Quaresmio, F., 382

Rafeq, Abdul-Karim, 354
Rafidiyya, 199
al-Rāfi'ī family, 126
Ramallah, 199
Ramle, 97, 101, 124-125, 201, 216, 220, 231-232, 256-262, 359, 414
Ramsgate, 234
Ra's al-Ṭaḥūna, 232, 236
Rashayda tribe, 35
Rāshayyā, 329
Raslān family, 146, 183
Raslān, Majīd Maẓhar Paşa, 160
Ratisbonne Catholic Foundation, 235
Rauchwolff, L., 391
Ra'ūf Paşa, 286-288
Razsviet, 285
Real-Schule (Haifa), 297, 299
re'āyā, 172, 175, 333, 336
Red Sea, 218, 249-251, 260, 343, 412
Reḥavya, 235
Reitz, J., 287
Rephaim, plain of, 35, 235
Reşīd Paşa, 283
Reuwich, E., 393
Riḍwān Bey, 254
al-Rifā'i, Shaykh Aḥmad, 155
Rifā'iyya, 154-155, 169(63), 175
Rif'at (Foreign Minister), 324
Rifki, Falih [Atay], 24-25, 402-414
al-Rikābī 'Alī Riḍā Paşa, 155, 166(11)
al-Rikābī family, 146, 159
al-Rikābī, Ṣāliḥ Paşa, 159
al-Rikābī, Sulaymān Āġa, 159
Rishon le-Tziyon, 194, 241, 284, 409
Rivlin, A., 50
Roberts, D., 393
Robinson, E., 383, 385, 391, 393
Rodinson, M., 132
Roger, E., 382, 384

Rogers, M.E., 383
Roḳe'aḥ, E., 287
Rome, Roman, 337(3), 341, 382, 385, 408
Rose, Colonel, 267, 323, 325-327, 329-332, 335
Rose Chamber, Noble Rescript of — see: Gülḫāne Decree of 1839
Rosen, G., 265, 374
Rosenfeld, J., 285
Rosenthal, S., 266, 276(26)
Rosh Pina, 285-286
Rothschild, Baron E. de, 191, 193, 197, 202, 241, 285-288, 292(36)
Rothschild Hospital (Jerusalem), 380
Rudolf, Crown Prince of Austria, 389, 391
Rumania, Rumanian, 74, 285
Rumeli ḳāḍī 'askeri, 78, 99
Rumelia, 75, 81, 135, 333
— Eastern, 8, 14
Rüppell, E. 391, 393
rüşdiye(s), 147
Russegger, J., 392
Russell, H., 221
Russia, Russian(s), 74, 251-255, 261(13), 264, 266-268, 274, 276(15), 281-287, 289, 290(14), 300, 302-306, 311, 313, 315, 320, 322-323, 325-326, 329-335, 341-346, 372, 385-386, 403, 412-413,
— Orthodox Church, 374, 376, 408, 410, 413
Russian, 241
Rustum, Asad, 354

Ṣabbāgh, 'Abbūd, 249
Ṣabbāgh, Ibrāhīm, 257
Ṣabbāgh, Yūsuf, 257
Safarjalānī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, 166(26)
Safed, 126, 129(25), 268, 283, 285, 288, 386-387, 390
Ṣafvetī Paşa, 333
Ṣa'īd, 250, 254
St. Jean de Maurienne, agreement of, 1917, 341, 346
St. John, Knights of, 272, 380
St. Petersburg, 267, 341, 344, 408
al-Ṣalāḥiyya, waḳf of, 116
al-Ṣāliḥiyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 167(47)(49)
al-Ṣāliḥiyya, the battle of, 255
Salmān al-Fārisī, shrine of, waḳf of, 112
sālnāme(s), 123-125, 127, 129
— *Devlet*, 123
— *'Ilmiye*, 123-125
— Provincial, 123-124
Salomon, Y.M., 287
Salzmann, A., 393
al-Ṣamādī family, 146
Samaria, 384
Samaritan(s), 280, 383, 385, 387
San Remo Treaty 1921, 71(23), 347
sancak(s), 5, 7-8, 10-13, 15-19, 23, 35, 42, 97, 123, 311
s.a. *livā*(s)
Sandys, G., 393
Sanuto, M. 393
Sarabīt al-Khādim, 391
Sardinia, Sardinian, 290(14), 372, 376
Şārim Efendi, 323
Sarona, 240, 287
al-Sarrāj family, 183
Savary, 386
Saxony, 264
al-Ṣayyādī, Abū'l-Hudā, 78, 154-155, 157, 160, 169(62)(63), 170(67)(68), 175-197
al-Ṣayyādī, 'Alī Khayrallāh, 154
al-Ṣayyādī family, 154-156, 170(68)
al-Ṣayyādī, Ḥasan Khālid Paşa, 170(68)
al-Ṣayyādī, Tāj al-Dīn, 170(68)
Ṣayyādiyya, 155
al-Sayyāf, Ibrāhīm Aġa, 168(47)
al-Sayyāfiyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 168(47)(49)
sayyid(s), 101-103
al-Sayyid, Jalāl, 184-185
Schacht, J., 63
Schick, C., 232
Schmidt, E., 297, 374
Schneller Orphanage, 306
Schubert, G.H. von, 391
Schultz, G.E., 263-275
Seetzen, U.J., 383-384, 387, 391
Selīm I, Sultan, 77, 353, 386
Selīm III, Sultan, 4, 99-100
ser'asker, 5, 358
Serbia, 74
Şerī'at — see: *sharī'a*
el-Serish, H., 271-272
Şevket Paşa, Maḥmūd, 78, 299
şeyḫ ül-Islām, 62, 64, 65, 98-100, 103, 125, 154, 179
şeyḫ ül-meşā'iḫ, 78
al-Sha'bāniyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 168(46), 169(50)
Shāfi'ī, 127, 168(46), 352
Shaftesbury, Earl of, 320
Shamir, S., 42
Shapira, Y., 241
al-Sharābātī, Aḥmad, 183
Sharabi, Hisham, 147
Sharī'a, 10, 60, 70, 102
s.a. Islamic law
— courts, 62-66, 68-70, 72(38), 93, 95-98, 111, 114-115, 118, 123-127, 149, 351, 353-356, 359-360
——Ottoman Law of Procedure for, 62-67

sharīf(s), *sharīfian*, 96-97, 101-102, 107(34)
— of Mecca, 81, 158, 250
Sharon, plains of, 216, 220
Shaw, T., 383
Shawkat (Şevket) Paşa, Maḥmūd — see: Şevket Paşa, Maḥmūd
al-Shawwāf family, 178
shaykh al-ḥaram, 94, 100
al-Shaykh Ḳala'ūn, waḳf of, 115
Shihāb, Aḥmad, 331
Shihāb family, 322, 330
Shihāb, Khalīl, 328, 331-332
Shihāb, Sa'd al-Dīn, 325-328, 331-332
Shi'ite(s), 250
Shim'oni, Y., 119-121
al-Shīshaklī, Adīb, 183-185
al-Shīshaklī, Ḥasan, 183
al-Shīshaklī, Ibrāhīm, 181
al-Shīshaklī, Tawfīḳ, 181-185
Shu'fāṭ, 232
al-Shūfī family, 184
al-Shuḳayrī, As'ad, 125, 160
Shūmān family, 184
Shurayf, Ismā'īl Aġa, 168(47)
Sīdnā Dāwūd, waḳf of, 111
Sidon, 249-250, 253, 256-258, 262(39), 325-326, 330, 332, 358
Sieber, F.W., 392-393
sijill(s), *sijillāt*, 124, 351-360
Simon, J., 294, 298, 300
Sinai, 242, 254, 311, 390
Smith, E., 322, 324-327, 331
Spafford, J., 391
Spain, Spanish, 281, 290(14), 330
Spencer, J.A., 219
Spillsbury, J.B., 387, 393
Staff College (Istanbul), 159
Stalin, J.W., 132
Stanhope, H., 386, 394
Stracey, W.J., 221
Straus, O., 288-289
Sublime Porte, 6, 9, 11-12, 59, 83, 100, 217, 264-265, 268, 271, 281, 283-286, 288-289, 297, 305, 317, 321-324, 326, 330-331, 333, 336, 341-345, 347, 358-359
Suez, 249, 251, 344
Suez Canal, 50, 310, 344, 403
Ṣūfī, Ṣūfī order(s), 78, 81, 85, 155, 160
Sūḳ al-Ḳaṭṭānīn (Jerusalem), 116
Sulaymān Bey 'Umar Kāshif, 253
Süleymān I, Sultan, 353
al-Sulṭāniye (*medrese*, Beirut), 78
Suni, Sunnite, 178, 180, 183-184
Supreme Muslim Council, 72(38), 127
Surius, B., 382
Şurşūḳ, E., 225
Sykes-Picot, agreement of, 341, 345-347
Syria, Syrian(s), 4, 24, 42, 51, 75, 77, 79, 81-85, 88(29), 135, 146ff., 172ff., 188-189, 247, 249-250, 252-259, 264, 267, 271, 283, 287, 303-304, 320ff., 343, 351, 353-354, 356, 358, 368, 376, 403, 405, 410-411, 413
— *vilāyet* of, 8, 123
Syrian Protestant College, 147
s.a. American University of Beirut
Szyliowicz, J.S., 153, 177

Ta'āmira tribe, 35, 218
al-Ṭabarī, 'Abd al-Salām, 127
al-Ṭabarī family, 126
Ṭahbūb family, 126
Taḥrīrāt Ḳalemi, 9
Ṭalās, As'ad, 184
Ṭalās family, 184
Ṭalas family, 168(46)
Ṭalās, Muṣṭafā, 184
Ṭalas, Shaykh Muṣṭafā, 168(46)
Ṭal'at Paşa, 283, 403-404
Tall Khalakh, 183
Ṭanīn, 402
al-Tankiziyya (*medrese*, Jerusalem), 112
— waḳf of, 113
Ṭanṭāwī, 'Alī Bey, 256
Tanẓīmāt, 5, 9-10, 30-31, 35-37, 39-40, 42-43, 59, 61, 75, 85, 95, 100, 147, 310, 313, 355, 393
ṭarīḳ emīnleri, 9
Ṭawīl family, 184
al-Ṭawrī (Abū Tōr) Muḥammad al-Nāṣirī b. Ahmad, waḳf of, 112, 121(13)
Ṭayyār Paşa, 323
Technikum (Haifa), 295, 297-300, 301(8)(14)
Tel-Aviv, 231, 394-395, 410
Templar(s), 189, 192, 196, 235-236, 238, 240, 242, 283, 306-307, 311, 375
Tenrreyru, A., 387
al-Termanīnī, Aḥmad, 168(48)
Terre Sainte hospice, 257
Tevfīḳ Paşa, 288
Thackeray, W.M., 383, 386
Thomson, W.M., 217, 222, 322, 324, 326, 331, 385-386
Thrace, 125
Tiberias, 126-127, 129(25), 217, 386, 390
Tiflis, 413
timār(s), 8, 140-141
Tischendorf, F.C., 391
Tischendorf, P. von, 374
Tiyāhā tribe, 34
Ṭlās — see: Ṭalās
Tobler, T., 263, 390-392, 394
Tobruk, 126
Transjordan, 242, 390
Tripoli (Lebanon), 124, 126- 27, 149, 180

Tripolitania, 79, 87(18)
Tristram, H.B., 222, 391
Ṭūbās, 221
Ṭūḳān family, 271
Ṭūḳān, Mūsā, 98, 107(40)
Tunisia, 74, 77, 343-346
Turcoman, 88(33), 159
Turjemān, Aḥmad Bey, waḳf of, 110
Turjemān family, 119-120
Turjemān, Ibrāhīm Bey, 110
Turjemān, Ḳāsim, waḳf of, 116
Turkish, 77, 78, 80, 147, 152, 154, 177-178, 356, 364, 378, 409, 412
Turkish Petroleum Company, 347
Tweedle, W.K., 220

al-'Ubayd family, 184
al-'Ubaysī, Shaykh Muḥammad, 155, 160, 168(46)(49)
'ulemā, 'ālim, 60, 81, 94-96, 99-100, 107(34), 109, 123-125, 127, 149, 152, 156, 160, 168(48)(49), 353, 357-358
Umayya Mosque, 168(46)
Umm Shamar, Mount of, 391
'Umrān, Muḥammad, 183
Uniate(s), 268-269, 320-321, 323-324, 326-328, 343-344
United States of America, American(s), 50, 197-198, 216, 238-240, 281, 283, 287-288, 290(14), 325, 327-328, 332, 339(53), 372, 384-386
— mission in Syria, 320ff.
'urf, 93
Ürgüp, 178
al-'Uryān, Shiblī, 328
Usishkin, M., 33
Üsküdar, 159
al-'Uthmāniyya (*medrese*, Aleppo), 151, 167 (40), 168(46)(47)(49)

Valerga, Latin patriarch, 381(7), 386
vālī(s), 5-6, 8-9, 11-13, 16-24, 96, 141, 164, 177
Valle, P. della, 382, 385
Velde, C.W.M. van de, 386, 393
Veneziani, E.F., 286
Venice, Venetian, 231, 251-252, 393
vergi, 40
Vienna, 264, 267, 375-379, 410
— Congress of 1815, 266, 334, 341-342
vilāyet(s), 7, 10, 13, 15-16, 153, 164, 174, 178
— laws, 6, 12, 35
Vilāyet Muḥāsebe-i Ḫuṣūṣiye Ḳalemi, 20
Visino, J.N., 386
Volney, C.F.C. de, 138, 231, 383, 386

Wādī al-Ṣarār, 360, 409
al-Wādiya (Bayt Sāḥūr), 360
Wahhābī(s), Wahhābiyya, 252
Wailing Wall, 408
waḳf(s) *awḳāf*, 42, 60-61, 109ff., 123, 127, 151-152, 160-161, 167(40), 168(46)(47), 169(50), 195-197, 219, 272-273
waḳfiyya(s), 110, 115-116, 118, 352
Wangenheim, H. von, 297-299
War College, 148, 159, 166(11)
Warburton, B.G., 391
Warren, C., 218, 221-223, 227, 383, 392
Washington, 216, 221
Weber, M., 36, 38
Webster, D., 323
Weitz, P., 289
Wellsted, J.R., 391
West Bank, 8
Whiting, G., 326-327, 331
Wildenbruch, Mayor von, 263, 265-266, 269, 327, 329-330
Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 55, 294, 296, 344, 375, 388
Williams, G., 392
Wilson, C., 391, 393
Wilson, J., 220-222, 226, 385
Wilson, W., 347
Wolcott, S., 324
Wolff, J., 385-386
Wood, R. 327-333
World War I, 24-25, 42, 47, 51, 53, 59, 62-63, 71(23), 153, 157-159, 180, 188-189, 191, 193, 195, 198, 202, 205-206, 241, 243, 294-295, 300, 302-303, 312, 341-347, 355, 363, 366-367, 373, 376, 381, 388, 403-405, 408
World War II, 374, 406
Wortruba, C., 392
wujahā', 175

Yakin, Muḥammad 'Alī Āġa, 168(46)
Yaman, Yamani, 139, 270-271, 384
Yazbakī family, 139
al-Yāzijī, Nāṣīf, 156
Yehoshu'a, Y., 235
Yehud, 240-242
Yelin, D. 40-41
Yelin, Y., 33
Yemen, Yemenite, 79, 88(33), 159, 251
Yemin Moshe, 234
Yerushalayim, 235
Yesud ha-Ma'ala, 285
Young, W.T., 265
Young Turk(s), 4, 16, 18, 23-24, 59-64, 67, 70, 147, 153, 155-160, 172, 179-180, 182-183, 296-297
Yūsuf Āġa, 99
al-Yūsuf, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Paşa, 156-158
al-Yūsuf family, 158

al-Zabībī, Sayyid Murtaḍā, 100
al-Zabrī, Shaykh Bakrī, 168(49)
ẓabṭiye, 9
Ẓahiriyya, 220
Zahle, 327-328
Zamarin — see: Zikhron Ya'aḳov
zāwiya, 155
al-Zaynabiyya mosque (Aleppo), 167(40)
Zepharovich, L.R. von, 298
Zeytindağı, 402, 414
zi'āmet(s), 140
Zikhron Ya'aḳov, 194, 238, 285, 287
Zimmerman, A., 300
Zion, Zionist(s), 33, 50, 280, 284, 286, 289, 295-296, 299-300, 320, 344, 347, 408-410, 413
Zor, 79
al-Zu'bī family, 184
Zuellart, G., 393
al-Zuwaytīnī, Aḥmad b. 'Aḳīl, 168(46)(49)